Early  Diplomatic  Relations 

Between 

The  United  States  and  Mexico 


THE  ALBERT  SHAW  LECTURES  ON 
DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 

By  the  liberality  of  Albert  Shaw,  Ph.D.,  of  New 
York  City,  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  has  been 
enabled  to  provide  an  annual  course  of  lectures  on 
Diplomatic  History.  The  courses  are  included  in  the 
regular  work  of  the  Department  of  History  and  are 
published  under  the  direction  of  Professor  John 
H.  Latane. 


THE   ALBERT   SHAW   LECTURES    ON 
DIPLOMATIC   HISTORY,  1913 


Early  Diplomatic  Relations 

Between 

The  United  States  and  Mexico 


BY 
/ 


WILLIAM  R.  MANNING,  Pn.D. 

Adjunct  Professor  of  Latin-American  History 
in  the  University  of  Texas 


BALTIMORE 

THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 

1916 


Copyright  1916 
By  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY 
LANCASTER,  PA. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

PREFACE   vii 

CHAPTER   I 

BEGINNINGS:  EARLY  MEXICAN  REPRESENTATIVES 
AT  WASHINGTON  i 

CHAPTER   II 

TARDY  APPOINTMENT  AND  COOL  RECEPTION  OF 
THE  FIRST  UNITED  STATES  MINISTER  TO  MEX 
ICO  31 

CHAPTER   III 

BRITISH  INFLUENCE  IN  MEXICO  AND  POINSETT'S 
STRUGGLE  AGAINST  IT 55 

CHAPTER   IV 
CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  89 

CHAPTER  V 

DIPLOMACY  CONCERNING  THE  OPENING  OF  THE 
SANTA  FE  TRAIL 166 

CHAPTER  VI 

DENUNCIATION  OF  POINSETT  BECAUSE  OF  His 
RELATIONS  WITH  THE  YORK  MASONS 190 

CHAPTER  VII 

OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  CONCLUDING  A  COM 
MERCIAL  TREATY 205 

334632 


VI  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   VIII 
COMMERCIAL  CONTROVERSIES   252 

CHAPTER   IX 
TEXAS  AND  THE  BOUNDARY  ISSUE 277 

CHAPTER   X 
PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT  AND  His  RECALL.  349 

CHAPTER  XI 
COMMENTS  ON  AUTHORITIES  378 


PREFACE 


The  diplomatic  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico  before  1830  have  heretofore  been  passed 
over  rapidly  by  students  in  this  field  of  history  in 
order  to  dwell  more  fully  on  the  events  leading  to  the 
Texas  Revolution,  the  admission  of  Texas  into  the 
Union,  and  the  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico.  Partial  explanations  have  been  made  of  the 
attempts  of  the  Adams  administration  in  1827  and  the 
Jackson  administration  in  1829  to  acquire  peaceably 
b}  purchase  the  whole  or  a  part  of  Texas.  Hostility 
to  Pomsett  because  of  his  relations  with  Mexican  offi 
cials  and  his  connection  with  the  organization  of  lodges 
of  York  Masons  has  been  frequently  mentioned,  to  be 
bitterly  condemned  by  many,  enthusiastically  praised 
by  others,  and  mildly  excused  by  a  few,  but  adequately 
explained  by  none. 

Practically  no  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  diffi 
culties  and  consequent  delays  in  the  establishment  of 
a  permanent  representation  of  Mexico  in  Washington, 
or  the  much  longeTand  much  less  excusable  delays  in 
the  selection  and  sending  pf  a  TTnit^H 


to  Mexico.  While  the  political  schemers  in  Washing 
ton  were  delaying  this  important  appointment  in  order 
to  use  it  as  a  political  pawn,  the  English  cabinet  under 
the  astute  leadership  of  Canning  with  his  violent  antip- 


yiii  PREFACE 

athy  to  the  "Yankee"  government  was  making  good 
use  of  its  advantage  to  establish,  by  means  of  semi 
official  agents  and  flattering  assurances,  a  powerful 
British  influence  over  the  Mexican  government  and 
to  elicit  the  deep  gratitude  of  the  Mexican  people 
for  British  promises  of  favor  and  protection  which 
made  the  earlier  recognition  of  Mexico's  independence 
by  the  United  States  seem  of  trifling  importance  and 
made  the  declarations  of  Monroe's  famous  message 
appear  to  be  of  little  value  and  to  have  been  dictated 
/by  selfish  interests.  Poinsett's  efforts  to  recover  for 
/  his  government  the  prestige  which  he  felt  had  been 
J  lost  by  this  delay  led  him  to  adopt  methods  which  he 
considered  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  liberty 
and  the  prevention  of  monarchy  in  Mexico,  but  which 
involved  him  in  charges  of  having  meddled  in  the  in 
ternal  affairs  of  that  country. 

The  suspicions  thus  engendered  of  the  motives  of 
Poinsett  and  his  government  made  it  next  to  impos 
sible  for  him  to  carry  to  a  successful  conclusion  any 
of  the  negotiations  with  which  he  was  charged.  The 
motive  for  his  effort  to  ward  off  the  impending  Mexi 
can  attack  on  Cuba  was  suspected.  His  attempt  to 
open  easy  trade  intercourse  by  way  of  the  Santa  Fe 
Trail  was  distrusted.  His  insertion  in  the  commercial 
treaty  of  provisions  which  were  distasteful  to  Mexico 
but  which  he  considered  liberal  or  absolutely  necessary 
was  resisted  until  his  persuasion  induced  the  Mexican 
negotiators  to  yield ;  and  then  because  of  these  provi 
sions  the  Mexican  Congress  delayed  ratification  or 


PREFACE  IX 

refused  it.  His  able  championship  of  the  cause  of 
United  States  merchants,  investors,  and  travelers  in 
their  controversies  with  Mexican  officials  widened  the; 
growing  breach.  His  schemes  for  getting  Texas  were' 
met  from  the  first  by  a  flat  refusal;  and  his  govern 
ment's  persistently  repeated  renewal  of  them  roused 
bitter  hostility.  Attempts  to  remove  suspicions  and 
allay  fears  only  increased  them.  Political  enemies  of 
those  who  \vere  friendly  to  Poinsett's  policies  fanned 
the  smoldering  embers  of  distrust  into  flames  of  bitter 
hatred  for  him  and  the  government  which  sent  and 
kept  him  there.  The  few  years  of  orderly  govern 
ment  in  Mexico  during  which  under  more  favorable 
circumstances  friendly  relations  might  have  been  estab 
lished  with  the  United  States,  thus  obviating  a  half 
century  of  discord  and  a  century  of  distrust,  were 
passed  in  quibblings  and  misunderstandings. 

In  a  careful  study  of  these  quibblings  and  misun 
derstandings  during  the  years  1825  to  1829  are  to  be 
found  the  origin  and  to  a  considerable  extent  the  ex 
planation  of  those  apparently  irreconcilable  differences^ 
which  grew  greater  and  greater  during  the  next  two 
decades,  finally  provoking  the  war  which  resulted  not 
only  in  the  United  States  keeping  Texas  but  seizing 
more  than  half  of  the  remainder  of  Mexican  territory, 
thereby  confirming  the  worst  fears  and  suspicions  that 
Mexico  had  entertained  of  the  motives  of  her  northern 
neighbor. 

The  sources  that  have  been  drawn  upon  for  this 
study  are  described  in  the  comments  on  authorities  at 


X  PREFACE 

the  end  of  the  volume.  By  far  the  larger  part  of  the 
information  has  been  taken  from  manuscripts  in  the 
archives  of  the  Department  of  State  in  Washington 
and  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Relations  in  Mexico. 
Only  a  few  of  either  have  been  published.  And  of 
those  published  most  are  only  extracts,  the  cipher  pas 
sages  and  other  more  important  portions  having  been 
withheld  because  at  the  time  when  the  documents 
were  published  these  portions  could  not  have  been  in 
cluded  without  involving  the  Washington  government 
in  difficulties  with  Mexico  or  with  discordant  factions 
within  the  United  States. 

The  chapter  on  "Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue" 
has  already  been  published  in  very  nearly  its  present 
form  in  the  seventeenth  volume  of  the  Southwestern 
Historical  Quarterly;  portions  of  the  third,  sixth, 
and  tenth  chapters  in  a  modified  form  under  the  title, 
"  Poinsett's  Mission  to  Mexico :  a  Discussion  of  his 
Interference  in  Internal  Affairs,"  have  been  published 
in  both  English  and  Spanish  in  the  seventh  volume  of 
the  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  and  its 
Spanish  edition,  La  Revista  Americana  de  Derecho  In- 
ternacional ;  the  Mississippi  Valley  Historical  Review, 
volume  I,  has  printed  in  a  modified  form  the  chapter 
on  "  Diplomacy  Concerning  the  Opening  of  the  Santa 
Fe  Trail " ;  and  the  proceedings  of  the  Panama-Pacific 
Historical  Congress  at  San  Francisco  in  1915  contain 
a  portion  of  the  chapter  on  "British  Influence  in 
Mexico." 

For  courteous  treatment  and  liberal  assistance,  I 
hereby  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to  Sefior  Las- 


PREFACE  XI 

curain,  who  was  minister  for  foreign  relations  in  the 
Madero  cabinet,  and  Senors  Galindo  and  Camarena  in 
charge  of  the  archives  of  that  office;  to  Ambassador 
Henry  Lane  Wilson,  and  Secretary  O'Shaughnessy  in 
charge  of  the  Embassy  archives;  to  Dr.  Buck  and 
others  in  the  archives  of  the  Department  of  State  at 
Washington,  and  Mr.  Stanton  in  the  library  of  that 
department;  and  to  Dr.  Bishop  and  his  assistants  of 
the  Library  of  Congress,  and  Dr.  Hunt  of  the  Manu 
scripts  Division  of  that  library.  For  assistance  in 
correcting  manuscript  and  reading  proof,  I  am  under 
obligations  to  my  wife. 

WILLIAM  R.  MANNING. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TEXAS,  AUSTIN, 
October,  1915. 


CHAPTER  I 

^BEGINNINGS:  EARLY  MEXICAN  REPRESENTATIVES  AT 
WASHINGTON 

Difficulties  and  delays  attended  the  opening  of  the 
permanent  legation  of  Mexico  at  Washington;  but 
they  were  not  due  to  any  lack  of  interest  on  the  part 
of  the  new  Mexican  government.  The  importance  of 
establishing  friendly  relations  with  the  neighboring 
republic  to  the  north  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
was  fully  appreciated.  Within  less  than  three  weeks 
after  the  provisional  government  was  fully  organized 
a  minister  plenipotentiary  had  been  appointed  and  was 
preparing  to  go  to  Washington. 

It  was  on  September  27,  1821,  that  Iturbide's  army 
entered  the  city  of  Mexico  and  took  possession  of  the 
quarters  which  had  been  vacated  only  four  days  earlier 
by  the  royalist  troops.  On  September  28,  the  Pro 
visional  Junta  was  formally  installed.  On  October 
4,  the  cabinet  of  four  ministers  was  formed.  On  Oc 
tober  25,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by  the  name  of 
Wilcocks  wrote  to  John  Quincy  Adams,  the  secretary 
of  state  at  Washington,  concerning  the  friendly  atti 
tude  of  the  new  government  toward  the  United  States. 
He  said :  "  On  this  subject  I  have  had  various  confer 
ences  with  the  leading  members  of  the  administration, 
whose  sentiments  will  be  fully  explained  to  you  shortly 
by  Don  Juan  Manuel  de  Elizalda,  the  minister  pleni- 

2  I 


KKPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

potentiary  that  is  already  named  and  now  preparing 
to  go  to  Washington."1 

The  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs  in  this  first  Mexi 
can  ministry  was  held  by  Jose  Manuel  de  Herrera. 
On  November  30,  he  despatched  the  first  diplomatic 
communication  which  passed  from  the  new  govern 
ment  to  that  of  the  United  States.  After  announcing 
the  triumph  of  the  revolution  and  the  establishment  of 
the  independent  government,  he  said :  "  The  Governing 
Regency  immediately  thought  it  a  primary  obligation 
upon  them  to  communicate  with  all  despatch  to  the  na 
tions  these  events,  which  have  gloriously  terminated 
our  war  of  liberty.  .  .  .  The  people  of  Mexico  .  .  . 
are  desirous  of  being  united  to  all  governments  by 
means  of  friendly  alliances  and  connections.  .  .  . 
The  United  States  of  North  America  have  a  prefer 
able  right  to  demand  of  the  Mexican  Empire  these 
considerations,  the  more  just  and  reasonable  because 
they  are  supported  by  the  well-known  maxims  of  pol 
icy.  .  .  .  Even  nature  herself  has  separated  these  na 
tions  from  Europe  by  immense  seas  and  placed  them 

1  Wilcocks  to  Adams,  Mexico,  October  25,  1821,  American 
State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  IV,  841 ;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  IX,  431.  For  the  organization  of  the  Mexican 
government  see  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  IV,  731-736. 
In  the  preceding  thirty  pages  is  an  account  of  the  proclama 
tion  of  the  Plan  of  Iguala  in  February,  1821 ;  of  the  startling 
success  of  the  independence  movement  under  this  plan  through 
the  succeeding  spring  and  summer ;  and  of  the  treaty  of  Cor 
doba  of  August  25  by  which  O'Donoju,  the  newly  arrived 
viceroy,  accepted  the  plan  in  his  sovereign's  name  and  agreed 
to  turn  over  the  government  to  Iturbide. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON  3 

upon  the  same  continent  .  .  .  that  they  might  make 
common  cause  in  reciprocally  supplying  their  neces 
sities  and  cooperating  for  their  mutual  felicity."  In 
closing  he  announced  that  the  legally  authorized  envoy 
would  soon  come  to  Washington  to  act  as  the  medium 
of  communication  "between  two  nations  destined  to 
be  united  in  the  bonds  of  the  most  intimate  and  cordial 
fraternity."2 

The  prompt  measures  thus  taken  by  the  first  govern- 

2  Herrera  to  Adams,  Mexico,  November  30,  1821,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I.  This 
despatch  was  borne  by  Wilcocks,  mentioned  above.  The  origi 
nal  Spanish  document,  signed  by  Herrera,  accompanies  the 
translation  from  which  these  extracts  are  quoted.  The  de 
spatch  was  received  at  Washington,  March  13,  1822. 

In  view  of  the  accepted  notion  to  the  contrary,  it  is  inter 
esting  to  notice  in  this  document  the  importance  which  the 
new  government  attached  to  establishing  their  relations  with 
foreign  powers.  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  IV,  753,  says : 
"  It  is  inconceivable  that  it  should  have  taken  no  effective 
steps  to  establish  friendly  relations  with  foreign  powers.  .  .  . 
All  it  did,  however,  was  to  pass  a  resolution  for  the  appoint 
ment  of  four  envoys  to  be  sent  respectively  to  South  America, 
the  United  States,  England,  and  Rome."  He  cites  an  act  of 
February  7,  1822,  apparently  unaware  of  the  earlier  steps. 
Bancroft  seems  to  be  following  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico, 
V,  470,  which  says :  "  Estrano  parecera  que  la  junta  no  hubiese 
tratado  del  punto  mui  importante  de  las  relaciones  exteriores," 
and  gives  as  the  only  thing  done  the  provision  for  the  four 
envoys  mentioned  in  the  quotation  from  Bancroft.  For  the 
order  of  February  7,  1822,  see  Coleccion  de  Ordenes  y  Decretos 
de  la  Soberana  Junta  y  Soberanos  Congresos,  I,  115.  Ibid., 
II,  41,  is  a  decree  of  4  de  mayo  de  1822,  declaring  that  all 
envoys  to  foreign  powers  should  be  natives  of  Mexico  or 
residents  of  at  least  seven  years'  standing.  This  order  was 
not  to  apply  to  appointments  already  made. 


4  MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

<  ment  of  independent  Mexico  to  open  diplomatic  rela 
tions  with  the  United  States  were  in  keeping  with  a 
plan  that  had  been  uniformly  followed  by  the  various 
short-lived  insurgent  governments  which  had  at 
tempted  during  the  preceding  eleven  years  to  establish 
i  the  independence  of  their  country.  Each  of  them  had, 
as  one  of  its  first  duties,  despatched  a  minister  to  open 
relations  with  the  United  States.  After  five  such  offi 
cially  appointed  envoys  had  attempted  in  vain  to  get 
out  of  the  troubled  country,  Herrera,  now  the  first 
minister  for  foreign  affairs  of  independent  Mexico, 
had  actually  reached  New  Orleans  in  1815.  Before 
he  could  start  from  there  for  Washington,  the  gov 
ernment  which  he  represented  was  overthrown.  But 
a  letter  addressed  by  him  to  President  Madison  accom 
panied  by  copies  of  his  credentials  and  several  other 
very  interesting  documents  reached  the  Department 
of  State  and  are  filed  in  its  archives.3  His  brief  resi- 

3  Herrera  to  President  of  the  United  States,  Nueva  Or 
leans,  I  de  marzo  de  1816,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Notes 
from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I.  The  most  important  docu 
ment  accompanying  it  is  a  letter  of  the  Supreme  Government 
of  Mexico  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  dated  Purua- 
ran,  14  de  Julio  de  1815,  which  gives  a  lengthy  account  of  the 
revolutionary  struggle,  tells  of  the  organization  of  a  govern 
ment  and  the  proclamation  of  a  constitution,  and  introduces 
Herrera  as  minister  plenipotentiary.  There  are  also  two  decrees 
of  the  same  date  describing  the  official  seal  and  the  flags  of 
the  new  state,  and  a  decree  of  July  3  relating  to  cruisers. 
These  manuscripts  are  not  bound  in  the  volume  but  are  fas 
tened  together  by  a  clip  and  inserted  under  the  front  cover 
of  the  volume. 

Earlier  efforts  of  transient  insurgent  governments  to  open 
relations  with  the  United  States  were  the  following:  In  De- 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON  5 

dence  in  the  United  States  as  a  diplomatic  represen 
tative  of  this  earlier  insurgent  government  doubtless 
had  much  to  do  with  his  being  chosen  to  direct  the 
foreign  policy  of  his  country,  now  that  its  indepen- 
ence  seemed  to  be  assured.  Although  Herrera  in 
tended  to  open  relations  with  the  United  States  at 
once,  and  took  steps  to  do  so,  circumstances  prevented. 
Sickness  delayed  the  departure  of  Elizalda,  the  first 
appointee,  and  ultimately  it  became  necessary  to  ap 
point  another  in  his  stead,  he  not  having  so  much  as 
started.4 

cember,  1810,  Letona  was  started  by  Hidalgo's  embryonic 
government  as  envoj'-  to  the  United  States,  but  was  captured 
on  his  way  to  Vera  Cruz  and  took  poison  to  escape  the  ven 
geance  of  the  viceroy.  In  February,  1811,  Aldama  was 
started  overland  and  got  as  far  as  Bexar  in  Texas  where,  in 
March,  he  fell  a  victim  to  the  counter  revolution  which  had 
ended  the  short-lived  insurgent  government  of  Casas.  After 
Hidalgo's  capture,  Morelos  sent  David  and  Tabares  as  his 
agents  to  secure  the  aid  of  the  United  States;  but  Rayon, 
claiming  superior  authority  over  Morelos,  turned  them  back. 
In  1813,  Rayon  sent  Peredo  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  the 
United  States,  but  the  royalists  prevented  his  departure  from 
the  country.  In  October,  1814,  Bustamante  started  as  revo 
lutionary  minister  to  the  United  States,  but  failed  to  reach 
the  coast.  In  July,  1815,  after  the  insurgent  government 
under  the  leadership  of  Morelos  had  proclaimed  its  consti 
tution,  Herrera  was  sent  as  its  minister  plenipotentiary,  with 
the  result  mentioned  above.  The  following  Mexican  agents 
without  full  diplomatic  character  reached  the  United  States 
and  attempted  unsuccessfully  to  open  diplomatic  relations: 
Gutierrez  de  Lara  in  1812;  Toledo  in  1813;  and  Humbert  in 
1814.  See  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  IV,  234  and  fol 
lowing,  passim. 

4 Herrera  to  [Cortes],  18  de  junio  de  1822,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 


6  MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

A  communication  from  Iturbide  direct  to  President 
Monroe  dated  January  8,  1822,  introduced  a  certain 
Captain  Cortes,  who  was  coming  in  a  semi-diplomatic 
capacity,  but  whose  chief  purpose  was  the  purchase 
of  vessels  in  ports  of  the  United  States  with  which  to 
begin  the  formation  of  a  Mexican  navy.  In  the  ab 
sence  of  an  official  representative  he  was  for  several 
months  the  medium  of  communication  between  the 
governments.  Iturbide  politely  requested  President 
Monroe  to  have  the  goodness  to  assist  Cortes  in  the 
discharge  of  his  commission.5 

Manuel  Zozaya  was  the  man  chosen  for  the  post  at 
Washington  when  it  was  found  that  the  first  appointee 
could  not  go.  This  choice  was  made  as  early  as 
March,  1822.  But  his  departure  was  delayed,  first  by 
lack  of  funds  due  to  the  embarrassed  condition  of  the 
finances  of  the  new  government,  then  by  a  congres 
sional  investigation  of  the  instructions  which  he  had 
been  given.6  Even  before  the  assembling  of  this  first 
Congress  discord  between  it  and  the  provisional  execu 
tive,  dominated  by  Iturbide,  had  appeared.  As  the 
discord  increased  it  paralyzed  all  activities  of  the  gov- 

5  Iturbide  to  Monroe,  Mexico,  8  de  enero  de  1822,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I.    This 
was  enclosed  with  a  letter  of  Cortes  to  Monroe,  not  dated  but 
postmarked    "  Philadelphia   20  June."     Through   this    agent, 
Cortes,  Iturbide  exchanged  letters,  portraits,  and  compliments 
with  Henry  Clay.     See  Cortes  to  Clay,  Philadelphia,  June  19, 
1822,  enclosing  Iturbide  to  Clay,  May  6,  1822,  in  Colton,  Henry 
Clay,  IV,  64,  65.    Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  303-305,  dis 
cusses  the  mission  of  Cortes. 

6  Zamacois,  Historia  de  Mexico,  XI,  181. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON  / 

ernment.  In  the  midst  of  the  struggle  the  executive 
urged  Congress  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  open 
diplomatic  relations  especially  with  the  United  States 
and  England.7  Finally  by  the  coup  d'etat  in  May 
Iturbide  was  proclaimed  emperor  by  the  populace,  and 
Congress  was  intimidated  into  endorsing  the  appoint 
ment.  In  July  his  coronation  took  place. 

In  the  reorganized  ministry  the  emperor  retained 
Herrera  as  minister  for  foreign  relations.  In  spite  of 
the  governmental  confusion  which  continued  through 
out  the  year  1822,  he  persisted  in  his  efforts  to  open 
relations  with  the  United  States.  Finally  in  the  latter 
part  of  September  Zozaya,  who  had  been  appointed 
under  the  provisional  junta  early  in  the  year,  was 
ready  to  start  to  Washington  as  the  representative  of 
the  empire.  In  Zozaya's  letter  of  introduction  dated 
September  24,  Herrera  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  a 
communication  from  the  government  at  Washington 
announcing  that  a  minister  to  Mexico  would  be  ap 
pointed  ;  said  the  announcement  was  exceedingly  pleas 
ing  to  him ;  and  continued :  "  The  Imperial  Govern 
ment  wishing  to  give  to  its  northern  neighbors  the 
most  solemn  proof  of  its  anxious  desire  for  amicable 
relations  and  cordial  intercourse  is  sending  the  Ex 
cellent  Sefior  D.  Manuel  Zozaya  with  full  power  and 
authority  as  its  envoy  extraordinary  and  minister  pleni 
potentiary,  who  will  have  the  honor  of  placing  this 
communication  in  the  hands  of  Your  Excellency."8 

7  Secretario  de  Guerra  to  Secretario  de  Relaciones,  24  de 
abril  de  1822,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

8  Herrera  to  Adams,  24  de  septiembre  de  1822,  MS.,  Depart- 


8  MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

It  was  more  than  a  month  after  this  letter  of  intro 
duction  was  written  and  the  formalities  of  his  appoint 
ment  were  attended  to  before  his  instructions  were 
drawn  up  and  signed.  But  the  embassy  started  at 
once,  leaving  the  instructions  to  follow.  They  were 
dated  October  31,  1822.  After  being  told  how  he 
should  proceed  to  open  communication  with  the  gov 
ernment  on  his  arrival  in  the  United  States,  he  was 
instructed  to  solicit  the  recognition  not  only  of  the 
Mexican  empire,  independent  of  all  connection  with 
Spain,  but  also  of  the  imperial  dynasty  which  it  had 
created.  He  was  to  negotiate  reciprocally  advantage 
ous  treaties  of  amity,  commerce,  and  limits;  and  in 
case  war  should  be  declared  with  Spain,  he  should 
at  once  procure  a  treaty  granting  to  Mexico  naval  as 
sistance  from  the  United  States  on  terms  as  advantage 
ous  as  possible.  If  he  could  not  get  such  aid  in  any 
other  way,  he  was  authorized  to  offer  a  money  pay 
ment  for  it.  He  was  to  use  the  newspapers  of  the 
United  States  to  correct  errors^that  had  been  published 
concerning  the  events  leading  to  the  establishment  of 
independence;  and  was  to  disseminate  by  the  same 
means  a  knowledge  of  any  facts  hitherto  not  made 
public  which  would  tend  to  establish  the  honor  and 

ment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I,  and  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  75.  Page  76  of  the  last  gives  the 
credential  letter  from  Iturbide  to  Zozaya,  dated  25  de  sep- 
tiembre  de  1822.  On  page  79  is  the  announcement  of  Tor- 
rens  as  secretary  of  legation,  dated  26  de  septiembre  de  1822. 
Other  brief  notes  of  26,  27,  and  28  de  septiembre  relate  to 
expenses,  escort,  acceptance,  and  affixing  the  seal.  The  min 
ister's  full  name  was  Jose  Manuel  Bermudez  Zozaya. 


MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON  9 

credit  of  the  empire.  He  was  also  authorized  to  ne 
gotiate  a  loan  of  ten  million  pesos.9  )  His  private  in 
structions  of  the  same  date  provided  for  the  negotia 
tion  of  treaties  of  limits,  extradition  of  criminals, 
and  protection  of  the  common  frontier,  matters  which 
will  be  discussed  in  subsequent  chapters.  He  was  to 
watch  and  report  any  movements  in  European  coun 
tries  that  had  anything  to  do  with  Mexican  affairs  or 
conditions.  He  was  to  report  as  accurately  as  pos 
sible  the  military  and  naval  strength  of  the  United 
States  government.10 

Before  these  instructions  were  sent  a  report  reached 
Mexico  to  the  effect  that  Zozaya  had  been  captured 
by  pirates  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  To  make  sure  that 
his  efforts  should  not  thus  be  thwarted  when  success 
seemed  so  near,  Herrera  appointed  a  substitute.  On 
the  same  day  that  the  instructions  were  sent  to  Zozaya, 
he  wrote  to  Cortes,  who  was  still  in  the  United  States, 
telling  him  of  the  report,  but  saying  that  he  had  doubts 
of  its  truth.  However,  he  appointed  Cortes  to  take 
the  place  of  Zozaya  in  case  the  rumor  should  prove  to 
be  true ;  and  copies  of  the  instructions  and  credentials 
were  sent  to  guide  him  if  the  duties  of  the  embassy 
should  thus  devolve  on  him.11  But  fortunately  the 

9  Herrera  to  Zozaya,  Instrucciones,  31  de  octubre  de  1822, 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  82. 

10  Herrera  to  Zozaya,  Instrucciones  Reservadas,  31  de  octu 
bre  de  1822,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  85. 

11  Herrera  to  Cortes,  31  de  octubre  de  1822,  La  Diplomacia 
Mexicana,  I,  88.     Poinsett,  who  later  was  appointed  United 
States  minister  to  Mexico,  was  at  this  time  traveling  in  the 
country  and  heard  the  same  report.     Santa  Maria,  the  Colom- 


IO         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

report  proved  to  be  without  foundation.  The  voyage 
was  uneventful,  if  one  can  judge  from  Zozaya's  simple 
narrative.  In  his  report  to  the  home  government  all 
he  said  about  it  is :  "  On  the  27  of  October  we  sailed 
from  Alvarado  and  on  the  28  of  November  we  an 
chored  in  Hampton  Roads."  Two  days  later  they 
landed  at  Baltimore.  Finding  it  necessary  for  the 
credit  of  Mexico  that  he  should  at  once  join  Cortes 
in  Philadelphia,  he  set  out  for  that  city  on  December 
3,  sending  his  secretary,  Torrens,  to  Washington  to 
announce  his  arrival  and  prepare  for  his  reception.12 

bian  minister  to  Mexico,  wrote  him  25  de  noviembre  de 
1822,  "  se  teme  aqui  que  el  Enviado  Zozaya  ha  ya  caido  en 
manas  de  piratas."  MS.,  Poinsett  Papers,  vol.  II,  in  Pennsyl- 
sylvania  Historical  Society  collection. 

12  Zozaya  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  7  de  diciembre  de  1822, 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  89.  In  view  of  the  subsequent 
financial  difficulties  of  the  legation,  it  is  interesting  to  notice 
what  a  heavy  drain  on  its  scant  allowance  was  necessary  at 
the  very  outset  in  order  to  maintain  the  good  name  of  the 
empire.  He  says :  "  Luego  que  llegue  aqui  me  dirigi  sin  per- 
dida  de  momento,  a  informarme  de  los  particulares  de  la 
comision  del  sefior  Cortes,  no  exigiendole  yo  y  antes  por  el 
contrario  habiendole  manifestado  que  no  tenia  ordenes  para 
mezclarme  en  este  asunto;  y  el  juicio  que  he  formado  de  sus 
trabajos  lo  expongo  en  oficio  numero  3.  Contrayendome  a 
las  urgencias  de  que  hablan  las  cartas  acompafiadas,  me  pene- 
tre  de  ellas  y  de  la  necesidad  que  habia  de  numerario  para 
cubrir  el  credito  del  Imperio  y  salvar  el  respetable  nombre 
de  Augustin  Primero,  tan  comprometido  en  esta  vez,  y  no 
contando  con  otros  fondos  que  los  que  traje  para  mi  sub- 
sistencia,  los  aplique  al  objeto  de  la  comision.  Tan  urgente 
me  parecio  la  necesidad,  que  crei  deber  ocurrir  a  ella  aunque 
me  expusiese  a  hacer  el  papel  mas  menesteroso  en  un  pais 
estrano ;  y  de  los  once  mil  pesos  que  habia  puesto  en  el  Banco 
de  estos  Estados,  solo  me  reserve  mil  pesos  para  comer  entre 


MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON         II 

On  November  28  of  this  year  1822  Adams  had 
written  in  his  diary :  "  From  Mexico  we  have  been 
informed  of  the  appointment  of  two  successive  min 
isters  plenipotentiary,  with  assurances  that  they  were 
coming  immediately;  but  there  is  no  appearance  of 
either  of  them  yet."13  Eight  days  later,  however, 
Adams  received  a  letter  from  Zozaya  dated  at  Balti 
more  on  December  3  announcing  his  arrival  in  the 
country  and  saying  that  he  would  proceed  to  Wash 
ington  in  a  few  days.  In  the  meantime  his  secretary, 
Torrens,  would  deliver  this  note  and  the  accompanying 
one  from  the  secretary  of  state  of  Mexico,14  and 
would  arrange  for  an  interview.15 

On  December  10  Adams  received  another  note  from 
Zozaya  written  the  same  day  on  which  it  was  received 
announcing  that  he  had  arrived  in  Washington.16 

tanto  se  reciben  los  auxilios  del  Imperio  y  los  diez  mil  re- 
stantes  los  he  entregado  al  sefior  Meade  para  que  pague  a  los 
jornaleros  y  que  cubra  en  parte  algunas  de  las  principales 
obligaciones  que  tiene  contraidas.  Of  reel  tambien  para  el 
mismo  objeto  mi  plata  labrada,  pero  el  sefior  Cortes  no  ha 
querido  se  haga  uso  de  ella.  Esto  supuesto,  yo  y  mi  comitiva 
quedamos  aqui  a  subsistir  con  mil  pesos  y  algunas  antici- 
paciones  que  he  hecho  a  los  que  tienen  sueldo.  No  traje  un 
medio  real  para  gastos  extraordinarios  y  esto  solo  basta  para 
que  su  Majestad  Imperial  se  penetre  de  mi  situation." 

13  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  in. 

14  Herrera  to  Adams,  24  de  septiembre  de  1822,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I,  and  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  75. 

15  Zozaya  to   Secretary  of   State,   Baltimore,    December  3, 
1822.    The  signed  original  in  Spanish  accompanies  the  trans 
lation. 

16  Zozaya  to  Secretary  of  State,  Washington,  December  10, 


12         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

With  this  was  enclosed  Zozaya's  full  power  signed  by 
Iturbide.17  The  commission  of  Torrens  as  secretary 
of  the  legation  and  a  list  of  ten  minor  officials  and 
domestics  connected  with  the  legation  were  also  in 
cluded.  Two  days  later,  according  to  previous  ar 
rangement,  occurred  the  formal  presentation  of 
Zozaya. 

It  was  this  reception  of  the  Mexican  envoy  on  De 
cember  12,  1822,  that  completed  the  American  recog 
nition  of  Mexican  independence.  Nine  months  earlier 
a  message  of  the  President  had  recommended  to  Con 
gress  the  recognition  of  Mexico  and  other  Spanish- 
American  countries;  and  two  months  thereafter  Con 
gress  passed  a  resolution  sustaining  the  administra 
tion  by  making  appropriations  to  establish  missions. 
But  no  minister  for  Mexico  was  yet  appointed,  and 
no  specific  diplomatic  act  had  yet  actually  recognized 
the  new  government  in  Mexico.  Furthermore  the 
change  in  the  government  of  Mexico  which  had  oc 
curred  subsequent  to  the  message  and  resolution  above 
mentioned  left  some  uncertainty  whether  the  envoy 
of  the  emperor  would  be  received  and  the  government 
of  the  empire  recognized. 

It  was  this  element  of  uncertainty  which  justified 
the  note  of  triumph  in  the  report  which  Zozaya  wrote 
to  his  government  on  December  20  telling  of  his  recep 
tion.  He  declared:  "I  hasten  to  take  advantage  of 

1822,  original  and  translation,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 

17  Iturbide  to  Zozaya,  September  25,  1822,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I ;  and  La  Diplo- 
macia  Mexicana,  I,  79. 


MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON         13 

the  favorable  opportunity  which  has  just  presented 
itself  to  inform  Your  Excellency  of  the  fact  that,  in 
spite  of  the  diligent  efforts  both  public  and  private  of 
some  of  the  enemies  of  our  country  to  prejudice  this 
government  against  the  form  of  our  government  and 
against  its  representative,  on  the  twelfth  of  the  present 
month  I  was  presented  by  the  secretary  of  state  to  the 
president  of  these  States,  by  whom  I  was  received  with 
the  same  courtesy  and  the  same  ceremony  with  which 
the  ministers  of  other  powers  are  received ;  and  when 
I  had  delivered  to  him  my  credentials  he  replied  to  me 
that  I  was  recognized  as  a  public  minister  and  an 
envoy  extraordinary  and  plenipotentiary  the  same  as 
other  foreign  ministers  resident  in  the  country.  .  .  . 
And  on  the  day  following  my  presentation  and  recog 
nition  it  was  officially  announced  in  the  ministerial 
paper  entitled  the  National  Intelligencer,  of  which  I 
am  sending  Your  Excellency  a  copy. 

"I  have  been  informed  that  the  Spanish  minister 
handed  this  government  a  note  protesting  against  the 
recognition  of  our  independence  and  against  my  recep 
tion  in  this  capital,  in  case  I  should  be  admitted  in  the 
character  of  a  plenipotentiary  of  Mexico."  He  says 
he  had  not  been  able  to  learn  with  certainty  the  reason, 
but  it  was  a  fact  that  the  Spanish  minister  alone  of  all 
the  foreign  ministers  was  absent  from  Washington; 
and  intimates  his  belief  that  the  Spaniard's  absence 
was  to  avoid  being  in  Washington  when  the  Mexican 
envoy  should  be  received.18 

18  Nota  del  Ministro  Zozaya,  20  de  diciembre  de  1822,  La  ^ 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  94.    Bocanegra,  Memorias  de  Mexico 


14        MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

Several  days  following  his  formal  reception  were 
consumed  in  ceremonial  calls  and  state  dinners.  On 
December  24  the  President  gave  a  banquet  in  Zozaya's 
honor  at  which  there  were  forty  invited  guests.  A 
day  or  two  later  he  was  entertained  by  the  secretary 
of  state,  and  then  by  the  secretary  of  the  treasury. 
The  Mexican  minister's  presence  among  the  repre 
sentatives  of  powers  that  had  not  recognized  his  gov 
ernment  created  a  situation  that  was  uncomfortable 
for  him,  for  them,  and  for  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington.  The  absence  from  the  President's  banquet  of 
the  British  minister  and  some  others  called  forth 
speculations  and  attempts  at  explanation  from  Zo- 
zaya.19  Ellisen,  the  Russian  representative,  in  ex 
plaining  the  awkward  situation  to  his  government 
said  Adams  had  suggested  to  him  that  an  easy  way 
out  of  the  difficulty  would  be  for  him  not  to  take 
advantage  of  the  invitation  which  he  had  received  to 

Independiente,  I,  118,  tells  of  Zozaya's  reception,  saying  that 
news  of  it  reached  Mexico  in  February,  1823.  Alaman,  His- 
toria  de  Mejico,  V,  815,  mentions  it. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  study  here  the  steps  leading  to  the 
recognition  of  Mexican  independence  by  the  United  States. 
The  attitude  toward  Mexico  was  practically  the  same  as  that 
toward  the  other  Spanish-American  countries.  For  a  detailed 
study  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  toward  all  of  these 
new  states  see  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South-American 
Republics:  a  Study  in  Recognition  and  Foreign  Policy,  137- 
177.  For  a  brief  study  see  McMaster,  History  of  the  People 
of  the  United  States,  V,  42. 

19  Nota  del  Ministro  Zozaya,  26  de  diciembre  de  1822,  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  97.  In  this  letter  he  tells  more  in 
detail  of  his  presentation  and  of  the  customs  of  the  diplomatic 
corps  in  Washington. 


MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON         15 

be  present.  The  French  representative  had  received 
the  same  suggestion  from  Adams.  Ellisen  says  he 
allowed  himself  to  profit  from  a  hint  that  so  strongly 
resembled  advice.20 

After  the  few  days  of  bustling  activity  and  cour 
teous  formalities  following  his  reception  Zozaya 
passed  a  winter  of  inactivity.  On  April  30,  1823,  he 
announced  to  Adams  that  he  was  going  to  return  to 
Mexico  for  a  time.  Later  he  would  bring  his  family 
with  him  to  Washington.21  Before  he  had  left,  a 
letter  reached  him  from  a  new  minister  for  foreign 
relations  in  Mexico  telling  him  that  the  imperial  gov 
ernment  which  had  sent  him  had  been  overthrown. 
He  was  instructed  to  give  to  the  government  at  Wash 
ington  information  of  Mexico's  "political  regenera 
tion  which  all  the  nation  has  welcomed  with  the 

20  Ellisen  to  Nesselrode,  13/25  de  Decembre  1822,  American 
Historical  Review,  XVIII,  542.     His  explanation  of  the  pro 
longed  absence  of  the  Spanish  minister  is  the  same  as  Zozaya's. 
He  says :  "  On  suppose  que  la  presence  de  1'agent  Mexicain  a 
Washington  est  un  des  motifs  qui  ont  engage  le  ministre  de 
sa  Majeste  Catholique  a  prolonger  son  sejour  a  New- York." 

Stratford  Canning,  the  British  minister,  wrote  in  the  fol 
lowing  spring:  "A  minister  from  Mexico  we  have  had  at 
Washington  during  the  whole  of  the  winter.  The  imperial 
character  of  his  government  and  his  total  ignorance  of  Eng 
lish  have  prevented  his  forming  any  intimate  relations  in 
society.  He  has  behaved  quietly  and  looks  exceedingly  like 
Sousa,  the  old  Portuguese  ambassador  in  London,  except  that 
he  has  not  the  advantage  of  green  goggles."  Stratford  Can 
ning  to  Bagot,  Washington,  March  30,  1823,  Josceline  Bagot, 
George  Canning  and  His  Friends,  II,  163. 

21  Zozaya  to  Adams,  Philadelphia,  April  30,  1823,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 


1 6         MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT  WASHINGTON 

greatest  enthusiasm."  He  immediately  wrote  to 
Adams  enclosing  this  communication  from  the  new 
government.22 

Iturbide's  nine  months'  tenure  of  the  imperial 
crown  had  been  anything  but  comfortable  to  him  or 
satisfactory  to  his  people.  Discord  with  his  Congress 
had  continued  until  October,  1822,  when  that  body 
was  forcibly  dissolved.  In  December,  Santa  Anna 
had  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  and  declared  for  a 
republic.  The  emperor's  supporters  rapidly  fell  away 
from  him.  In  February,  1823,  the  commander  of  his 
army  turned  it  against  him.  In  March  he  resigned 
his  crown.  The  fragment  of  the  Congress  which  he 
had  reconvened  declined  to  act  on  his  resignation,  de 
claring  his  coronation  to  have  been  a  work  of  violence 
and  void  of  right.  He  was  exiled  to  Italy;  but  pen 
sioned  for  his  services  on  condition  that  he  remain 
in  Italy. 

In  response  to  orders  from  the  new  government 
Zozaya  replied  on  May  20 :  "  With  respect  to  the  ad 
vice  which  Your  Excellency  has  given  that  I  should 
refrain  from  beginning  or  continuing  any  negotia 
tions  until  I  should  receive  instructions  from  the  exist 
ing  executive  power  [I  need  only  say  that]  it  is 
wholly  unnecessary,  for  no  negotiation  whatever  has 

22  Zozaya  to  Adams  [May  16],  1823,  enclosing  translation 
of  Illueca  to  Zozaya,  Mexico,  April  4,  1823,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Notes  from  Mexican  Legation,  I.  With  these  were 
enclosed  also  six  official  orders  printed  in  Spanish,  issued  by 
the  supreme  executive  power,  organizing  the  new  govern 
ment. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON         I/ 

been  begun.  Indeed,  if  it  can  be  said  that  I  have  done 
my  country  any  service  on  this  mission,  that  service 
can  consist  only  in  my  having  done  nothing,  at  least 
so  far  as  the  foreign  loan  is  concerned  which  I  was 
authorized  to  negotiate  and  could  have  placed  suc 
cessfully."23 

Colonel  Jose  Anastasio  Torrens,  secretary  of  the 
legation,  was  left  as  charge  d'affaires.24  The  lack  of 
funds  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  legation  which  had 
embarrassed  the  minister  was  still  more  troublesome 
to  the  charge.  The  financial  difficulties  of  the  gov 
ernment  in  Mexico,  due  to  its  uncertain  tenure,  made 
it  impossible  to  supply  the  needs.  During  these  early 
years  there  was  a  constant  clamor  for  more  funds  to 
enable  it  to  maintain  its  dignity  and  sustain  the  credit 
of  the  country.  In  the  absence  of  the  necessary  funds, 
various  devices  and  subterfuges  were  resorted  to. 

23  Nota  del  Ministro  Zozaya,  20  de  mayo  de  1823,  La  Diplo- 
macia  Mexicana,  I,  no.     In  this  he  told  of  the  debt  he  had 
incurred  for  the  running  expenses  of  the  legation.    He  also 
told  of  his  having  planned  before  receiving  the  communica 
tion  to  return  to  Mexico,  and  of  his  having  presented  Torrens 
as  charge.     On  the  day  following  that  on  which  this  letter 
was  written  he  said  he  would  leave  for  New  Orleans,  and 
study  there  the  conditions  on  the  frontier  between  the  two 
countries  that  he  might  report  them  the  better  when  he  should 
reach  Mexico. 

24  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  31  de  mayo  de  1823,  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  9. 

In  this  Torrens  tells  of  the  arrival  of  commissioners  from 
San  Salvador  in  Central  America,  who  came  to  ask  that  the 
United  States  accept  their  country  as  a  state  of  the  union. 
For  later  notices  concerning  this  commission  see  pages  12, 
2o>  32,  33,  of  the  same  volume. 


1 8         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

In  order  to  escape  the  social  obligations  of  the  capital, 
Torrens  resided  much  of  the  time  in  Philadelphia. 
When  his  credentials  from  the  new  government  ar 
rived  he  did  not  have  money  enough  to  pay  the  ex 
pense  of  a  trip  to  Washington  and  at  the  same  time 
pay  his  board  bill  at  the  Philadelphia  boarding-house, 
in  the  payment  of  which  he  was  several  weeks  behind. 
So  he  decided  to  write  Adams  that  a  slight  indisposi 
tion  prevented  him  from  coming  immediately  to  pre 
sent  the  credentials  which  he  had  just  received;  but 
he  would  have  the  honor  of  doing  so  a  few  weeks 
later.  He  enclosed  copies  of  them.25  He  felt  that  it 
would  be  necessary  for  him  to  be  in  Washington  in 
the  winter  during  the  sessions  of  Congress ;  but  he  had 
concluded  to  stay  there  for  not  more  than  a  month  at 
a  time,  thus  relieving  himself  of  the  necessity  of 
taking  a  house  and  keeping  a  coach,  which  custom  had 
rendered  essential.26  When  Richard  Meade  learned 
that  Torrens  was  unable  to  go  to  Washington  for  lack 
of  funds  he  promised  to  pay  the  board  bill.27  But  in 
the  middle  of  December  he  was  still  in  Philadelphia. 
President  Monroe  had  sent  word  that  his  presence  in 

25  Torrens   to   Secretario,   Filadelfia,   22   de  noviembre  de 
1823,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,   II,  48;  Torrens  to  Adams, 
Filadelfia,  29  de  octubre  de  1823,  enclosing  the  copy  of  his 
credential  letter,  Supreme  Executive  Power  to  President  of 
the  United  States,  Mexico,  23  de  agosto  de  1823,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Notes   from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I.    The 
credential  letter  is  printed  in  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  28. 

26  Torrens  to  Secretario,  22  de  noviembre  de  1823,  La  Di 
plomacia  Mexicana,  II,  55. 

27  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  2  de  diciembre  de  1823, 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  63. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON         19 

Washington  was  necessary.  So  on  December  19  he 
started  for  the  capital.28  In  spite  of  the  scantiness 
of  funds  he  was  still  there  three  months  later  since 
Meade  had  agreed  to  advance  what  money  he  should 
need  till  funds  from  Mexico  should  arrive.  For  econ 
omy's  sake  he  was  living  with  the  secretary  of  lega 
tion  and  consul-general  of  Colombia ;  but  he  found  this 
very  unsatisfactory.29  Later  the  President  of  the 
United  States  declared  that  it  was  improper  for  diplo 
matic  agents  to  reside  away  from  Washington,  since 
they  had  to  be  summoned  and  awaited  every  time  it 
became  necessary  to  treat  with  them.30 

For  several  months  after  assuming  the  duties  of  the 
legation  Torrens  was  left  without  instructions  or  cre 
dentials  from  the  new  government,  or  even  official  no 
tices  of  occurrences  in  Mexico.  He  frequently  com 
plained  of  this  neglect  and  the  embarrassment  which 
it  occasioned  for  him  and  for  the  interests  of  his  gov 
ernment.31  When  in  August,  1823,  Lucas  Alaman, 
then  minister  for  foreign  relations,  had  the  new  cre 
dentials  ready  to  send,  he  explained  that  the  delay 
had  been  due  to  the  fact  that  the  new  executive  did 
not  feel  itself  authorized  to  enter  into  relations  with 

28  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  16  de  diciembre  de  1823, 
La    Diplomacia    Mexicana,    II,    69;    Torrens    to    Secretario, 
Washington,  26  de  enero  de  1824,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  72. 

29  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Washington,  23  de  marzo  de  1824, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

30  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  14  de  julio  de  1824,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

31  See  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  13,  15,  18,  19,  69,  72. 


2O         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

foreign  countries  until  the  Congress  should  take  action 
on  the  matter.  That  body  had  not  acted  until  July  21, 
although  the  executive  had  requested  authority  as 
early  as  April  5,  preceding.  For  some  reason  the  re 
quest  had  not  been  submitted  to  the  Congress  until 
July  I3.32  Torrens's  credential  letter  which  Alaman 
addressed  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  the 
name  of  the  supreme  executive  power  of  Mexico  de 
clared  that  from  the  moment  when  it  was  put  in  charge 
of  the  government  its  first  and  most  ardent  desire  had 
been  to  strengthen  the  relations  with  the  United  States. 
Now  finding  itself  able  to  do  so,  it  named  Torrens  for 
the  purpose.33  On  December  22,  1823,  as  soon  as  he 

32  Minuta  de  Ministro  Alaman,  21  de  agosto  de  1823,  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  26.    Decreto  de  Congreso  de  21  de 
julio  de  1823,  Coleccion  de  Ordenes  y  Decretos  de  la  Soberana 
Junta  y  Congresos,  II,  152 :  "  Se  autoriza  al  supremo  poder 
ejecutivo  para  que  abra,  por  ahora,  relaciones  de  amistad  con 
las  potencias  que  juzge  oportuno." 

33  Supreme  Executive  Power  to   President  of  the  United 
States,  23  de  agosto  de  1823,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  28. 
No  new  instructions  came   for  Torrens,   so  he  took  it  for 
granted  that  he  was  to  be  guided  by  those  which  the  imperial 
government  had  given  to  Zozaya.    La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  53. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  again  the  great  respect,  bordering 
on  veneration,  which  the  Mexicans  had  for  Henry  Clay.  The 
letter  from  Iturbide  to  Clay  of  the  preceding  year  is  men 
tioned  in  note  5  above.  The  new  supreme  provisional  gov 
ernment  addressed  him  as  follows :  "  Mexico,  27  de  agosto  de 
1823.  Al  Honorable  Senor  Enrique  Clay.  El  Supremo  Go- 
bierno  Provisional  de  la  Nacion  Mexicana,  lleno  de  gratitude 
por  el  interes  que  usted  con  tanta  energia  ha  manifestado 
por  este  pais,  se  ve  en  la  grata  obligacion  de  manifestarle  cor- 
dialmente  aquella,  tanto  en  su  nombre  como  en  el  de  todos 
los  habitantes  de  Mexico. 


MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON        21 

arrived  in  Washington  Torrens  handed  to  Adams  the 

"  El  Soberano  Congreso  de  la  Nacion,  reinstalada  por  los 
heroicos  esfuerzos  de  los  patriotas,  ocupado  indefatigable- 
mente  en  trazar  las  lineas  del  grandioso  edificio  de  nuestra 
futura  prosperidad  identificada  con  la  de  nuestros  hermanos 
de  esos  Estados,  al  paso  que  ofrece  testimonios  del  reconoci- 
miento  mas  sincere  a  los  que  ban  peleado  por  la  independen- 
cia  mexicana  sabe  ser  agradecido  a  los  buenos  deseos  y 
oficios  de  cuantos  los  ban  prestado  al  pais  para  hacer  valer 
sus  derechos  y  contribuir  a  su  bienestar  future. 

"  Entre  todos  ocupa  usted  un  lugar  mui  distinguido,  y  asi 
es  tambien  el  aprecio  que  el  Supremo  Poder  Ejecutivo,  en 
consonancia  con  aquellos  sentimientos,  tributa  a  sus  singulares 
talentos  y  sublimes  virtudes  patrioticas,  congratulandose  al 
considerar  que  cuando  todo  nos  anuncia  aqui  el  establecimiento 
firme  y  duradero  de  un  sistema  de  gobierno  analogo  a  las 
circunstancias  de  nuestro  pais,  ya  destruido  el  que  se  habia 
instalado;  y  que  sobre  haber  sido  obra  de  la  violencia  habia 
degenerado  en  despotico  con  demasiada  velocidad,  hallara 
en  usted  un  firme  amigo  que  contribuira  a  nuestra  apetecida 
felicidad. 

"  Hecha  como  esta  hace  tiempo,  la  convocatoria  para  el 
nuevo  Congreso  Constituyente,  que  debe  reunirse  a  lo  mas 
tarde  el  dia  ultimo  de  octubre  de  este  afio  y  que  toda  la 
Nacion  aguarda  con  la  mayor  ansia  y  las  mas  felices  disposi- 
ciones  deben  esperarse  de  tan  augusta  Asemblea  toda  clase 
de  bienes  y  cuantas  ventajas  son  imaginables  para  esta  naciente 
Estado,  que  tiene  el  mayor  anhelo  por  estrechar  mas  y  mas 
los  vinculos  de  amistad  y  f  raternidad  con  los  norte-americanos 
y  reproducir  a  V.  los  sentimientos  mas  puros  de  benevolencia. 

"  Con  ellos  y  los  de  la  mayor  consideration,  me  protesto 
su  muy  obediente  servidor."  This  was  signed  by  Alaman. 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  30. 

The  original  of  this  in  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores,  is  accom 
panied  by  the  following  note :  "  El  Soberano  Congreso  al  paso 
que  ofrece  testimonios  de  gratitud  a  los  heroes  que  han 
peleado  derramando  su  sangre  y  perecido  en  la  causa  de  su 
independencia  no  puede  desentenderse  de  la  simpatia  y  buenos 
deseos  manifestados  por  sus  hermanos  de  la  Republica  adya- 


22         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

original  of  his  credential  letter,  of  which  he  had  sent  a 
copy  two  months  earlier.34 

On  December  6,  Torrens  had  written  from  Phila 
delphia  telling  of  the  reception  of  the  President's  an 
nual  message,  which  contained  the  declarations  des 
tined  to  become  famous  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He 
quoted  the  significant  clauses,  said  they  were  very 
popular  and  were  applauded  by  all  the  public  papers, 
and  declared  they  meant  that  the  United  States  would 
break  their  neutrality  in  case  any  power  should  aid 
Spain  to  conquer  America.  Already  ships  were  or 
dered  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  watch  developments.35 

cente  de  los  Estados  Unidos  de  America;  y  reconociendo  con 
agradecimiento  las  amistosas  disposiciones  de  los  patriotas 
ciudadanos  de  dhos.  Estados,  confia  que  no  considerera  odioso 
el  hacer  mencion  particular  del  individuo  que  ha  dada  las 
pruebas  mas  relevantes  del  interes  que  toma  en  nros.  negocios. 
"  Por  tanto  se  ha  servido  resolver  que  el  Supremo  Poder 
Ejecutivo  haga  presente  al  Honorable  Enrique  Clay,  los  satis- 
factorios  que  ban  sido  al  Congreso  de  la  Nacion  Mexicano, 
sus  activos  esfuerzos  en  apoyo  de  los  derechos  de  nra. 
Nacion,  en  que  ha  manifestado  su  amor  a  los  interesos  de  la 
humanidad  y  a  la  libertad  de  los  pueblos,  en  cuya  virtud  se  le 
suplica  acepte  este  testimonio  de  su  mas  sincero  agradeci 
miento,  como  una  ligera  prueba  de  su  consideration  y  respeto 
a  sus  conocimientos  politicos." 

34  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Washington,  26  de  enero  de  1824, 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  72. 

35  Torrens  to  Secretario,  6  de  diciembre  de  1823,  La  Diplo 
macia  Mexicana,  II,  67. 

A  study  of  the  character  of  and  evolution  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  not  necessary  here,  though  its  connection  with  the 
subject  matter  of  this  and  the  two  following  chapters  is  very 
close.  Numerous  special  treatises  on  the  subject  are  easily 
available. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON         23 

About  a  month  before  Monroe's  famous  message 
was  read  in  the  United  States  Congress,  the  Mexican 
foreign  minister,  Alaman,  had  read  to  the  new  Mexi 
can  Congress  a  memorial  setting  forth  the  state  of 
that  country's  relations  with  other  powers.  He  de 
clared  :  "  During  the  first  steps  of  our  political  exist 
ence,  our  foreign  relations  have  necessarily  been  very 
limited;  for  while  our  attention  was  occupied  with 
domestic  dissensions,  it  was  not  possible  for  the  na 
tion  to  be  represented  with  the  requisite  dignity  and 
consistency  to  render  it  respectable  in  the  eyes  of 
other  nations.  Our  independence  has  nevertheless 
been  solemnly  recognized  by  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
The  friendship  and  good  understanding  with  that  na 
tion  continues  undisturbed."36 

It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  new  government  to 
leave  the  post  at  Washington  filled  merely  by  a  charge. 
Steps  were  taken  to  send  again  a  fully  accredited  min 
ister  plenipotentiary.  Zozaya,  who  had  returned  to 
Mexico  after  one  winter  at  Washington,  was  not  sent 
back  as  he  had  thought  he  would  be.  He  had  been 
the  representative  of  the  empire.  The  new  republican 
government  chose  a  new  man  to  represent  it.  The 
first  that  it  selected  was  Colonel  Melchor  Muzquiz. 
He  was  appointed  in  April,  1824,  but  various  cir 
cumstances  delayed  his  departure,  and  finally  he  de- 

36  Alaman,  Memoria  que  el  Secretario  de  .  .  .  Relaciones 
.  .  .  presenta  al  Soberano  Congreso  .  .  .  8  de  noviembre  de 
1823.  Poinsett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  311,  quotes  a  translation  of 
the  same.  The  translation  given  in  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  X,  1070,  is  dated  November  I. 


24        MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

cided  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  go.3T  A 
few  days  after  the  resignation  of  Muzquiz  had  been 
accepted,  Pablo  Obregon  was  appointed  in  his  stead. 
This  was  early  in  August,  1824.  Preparations  were 
made  for  his  early  departure.38  His  credentials  were 
signed  on  August  3O.39 

Obregon  was  thus  the  fourth  minister  plenipoten 
tiary  whom  the  various  governments  in  Mexico  had 
accredited  to  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
He  was  the  second  actually  to  reach  his  post,  and  the 
first  who  really  had  any  important  dealings  with  the 
administration  at  Washington.  The  real  beginning  of 

37  Bocanegra,   Memorias  .  .  .  de   Mexico   Independiente,   I, 
299;  Alaman  to  Torrens,  7  de  abril  de  1824,  La  Diplomacia 
Mexicana,  II,  78.     For  the  decree  of  Congress  of  8  de  abril 
de  1824,  approving  the  appointment  of  Muzquiz,  see  Coleccion 
de  Ordenes  y  Decretos  de  la  Soberana  Junta  y  los  Congresos, 
III,  41.     Secretario  to  Torrens,  10  de  julio  de  1824,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores,  announced  that  it  was  impossible  for  Muz 
quiz  to  go  and  another  would  be  appointed. 

38  Secretario  to  Torrens,  21  de  julio  de  1824,  tells  of  the 
resignation  of  Muzquiz  and  the  selection  of  Obregon.    The 
latter's  commission  was  dated  4  de  agosto  de  1824.    The  ap 
proval  of  Congress  bears  the  same  date.     Obregon's  accept 
ance  is  dated  5  de  agosto  de  1824.    All  of  these  documents 
are  in   MS.,   Relaciones   Exteriores.    The  congressional   ap 
proval  is  in  Coleccion  de  Ordenes  y  Decretos  de  la  Soberana 
Junta  y  los  Congresos,  III,  63.     On  October  2,  Torrens  in 
Washington  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  the  letter  of  July 
21.    Torrens  to  Secretario,  2  de  octubre  de  1824,  MS.,  Rela 
ciones  Exteriores;  and  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  85.     See 
Bocanegra,  Memorias  .  .  .  de  Mexico  Independiente,  I,  323, 
and  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  299,  for  brief  discussions  of 
Obregon's  appointment. 

39  President  of  Mexico  to  President  of  the  United  States, 
30  de  agosto  de  1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


MEXICAN    REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON        25 

the  Mexican  legation  dates  from  his  arrival.  The 
first  article  of  his  general  instructions  reminded  him 
of  the  fact  that  the  government  to  which  he  was 
going  had  so  early  recognized  the  independence  of 
Mexico,  and  instructed  him  to  cultivate  and  strengthen 
the  friendly  relations  thus  established,  avoiding  every 
motive  for  complaint  or  discord.  The  first  article  of 
his  secret  instructions  told  him  how  these  friendly 
relations  might  be  strengthened.  President  Monroe's 
message  at  the  beginning  of  the  last  session  of  Con 
gress,  he  was  told,  indicated  that  the  United  States 
was  disposed  to  make  common  cause  with  the  other 
independent  governments  of  the  American  continent 
in  resisting  the  threatened  aggression  of  the  Holy  Al 
liance.  He  was  to  learn  what  assistance  Mexico  might 
expect  from  the  United  States  in  case  of  an  attack  by 
the  European  powers,  and  was  to  use  his  influence 
to  further  any  tendency  that  he  might  discover  to  help 
the  new  governments.  He  was  to  appoint  and  super 
vise  the  Mexican  consuls  at  the  various  ports  of  the 
United  States  and  on  the  frontier  posts  through  which 
immigrants  from  the  United  States  were  entering  the 
Mexican  republic.  He  was  to  fix  regulations  for  is 
suing  passports  to  such,  and  see  that  none  entered 
Mexico  without  passports.  He  was  also  to  issue  regu 
lations  for  the  shipment  of  goods  from  ports  of  the 
United  States  into  Mexico,  and  through  his  consular 
appointees  enforce  those  regulations.  His  instruc 
tions  concerning  treaties  of  amity,  commerce,  boun- 


26         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

daries,  and  other  matters  will  be  studied  in  the  sub 
sequent  chapters  dealing  with  those  subjects.40 

On  September  26,  he  embarked  at  Mocambo,  near 
Vera  Cruz;41  and  on  October  20  he  landed  at  New 
York.42  On  October  22  Torrens  wrote  from  Phila 
delphia  to  Adams  announcing  Obregon's  arrival  at 
New  York  and  saying  that  the  new  minister  would 
soon  proceed  to  Washington.43  Obregon  and  Torrens 
together  arrived  in  Washington  on  November  15. 
The  latter  introduced  the  former  to  Secretary  Adams 
on  the  1 7th  when  arrangements  were  made  for  the 
formal  presentation  of  the  new  minister  to  President 
Monroe.  On  the  following  day,  November  18,  the 
presentation  ceremony  occurred,  completing  the  rec 
ognition  of  Obregon  as  minister  plenipotentiary.44 

40  Instrucciones  de  Obregon,  Mexico,  30  de  agosto  de  1824, 
and   Instrucciones   mui   Reservadas,    MS.,   Relaciones   Exte- 
riores. 

41  Obregon  to  Secretario,   Mocambo,  26  de  septiembre  de 
1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

42  Obregon  to  Secretario,  New  York,  21  de  octubre  de  1824, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

43  Torrens  to  Adams,  Philadelphia,  October  22,  1824,  MS., 
Department  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 

44  Obregon   to   Secretario,   Filadelfia,   26  de  noviembre   de 
1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores;  and  Torrens  to  Secretario, 
Filadelfia,  27  de  noviembre  de  1824,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  86.     Obregon  to  Adams,  Washington,  16  de  noviembre  de 
1824,   MS.,  Department  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican 
Legation,   I,  announces  his  arrival  at  the  capital.    The  cre 
dential  letter  declared:   "  Animados  como   siempre  del  mas 
vivo  deseo  de  continuar  y  estrechar  las  relaciones  amistosas 
que  felizmente  existen  entre  estos  y  esos  Estados,  y  que  debe 
hacer  mui  firmes  y  duraderas  la  identidad  de  las  intereses 
de   una   y  otra  nacion   hemos   resuelto   nombrar   al   Exmo. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON        2/ 

Torrens  took  formal  leave  at  the  same  audience  at 
which  he  presented  the  new  minister,  and  his  duties  as 
charge  at  Washington  ceased.  He  had  already  been 
appointed  to  a  similar  position  at  Bogota  and  received 
instructions  to  proceed  directly  from  Washington  to 
his  new  post  in  Colombia.45  There  we  shall  find  him 
doing  important  service  for  his  country  in  connection 
with  the  schemes  of  Colombia  and  Mexico  for  inter 
vening  in  the  affairs  of  Cuba. 

On  the  last  day  of  the  year  1824,  Obregon  had  an 
audience  with  President  Monroe  to  present  a  personal 
letter  from  the  newly  elected  President  of  Mexico, 
Guadalupe  Victoria,  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  announcing  that  on  October  4,  preceding,  the 
Mexican  Congress  had  adopted  a  federal  constitution 

Sor.  D.  Pablo  Obregon  Ministro  Plenipotenciario  y  enbiado 
estraordinario  de  esta  Republica  en  esos  Estados."  This  was 
dated  Mexico,  30  de  agosto  de  1824,  and  signed  by  Bravo, 
Guerrero,  and  Dominguez  in  the  name  of  the  supreme  execu 
tive  power,  and  addressed  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  A  copy  of  this  was  enclosed  with  Obregon  to  Adams, 
16  de  noviembre  de  1824,  above;  and  the  original  was  pre 
sented  at  the  audience  of  November  18.  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I.  For  a  brief 
account  of  Obregon's  reception  see  Bocanegra,  Memorias 
.  .  .  de  Mexico  Independiente,  I,  365.  This  quotes  from  the 
Aguila  Mexicana,  10  de  enero  de  1825,  the  presentation  address 
and  response. 

45  Torrens  to  Secretario,  27  de  noviembre  de  1824,  La  Di- 
plomacia  Mexicana,  II,  86;  Torrens  to  Adams,  December  10, 
1824,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican 
Legation,  I.  In  the  last  he  offers  to  bear  despatches  from 
the 'United  States  government  to  its  minister  at  Bogota, 
whither  he  was  going  as  quickly  as  possible. 


28        MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES  AT  WASHINGTON 

for  the  country.  He  added :  "  I  deemed  it  of  the  first 
importance  to  discharge  before  all  things  the  grateful 
task  of  making  it  known  to  Your  Excellency,  and  also 
[of  informing  you]  that  I  am  in  possession  of  the 
office  of  President."  On  receiving  the  announcement, 
President  Monroe  said  it  was  an  event  the  communi 
cation  of  which  he  received  with  the  greatest  satis 
faction.46 

The  administration  of  President  Victoria  which  be 
gan  at  this  time  and  lasted  for  a  little  more  than  four 
years  was  the  longest  period  of  orderly  government 
that  Mexico  has  ever  enjoyed,  with  the  exception  of 
the  period  of  the  rule  of  Porfirio  Diaz.  Mexico  gave 
promise  of  becoming  a  country  of  such  rank  and  im 
portance  that  it  seemed  well  worth  while  for  the 
United  States  not  only  to  establish  a  legation  at  its 
capital,  but  to  put  in  charge  of  that  legation  a  fully 
accredited  minister  of  recognized  talents  and  expe 
rience  to  establish  and  defend  the  important  interests 
of  the  United  States  in  the  new  country. 

All  negotiations  of  importance  during  the  period 
covered  by  this  study  were  destined  to  be  carried  on 
in  Mexico  City  between  the  United  States  minister 
there  and  the  Mexican  cabinet.  Although  no  very  im 
portant  negotiation  was  entrusted  to  him,  yet  Obregon's 
presence  in  Washington  was  of  great  value  to  his  gov- 

46  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  456.  Guadalupe  Victoria  to  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States,  Mexico,  October  26,  1824,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I.  The 
Spanish  original  signed  by  Victoria  accompanies  the  transla 
tion  from  which  the  above  is  quoted. 


MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON        2Q 

ernment.  He  was  eyes  and  ears  for  it,  reporting  all 
he  could  hear  or  see,  which  would  concern  his  country, 
of  occurrences  not  only  in  the  United  States  but  in 
Europe  as  well.  In  this  capacity  he  served  his  country 
faithfully  for  nearly  four  years.  His  government's  un 
stable  financial  condition  made  it  impossible  to  supply 
him  with  funds  sufficient  to  maintain  his  country's 
credit  and  dignity  or  his  own  comfort.  Finally  driven 
to  distraction  by  financial  embarrassment,  by  ill  health, 
probably  by  bad  news  from  home,  and,  it  was  thought 
also,  by  disappointment  in  love,  he  terminated  his  serv 
ices  by  committing  suicide.47 

47  He  had  repeatedly  requested  his  recall.  Before  he  had 
been  in  Washington  two  years  he  wrote  that  the  grave  in 
firmity  from  which  he  was  suffering  and  of  which  he  had 
previously  written  made  continuous  exertion  impossible;  and 
he  asked  to  be  permitted  to  withdraw  from  his  post  and  re 
turn  home.  Obregon  to  Secretario,  20  de  agosto  de  1826.  In 
the  following  winter  he  asked  that  his  recall  be  sent  as  soon 
as  possible,  alluding  to  pecuniary  and  other  difficulties.  Same 
to  same,  21  de  febrero  de  1827,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

In  August,  1828,  Obregon  announced  to  the  State  Depart 
ment  his  intention  of  absenting  himself  from  the  United 
States  on  a  visit  to  Mexico,  giving  ill  health  as  his  reason.  He 
said  that  he  would  leave  Montoya  as  charge  d'affaires.  A 
little  less  than  a  month  later  Montoya  announced  the  death 
of  Obregon.  Obregon  to  Clay,  August  14,  1828,  and  Montoya 
to  Clay,  September  n,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Notes 
from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  he  announced  Obregon's  death 
to  the  State  Department  Montoya  wrote  a  long  account  of  it 
to  his  government  Beginning  by  saying  that  Obregon  had 
retired  to  return  to  Mexico  leaving  him  as  charge  and  that 
one  of  his  first  duties  was  the  unpleasant  one  of  telling  of 
Obregon's  suicide,  he  speculated  at  length  on  the  probable 


3<D         MEXICAN   REPRESENTATIVES   AT   WASHINGTON 

cause  for  the  deed.  He  said  that  no  declaration  of  motives 
could  be  found.  But  it  seemed  that  the  minister  had  offered 
his  hand  to  a  young  lady,  a  resident  of  the  United  States, 
and  had  been  refused.  This  made  a  deep  impression  on  his 
too  vivid  imagination  and  was  probably  the  final  cause  of  his 
complete  loss  of  balance.  But  the  absolute  failure  of  his 
means  of  subsistence  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  retiring 
from  his  post  in  order  to  sell  his  furniture  had  aggravated 
the  malady  from  which  he  was  suffering.  In  spite  of  his 
melancholy,  however,  Obregon  had  given  no  sign  of  attempt 
ing  to  take  his  life  until  two  or  three  days  before  his  death. 
Up  to  that  time  he  had  been  engaged  in  arranging  his  papers 
and  preparing  for  the  journey  which  he  expected  to  make  by 
way  of  New  Orleans.  At  that  time  he  had  received  some 
letters.  Montoya  was  uncertain  whether  they  brought  disa 
greeable  domestic  news,  or  whether  Obregon  imagined  some 
misfortune  that  did  not  exist.  But  it  was  certain  that  on  the 
very  day  on  which  he  had  received  the  correspondence  he 
had  broken  out  with  a  declaration  that  he  would  not  now  go 
to  Mexico  but  would  stay  in  the  United  States.  He  had  made 
good  this  declaration  by  the  catastrophe  which  had  just  oc 
curred.  Taking  advantage  of  the  absence  of  the  legation 
officials,  Obregon  had  hanged  himself  from  the  ceiling  of  his 
room.  An  enclosed  medical  certificate  of  a  physician  who 
had  been  summoned  in  hope  of  restoring  life  told  the  facts 
so  far  as  known.  Death  certificate,  dated  10  de  septiembre 
de  1828,  and  Montoya  to  Secretario,  II  de  septiembre  de  1828, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


CHAPTER  II 

TARDY  APPOINTMENT  AND  COOL  RECEPTION  OF  THE 
FIRST  UNITED  STATES  MINISTER  TO  MEXICO 

Athough  the  government  of  Mexico  was  very  slow 
in  establishing  its  legation  in  Washington,  jyet  the 
Washington  government  was,  slower  still  in  .opening 
the  United.. States  legation  at  Mexico.  Furthermore 
the  delays  were  less  unavoidable.  The  equivocal  char 
acter  and  uncertain  tenure  of  the  various  shortlived' 
governments  of  Mexico  had  something  to  do  with  th£ 
delays  on  both  sides.  But  there  were  other  reasons, 
the  motive  for  which  was  far  less  creditable  to  the 
Washington  administration.  There  were  strong  suspi 
cions — and  there  is  little  doubt  that  those  suspicions 
were  well  founded — that  this  and  other  diplomatic  ap 
pointments  were  intentionally  delayed  to  be  used  as 
political  capital.  The  relation  between  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  minister  for  Mexico  and  the  notorious  presi 
dential  contest  of  1824  is  so  intimate  that  in  order  to 
understand  the  former  it  is  essential  to  refer  fre 
quently  to  the  latter.  For  two  or  three  years  before  it 
occurred  that  coming  conflict  cast  its  shadow  over  the 
country  and  influenced  the  conduct  of  the  Washington 
cabinet,  and  especially  that  of  the  secretary  of  state, 
who  was  one  of  the  most  important  participants  in  the 
conflict.  To  appreciate  the  difficulties  which  the  first 

31 


32  APPOINTMENT   AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

minister  encountered  when  he  finally  reached  Mexico, 
which  difficulties  he  felt  were  a  consequence  of  the 
long  delay,  it  is  also  desirable  to  understand  the  causes 
for  the  delay. 

On  March  7,  1822,  the  day  preceding  the  one  on 
which  President  Monroe  sent  his  famous  message  to 
Congress  recommending  the  recognition  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  Mexico  and  of  several  other  Latin-Ameri 
can  countries,  Secretary  Adams  wrote:  "There  has 
been  hitherto  no  agent  of  the  United  States  in  Mexico ; 
but  among  the  papers  herewith  submitted  is  a  letter 
recently  received  from  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
who  has  been  some  years  residing  there,  containing 
the  best  information  in  possession  of  the  government 
concerning  the  late  revolution  in  that  country."1  Wil- 
cocks,  the  citizen  here  mentioned,  arrived  in  Washing 
ton  a  few  days  afterward  and,  on  March  13,  delivered 
to  the  State  Department  the  despatch  dated  Novem 
ber  30,  preceding,  sent  by  Herrera,  the  minister  for 
foreign  relations  of  the  new  Mexican  executive,  men- 

1  Adams  to  Monroe,  March  7,  1822,  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  IV,  819.  For  the  President's  message  to  Congress 
of  the  following  day,  see  the  same,  818;  or  British  and  For 
eign  State  Papers,  IX,  366.  Concerning  the  recognition  of 
Mexican  independence  by  the  United  States,  see  footnote  18, 
chapter  I,  above. 

The  letter  referred  to  by  Adams  is  that  of  Wilcocks,  dated 
October  25,  1821,  cited  in  footnote  I,  chapter  I,  above.  It  is 
a  long  laudatory  account  of  the  character  and  work  of  Itur- 
bide.  It  reviews  also  the  progress  of  the  revolution  from  its 
beginning  in  1810. 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO   MEXICO  33 

tioned  above  as  the  first  diplomatic  communication 
which  passed  between  the  governments.2 

Adams  replied  to  Herrera's  letter  on  April  23.  In 
the  meantime  Congress  had  almost  unanimously  en 
dorsed  the  President's  proposal  to  recognize  the  new 
states.  In  this  reply  Adams  told  Herrera  that  the 
President  would  appoint  a  minister  to  represent  the 
United  States  at  Mexico.3  Almost  as  soon  as  it  was 
decided  that  the  United  States  should  recognize  the 
new  states  the  question  presented  itself  whether  min 
isters  should  be  appointed  and  despatched  at  once ;  or 
whether  the  government  at  Washington  should  await 
the  arrival  of  an  agent  from  each  of  those  states  and 
then  send  one  of  the  same  rank  in  exchange.  The 
cabinet  was  not  unanimous  for  either  proposition. 
Adams  thought  the  latter  course  should  be  pursued, 
but  was  not  insistent.  The  indecision  caused  delay. 
The  matter  was  discussed  in  April,  1822,  again  in 
June,  and  as  late  as  November  without  a  definite  deci 
sion  being  reached.4  The  arrival  and  reception  of 
Zozaya,  the  minister  from  Mexico,  early  the  follow 
ing  month  removed  this  ground  for  delay.5  Early  in 
January  of  1823  the  selection  of  a  minister  for  Mexico 
was  taken  up  in  earnest,  the  President  having  decided 
that  the  position  should  be  filled  at  once. 

2  See  footnote  2,  chapter  I,  above. 

3  Herrera  to  Adams,  September  24,  1822,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Notes  from  Mexican  Legation,  I,  acknowledges  this 
letter  from  Adams  of  April  23. 

4  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  492;  VI,  24,  no. 

5  See  chapter  I,  above. 


34  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

i  At  President  Monroe's  request  Adams  offered  the 
post  to  Senator  Brown  of  Mississippi  on  January  10. 
That  gentleman  expressed  his  appreciation  of  the 
confidence  which  the  President  thus  showed  in  him  but 
declined,  "the  state  of  society  and  the  condition  of 
the  country  being  such  that  he  could  not  think  of  tak 
ing  his  wife  there,  and  he  could  not  think  of  going 
without  her."  The  President  had  thought  Brown  pe 
culiarly  fitted  for  the  mission  because  of  his  wealth, 
ability,  handsome  person  and  polished  manners.  When 
Brown  declined  Monroe  was  disappointed  and  some 
what  perplexed  to  find  another  so  well  fitted.6 

In  this  same  month  Poinsett  returned  from  Mexico 
where  he  had  spent  the  autumn  of  the  preceding 
year  studying  the  conditions  of  the  country.  The 
report  which  he  sent  to  Monroe  with  reference  to  the 
stability  of  the  imperial  government,  then  in  control, 
was  not  encouraging.  After  telling  of  the  disturbed 
condition  of  the  country,  he  said :  "  It  is  difficult 
therefore  to  form  a  correct  opinion  of  the  result  of 
this  contest  although  I  am  disposed  to  believe  that 
Iturbide  cannot  maintain  himself  many  months  on 
the  throne.  At  all  events  it  becomes  an  important 
question  whether  the  United  States  ought  to  sanction 
and  recognize  as  legitimate  a  government  erected  and 
supported  by  violence  and  oppression.  By  recognis 
ing  the  Emperor  during  the  present  contest  we  give 
him  an  advantage  over  the  republican  party.  We 
take  part  against  the  majority  of  the  nation."7 

6  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  121-123. 

7  Poinsett  to  Monroe,  Washington,  January  [ — ],  1823,  MS., 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO   MEXICO  35 

In  spite  of  this  advice  the  President  did  not  at  once 
desist  from  his  attempts  to  fill  the  Mexican  position. 
On  January  12,  1823,  just  after  Brown's  refusal, 
Adams  had  suggested  to  Monroe  that  the  Mexican 
mission  be  offered  to  Andrew  Jackson.  The  Presi 
dent  thought  Jackson's  quickness  and  violence  of  tem 
per  might  make  the  expediency  of  his  appointment 
questionable.  Adams  believed  he  would  do  nothing 
to  injure  the  interests  of  his  country;  but  said  there 
was  a  more  serious  difficulty.  The  legislature  of  Ten 
nessee  had  nominated  him  for  the  presidency  in  the 
election  to  take  place  the  next  year.  To  send  him  on 
a  mission  would  look  like  trying  to  get  him  out  of  the 
way.  The  President  agreed  that  there  was  some 
danger  of  that.8 

To  get  Jackson  out  of  the  way  was  exactly  what 
Adams  wanted  to  do,  though  he  probably  would  not 
have  admitted  it  even  to  himself.  But  of  course  he 
did  not  want  it  to  look  as  if  he  were  trying  to  do  so. 
He  had  already  attempted  to  rid  himself  of  a  still 
more  formidable  rival,  as  he  thought,  by  suggesting 
that  Henry  Clay  be  honored  by  being  appointed  first 
minister  to  Colombia,  as  a  reward  for  Clay's  long 
and  enthusiastic  advocacy  of  the  cause  of  human  lib 
erty  and  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the 

Poinsett  Papers,  volume  II,  Pennsylvania  Historical  Society 
Archives.  This  is  in  Poinsett's  own  hand.  The  day  of  the 
month  is  not  given.  See  below,  footnote  25,  this  chapter,  for 
the  copy  of  this  report  filed  in  the  archives  of  the  Department 
of  State. 
8  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  128. 


36  APPOINTMENT   AND   RECEPTION    OF   FIRST 

Spanish-American  states,  which  advocacy  had  consid 
erably  embarrassed  Adams  in  the  slow,  cautious  pol 
icy  which  he  had  pursued  in  the  matter.9  In  spite  of 
the  difficulty,  however,  Adams  addressed  a  letter  to 
Jackson  on  February  19,  1823,  enclosing  the  latter 's 
commission  from  the  President  as  minister  to  Mexico, 
adding  the  gentle  compliment,  "  Permit  me  to  express 
my  own  hopes  that  our  country  may  on  this  occasion 
have  the  benefit  of  your  services."10  The  honor  came 
as  a  complete  surprise  to  Jackson ;  but  he  rose  to  the 
occasion.  Nearly  a  month  later  he  replied  that  the 
President  had  said  he  was  under  no  obligation  to  ac 
cept  since  he  had  not  been  consulted  before  the  nom 
ination  was  made.  As  a  sort  of  sugar-coating  for 
the  dose  of  disappointment,  and  to  conceal  his  real 
motive  as  artfully  as  Adams  had  done,  Jackson  said 
he  believed  that  no  American  minister  could  at  the 
time  effect  any  beneficial  treaty  with  Mexico,  because 
that  country  was  engaged  in  a  new  .struggle  for  lib 
erty  against  the  efforts  of  the  usurper  Iturbide  to 
establish  himself  as  emperor.  Furthermore,  because 
of  his  own  well  known  sympathies  for  the  republi 
cans  of  Mexico  he  thought  it  would  be  embarrassing 

9  Adams,   Memoirs,   VI,  26.    It  is  interesting  to  note  the 
magnanimity  with  which  Adams  felt  he  was  acting.    He  says : 
"  In  pursuing  a  generous  policy  towards  him,  as  an  enemy  and 
a  rival,  I  do  some  violence  to  my  own  inclination,  and  shall 
be  none  the  better  treated  by  him ;  but  I  look  to  personal  con 
siderations  only  to  discard  them,  and  regard  only  the  public 
interests." 

10  Adams  to  Jackson,  February  19,  1823,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  IX,  169. 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO   MEXICO  3/ 

for  him  to  go  as  minister  to  the  imperial  govern 
ment.11 

The  expected  collapse  of  Iturbide's  empire  very 
shortly  after  Jackson's  refusal  of  the  mission  and 
the  long  period  of  uncertainty  during  which  the  Mex 
ican  government  was  being  reorganized  caused  the 
government  at  Washington  to  abandon  for  the  time 
its  efforts  to  fill  the  post.  In  October,  1823,  Torrens, 
then  Mexican  charge  in  Washington,  told  his  gov 
ernment  that  the  reports  of  recent  events  in  Mexico 
and  especially  letters  from  citizens  of  the  United 
States  living  in  Mexico  had  influenced  the  govern- 

11  Jackson  to  Adams,  March  15,  1823,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.  Between  the  time  of 
Jackson's  appointment  and  his  refusal,  Zozaya,  the  Mexican 
minister  lately  arrived  in  Washington,  wrote  to  his  govern 
ment  of  the  choice,  and  of  the  probability  that  Jackson  would 
not  accept.  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  104.  The  date  of 
Zozaya's  letter  is  incorrectly  given  as  28  de  diciembre  de 
1822.  It  says :  "  El  23  de  enero,  cuando  todo  lo  que  corria 
era  contrario  al  Imperio,  y  cuando  todavia  ni  aun  podian 
tenerse  las  instrucciones  de  Mr.  Poinsett,  porque  no  habia 
llegado,  procedio  el  Presidente  al  nombramiento  de  Ministro 
para  Mexico,  con  el  caracter  de  Enviado  Extraordinario  y 
Plenipotenciario,  lo  mismo  que  yo  he  venido  aqui,  a  difer- 
encia  de  los  demas  lugares  de  America  para  los  que  los  nom- 
brados  no  tienen  el  caracter  de  Enviados  Extraordinarios. 

"  El  nombramiento  recayo  en  el  General  Jackson,  el  militar 
de  mas  reputacion  en  todos  estos  Estados,  y  tanto  que  se 
tiene  por  uno  de  los  candidates  para  las  elecciones  de  Presi 
dente.  No  ha  venida  su  contestation  oficial  para  saber  si 
admite  el  cargo,  pero  por  noticias  privadas  recibidas  ayer, 
he  sabido  que  no  lo  admite,  .  .  ." 

Reeves,  J.  S.,  Diplomacy  Under  Tyler  and  Polk,  60,  men 
tions  Jackson's  appointment  and  refusal;  also  Rives,  United 
States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  46. 


38  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

ment  at  Washington  and  that  all  talk  of  sending  an 
envoy  had  been  suspended.12 

It  was  not  until  the  beginning  of  the  next  year  that 
the  matter  was  again  seriously  taken  up.  On  Jan 
uary  5,  1824,  Adams  entered  in  his  diary  the  fact  that 
he  had  discussed  the  fitness  for  the  mission  of  Ninian 
Edwards,  who  had  been  territorial  governor  of  Illinois 
during  the  whole  of  that  commonwealth's  territorial 
period  and  was  just  about  to  complete  his  term  as 
one  of  the  first  two  senators  from  that  new  state.  On 
January  17  he  says  he  had  urged  President  Monroe 
to  appoint  Edwards  although  Adams  felt  that  he  had 
been  mistreated  by  Edwards.  The  President  favored 
G.  M.  Dallas  who  was  also  urged  for  the  appointment 
by  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  in  Congress.  But 
Adams  opposed  Dallas  on  the  ground  that  "he  was 

12  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  21  de  octubre  de  1823, 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  45.  He  says :  "  Desde  los  pri- 
meros  movimientos  del  Gral.  Santana,  cuando  se  pronuncio 
en  Veracruz  por  la  libertad,  comenzaron  los  particulars  a 
desconfiar  de  que  nos  pudiesemos  consolidar,  a  lo  que  ayuda- 
ban  las  cartas  de  los  mismos  americanos  de  los  E.  U.,  estable- 
cidos  en  Mexico,  que  se  publicaban  en  las  Gacetas,  y  de  las 
cuales  la  major  parte  se  reducia  a  describirnos  llenos  de 
vicios  que  nos  hacian  incapaces  de  formar  un  gobierno  repub- 
licano.  Esto  no  dejo  de  influir  en  el  Gobierno,  pues  me 
consta  que,  habiendo  renunciado  el  Gral.  Jackson  el  destine 
de  Enviado  a  Mexico,  se  habia  dispuesto  que  fuese  el  Secre 
tario  como  Encargado  de  Negocios ;  lo  cual  se  suspendio  y  no 
se  ha  vuelto  a  hablar  mas  de  Enviado,  sobre  todo,  despues 
del  ultimo  movimiento  del  Gral.  Santana,  que  acabo  de 
perdernos  el  concepto,  tanto  mas,  que  lo  suponian  de  acuerdo 
con  San  Juan  de  Ulua,  para  dividirnos  y  que  triunfase  el 
partido  borbonista  que  creian  existente." 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO    MEXICO  39 

not  yet  of  the  age  and  political  standing  suitable  for 
that  appointment."  The  fact  that  the  influence  of 
the  appointment  on  the  coming  presidential  election 
was  a  matter  for  serious  consideration  is  evident  from 
Adams's  statement,  "  as  to  its  bearing  on  the  presiden 
tial  election,  I  must  be  indifferent  between  Mr.  Ed 
wards  and  Mr.  Dallas,  both  of  whom  are  avowed 
partisans  of  Mr.  Calhoun."13  He  was  apparently  satis 
fied  that  the  post  should  go  to  the  Calhounites,  since 
the  great  South  Carolinian's  ambition  had  been  post 
poned  for  the  present  by  conceding  to  him  the  position 
of  vice-president  on  the  ticket  in  the  famous  contest 
of  that  year.  Adams's  influence  prevailed.  Edwards  l 
was  nominated,  and  on  March  4,  1824,  his  nomina 
tion  was  confirmed  by  the  Senate.14  A  few  days  later 
he  resigned  his  seat  in  that  body,  and  in  less  than  a 
month  had  left  Washington  for  his  home  in  Illinois 
to  prepare  for  an  early  departure  for  Mexico.15 

13  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  227,  233,  234,  241,  243.    Torrens 
to  Secretario,  4  de  febrero  de  1824,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  76,  mentions  the  proposed  appointment  of  Dallas,  but  says 
objections  had  arisen. 

14  Jackson  to  Edwards,  March  4,  1824,  congratulating  him 
on  his  appointment,  Washburne,  the  Edwards   Papers,  222; 
Rufus    King   to    Edwards,    March    4,    1824,    the    same,    222. 
Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  245. 

15  Edwards  to  Adams,  March  9,  1824,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,   Despatches   from   Mexico,   I.     This   shows   anxiety  to 
get  to  Vera  Cruz  as  soon  as  possible  to  avoid  being  on  the 
coast  during  the  rainy,  sickly  season.     Torrens  to  Secretario, 
Washington,  23  de  marzo  de  1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 
In  this  letter  the  Mexican   charge  told  his  government  of 
Edwards's  appointment,  resignation  from  the  Senate,  and  pro 
posed  route,  saying  he  would  probably  arrive  in  July. 


4O  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

At  this  juncture  the  relation  between  the  appoint 
ment  to  Mexico  and  the  exciting  presidential  con 
test  of  1824  becomes  more  intimate  and  interesting. 
Just  about  the  time  Edwards  was  leaving  Washington 
some  unkind  things  were  said  about  him  by  supporters 
of  Crawford,  the  fourth16  candidate  for  the  presidency. 
While  on  his  way  towards  Illinois  Edwards  returned 
the  compliment  by  addressing  to  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  a  communication  declaring  himself  to  have 
been  the  author  of  an  anonymous  statement  which  had 
appeared  some  time  before  charging  Crawford  with 
official  misconduct  as  secretary  of  the  treasury.  He 
now  renewed  the  accusation.  This  caused  great  ex 
citement.  A  congressional  investigating  committee 
was  appointed,  and  given  power  to  send  for  persons 
and  papers.  Monroe  was  very  indignant  at  Edwards 
and  thought  he  ought  to  resign  at  once.  He  instructed 
Adams  to  request  Edwards  not  to  proceed  on  his  mis 
sion  for  the  present  but  to  await  the  orders  of  the 
committee.17  Edwards  returned  to  Washington.  The 
investigation  was  political  rather  than  judicial,  and 
eminently  unfair  to  Edwards,  being  in  the  hands  of 
Crawford's  friends.  Calhoun  had  foreseen  that  it 

16  Adams,  Clay,  and  Jackson,  already  mentioned,  were  the 
other  three. 

17  Adams  to  Edwards,  April  22,  1824,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,   171 ;  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  296-301 ; 
D.   P.   Cook  to   Edwards,   April   17,   1824,  Washburne,   The 
Edwards  Papers,  223. 

Torrens  to  Secretario,  5  de  mayo  de  1824,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores,  said  it  was  thought  that  another  minister  would 
be  chosen,  since  it  was  supposed  that  Mexico  would  take 
Edwards's  appointment  as  an  insult. 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO    MEXICO  4! 

would  be  so.  In  a  preliminary  report  of  the  Senate 
committee  all  the  facts  charged  by  Edwards  were 
admitted ;  but  Crawford  was  acquitted  of  any  evil  in 
tention.  Then  to  throw  dust  into  the  air  in  hope  that 
Crawford  might  hide  behind  the  cloud,  some  indiscreet 
things  that  Edwards  had  said  and  done  were  brought 
forward  and  discussed.  Monroe  brought  pressure  to 
bear  and  on  June  22,  after  he  found  further  resist 
ance  hopeless,  Edwards  resigned,  declaring  to  the 
President  that  he  thereby  made  a  voluntary  surrender 
of  what  his  enemies  had  tried  to  force  from  him,  and 
that  his  sole  reason  for  doing  it  was  to  relieve  Monroe 
from  any  further  embarrassment  because  of  him.  A 
cabinet  meeting  in  session  when  the  resignation  was 
presented  agreed  that  Edwards  was  a  much  injured 
man.18  This  Edwards-Crawford  controversy  occupied 
most  of  the  attention  of  the  cabinet  meetings  from 

18  Edwards  to  the  President,  June  22,  1824,  enclosing  his 
resignation  of  the  same  date  and  saying  that  he  was  unde 
cided  whether  he  should  accompany  it  with  an  explanation  of 
his  reasons  or  not,  MS.,  Department  of  States,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  I ;  same  to  same,  same  date,  in  Washburne, 
The  Edwards  Papers,  224-229,  explains  at  length  his  reasons. 
Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  46,  mentions 
Edwards's  appointment  and  resignation. 

An  amount  equal  to  a  full  year's  salary,  $9,000,  had  been 
advanced  to  Edwards  to  purchase  an  outfit,  and  the  govern 
ment  experienced  difficulty  in  getting  him  to  refund.  He  had 
actually  purchased  part  of  his  outfit.  He  finally  agreed  to 
repay  two  thirds,  though  he  said  he  believed  the  government 
had  no  legal  right  to  claim  it.  Adams  to  Edwards,  October 
9,  1824,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instructions,  X,  213;  Ed 
wards  to  Adams,  November  10,  1824,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


42  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

May  1 8  to  June  22,  if  one  can  judge  from  the  space 
given  to  it  in  the  hundred  pages  of  Adams's  diary  cov 
ering  this  period.19  It  was  the  influence  which  the 
affair  exerted  on  the  election,  and  the  fact  that  the 
administration  was  dragged  into  the  controversy,  that 
made  it  seem  so  important. 

The  resignation  of  Edwards  left  the  Mexican  post 
still  vacant,  and  the  interests  of  the  United  States  in 
Mexico  still  neglected.  Some  suspected  and  charged 
that  this  and  other  vacant  diplomatic  posts  were  being 
held  open  by  Adams  to  purchase  support  in  the  presi 
dential  conflict.20  He  declared  that  this  was  a  mistaken 
notion,  and  that  he  would  as  soon  all  should  be  filled ; 
but  still  they  remained  open.  The  threatened  return 
to  power  of  Iturbide  after  his  year  of  exile  had  some 
thing  to  do  with  delaying  again  the  Mexican  appoint 
ment.  As  the  delay  lengthened  the  number  of  candi 
dates  for  the  Mexican  place  increased.  The  most 

19  Adams,   Memoirs,   VI,  296-395.    Torrens   to   Secretario, 
10  de  julio  de  1824,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  80,  tells  of 
Edwards's  detention,  of  the  congressional  investigation,  and 
of   Edwards's   resignation.    He   said   the  talk   now   was   of 
choosing  another. 

20  Torrens  to  Secretario,   10  de  julio  de  1824,  La  Diplo 
macia   Mexicana,   II,   80,   says:   "El   Presidente  se  ha  visto 
tan  atacado  por  los  diferentes  partidos  acerca  de  la  presi- 
dencia,  que  le  acusan  de  parcialidad  en  el  nombramiento  de 
fos   empleos,   haciendolos   recaer   en    los   amigos   del  que  el 
prefiere  para  su  sucesor,  que  yo  creo  dificil  que  se  resuelva  a 
nombrar  alguno  antes  de  la  reunion  del  Senado,  el  primer 
lunes  de  diciembre.     Sin  embargo,  nombrando  al  General  Har 
rison,  no  se  expone  a  la  censura,  por  considerarse  dicho  Gen 
eral  amigo  politico  de  Mr.  Crawford." 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO   MEXICO  43 

prominent  were  Dallas,  who  had  been  urged  when 
Edwards  was  appointed,  and  wrho  later  was  vice-pres 
ident;  Henry  Wheaton,  later  so  prominent  in  Ameri 
can  diplomacy  and  as  a  writer  on  international  law ; 
Thomas  H.  Benton,  who  was  urged  for  the  place  by 
Poinsett  when  Monroe  first  suggested  the  latter  for  it ; 
and  William  H.  Harrison,  whom  Clay  favored  for  the 
place,  who  was  himself  anxious  for  it  and  had  solic 
ited  and  obtained  many  recommendations  for  it,  and 
who  was  later  appointed  minister  to  Colombia.21 

When  the  resignation  of  Edwards  was  imminent 
Poinsett  was  considered  for  the  place.  In  July,  a 
month  after  Edwards  resigned,  Southard  of  the  Navy 
Department  asked  Poinsett  confidentially  if  he  was 
willing  to  go  to  Mexico,  if  he  could  go  at  once,  and  if 
his  absence  would  affect  the  vote  of  his  state  in  the 
coming  election.22  In  November  a  long,  very  cordial 
letter  from  a  very  intimate  friend  had  closed  with 
the  statement:  "As  I  perceive  no  appointment  yet 
made  for  Mexico  I  cannot  avoid  hoping  that  if  our 
presidential  question  can  be  fortunately  adjusted,  the 

21  Adams,   Memoirs,   VI,  413-415.  484-524;   Lyman,   Diplo 
macy  of  the  United  States,  II,  484.    Obregon  to  Secretario, 
2  de  febrero  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores,  said  in  order 
to  prevent  the  Mexican  appointment  from  being  regarded  as 
a  price  for  purchasing  votes,  it  appeared  that  the  post  would 
be  filled  at  once.     He  expected  the  appointment  to  go  to  Ben- 
ton,   or  to   Everett    (later  appointed   to   Madrid)  ;   but   said 
nevertheless  it  might  be  that  the  project  would  prevail  for 
sending  Mr.  Poinsett,  a  person  known  in  Mexico. 

22  Southard  to  Poinsett,   Navy  Department  July  17,   1824, 
MS.,  Poinsett  Papers,  volume  II,  Pennsylvania  Historical  So 
ciety  Archives. 


44  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

one  which  we  all  desire  may  yet  be  made."23  In  Jan 
uary  Monroe  had  offered  Poinsett  the  place ;  but  Poin- 
sett  urged  Benton  instead.  The  reasons  for  Poinsett's 
self-denial  Adams  discovered  later.  As  soon  as  the 
House  of  Representatives  had  decided  that  Adams 
should  be  president  the  Calhounites  began  urging 
Poinsett  for  the  office  of  secretary  of  state  to  forestall 
the  expected  appointment  of  Clay ;  but  in  spite  of  the 
opposition,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact,  which  Adams  and 
Clay  foresaw,  that  it  would  give  color  to  the  "  corrupt 
bargain  "  cry,  and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Adams  dis 
liked  Clay  personally,  the  latter  was  given  the  coveted 
first  place  in  the  cabinet.  This  exalted  position  hav 
ing  eluded  Poinsett's  grasp,  he  was  willing  to  accept 
the  Mexican  post,  having  been  previously  assured  that 
his  nominee,  Benton,  would  in  no  case  be  appointed. 
He  accepted  it  on  March  6,  the  next  day  after  Adams 
had  tendered  him  the  appointment.  Clay  wished 
William  H.  Harrison  to  have  it;  but  he  had  no  ob 
jection  to  Poinsett.2*  Two  days  later  the  appointment 
was  confirmed  by  the  Senate. 

23  Stephen   Elliote  to   Poinsett,    Charleston,   November   16, 
1824,  MS.,  Poinsett  Papers,  volume  II,  Pennsylvania  Histor 
ical  Society  Archives. 

24  Adams,   Memoirs,   VI,  484,  506,   522-524.     On   March  7, 
Obregon  told  his  government  that,  as  he  had  said  formerly 
might  be  done,  Poinsett  had  been  selected  and  would  start 
early  next  month.    At  the  end  of  March  he  told  of  Poinsett's 
departure  for  Norfolk,  whence  he  would  sail   for  Mexico. 
Poinsett  was  taking,   for  Obregon,  to  the  Mexican   foreign 
office  a  number  of  books  and  papers.    Obregon  to  Secretario, 
7  de  marzo,  28  de  marzo,  and  30  de  marzo,  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO    MEXICO  45 

Probably  no  man  in  the  country  had  the  knowledge 
and  experience  which  could  have  so  well  qualified  him 
for  the  place  as  had  Joel  R.  Poinsett.  At  the  time 
of  his  appointment  he  was  a  congressman  from  South 
Carolina.  He  was  a  careful  student  and  a  polished 
gentleman.  He  had  traveled  extensively  in  Europe. 
In  1810  he  had  gone  to  South  America  with  a  com 
mission  from  President  Madison  to  report  on  condi 
tions  in  Argentina  and  Chile,  then  just  beginning  their 
struggle  for  independence.  In  1822  he  went  on  the 
similar  mission  to  Mexico  already  mentioned,  was 
favorably  received,  learned  much  of  the  country  and 
people,  and  made  an  intelligent  and,  as  events  proved, 
a  prophetic  report  to  the  State  Department  which  was 
the  principal  reliance  of  the  government  in  shaping 
its  policy  with  reference  to  Mexico.25  In  1824  he 
published  his  Notes  on  Mexico,  giving  an  account  of 
his  travels  two  years  earlier  and  his  comments  on  po 
litical  conditions.26 

25  Poinsett's  Report,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Duplicate 
Despatches  from  Poinsett.     This  is  not  dated  nor  is  it  ad 
dressed  to  the  department  or  any  individual.     It  fills   sixty 
manuscript  pages,  and  is  accompanied  by  an  appendix  of  equal 
length.     It  begins  with  the  Iturbidist  movement  of  February, 
1821 ;   tells   in   considerable   detail  of  the   struggles   between 
Iturbide  and  the  legislative  body,  of  the  erection  of  the  em 
pire,  of  the  ambition  and  stubbornness  of  the  emperor,  and  of 
the  beginning  of  the  movement  against  him;  and  closes  in 
December,  1822,  the  time  of  Poinsett's  departure  from  Mexico. 

26  Poinsett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  made  in  the  Autumn  of  1822, 
accompanied  by  an  Historical  Sketch  of  the  Revolution,  and 
Official  Reports,  359  pages.    Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  241, 
pays  a  tribute  to  Poinsett's  astuteness  in  foretelling  events. 


46  APPOINTMENT   AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

To  the  average  person  Poinsett's  chief  title  to  fame 
does  not  rest  on  his  filling  this  diplomatic  position,  or 
a  number  of  other  official  posts  which  he  held  before 
or  after;  but  on  the  fact  that  he  made  known  to  the 
world  the  beautiful  Christmas  flower  which  in  honor 
of  him  was  named  "  poinsettia."  However  even  this 
discovery  was  a  result  of  his  residence  in  Mexico ;  for 
it  was  in  Mexico  that  he  found  the  flower  and  from 
there  that  he  brought  it  to  the  attention  of  the  botan 
ical  world. 

In  the  instructions  which  Clay  drew  up  on  March 
26,  1825,  to  govern  Poinsett's  conduct  in  Mexico,  the 
latter  was  reminded  of  the  great  interest  in  and  im 
portance  of  his  mission.  Its  purpose  was  "  to  lay  for 
the  first  time  the  foundation  of  an  intercourse  of 
amity,  commerce,  navigation,  and  neighborhood  which 
may  exert  a  powerful  influence  for  a  long  period  upon 
the  prosperity  of  both  states."  The  fact  is  dwelt 
upon  that  the  territory  of  the  United  Mexican  States 
is  coterminous  with  that  of  the  United  States,  render 
ing  the  relations  with  them  more  important  than  with 
any  other  of  the  new  states.  He  was  told  that  in 
point  of  population,  position,  and  resources,  they 
ranked  among  the  first  powers  of  America;  and  that 
their  early  history  was  not  surpassed  in  interest  by 
that  of  any  other  part  of  America.  He  was  to  bring 
to  the  attention  of  the  Mexican  government  the  kindly 
feeling  and  sympathy  with  which  the  United  States 

Brown's  History  of  Texas,  I,  81,  gives  a  very  incorrect  ac 
count  of  Poinsett's  career  before  the  time  of  his  arrival  in 
Mexico. 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO    MEXICO  47 

had  looked  upon  the  long  struggle  of  the  new  states 
against  the  tyranny  of  Spain,  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  had  recognized  their  independence  at  the  earliest 
practicable  moment  and  long  before  any  other  country 
had  done  so,  and  the  message  of  President  Monroe 
warning  European  governments  against  interfering  in 
the  affairs  of  the  American  states.  He  was  to  say, 
however,  that  the  United  States  expected  in  return  no 
special  favors  or  privileges ;  but  that  this  government 
did  expect  that  no  such  favors  or  privileges  would  be 
extended  to  any  European  power  unless  at  the  same 
time  they  were  extended  to  the  United  States.  He 
was  asked  to  express  the  compliment  felt  by  the  United 
States  in  that  the  Mexican  states  had  copied  so  largely 
the  federal  constitution  of  the  former;  and  was  told 
to  show  an  unobtrusive  readiness  to  explain  to  the 
Mexican  government  the  workings  of  that  constitu 
tion.27 

It  was  Poinsett's  over-enthusiastic  belief  in  the  ab 
solute  necessity  of  maintaining  the  federal  form  of 
government,  when  he  found  that  centralizing  tenden- 

27  Clay  to  Poinsett,  Instructions,  March  26,  1825,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Instructions,  X,  225.  Extracts  from  these 
instructions  containing  most  of  the  facts  given  above  are 
printed  in  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  908,  and  VI, 
578,  and  in  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  485,  bear 
ing  the  date  March  25.  The  autograph  copy  of  these  instruc 
tions  in  the  archives  of  the  United  States  Embassy  in  Mexico 
bears  the  date  March  25. 

Only  such  portions  of  Poinsett's  instructions  are  mentioned 
here  as  could  have  influenced  his  personal  conduct  in  his  rela 
tions  to  the  Mexican  government.  The  instructions  intended 
to  govern  his  negotiations  will  be  studied  in  connection  with 
those  negotiations. 


48  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

cies  in  Mexico  threatened  its  overthrow,  which  led  him 
to  engage  in  the  activities  that  gave  rise  to  the  charges 
against  him  of  meddling  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Mex 
ico.  And  it  was  in  this  injunction  of  Clay's  to  show 
an  unobtrusive  readiness  to  explain  to  the  Mexican 
government  the  workings  of  the  constitution  that  he 
could  find  the  only  excuse  for  his  actions.  Obregon 
wrote  his  government  that  Poinsett  was  pronounced  in 
favor  of  the  cause  of  the  American  continent  and  the 
republican  system;  that  he  had  a  good  opinion  of 
the  state  of  Mexico;  and  that  he  was  especially  in 
structed  to  prevent  England  from  being  granted  special 
favors  in  return  for  her  tardy  recognition.  He  told 
of  Poinsett's  visit  to  Mexico  in  1822  and  of  his 
memoirs  subsequently  published;  and  inserted  a  line 
in  cipher  declaring,  "  in  my  conception  he  is  not  a 
person  of  great  talents."28 

28  The  cipher  is  as  follows :  en  mi  co   n    ce  p     to    no   es 

15  414  53  115  33  118  552  55i  321 

pe      r     so    na    de  g    ra     n    de     s     ta     le      n      to     s 
318  120  521  215  34  17  220  115  34  121  222  321   115  522  121. 
Obregon  to  Secretario,  30  de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 

On  the  eve  of  Poinsett's  departure  C.  C.  Cambreleng  wrote 
to  him  a  long,  friendly,  facetious  letter  saying,  among  other 
things :  "  Make  a  good  commercial  treaty  for  us  and  take  care 
that  John  Bull  gets  no  advantage  of  you — if  anything  get  the 
weather  gauge  of  him — If  you  can  get  Texas  for  some  of  the 
lands  of  the  poor  Indians  of  the  wilderness  you  will  soon  be 
a  great  man  among  us — or  if  you  can  contrive  to  make  Cuba 
independent,  protected  by  the  United  States,  Mexico,  and 
Colombia,  you  have  a  fair  chance  and  I  wish  you  luck — for 
it  is  pretty  much  everything  in  political  whatever  it  may  be  in 
other  matters."  Cambreleng  to  Poinsett,  New  York,  March 
30,  1825,  MS.,  Poinsett  Papers,  volume  II,  Pennsylvania  His- 


UNITED  STATES   MINISTER   TO   MEXICO  49 

While  this  appointment  had  been  knocked  about  as 
the  football  of  politicians  in  Washington,  American 
interests  at  the  new  capital  were  being  neglected.  The 
United  States  might  have  turned  to  good  account  the 
advantage  she  naturally  gained  by  recognizing  the  in 
dependence  of  Mexico  and  other  Spanish-American 
states  nearly  three  years  before  England  took  the  same 
step.  But  when  on  May  5,  1825,  Poinsett  wrote  from 
Vera  Cruz  giving  notice  of  his  arrival,  he  had  to  re 
port  that  British  agents  had  anticipated  him  in  making 
a  treaty.  The  instructions  to  the  commissioners  from 
that  country  had  arrived  two  months  earlier,  just  about 
the  time  of  Poinsett's  appointment.  The  treaty  was 
already  concluded ;  the  lower  house  of  the  Mexican 
Congress  had  already  ratified  it  and  he  had  no  doubt 
the  Senate  would  do  so  soon.29  The  abstract  recogni 
tion  and  philanthropic  declarations  of  the  United 
States  had  interested  Mexico  for  a  time  and  had 
elicited  admiration  and  gratitude;  but  dilatoriness  in 
opening  communications  had  made  the  attitude  of  the 
Washington  government  seem  cold  and  platonic.  If 
England's  advances  had  been  long  delayed  they  had 
been  pressed  with  ardor  when  once  begun,  and  had 

torical  Society  Archives.  This  familiar  comment  probably 
reflected  pretty  closely  what  his  friend  knew  to  be  Poinsett's 
own  sentiments.  The  latter's  actions  with  reference  to  the 
three  matters  here  specifically  mentioned,  British  influence, 
Texas,  and  Cuba,  show,  as  will  be  explained  later,  that  these 
playful  injunctions  did  not  fall  on  deaf  ears,  though  his  policy 
varied  in  detail  from  these  suggestions. 

29  Poinsett  to  Clay,  Vera  Cruz,  May  5,  1825,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 
5 


5O  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

elicited  an  enthusiastic  response.  Herein  was  the 
beginning  of  Poinsett's  troubles. 

At  a  later  period  many  Mexican  writers,  looking 
back  to  the  time  of  Poinsett's  arrival  and  firmly  be 
lieving,  though  unable  to  produce  conclusive  evidence, 
that  he  was  largely  responsible  for  the  confusion  and 
disorders  into  which  the  country  had  fallen,  alluded 
to  his  arrival  as  an  unlucky  or  dismal  day  for  the  re 
public.30 

In  Poinsett's  letter  of  May  5,  mentioned  above,  he 
announced  that  he  would  leave  Vera  Cruz  the  next  day 
and  proceed  with  all  possible  despatch  to  the  capital. 
But  the  speed  which  he  made  was  of  the  Spanish 
variety.  He  reported  that  his  reception  everywhere 
was  friendly.  The  attentions  given  him  were  not  only 
respectful,  but  extremely  kind.  He  was  accorded  mili 
tary  honors  and  every  distinction.  As  was  customary 
he  went  to  Jalapa  and  waited  there  for  a  reply  to  his 

30  The  following  quotation  from  the  Voz  de  la  Patria,  •  II, 
numero  7,  u  de  febrero  de  1830,  is  typical  of  the  bitterly 
prejudiced  but  generally  believed  statements  of  the  character 
and  influence  of  Poinsett.  Reviewing  the  history  of  the  Mexi 
can  government  during  the  time  of  Poinsett's  mission,  and 
alluding  to  his  arrival,  the  writer  says:  "En  este  misma 
aciago  dia,  un  correo  estraordinario  llegado  de  Veracruz 
aviso  que  habia  desembarcado  Mr.  Ricardo  Joel  [sic]  Poinsett, 
ministro  plenipotenciario  de  los  Estados-Unidos  del  Norte  de 
America:  al  saberla  el  general  Wilkinson  que  se  hallaba  en 
Mexico,  pregunto  el  que  le  anuncio  esta  neuva,  ,jque  crimen 
habria  cometida  este  desgraciado  pueblo,  que  el  cielo  en  su 
colera  le  mandaba  tal  hombre  para  que  le  cause  las  mayores 
desgracias?  Dentro  de  breve  se  cumplio  este  vatecino." 


UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO   MEXICO  51 

note  informing  the  government  of  his  arrival.31  While 
at  Jalapa  he  was  informed  that  he  would  be  expected 
to  delay  his  entrance  into  the  city  of  Mexico  until  the 
conclusion  of  a  five  days'  religious  festival  being  cele 
brated  at  San  Augustin,  a  village  just  outside  the 
capital.  During  the  delay  he  lodged  at  the  country 
home  of  Wilcocks,  the  United  States  consul,  near  by, 
and  visited  the  scene  of  festivity  every  day.  The 
holidays,  he  reported,  were  celebrated  by  early  mass 
and  late  orgies.  From  daylight  to  ten  o'clock  the 
churches  were  filled.  At  twelve  all  went  to  the  cock 
pit.  The  afternoon  and  night  were  passed  in  gam 
bling,  in  which  all  ages,  sexes,  and  conditions  joined; 
and  in  dancing  on  the  green  as  long  as  daylight  lasted, 
then  after  dark  in  the  cock-pit.  It  \vas  in  the  cock-pit 
that  he  had  the  honor  of  meeting  two  members  of  the 
cabinet,  the  secretary  of  state  and  the  secretary  of 

31  Poinsett  to  Clay,  Vera  Cruz,  May  5,  1825,  and  same  to 
same,  Mexico,  May  28,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

Governor  Barragan  to  Secretario,  Veracruz,  3  de  mayo  de 
1825,  told  of  Poinsett's  arrival,  and  said  provision  had  been 
made  for  his  journey  to  and  his  lodgment  at  Jalapa.  A  reply 
to  this  of  10  de  mayo  approved  the  governor's  conduct.  Poin 
sett  to  Alaman,  Sacrificios,  May  4,  1825,  gives  official  notice 
of  his  arrival.  A  reply  of  10  de  mayo  acknowledged  Poin 
sett's  note,  enclosed  a  passport  for  him  to  continue  his  journey 
to  the  capital,  and  told  that  orders  had  been  given  providing 
for  the  security  and  comfort  of  the  trip.  Alaman  to  Gover 
nor  of  Puebla,  10  de  mayo,  instructed  the  latter  to  provide 
for  Poinsett.  A  reply  of  15  de  mayo  said  the  order  had  been 
complied  with,  and  Poinsett  had  just  arrived.  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 


52  APPOINTMENT  AND   RECEPTION   OF   FIRST 

the  treasury.  He  entered  the  capital  on  May  25. 32 
Next  day  he  announced  to  Alaman  his  presence  and 
asked  for  an  opportunity  to  present  his  credentials. 
Alaman  replied  May  27,  appointing  June  I  for  Poin- 
sett's  reception  by  the  president.33 

On  the  day  preceding  Poinsett's  reception  the 
British  charge,  Ward,  was  formally  received  by  Pres 
ident  Victoria.  On  that  occasion  the  latter  had  em 
phasized  the  importance  of  Great  Britain's  recogni 
tion  of  Mexican  independence,  alluded  to  the  English 
as  "  that  great  people  who  sustain  the  liberties  of  the 
world,"  and  said  he  had  every  reason  to  believe  that 
the  friendship  of  the  two  nations  would  be  perpetual. 
In  Poinsett's  report  to  Clay  he  said  in  view  of  this 
speech  he  thought  it  necessary  to  set  the  conduct  of 
the  United  States  toward  these  countries  in  its  true 
light ;  and  in  a  cipher  paragraph  added :  "  It  is  manifest 
that  the  British  have  made  good  use  of  their  time  and 
opportunities.  The  President  and  three  of  the  secre 
taries — those  of  state,  treasury,  and  ecclesiastical  af 
fairs — are  in  their  interest.  We  have  a  very  re 
spectable  party  in  both  houses  of  Congress;  and  a 
vast  majority  of  the  people  are  in  favor  of  the  strictest 
union  with  the  United  States.  They  regard  the 
British  with  distrust."  In  the  speech  which  he  felt 
called  upon  to  make  at  his  own  presentation  next  day, 
Poinsett  seized  the  opportunity  to  say,  as  Clay  had  in- 

32  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  28,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

33  Poinsett  to  Alaman,  May  26,  1825,  and  Alaman  to  Poin 
sett,  27  de  mayo  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


UNITED  STATES  MINISTER  TO  MEXICO       53 

structed,  that  it  was  peculiarly  flattering  to  the  United 
States  that  a  constitution  so  similar  to  their  own  had 
been  adopted  by  Mexico.  Then  he  dwelt  upon  the 
sympathy  with  which  the  government  and  people  of 
the  United  States  had  watched  the  progress  of  the 
movement  toward  independence;  told  of  the  recogni 
tion  of  that  independence  within  less  than  a  year  after 
it  was  declared ;  and  mentioned  the  subsequent  declara 
tion  against  any  attempt  of  any  European  govern 
ment  to  deprive  them  of  independence.  In  these  steps, 
he  reminded  them,  the  United  States  had  taken  the 
lead;  and  now  the  freest  government  of  Europe  had 
followed.  President  Victoria's  brief  reply  was  re 
spectful  but  entirely  non-committal,  and  lacked  the 
enthusiasm  which  marked  his  speech  to  the  British 
representative  the  preceding  day.3* 

34  Poinsett  to  Clay,  June  4,  1825,  enclosing  a  copy  of  the 
speech  of  President  Victoria  to  the  British  charge  on  May 
31 ;  of  Poinsett's  address  of  June  I ;  of  Victoria's  reply  to 
the  last  of  the  same  date;  of  Wilcocks's  to  Poinsett,  May  12, 
and  Poinsett's  reply,  to  the  last,  of  May  15  arranging  the 
reception  ceremonies.  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  I.  Poinsett's  address  and  Victoria's  reply  are 
printed  in  Bocanegra,  Memorias  para  la  Historia  de  Mexico, 
I»  379-382.  A  copy  of  Poinsett's  speech  in  English  with  a 
Spanish  translation  is  in  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.  With 
them  is  Poinsett's  credential  letter,  dated  March  14,  1825,  and 
signed  by  J.  Q.  Adams  and  H.  Clay.  An  account  of  these 
receptions  in  Voz  de  la  Patria,  II,  numero  7,  compares  Ward 
and  Poinsett,  complimenting  the  latter's  linguistic  ability  but 
casting  reflections  on  his  character :  "  El  dia  primero  de  Junio 
hizo  lo  mismo  Mr.  Poinsett,  enviado  de  Norte  America:  su 
arenga  estuvo  mejor  dicha  que  la  del  de  Inglaterra,  y  mas 
larga,  pues  posee  el  idioma  espanol  muy  regularmente  por 
desgracia  nuestra,.para  causarnos  infinites  males." 


54       FIRST   UNITED   STATES    MINISTER   TO    MEXICO 

Thus  early  Poinsett  began  definitely  to  endeavor  to 
exert  an  influence  on  the  Mexican  government  in  order 
to  counteract  what  he  thought  was  undue  English  in 
fluence.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  he  did  this  not  for 
his  own  pleasure  or  profit,  nor  even  for  the  benefit  of 
the  United  States,  but  for  the  good  of  Mexico  espe 
cially,  and  incidentally  for  the  advantage  of  all  the 
free  governments  of  America  as  opposed  to  the  des 
potic  system  of  the  European  powers. 

Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  252, 
says  that  Ward's  reception  occurred  May  21,  and  cites  as  evi 
dence  a  letter  of  that  date  in  the  British  Foreign  Office  ar 
chives.  This  must  be  an  error. 

Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821  to  1848,  I,  48,  says: 
"Ward  was  received  as  charge  by  the  Mexican  government 
on  May  31  of  the  same  year.  England  thus  anticipated  by  one 
day  the  presentation  of  the  credentials  of  the  American  min 
ister  to  Mexico."  He  says  almost  nothing  about  nearly  two 
years  of  negotiations  that  had  preceded  this  formal  reception, 
and  had  entrenched  England  so  strongly  in  the  good  graces 
of  the  Mexican  government  and  people. 


CHAPTER   III 

BRITISH    INFLUENCE    IN    MEXICO,    AND    POINSETT'S 
STRUGGLE  AGAINST  IT 

It  is  desirable  at  this  point  to  review  briefly  the  re 
lations  between  England  and  Mexico  during  the  three 
years  preceding  Poinsett's  arrival  in  order  to  under 
stand  how  the  former  acquired  the  influence  in  the 
latter  which  Poinsett  felt  it  so  necessary  to  counter- 
act. 

In  1822  as  soon  as  Canning  took  control  of  the 
British  foreign  office  he  began  seriously  to  consider 
the  question  whether  England  should  recognize  the 
new  Spanish- American  states.  To  Wellington,  who 
was  sent  to  represent  England  at  the  Congress  of 
Verona,  Canning  wrote  on  "  September  27,  1822,  that 
he  must  under  no  circumstances,  pledge  his  govern 
ment  against  recognition,  and  instructed  him  to  hint 
that  England  might  be  compelled  to  recognize  the  col 
onies  before  Parliament  met."1  On  December  21  of 
the  same  year  he  instructed  Mackie,  whom  he  was 
despatching  on  a  special  mission  to  Mexico,  to  acquire 
information  concerning  the  probable  stability  of  the 

1Temperly,  Life  of  Canning,  175,  citing  a  Foreign  Office 
manuscript. 

Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  46-48,  makes 
the  relations  between  England  and  Mexico  from  1822  to  1825 
seem  very  unimportant. 

55 


56  BRITISH    INFLUENCE  IN   MEXICO 

Iturbide  government,  the  attitude  toward  Spain,  and 
the  disposition  toward  British  commerce.  Mackie 
was  authorized  to  declare  the  friendly  disposition  to 
ward  Mexico  and  the  determination  of  England  to 
maintain  a  scrupulous  neutrality  between  Spain  and 
her  late  colonies  so  long  as  the  contest  between  them 
should  continue.  He  was  to  learn  whether  Mexico 
would  be  favorable  toward  a  mediation  by  Great 
Britain  between  the  new  government  and  the  mother 
country.2 

Mackie  reached  Mexico  about  the  middle  of  the 
next  year,  a  few  months  after  the  overthrow  of  Itur 
bide.  On  July  27,  1823,  the  new  provisional  govern 
ment  appointed  Victoria  to  confer  with  the  British 
agent.  Four  conferences  were  held  between  them 
within  the  next  month.3  This  was  looked  upon  by  the 
Mexicans  at  the  time,  and  afterward  continually  al 
luded  to,  as  the  beginning  of  diplomatic  relations  be 
tween  Mexico  and  Great  Britain.  On  Mackie's  return 
in  November  he  bore  to  Migoni  (who  was  already  in 
England  attempting  to  raise  a  loan  for  his  govern 
ment)  a  commission  as  Mexico's  confidential  diplo- 

2  Canning  to  Mackie,  December  21,  1822,  Mexico,  Tratados 
y  Convenciones,  II,  301 ;  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South 
American  Republics,  204. 

3  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  II,  301-307,  gives  Vic 
toria's  instructions  dated  27  de  julio  de  1823,  and  the  minutes 
of  the  four  conferences  held  31  de  julio,  6  de  agosto,  7  de 
agosto,  19  de  agosto  de  1823.    La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II, 
95-132,  gives  these,  and  several  communications  between  Vic 
toria  and  his  government  concerning  the  conferences. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  57 

matic  agent  in  London.4  It  will  be  noticed  that  the 
instructions  were  given  to  Mackie  only  a  few  months 
after  the  message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  the  resolution  of  Congress  had  declared  for  recog 
nition.  Mackie's  arrival  in  Mexico  was  almost  two 
years  before  Poinsett's.  The  fact  that  the  former 
was  only  a  confidential  agent  while  the  latter  was  a 
minister  plenipotentiary  made  little  difference  to  the 
Mexican  mind.  He  was  a  representative  of  the 
British  government. 

When  in  1823,  in  spite  of  England's  protest,  the 
other  European  powers  intervened  to  restore  absolute 
government  in  Spain,  Canning  advanced  a  step  fur 
ther  in  his  approach  toward  opening  friendly  rela 
tions  with  the  new  states.  It  \vas  the  proposal  of 
those  powers  to  hold  a  conference  on  Spanish-Amer 
ican  affairs  that  furnished  the  occasion  for  Canning 
to  make  to  Rush,  the  United  States  minister  in  Lon- 

4  See  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  198,  which  says :  "  Este 
fue  el  principle  de  las  relaciones  diplomaticas  entre  ambas 
naciones."  On  page  253  he  compares  the  English  manner  of 
recognizing  Mexico  with  that  of  the  United  States  and  com 
ments  on  the  difference.  On  page  265  he  tells  of  the  com 
mission  which  Mackie  bore  to  Migoni.  La  Diplomacia  Mexi- 
cana,  II,  150-206,  gives  the  correspondence  between  Migoni 
and  his  government  from  his  appointment,  August  2,  1823,  till 
after  his  displacement  by  Michelena  nearly  a  year  later. 

Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics, 
218,  tells  of  Mackie's  exceeding  his  instructions  by  interfering 
to  prevent  Mexico  from  concluding  a  commercial  treaty  with 
Spain  which  he  thought  was  nearing  completion  and  consid 
ered  inimical  to  the  policy  and  commerce  of  the  British 
Empire. 


58  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

don,  the  well-known  proposals  for  a  joint  declaration 
by  England  and  the  United  States  of  their  policy  with 
reference  to  the  new  governments  and  their  relation 
to  the  mother  country.  Canning  was  not  yet  prepared 
formally  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  new 
states,  and  declined  to  do  so  when  Rush  made  that  a 
necessary  condition  for  his  taking  the  responsibility 
of  agreeing  to  the  joint  declaration  in  the  name  of  his 
government.5 

But  shortly  afterward,  on  October  9,  1823,  in  his 
conference  with  the  French  minister,  Polignac,  Can 
ning  made  the  declaration,  also  well  known,  "That 
the  British  government  were  of  the  opinion  that  any 
attempt  to  bring  Spanish  America  again  under  its  an 
cient  submission  to  Spain  must  be  utterly  hopeless; 
.  .  .  [and]  that  the  junction  of  any  foreign  power  in 
an  enterprize  of  Spain  against  the  colonies  .  .  . 
[would  be  considered]  a  motive  for  recognizing  the 
latter  without  delay."6 

On  the  day  following  that  on  which  the  above  decla 
ration  was  made,  Canning  instructed  a  commission, 
composed  of  Hervey,  O'Gorman,  and  Ward,  to  go  to 
Mexico  and,  if  certain  prescribed  conditions  should 
be  found  to  exist  there,  invite  that  government  to 
send  a  representative  to  England  to  arrange  for  the 

5  For  Canning's  proposals  see  Moore,  Digest  of  Interna 
tional  Law,   VI,  386-392;  or  Chadwick,  United   States  and 
Spain,  Diplomacy,  187-189 ;  or  any  careful  -study  of  the  evolu 
tion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

6  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  49-51 ;  Paxson,  In 
dependence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  206. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  59 

interchange  of  diplomatic  missions.  They  were  to 
make  it  clear  "  that  so  far  is  Great  Britain  from  look 
ing  to  any  more  intimate  connection  with  any  of  the 
late  Spanish  provinces  than  that  of  friendly  political 
and  commercial  intercourse,  that  His  Majesty  could 
not  be  induced  by  any  consideration  to  enter  into  any 
engagement  which  might  be  considered  as  bringing 
them  under  his  dominion.  Neither,  on  the  other 
hand,  would  His  Majesty  consent  to  see  them  (in  the 
event  of  their  final  separation  from  Spain)  brought 
under  the  dominion  of  any  other  power."7  If  a  dis 
position  should  be  found  to  establish  a  monarchical 
government  under  a  Spanish  prince  the  commission 
ers  were  to  encourage  it;  but  they  were  "not  to  at-  / 
tempt  to  prescribe  to  the  Mexican  authorities  this,  or  ' 
any  particular  course  of  action."8 

This  pledge  that  England  would  not  take  any  of 
the  former  Spanish  colonies  for  herself  nor  consent 
to  any  other  power's  taking  them  was  of  immense 
value  to  Mexico.  It  was  far  more  positive  than  the 
Monroe  declaration,  and  was  clearly  disinterested, 
which  that  was  not.  It  should  be  noticed  that  these 
instructions  were  given  some  two  months  before  Pres 
ident  Monroe's  message  was  published.  Not  only 

7  Quoted  by  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American 
Republics,  210,  citing  a  Foreign  Office  manuscript.     Migoni  to 
Alaman,  9  de  ocrubre  de  1823,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II, 
168,  told  of  the  appointment  of  this  commission  and  its  prepa 
ration  for  departure. 

8  Further  instructions  to  Mexican  Commissioners,  October 
10,  1823,  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Re-  ' 
publics,  211-213,  citing  Foreign  Office  manuscript 


6O  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN   MEXICO 

was  this  more  positive  and  disinterested,  but  the  power 
and  prestige  of  England  left  much  less  doubt  of  her 
ability  to  afford  the  protection  thus  pledged.  This 
of  course  was  not  a  public  document;  but  its  content 
was  made  known  to  the  Mexican  government. 

In  the  same  month  of  October,  1823,  Torrens  wrote 
that  the  government  at  Washington  was  being  roused 
from  its  apathy  by  reports  of  England's  opening  rela 
tions  with  Mexico  which  might  be  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  United  States.9  It  was  only  a  few  days  before 
Torrens  wrote  this  letter  that  President  Monroe  had 
received  Rush's  despatches  telling  of  the  proposals  by 
Canning  for  the  joint  declaration  by  England  and  the 
United  States,  mentioned  above,  and  had  asked  the 
advice  of  Jefferson  and  Madison  to  guide  him  and  his 
cabinet  in  replying  to  the  English  proposals.  In  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  two  ex-presidents  and  most  of  the 
cabinet  favored  meeting  the  English  advances  and 
joining  in  the  declaration,  even  at  the  expense  of 
abandoning  their  hope  of  acquiring  Cuba,  Adams's  de 
termined  stand  for  independent  action  prevailed. 
Late  in  November  he  wrote  to  Rush  at  length  con- 

9  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Filadelfia,  21  de  octubre  de  1823, 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  45 :  "  En  la  de  18,  hai  noticias 
por  la  via  de  la  Habana,  que  corroboran  las  del  14 ;  y  ademas 
lo  que  se  dice  de  tm  agente  que  regresaba  a  Londres  con  ideas 
favorables  respecto  a  la  consolidation  de  nuestro  Gobierno, 
y  que  suponian  haber  cocluido  una  negotiation  con  Mexico, 
hara  que  este  Gobierno  saiga  de  la  apatia  y  procure  estrechar 
relaciones  con  nosotros,  por  temor  de  que  los  ingleses  se 
adelanten  y  concluyan  un  tratado  que  les  quite  algunas  ven- 
tajas  en  el  comercio." 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  6 1 

cerning  Canning's  proposals  and  concluded  by  declar 
ing  :  "  We  believe,  however,  that  for  the  most  effectual 
accomplishment  of  the  object,  common  to  both  govern 
ments,  a  perfect  understanding  with  regard  to  it  being 
established  between  them,  it  will  be  most  advisable 
that  they  should  act  separately."10  A  few  days  later, 
in  keeping  with  the  determination  of  Adams,  the  so- 
called  Monroe  Doctrine  was  proclaimed  to  the  world 
in  the  President's  message  to  Congress. 

Thus  while  England  was  privately  renouncing  any 
selfish  intentions  and  generously  pledging  to  Mexico 
(and  other  Spanish-American  states)  her  protection 
against  any  power  except  Spain,  the  United  States  was 
refusing  to  join  with  England  in  publicly  proclaim 
ing  similar  principles.  Furthermore  the  reason  that 
Adams  refrained  from  joining  in  the  self-denying 
declaration  was  that  he  did  not  want  to  pledge  the 
United  States  against  acquiring  Spanish-American 
territory  if  the  opportunity  should  later  present  itself. 
The  motives  underlying  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
could  not  have  been  certainly  known  in  Mexico;  but 

10  Adams  to  Rush,  November  29,  1823,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  120.  Another  letter  from  Adams  to 
Rush  written  the  same  day  contains  virtually  the  same  decla 
ration  as  the  so-called  Monroe  Doctrine.  Ibid.,  125.  Adams 
to  James  Brown,  minister  to  Paris,  December  23,  1823,  ibid., 
150,  instructs  the  latter  to  be  guided  by  the  President's  mes 
sage  to  Congress  at  the  beginning  of  the  session  in  all  of  his 
communications  with  the  French  court  concerning  Spain  and 
the  Spanish-American  countries.  For  the  influence  of  Can 
ning's  proposals  on  the  Cuban  policy  of  the  Washington  cabi 
net,  see  the  chapter  on  Cuba  Saved  to  Spain,  below. 


62  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

it  was  strongly  suspected  at  the  time  that  they  were 
selfish;  and  subsequent  events  unfortunately  tended 
to  confirm  the  suspicion.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the 
Mexican  officials  were  privately  informed  of  Can 
ning's  offer  to  join  the  United  States  in  the  declaration 
of  principles  and  of  Adams's  refusal  to  accede  to  the 
proposal.  In  view  of  Torrens's  suggestion  only  a  few 
weeks  before  that  England's  advances  toward  Mexico 
were  rousing  the  Washington  government  from  its 
apathy,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  Mexican  officials 
looked  upon  the  declaration  of  Monroe's  message  as  a 
result  of  England's  friendship,  and  as  an  effort  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  to  snatch  from  England 
some  of  the  benefits  of  that  friendship. 

The  British  commission  consisting  of  Hervey, 
O'Gorman,  and  Ward,  whom  Canning  had  instructed 
on  October  10,  1823,  reached  Mexico  just  before  the 
end  of  the  year.11  The  commissioners  were  too  en 
thusiastic  in  their  efforts  to  produce  a  favorable  im 
pression  in  Mexico  concerning  the  attitude  of  Eng 
land,  and  in  their  attempt  to  convince  Canning  that 
the  Mexican  government  was  stable.  After  only  about 
three  weeks  they  despatched  a  very  favorable  report, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  serious  Lobato  revolt  was 
then  in  progress.  About  a  week  later  Hervey  guar 
anteed  a  loan  to  carry  the  Mexican  government  over 
the  crisis.  When  the  report  reached  London,  Can 
ning  rebuked  the  commission  for  sending  it  "  not  only 

11  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics, 
219;  Bocanegra,  Memorias,  I,  288;  Bancroft,  History  of  Mex 
ico,  V,  50;  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico,  V,  782. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  63 

'before  you  had  allowed  yourselves  time  to  form  a 
mature  judgment/  but  at  'a  moment  of  public  dis 
turbance/  "  And  when  he  learned  of  the  loan  he  re 
called  Hervey  for  guaranteeing  it.  Morier,  who  was 
sent  to  supersede  Hervey  as  head  of  the  commission, 
was  told  " '  that  you  are  sent  to  ascertain  the  fact  of 
Mexican  independence,  not  actively  to  promote  it; 
and  to  form  and  report  an  opinion  of  the  stability  of 
the  government,  not  to  prescribe  its  form  or  attempt 
to  influence  its  councils.'  "12 

But  these  rebukes  were  unknown  to  the  Mexican 
people  and  the  ultra-favorable  acts  of  the  commis 
sioners  were  accepted  as  expressive  of  the  sentiments 
of  the  British  government.  The  gratitude  of  the 
Mexicans  for  the  support  which  they  felt  they  were 
receiving  from  England  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  late 
in  April,  1824,  the  question  was  considered  by  the 
executive  and  Congress  whether  the  approaching  birth 
day  of  the  king  of  England  should  be  publicly  cele 
brated.  It  was  decided  that  there  should  be  no  offi 
cial  demonstration  on  the  occasion.13 

In  response  to  the  invitation  which  the  British  com 
mission  wras  authorized  to  extend,  Michelena  was  ap 
pointed  on  March  2,  1824,  Mexican  minister  to  Lon 
don  ;  and  Rocafuerte,  a  native  of  Quito  but  a  citizen 

12  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics, 
219,  citing  Foreign  Office  manuscripts :   Canning  to  Hervey, 
April  23,  1824;  same  to  same,  July  20,  1824;  and  Canning  to 
Morier,  July  30,  1824. 

13  Secretario  de  Relaciones  al  Congreso,  21  de  abril  de  1824, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


64  BRITISH   INFLUENCE  IN    MEXICO 

of  Mexico,  accompanied  him  as  interpreter  and  secre 
tary.14  On  May  i,  1824,  they  left  Tampico;  and  they 
landed  at  Portsmouth  on  June  24.  Iturbide  had  just 
left  on  his  return  to  Mexico.  The  ex-emperor's  act 
had  shaken  confidence  and  would  retard  England's 
recognition  of  Mexico,  Michelena  reported;  but  he 
said  he  would  do  all  he  could  to  counteract  the  un 
favorable  impression.  He  reported  that  public  opin 
ion  was  decidedly  in  favor  of  early  recognition ;  and 
the  government  seemed  to  agree.  On  June  25  he  ad 
dressed  a  note  to  Canning  saying  that  as  a  result  of 
the  mission  of  Mr.  Hervey  the  Mexican  government 
had  sent  him  in  the  same  capacity  and  he  asked  that 
a  day  be  appointed  on  which  he  might  present  his  cre 
dentials.15  Within  less  than-  a  week  Canning  had  re 
ceived  him  with  great  friendliness,  though  without 
formally  recognizing  his  government.16 

Through  the  latter  half  of  the  year  1824  the  Mex 
ican  representative  had  several  conferences  with  Can- 

14  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  3-6,  gives  Michelena's  cre 
dentials  and  instructions,  dated  March  2,  1824.     For  brief  allu 
sions  to  this  mission  see  Bocanegra,  Memorias,  I,  296;  Za- 
vala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  302;  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico, 
V,  782;  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  V,  51.    La  Llave  had 
been  appointed  and  resigned.    See  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  257-283. 

15  Michelena  to  Secretario,  Londres,  26  de  junio  de  1824, 
enclosing  Michelena  to  Canning,  25  de  junio  de  1824,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores ;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  18,  25. 

16  Canning  to    Michelena,    Londres,   26  de   junio   de    1824, 
Michelena  to  Secretario,  27  de  junio  de  1824,  and  same  to 
same,  3  de  julio  de   1824,   MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores;   La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  24,  25,  27. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  65 

ning  at  which  the  most  important  matter  discussed 
was  the  probability  of  Spain's  accepting  the  mediation 
of  England  between  herself  and  her  former  colonies, 
which  mediation  had  been  accepted  by  Mexico  and 
had  been  urged  upon  Spain  for  many  months  but  in 
vain.  Formal  recognition  was  delayed  by  England  in 
the  vain  hope  that  Spain  might  be  induced  first  to 
recognize  her  former  colonies  in  return  for  special 
favors.17 

Finally  Canning's  patience  was  exhausted  by  Spain's 
repeated  delays,  and  at  the  very  end  of  the  year  1824 
he  wrote  to  inform  the  Spanish  government  of  his 
resolution  to  recognize  the  new  states.18  On  January 
3,  1825,  he  announced  his  determination  to  the  diplo 
matic  corps  in  London.  On  the  same  day  he  sent  in 
structions  to  Morier  and  Ward  to  guide  them  in  nego 
tiating  a  treaty  with  Mexico.  This  act  constituted  a 
recognition  of  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of 
the  new  government.19 

17  Numerous  despatches  between  Michelena  and  the  Mexi 
can  government  in  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores ;  also  in  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  31-138. 

18  Temperley,  Life  of  Canning,  187 ;  Paxson,  Independence 
of  the  South  American  Republics,  243,  citing  Foreign  Office 
manuscript.     Michelena    to    Secretario,    30    de    diciembre    de 
1824,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  139,  announced  with  tri 
umph  England's  recognition :  "  El  Ser  Supremo  que  dirige  la 
suerte  de  las  naciones,  ha  visto  el  merito  y  sacrificios  de  la 
nuestra ;  los  aprecio  y  decidio  en  nuestra  favor  la  gran  causa. 
Todo    esta   acabado;    la    Inglaterra    reconoce    nuestra    Inde- 
pendencia." 

19  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics, 
220,  224,  citing  Foreign  Office  manuscripts;  Bocanegra,  Me- 

6 


66  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

The  Spanish  government  protested  vigorously  but 
without  avail.20  Equally  futile  were  the  remonstrances 
of  the  London  representatives  of  the  other  European 
powers.21  England's  efforts  to  induce  Spain  to  admit 
British  mediation  continued  even  after  the  new  states 
were  recognized.  During  the  first  half  of  1825  sev 
eral  notes  passed  and  several  conferences  were  held 
between  the  British  foreign  office  and  the  Mexican 
agents.  But  each  time  the  report  was  that  no 
progress  had  been  made  and  that  there  was  little 
prospect  that  Spain  would  ever  consent  to  treat  with 
her  former  colonies.22 

morias,  I,  376;  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico,  V,  815;  Zamacois, 
Historia  de  Mejico,  XI,  608.  The  last  two  give  January  I 
as  the  date  of  Canning's  announcement  to  the  diplomatic  corps. 

20  Canning  to  Los  Rios,  25  de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores.     This  is  a  long  memorial,   of  which  the 
transcript  covers  nine  typewritten  pages,  replying  to  an  official 
note  of  Zea,  the  Spanish  foreign  minister,  of  January  21,  1825, 
protesting  against  English  recognition.     It  reviews  the  rela 
tions  between  England  and  Spain  since  the  beginning  of  the 
French  Revolution,  and  especially  since  1809,  refuting  Zea's 
charges    that    England    was    violating   treaties    and    national 
rights  in  recognizing  the  American  states.     Canning  justifies 
England's  conduct.    There  is  an  abstract  of  the  Zea  and  Can 
ning  notes  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  25,  1825, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.    The 
memorial  of  Canning  is  in  Annual  Register,  LXVII,  part  two, 
51.    See  also  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American 
Republics,  244-247. 

21  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics, 
247-250. 

22  Michelena  to  Secretario,  Londres,  6  de  febrero  de  1825 ; 
same  to  same,  6  de  marzo  de  1825,  enclosing  a  memorandum 
pf  a  conference  between  Michelena  and  Planta,   Canning's 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  6/ 

Morier,  who  had  been  appointed  to  supersede  Her- 
vey  and  had  received  his  instructions  from  Canning 
late  in  July,  i824,23  had  found  an  enthusiastic  wel 
come  awaiting  him.  On  November  17,  1824,  the  Mex 
ican  government  had  reported  to  its  agent  in  London 
that  Morier  had  reached  Jalapa  and  that  the  proper 
steps  had  been  taken  to  receive  him  with  fitting  splen 
dor.24  Early  in  January,  1825,  the  minister  for  for 
eign  relations,  Alaman,  in  his  report  to  the  Mexican 
Congress  on  foreign  affairs  dwelt  on  the  value  to  Mex 
ico  of  England's  friendship.  Concerning  the  danger 
of  European  intervention  in  1823,  he  said:  "England, 
in  reply  to  the  invitation  of  the  minister  of  king  Fer 
dinand,  declined  attending  the  proposed  congress ;  and, 
in  papers  presented  by  the  English  Ministry  to  the 

secretary,  of  4  de  marzo  de  1825 ;  Canning  to  Michelena  and 
Rocafuerte,  May  20,  1825,  inviting  them  to  a  conference; 
Memorandum  of  the  conference  of  Michelena  and  Rocafuerte 
with  Canning  and  Planta,  21  de  mayo  de  1825 ;  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores ;  and  same  in  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III, 
154,  1 60,  169,  180,  182. 

Shortly  after  this,  Michelena  received  instructions  to  leave 
Rocafuerte  as  charge  in  London  and  return  home  to  repre 
sent  his  government  in  the  approaching  congress  at  Panama. 
[Secretario]  to  Michelena,  Mexico,  2  de  abril  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  176. 

23  Canning  to  Morier,  July  30,  1824,  Paxson,  Independence 
of  the  South  American  Republics,  220,  citing  Foreign  Office 
manuscript 

24  [Secretario]  to  Michelena,  17  de  noviembre  de  1824,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores,  says :  "  El  Sor  Morier  esta  ya  en  Jalapa 
y  el  Govierno  ha  tornado  ya  las  medidas  convenientes  p8  pro- 
porcionarle  qto  pueda  necesitar  y  recibirlo  con  el  decoro  y 
esplendor  qe  corresponde.     El   Sor  Harbey    [Hervey]    saldra 
de  aqui  para  esa  corte  dentro  de  6  a  8  dias." 


68  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

Parliament,  which  were  published,  she  frankly  dis 
closed  the  liberal  principles  which  were  to  guide  her 
conduct.  Without  refusing  to  recognize  our  inde 
pendence,  England  desired  that  Spain  should  first  take 
the  important  step,  indicating,  at  the  same  time,  that 
she  would  not  long  wait  the  tardy  policy  of  the  Cab 
inet  of  Madrid;  and  she  frankly  declared  that  she 
could  not  suffer  any  power  or  league  of  powers,  to 
interfere  with  an  armed  force  as  the  auxiliary  of 
Spain,  in  the  questions  pending  between  her  and  her 
colonies.  ...  A  minister  plenipotentiary  was  ap 
pointed  to  the  government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty 
so  soon  as  its  friendly  dispositions  were  known;  .  .  . 
The  diplomatic  agents  from  that  government  have 
been  received  and  regarded  with  the  consideration  due 
to  a  nation  which  was  the  first  among  those  of  Europe 
to  open  relations  of  friendship  and  good  correspon 
dence  with  the  republic."25 

25  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII,  984,  985.  Some 
light  is  cast  on  Alaman's  notion  of  the  relative  value  to  Mexico 
of  the  friendship  of  England  and  of  the  United  States  by 
noticing  the  attention  which  he  gives  to  each  in  this  report. 
Not  more  than  half  as  much  space  is  devoted  to  the  latter  as 
to  the  former ;  and  there  is  a  marked  difference  in  the  enthu 
siasm.  Just  following  the  statement  concerning  England's 
declaration  against  the  interference  of  any  power  or  league 
of  powers  to  assist  Spain  against  her  colonies,  he  says :  "  The 
determination  of  the  president  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
announced  in  his  message  to  the  last  congress,  was  of  a  simi 
lar  character."  And  further  on  he  says:  "The  friendship 
that  has  subsisted  with  the  United  States  of  America,  since 
the  declaration  of  independence,  has  not  been  interrupted. 
That  government  has  appointed  a  minister  plenipotentiary  to 
reside  near  this  republic;  and  the  delay  of  his  arrival  has  had 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  69 

When  Canning's  instructions  of  January  3,  1825, 
reached  Morier  and  Ward,  they  at  once  entered  upon 
negotiations  which  resulted  in  a  treaty  signed  on  April 
6.  In  accord  with  the  friendly  attitude  hitherto  main 
tained  by  the  British  commissioners,  this  treaty  in 
cluded  provisions  decidedly  favorable  to  Mexico. 
Speaking  of  the  privileges  therein  provided  for  Mex 
ican  shipping  interests,  the  Mexican  foreign  office  de 
clared  to  its  agent  in  London  that  a  thousand  advan 
tages  had  been  gained.26  It  wras  so  favorable  to 

no  connection  with  [effect  upon?]  the  friendly  relations  that 
unite  the  two  states.  Don  Pablo  Obregon  has  been  sent  by 
this  republic  to  that  government  with  a  similar  rank,  and, 
according  to  official  communications,  he  has  been  received 
and  recognized  by  the  president  at  Washington." 

26  [Secretario]  to  Rocafuerte,  7  de  junio  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores.  The  statement  is  as  follows :  "  un  articulo 
espreso  del  tratado,  en  el  que  se  lograron  mil  ventajas  que 
probablemente  no  hubieran  podido  conseguirse  por  una  decla- 
racion  espontanea  de  esa  Gob0." 

For  the  text  of  the  treaty  both  in  Spanish  and  English,  see 
Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  II,  307-321.  For  brief 
comments  on  it,  see  Bocanegra,  Memorias,  I,  377;  Alaman, 
Historia  de  Mejico,  V,  815;  Zamacois,  Historia  de  Mejico, 
XI,  608;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  321-330;  Bancroft,  His 
tory  of  Mexico,  V,  51. 

In  spite  of  the  recommendation  to  Congress  that  the  treaty 
should  be  kept  secret  it  had  been  published.  The  responsi 
bility  for  its  publication,  it  was  said,  could  not  be  located. 
Rocafuerte  in  London  was  notified  of  this  so  that  he  might 
be  able  to  explain  to  the  English  government  that  the  publi 
cation  could  not  be  prevented.  Secretario  to  Rocafuerte,  25 
de  mayo  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.  It  was  later 
charged  that  the  writer  of  this  letter,  Alaman,  the  negotiator 
of  the  treaty,  was  himself  responsible  for  the  publication.  If 
so  this  letter  was  intended  merely  for  a  blind. 


7O  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

Mexico,  indeed,  and  so  at  variance  with  the  practices 
of  England  that  it  could  not  be  accepted.  "  It  is  not 
to  be  expected,"  wrote  Canning  with  exasperation  as 
he  rejected  the  whole  treaty  and  ordered  the  negotia 
tion  of  a  new  one,  "  that  we  will  abandon  '  for  the  sake 
of  this  new  connexion,  principles  which  we  never  have 
conceded,  in  our  intercourse  with  other  states,  whether 
of  the  old  world  or  the  new,  either  to  considerations 
of  friendship,  or  to  menaces  of  hostility/"27  It  was 
late  in  the  year  before  news  of  Canning's  rejection 
of  the  treaty  reached  Mexico. 

Thus  it  is  seen  that  during  the  first  few  months  of 
Poinsett's  stay  in  Mexico  the  popularity  of  England 
in  that  country  was  at  the  flood  tide,  and  Mexican 
gratitude  for  England's  friendship  was  unbounded. 
It  is  not  at  all  strange  that  President  Victoria  should 
have  valued  England's  friendship  more  highly  than 
that  of  the  United  States,  or  that  his  address  on  the 
occasion  of  the  formal  reception  of  the  British  charge 
should  have  been  more  enthusiastic  than  his  reply  to 
Poinsett's  speech  on  the  following  day.  This  would 
have  been  but  natural  even  if  the  United  States  had 
been  officially  represented  at  the  Mexican  capital  as 
early  and  as  continuously  as  England  had  been. 

Not  only  was  British  influence  in  Mexico  dominant 
when  Poinsett  arrived,  but  Canning  was  consciously 
and  intentionally  exerting  it  to  counteract  that  of  the 
United  States.  A  memorandum  which  was  consid- 

27  Paxson,  Independence  of  the  South-American  Republics, 
220,  quoting  from  Canning  to  Ward,  September  9,  1825,  and 
citing  Foreign  Office  manuscripts. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  /I 

ered  by  a  cabinet  meeting  in  December,  1824,  and 
which  seems  to  have  been  inspired  by  Canning,  makes 
this  certain  if  the  document  can  be  accepted  as  gen 
uine,  which  seems  probable.  This,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  was  only  a  few  days  before  the  policy  of  British 
recognition  was  announced.  Speaking  of  two  mo 
tives  for  recognizing  Mexico  and  Colombia,  of  which 
one  was  the  investment  there  of  English  capital,  the 
memorandum  continues :  "  The  other  and  perhaps  still 
more  powerful  motive  is  my  apprehension  of  the  am 
bition  and  the  ascendancy  of  the  Ufnited]  Sftates] 
of  Am  [erica]  :  It  is  obviously  the  policy  of  that 
Gov[ernmen]t  to  connect  itself  with  all  the  powers  of 
America  in  a  general  Transatlantic  League,  of  which 
it  would  have  the  sole  direction.  I  need  only  say 
how  inconvenient  such  an  ascendancy  may  be  in  time 
of  peace,  and  how  formidable  in  case  of  war. 

"  I  believe  we  now  have  the  opportunity  (but  it  may 
not  last  long)  of  opposing  a  powerful  barrier  to  the 
influence  of  the  U[nited]  S[tates]  by  an  amicable 
connection  with  Mexico,  which  from  its  position  must 
be  either  subservient  to  or  jealous  of  the  U[nited] 
Sftates].  In  point  of  population  and  resources  it  is 
at  least  equal  to  all  the  rest  of  the  Spanish  colonies; 
and  may  naturally  expect  to  take  the  lead  in  its  con 
nections  with  the  powers  of  Europe.  I  by  no  means 
think  it  at  present  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  rela 
tions  of  amity  and  commercial  intercourse;  but  if  we 
hesitate  much  longer,  and  especially  if  our  commer 
cial  treaty  [July  23,  1824]  with  Buenos  Ayres  should 


/2  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

not  take  effect,  all  the  new  states  will  be  led  to  con 
clude  that  we  regret  their  friendship  upon  principle, 
as  of  a  dangerous  and  revolutionary  character,  and 
will  be  driven  to  throw  themselves  under  the  protec 
tion  of  the  U[nited]  S[tates],  as  the  only  means  of 
security."28 

After  the  policy  of  recognition  had  been  announced 
and  the  instructions  for  negotiating  the  treaties  had 
been  despatched,  Canning  declared  in  a  letter  of  Jan 
uary  8,  1825 :  "  The  thing  is  done.  .  .  .  The  Yankees 
will  shout  in  triumph;  but  it  is  they  who  lose  most 
by  our  decision.  The  great  danger  of  the  time — a 
danger  which  the  policy  of  the  European  system  would 
have  fostered,  was  a  division  of  the  World  into  Euro 
pean  and  American,  Republican  and  Monarchical;  a 
league  of  worn-out  Gov[ernmen]ts,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  youthful  and  stirring  nations,  with  the  U[nited] 
States  at  their  head,  on  the  other.  We  slip  in  be 
tween;  and  plant  ourselves  in  Mexico.  The  Un[ited] 
States  have  gotten  the  start  of  us  in  vain ;  and  we  link 

28  Temperley,  "  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning," 
American  Historical  Review,  XI,  781,  citing  British  Museum 
manuscripts.  He  says  of  this,  on  page  780,  "  It  is  the  memo 
randum  '  which  enabled  us  to  carry  Colombia  too  [as  well  as 
Mexico]  at  the  Cabinet,"-  and  cites  Canning  to  Granville, 
December  17,  1824. 

Temperley  explains,  page  779,  "The  object  of  the  present 
article  is  to  show  that  the  later  American  policy  of  George 
Canning  was  intended  to  defeat  certain  claims  and  preten 
sions  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  These  were  the  principles 
which  forbade  future  colonization  in  America  to  European 
powers,  and  the  principle  which  tended  to  make  America  a 
separate  world  from  Europe." 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  73 

once  more  America  to  Europe.  Six  months  more — 
and  the  mischief  would  have  been  done."29 

Canning's  opposition  to  the  United  States  was  shown 
not  only  in  his  Mexican  policy,  but  also  in  his  dealings 
with  the  assembled  representatives  of  the  American 
states  at  Panama  in  1826.  In  instructing  the  repre 
sentative  whom  England  had  been  invited  to  send  to 
that  congress  Canning  said:  "You  will  understand 
that  to  a  league  among  the  states,  lately  colonies  of 
Spain,  limited  to  objects  growing  out  of  their  common 
relations  to  Spain,  H[is]  M[ajesty']s  Gov[ernmen]t 
would  not  object.  But  any  project  for  putting  the 
U[nited]  S[tates]  of  North  America  at  the  head  of 
an  American  Confederacy,  as  against  Europe,  would 
be  highly  displeasing  to  your  Gov[ernmen]t.  It 
would  be  felt  as  an  ill  return  for  the  service  which 
has  been  rendered  to  those  states,  and  the  dangers 
which  have  been  averted  from  them,  by  the  counte 
nance  and  friendship,  and  public  declarations  of  Great 
Britain ;  and  it  would  too  probably  at  no  very  distant 
period  endanger  the  peace  both  of  America  and 
Europe."30 

Although  Poinsett  could  not  have  known  in  1825 
exactly  what  England's  policy  was,  nor  the  steps 

29  Temperley,  American  Historical  Review,  XI,  781,  note, 
citing  two  places  where  the  letter  was  already  printed. 

30  Temperley,  American  Historical  Review,  XI,  787,  citing 
Public  Record  Office  manuscripts.     For  English  opposition  to 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  at  the  Panama  conference, 
and  especially  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States  concerning 
Cuba,  see  below,  chapter  on  Cuba  Saved  to  Spain,  and  foot 
note  101  to  same  chapter. 


74  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

whereby  she  had  gained  a  dominant  influence  in  Mex 
ico,  yet  he  saw  that  the  influence  existed  and  felt 
that  it  was  inimical  to  the  United  States.  He  believed 
that  it  was  even  more  inimical  to  the  interests  of  Mex 
ico  and  of  all  free  governments  in  America.  In 
struggling  to  resist  this  influence  he  was  not  fighting 
windmills.  Cambreleng's  playful  injunction  written 
to  him  just  as  he  was  starting  for  his  post,  "  Make  a 
good  commercial  treaty  for  us  and  take  care  that 
John  Bull  gets  no  advantage  of  you — if  anything  get 
the  weather  gauge  of  him,"  must  have  seemed  to  him, 
when  he  received  it  just  after  his  arrival,  like  the 
sound  of  a  herald's  trumpet  summoning  him  to  a 
genuine  battle.31  As  soon  as  he  landed  on  Mexican 
soil  he  scented  the  conflict  and  prepared  for  the  fray. 
In  Poinsett's  mind  he  early  divided  all  Mexicans 
into  two  classes,  those  friendly  to  the  American  sys 
tem  championed  by  the  United  States,  and  those 
friendly  to  the  European  system  championed  by  Eng 
land.  In  a  cipher  paragraph  of  a  letter  to  Clay  of 
August  5,  1825,  he  said  that  the  President  of  Mexico 
was  a  weak  man  and  was  controlled  by  his  ministers, 
especially  the  secretary  of  state  and  secretary  of  the 
treasury.  The  former  (Alaman),  he  declared,  was  a 
man  of  good  natural  talents  and  better  educated  than 
is  common  among  men  of  his  class  in  Mexico.  He 
was  director  of  an  English  mining  company  and  con 
sequently  favored  British  interests.  The  latter  (Es- 
teva),  he  added,  was  a  man  of  tolerable  ability  but 

31  See  footnote  28  of  the  preceding  chapter. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  75 

without  education.  He  was  attached  to  England  be 
cause  English  men  of  means  loaned  the  government 
money  to  help  him  out  of  his  official  difficulties.  From 
this,  English  influence  had  profited  enormously.  These 
opinions,  he  said,  were  not  the  result  of  the  treatment 
he  had  received,  for  that  had  been  only  the  most 
friendly.  On  the  other  hand  he  added :(/'  There  is  an 
American  party  in  the  House  of  Representatives  and 
in  the  Senate,  in  point  of  talents  much  the  strongest; 
but  the  government  have  an  ascendency  over  both 
bodies."32  N 

On  September  24,  Clay  wrote,  in  reply  to  Poinsett's 
despatch  of  June  4,33  that  the  prevalence  of  British 
influence  in  Mexico  was  to  be  regretted;  but  that  it 
could  hardly  be  made  the  subject  of  formal  complaint 
if  it  were  merely  the  effect  of  British  power  and 
British  capital  fairly  exerted,  and  if  not  rewarded  by 
favors  to  British  commerce  or  British  subjects  to  the 
prejudice  of  American.  (But,  he  added,  against  any 
partiality  or  preference  to  any  foreign  nation  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  United  States  Poinsett  was  to 
remonstrate.34  N< 

32  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  5,   1825,  MS.,   Department  of 
State,    Despatches    from    Mexico,    I.     The    brief    paragraph 
quoted  above  telling  of  the  American  party  appears  in  the 
copy  of  the  letter  in  the  volume  of  Duplicate  Despatches  from 
Poinsett  but  not  in  the  regular  volume. 

33  See  the  preceding  chapter,  and  footnote  34  of  the  same. 

34  Clay  to  Poinsett,  September  24,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  225.    This  paragraph  is  not  contained 
in  any  of  the  printed  extracts  from  this  letter  cited  in  note 
20  of  the  chapter  on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue,  below. 


76  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

Before  this  cautious  advice  could  reach  Mexico  a 
sort  of  "palace  revolution"  had  occurred.  The 
strongest  British  sympathizers  had  left  the  cabinet 
and  those  who  remained,  as  well  as  President  Victoria, 
were  entirely  favorable  to  the  United  States.  Poin- 
sett  was  in  high  favor.  How  it  happened  is  told  in  a 
letter  to  Clay  of  October  12,  1825,  all  in  cipher  and 
covering  twelve  pages.  Poinsett  began  by  telling  how 
England  had  secured  her  overwhelming  influence. 
He  explained  that  in  1823,  after  the  overthrow  of 
Iturbide,  Victoria  had  met  the  unofficial  British  agent, 
Dr.  Mackie,  who  had  proposed  that  Mexico  should 
offer  certain  commercial  privileges  to  Great  Britain 
in  return  for  British  recognition;  that  a  Mexican 
agent  was  thereupon  sent  to  London  to  invite  the  Eng 
lish  government  to  send  commissioners  to  treat,  hint 
ing  that  they  might  expect  privileges ;  that  in  response 
to  this  invitation  the  commissioners  had  come  and 
had  concluded  a  treaty ;  that  Victoria  thus  considered 
the  establishment  of  friendly  relations  with  England 
his  own  work;  and  that  a  flattering  personal  letter 
from  Canning  had  further  bound  Victoria  to  the  Eng 
lish  cause.  Poinsett  further  said  that  the  English 
commissioners  had  won  over  Tornel,  the  President's 
secretary,  whom  he  called  "a  vain  and  venal  man," 
and  further  on,  "  a  very  bad  man  without  a  single  re 
deeming  quality,"  and  believed  "to  be  in  the  pay  of 
the  British  charge  d'affaires."  Tornel  exercised  a 

This  letter  of  Clay's  was  written  before  he  had  received  Pom- 
sett's  of  August  5,  cited  in  note  32  of  this  chapter.  That  came 
to  the  State  Department  on  October  3. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  77 

great  influence  over  Victoria.  So  did  Alaman,  the 
secretary  of  state,  and  Esteva,  of  the  treasury.  These 
three  had  concocted  a  scheme  to  introduce  into  the 
cabinet  the  Bishop  of  Puebla,  a  European  Spaniard, 
whose  influence  was  dangerous  to  these  countries ;  but 
counter  influence  prevented  the  appointment  and  set 
about  an  attempt  to  induce  the  president  to  dismiss 
Alaman.  The  British  charge,  Ward,  because  of  per 
sonal  pique  at  Alaman,  exerted  his  influence  to  the 
same  end.  Alaman,  learning  of  the  combination 
against  him,  resigned.  Then  came  the  "  revolution." 
Esteva  had  already  deserted  Alaman  and,  Poinsett 
continued,  "hastened  to  assure  me  of  his  earnest  de 
sire  to  see  our  countries  united  and  an  American  sys 
tem  formed  on  the  principles  he  knew  I  had  at  heart. 
.  .  .  Esteva  is  a  man  -of  great  activity  and  of  some 
talents ;  he  came  over  to  the  American  party  only  be 
cause  he  perceived  the  impossibility  of  sustaining  him 
self  independently  of  it."  Victoria's  attitude  also 
suddenly  changed.  Of  him  Poinsett  said,  "  The  Pres 
ident  sent  me  word  that  he  wished  to  have  an  inter 
view  with  me,  and  notwithstanding  I  requested  him 
to  appoint  a  time  convenient  to  him  to  receive  me,  he 
insisted  on  coming  to  me.  Our  interview  was  very 
friendly  and  in  the  course  of  it  he  gave  me  repeated 
assurances  of  regard  for  the  United  States  and  of  his 
American  sentiments.  The  President  is  a  very  good 
man  with  no  bad  dispositions,  but  he  is  very  vain  and 
is  badly  surrounded." 

It  had  been  suggested  to  Poinsett  that  Victoria's 


78  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

attachment  to  England  sprang  from  a  hope  that 
Great  Britain  might  assist  in  placing  a  Mexican 
on  the  throne  of  Mexico  to  prevent  other  powers 
of  Europe  from  placing  a  member  of  some  of  their 
royal  houses  on  the  throne.  Poinsett  thought  the 
President  was  unwilling  to  leave  office;  but  the  con 
stitution  forbade  his  reelection,  which  under  the 
circumstances  was  a  dangerous  provision.  He  de 
clared  that  Victoria  was  not  and  never  would  be  a 
real  friend  to  the  United  States.  He  had  become 
reconciled  to  Poinsett  but  disliked  him.  The  man 
who  had  told  Poinsett  of  Victoria's  dynastic  ambi 
tion  and  had  been  most  influential  in  ousting  Alaman 
and  effecting  this  change  in  the  sentiments  of  the  ex 
ecutive  was  Arispe,  a  daring  and  intriguing  man  of 
talents  professing  a  zeal  for  America  and  declaring 
himself  anxious  to  promote  Poinsett's  views.  He  had 
been  useful  but  Poinsett  did  not  repose  entire  confi 
dence  in  him.  Neither  did  he  feel  any  confidence  in 
Esteva,  for,  he  said,  "  on  the  very  day  that  he  declared 
himself  to  me  he  told  the  grossest  falsehoods  of  me 
to  Mr.  Ward,  which  occasioned  in  great  measure  the 
difference  between  that  gentleman  and  myself.  The 
state  of  society  here  is  scarcely  to  be  credited.  I 
hardly  know  a  man  however  high  his  rank  or  office 
whose  word  can  be  relied  on."  Poinsett  declared  that 
he  would  have  kept  aloof  from  such  men,  but  he  had 
found  it  necessary  to  form  a  party  out  of  such  ele 
ments  as  the  country  afforded,  or  leave  the  English 
complete  masters  of  the  field.  The  friends  of  the 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  /9 

latter  country  were  alarmed,  and  could  not  conceal 
their  mortification  or  fears.  Ward  had  sent  a  mes 
senger  to  Canning  with  most  exaggerated  accounts  of 
Poinsett's  influence.  The  latter  added,  "  His  want  of 
tact  and  overwrought  exertions  may  contribute  to  es 
tablish  that  influence  he  so  much  dreads."  In  con 
clusion  Poinsett  explained  that  "the  country  is  tran 
quil  and  I  see  no  cause  to  fear  any  convulsion  except 
that  in  a  republic  without  virtue  and  with  a  large 
standing  army  there  is  always  danger."35  This  de 
spatch  was  dated  almost  three  weeks  after  the  minis 
terial  crisis  had  occurred.36 

To  counteract  Ward's  report  to  Canning,  Poinsett 
had  written  to  Rufus  King,  the  United  States  min 
ister  in  London,  telling  the  circumstances  that  had  oc 
curred  in  order  that  King  might  be  able  to  give  any 
explanation  that  might  be  needed.  In  the  letter  to 
King  he  explained  that  Ward  had  been  forming  a 
European  party,  which  activity  had  resulted  in  iden 
tifying  Great  Britain's  policy  with  that  of  the  other 
European  powers.37 

In  his  long  cipher  despatch  to  Clay,  Poinsett  prac 
tically  claimed  to  have  brought  about  this  change  in 
the  government  through  the  group  of  men  which  he 

35  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  12,  1825,  all  in  cipher,  covering 
twelve  pages,   MS.,  Department  of   State,   Despatches   from 
Mexico,  I. 

36  Resignation  of  Alaman,  23  de  septiembre  de  1825,  and 
acceptance  of  same,  27  de  septiembre  de   1825,   MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores.    Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  342. 

37  Poinsett  to  Rufus  King,  October  10,  1825,  enclosed  with 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  12,  1825,  cited  in  note  35,  above. 


8O  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

alluded  to  as  an  American  party.  Its  purpose  was  to 
resist  the  centralizing  tendency  and  preserve  and  per 
petuate  the  federal  form  of  government,  to  which 
Poinsett  was  so  strongly  attached  and  which  he  be 
lieved  was  the  only  hope  for  preserving  free  govern 
ment  in  Mexico.  Four  years  later,  in  referring  to  his 
part  in  effecting  this  peaceable  political  revolution, 
Poinsett  explained  that  the  cordiality  of  the  demo 
cratic  party,  his  own  principles,  and  the  hostility  of 
the  aristocratic  party  all  tended  to  cause  him  to  seek 
his  associates  among  the  popular  party.  He  believed 
that  England  was  making  efforts  to  obtain  a  domi 
nant  influence  in  Mexico  as  she  had  in  Portugal.  He 
believed  too  that  this  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
interests  of  the  United  States.  Learning  that  the 
democratic  party  intended  to  effect  a  revolution  by 
force  to  get  control,  he  advised  them  to  use  the  more 
moderate  measures  of  organization,  use  of  the  fran 
chise,  and  establishment  of  their  own  press.  They 
took  his  advice  and  were  eminently  successful.38 

Poinsett's  dislike  of  Tornel,  the  President's  secre 
tary,  reflected  in  his  report  of  October  12,  above,  was 
heartily  reciprocated  by  the  latter.  He  did  all  he 
could  to  counteract  Poinsett's  influence  at  the  time; 
and  in  a  book  which  he  published  several  years  later 
he  spoke  of  the  minister's  arrival  as  an  ill-fated  hour 
for  the  republic;  reviewed  his  career  and  acknowl 
edged  his  ability;  told  of  his  attracting  to  himself 

38  Poinsett  to  Secretary  of  State,  March  10,  1829,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  8 1 

little  by  little  persons  possessed  of  state  secrets  and 
from  them  organizing  a  party,  exciting  their  natural 
animosities  against  their  rivals;  and  characterized 
his  conduct  as  unbecoming  in  a  diplomat.39  Ala- 
man,  too,  was  bitterly  hostile  toward  Poinsett,  as 
might  have  been  expected,  and  later  declared  that 
Poinsett  planned  to  remove  the  aristocratic  influ 
ence  from  the  government  to  substitute,  not  a 
democracy,  for  that  was  impossible  in  a  country  in 
which  the  mass  of  the  people  took  no  part  in  public 
affairs,  but  the  uncontrolled  domination  of  a  few  am 
bitious  individuals  of  less  respectable  connections.40 
The  testimony  of  both  of  these  is  decidedly  prejudiced, 
but  it  expresses  a  feeling  that  later  became  almost 
universal.  And  although  Poinsett  did  what  he  felt 
was  for  the  good  of  the  country  it  must  be  admitted 
that  from  the  standpoint  of  Tornel,  Alaman,  and 
others  of  their  faction  there  was  some  justification 
for  their  violent  hostility  to  him,  even  if  there  were  no 
other  ground  on  which  to  base  their  charge  that  he 
meddled  in  Mexican  internal  affairs  than  Poinsett's 
own  account  studied  above  of  the  way  in  which  the 
change  in  the  government  was  effected.  On  the  other 
hand  it  is  certain  that  Poinsett's  belief  was  not  un 
founded  that  England  was  trying  to  exert  an  influence 
hostile  to  the  American  system  which  had  been  enun 
ciated  by  Monroe  and  was  now  championed  by  Adams 

39  Tornel,  Breve  Resena  Historico,  38. 

40  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico,  V,  823. 


82  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

and  Clay  and  accepted  by  Poinsett  as  the  guiding 
principle  of  the  relations  of  the  American  states.41 

The  influence  which  Poinsett  was  so  pleased  to  see 
in  control  of  affairs  remained  dominant.  Some  three 
months  later  he  reported  to  Clay  that  the  executive 
had  openly  avowed  a  change  in  policy  from  the  cen- 
tralista  party  to  the  federalista.  Poinsett's  agency  in 
bringing  about  the  change,  he  said,  had  drawn  upon 
him  the  odium  of  the  centralistas.  They  were  de 
claring,  he  continued,  his  purpose  to  be  to  gain  such 
influence  that  the  government  would  consent  to  any 
proposal  he  might  make  regarding  limits.42  There 
was  probably  little  if  any  truth  in  the  assertion;  but 
if  he  was  trying  to  do  so  events  proved  that  he  failed 
signally  in  this  purpose.43  What  he  really  did  toward 
bringing  about  this  change  was  known  only  to  the 
few  most  intimately  concerned  in  keeping  it  secret. 
Some  things,  however,  became  known,  for,  as  he  said 
in  another  connection,  "there  are  no  secrets  in  Mex 
ico."  The  uninitiated  naturally  suspected  much  more 
than  existed,  hence  the  criticisms  and  attacks  that 
shortly  began  so  seriously  to  embarrass  Poinsett. 

The  displacement  of  English  sympathizers  in  the 
Mexican  ministry  by  what  Poinsett  called  an  Amer- 

41  Much  interesting  light  remains  to  be  cast  on  this  matter 
of  the  conflicting  interests  of  England  and  the  United  States 
at  the  Mexican  capital  and  the  conflicting  intrigues  of  Poinsett 
and  Ward,  by  a  careful  study  of  Ward's  correspondence  with 
his  government  while  charge  in  Mexico. 

42  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  4,   1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

43  See  below,  chapter  on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  83 

lean  party  had  nothing  to  do  with  England's  rejec 
tion  of  the  Mexican  treaty.  The  conferences  at  which 
Canning  declared  the  treaty  inadmissible  occurred 
late  in  July,  1825;  and  the  change  in  the  Mexican 
ministry  did  not  take  place  until  late  in  September. 
It  is  probable  that  news  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty 
reached  Mexico  about  the  time  of  the  cabinet  up 
heaval:  but  this  is  not  certain.44  If  it  did,  it  doubt 
less  had  much  to  do  with  the  sudden  change  from 
sympathy  with  England  to  sympathy  with  the  United 
States. 

The  messengers  from  Mexico  bearing  the  treaty 
reached  London  July  16.  On  July  27  at  a  confer 
ence  which  Rocafuerte  had  with  Canning  and  two 
other  British  officials  the  treaty  was  discussed  at 
length.  At  the  close  of  the  conference  Canning  de 
clared  that  the  seventh  and  eighth  articles  would  have 
to  be  radically  changed,  or  the  treaty  would  have  to 
be  rejected.  Rocafuerte  did  not  have  sufficient  author- 

44  Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  21  de  julio  de  1825,  announcing 
the  arrival  at  London  of  the  messengers  with  the  treaty  bears 
a  marginal  note  indicating  that  a  reply  to  it  was  sent  29  de 
septiembre.  There  is  nothing  to  indicate  how  long  it  had 
been  in  the  office  before  the  reply  was  sent.  Neither  is  there 
anything  to  indicate  the  date  of  the  receipt  at  Mexico  of  Roca 
fuerte  to  Secretario,  2  de  agosto  de  1825,  telling  of  the  rejec 
tion  of  the  treaty.  But  it  was  probably  late  in  September  or 
early  in  October.  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

Alaman's  resignation  was  accepted  on  September  27.  See 
above,  note  36.  The  reorganization  of  the  cabinet  in  favor 
of  the  American  party  took  place  between  this  and  October 
12,  the  date  of  Poinsett's  long  cipher  despatch  telling  about  it. 
See  above,  note  35. 


84  BRITISH   INFLUENCE  IN    MEXICO 

ity  to  make  the  necessary  changes.  The  seventh  pro 
vided  that  a  ship  should  be  considered  Mexican  if 
two  thirds  of  its  crew  had  been  admitted  into  the 
service  with  the  knowledge  of  the  government.  There 
was  no  requirement  concerning  citizenship.  Article 
eight  embodied  the  "  flag  shall  cover  the  goods  "  prin 
ciple  which  England  had  never  admitted  in  her  rela 
tions  with  any  nation.  Canning  declared  that,  in  case 
of  war  between  England  and  the  United  States  (or 
any  other  power),  by  combining  the  privileges  con 
ceded  to  Mexico  in  the  two  articles  in  question,  all 
enemy  property  could  be  carried  in  what  were  really 
enemy  ships  but  had  been  transformed  in  a  night  into 
Mexican  ships.  This  he  declared  would  be  too  great 
an  advantage  for  England's  enemies.  A  clause 
stipulating  that  merchant  vessels  of  either  nation 
should  under  no  circumstances  be  embargoed  in  ports 
of  the  other,  without  the  payment  of  full  indemnity, 
was  also  strenuously  resisted.45 

Morier,  who  with  Ward  had  negotiated  the  treaty 
that  was  rejected,  was  sent  back  to  Mexico  with  strict 
instructions  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty  which  should 
not  contain  the  objectionable  clauses.  He  reached 
Mexico  about  the  end  of  the  year,  i825.46  Until 

45  "  Memorandum  de  una  conferencia  tenida  en  Londres  el 
27  de  julio  de  1825  entre  los  senores  Ministros  el  Honorable 
Sor  Jorge  Canning,  Ministro  de  Relaciones,  el  Senor  Planta 
ier  secretario  del  Ministro  de  Relaciones,  el  Huskisson,  Min 
istro  de  la  camara  de  comercio;  y  Don  Vicente  Rocafuerte," 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

46  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  4,   1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  85 

about  the  middle  of  December  Poinsett  seems  not  to 
have  learned  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  in  Eng 
land.47 

Neither  England's  rejection  of  the  treaty  nor  the 
Mexican  cabinet  upheaval  changed  entirely  the  feeling 
of  gratitude  to  England  for  the  stand  which  that  power 
had  taken  in  supporting  the  interests  of  Mexico  (and 
other  new  Spanish- American  states)  against  the  pro 
jects  of  Spain  and  the  other  reactionary  European 
powers.  On  the  first  of  January,  1826,  President 
Victoria,  in  his  speech  at  the  opening  of  Congress,  de 
clared  that  the  month  of  January  of  the  year  just 
closed  was  worthy  of  eternal  commemoration  because 
it  was  then  that  Great  Britain  had  announced  to  the 
powers  her  intentions  to  recognize  and  enter  into 
relations  with  the  new  American  states,  and  thereby 
defeated  the  designs  of  the  continental  powers.  He 
said:  "Thus  has  been  revealed  the  secret  of  their 
ulterior  intentions,  and  they  have  been  forced  to  con 
fess  that  they  renounced  for  the  future  all  armed  in 
tervention  in  subjects  relating  to  the  insurgent  Amer 
icans."  He  dwelt  on  the  value  to  Mexico  of  this  gen 
erous  act  of  Great  Britain,  which  was  the  more  flat 
tering  because  it  met  with  the  general  approbation  of 
the  English  nation.  He  then  mentioned  the  exchange 
of  diplomatic  agents  between  Mexico  and  England 
and  the  arrival,  two  weeks  earlier,  of  Morier  who 
came  to  revise  the  treaty.48 

47  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  16,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

48  Victoria's  message  to  Congress,  January  I,  1825,  enclosed 


86  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

But  to  the  great  satisfaction  of  Poinsett,  Victoria, 
after  finishing  his  review  of  relations  with  European 
governments,  continued:  "With  respect  to  the  na 
tions  of  the  happy  hemisphere  of  Columbus,  justice 
and  gratitude  compel  us  to  mention,  before  all  others, 
the  most  ancient  state  of  America,  and  the  first  of  the 
civilized  world  which  solemnly  proclaimed  our  rights, 
after  having  preceded  us  in  the  heroic  resolution  of 
shaking  off  a  dependence  on  the  mother  country.  The 
United  States  of  the  North,  models  of  political  virtue 
and  moral  rectitude,  have  advanced  under  the  system 
of  a  federative  republic,  which,  having  been  adopted 
amongst  us,  by  the  most  spontaneous  act  on  record, 
exalts  us  to  a  level  with  the  country  of  Washington, 
and  establishes  the  most  intimate  union  between  the 
neighboring  countries.  A  plenipotentiary  from  that 
nation  accredited  to  our  government  is  commissioned 
to  conclude  treaties  which,  without  delay,  shall  be  laid 
before  your  chambers.  The  most  urgent  point  is  the 
definitive  regulation  of  the  limits  between  the  two 
nations;  and  the  government  is  preparing  surveys 
which  will  facilitate  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiation 
on  the  unalterable  bases  of  liberality  and  good  faith."49 
This  virtually  announced  the  supremacy  of  the  in- 

with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  4,  1826,  cited  in  note  46  above ; 
also  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  1067.  Ibid.,  1104, 
is  a  memorial  of  the  Secretario  de  Relaciones  to  the  Con 
gress,  some  time  in  the  month  of  January.  It  gives  a  brief 
account  of  relations  with  England  during  1825.  The  same  was 
enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  18,  1826,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 
49  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  1069. 


BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO  8/ 

fluence  favorable  to  the  United  States  and  also  the 
government's  change  from  the  centralist  to  the  fed 
eralist  party.  Had  Poinsett  dictated  this  portion  of 
the  message,  as  he  might  have  done  if  he  had  wielded 
the  influence  which  his  enemies  and  those  of  the  gov 
ernment  suspected,  he  could  hardly  have  worded  it 
in  more  flattering  terms.  He  could  not  now  complain, 
as  he  had  done  seven  months  earlier,  that  Victoria's 
allusions  to  England  were  more  enthusiastic  than  those 
to  the  United  States. 

The  new  negotiations  for  the  treaty  with  England 
were  conducted  in  profound  secrecy,  even  the  clerks 
of  the  foreign  office  not  being  permitted  to  copy  or 
translate  the  protocols.  They  had  not  gone  very  far, 
however,  when  it  became  evident  that  no  treaty  could 
be  made  in  keeping  with  the  strict  instructions  which 
Morier  bore.  Consequently  in  March,  1826,  he  aban 
doned  the  attempt  and  returned  to  London,  having 
insisted  that  one  of  the  secretaries  of  the  Mexican 
cabinet  accompany  or  follow  him  with  full  power  to 
conclude  a  treaty  in  London.50 

Camacho,  the  secretary  for  foreign  relations,  was 
chosen.  Poinsett  wrote  to  Clay  that  the  Mexican 
Senate  did  not  want  a  secretary  to  go  out  of  the 
country,  and  at  first  refused  to  ratify  the  appointment. 
But,  he  said,  the  British  charge  declared  that  no  one 
but  a  secretary  would  be  acceptable,  and  "  that  by  re 
fusing  to  ratify  the  nomination  of  Camacho,  the  Sen 
ate  would  occasion  a  rupture  between  the  two  powers, 

50  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  i,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


88  BRITISH    INFLUENCE   IN    MEXICO 

— conduct  which  could  only  be  imputed  to  the  secret 
influence  of  those  who  sought  to  divide  the  old  world 
from  the  new,  in  order  that  they  might  govern  the 
latter;  meaning  of  course  the  United  States."  Ca- 
macho's  appointment  was  finally  ratified.51  He  went 
to  London ;  and  just  before  the  end  of  the  year  1826, 
a  treaty  was  concluded  which  omitted  the  provisions 
objectionable  to  England.  In  the  middle  of  1827  the 
ratifications  were  exchanged.  It  was  submitted  to 
Congress  and  proclaimed  to  the  nation  on  October 
25,  i82;.52 

51  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  8,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.     For  brief  reviews  of  Camacho's 
mission  and  the  treaty  which  he  negotiated,  see  Zavala,  Ensayo 
Historico,  I,  360;  Zamacois,  Historia  de  Mejico,  XI,  615;  Ban 
croft,  History  of  Mexico,  V,  51. 

52  For  the  treaty  both  in  English  and  Spanish,  see  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIV,  614-629.     For  the  submission 
to  Congress  and  proclamation,  see  Coleccion  de  Ordenes  y 
Decretos  de  la  Soberana  Junta  y  los  Congresos,  IV,  87. 


CHAPTER  IV 

CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

Before  the  Mexican  cabinet  changes  had  occurred 
which  displaced  English  influence  in  Mexico  by  that 
of  the  United  States,  a  serious  international  question 
had  arisen  which  vitally  affected  the  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico,  and  the  relations  of 
each  of  these  governments  with  England.  It  also  in 
fluenced  the  relations  of  all  three  of  these  powers  with 
other  governments  of  both  America  and  Europe. 
That  question  was,  what  would  become  of  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico  in  case  Spain  should  lose  her  feeble  hold 
on  them,  which  seemed  certain  to  occur. 

All  of  the  possessions  of  Spain  on  the  continents 
of  North  and  South  America  were  irrevocably  lost. 
Every  one  expected  a  change  of  some  kind  in  the  rela 
tions  between  Spain  and  her  only  remaining  American 
possessions,  these  two  important  West  India  islands. 
Each  government  concerned  feared  that  the  change 
might  be  adverse  to  its  interests.  The  following  are 
some  of  the  questions  that  were  in  the  minds  of  states 
men  concerning  the  islands:  Would  they  be  ceded  to 
France  in  return  for  French  support  of  Spanish  ab 
solutism?  Would  they  be  given  to  England  to  pur 
chase  that  government's  assistance  in  freeing  Spain 
from  French  domination  ?  Would  they  be  revolution- 


9O  CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

ized  and  annexed  by  Colombia  or  Mexico,  or  held  in 
joint  control  by  them?  Would  the  combined  Spanish- 
American  states  soon  to  assemble  in  the  conference  at 
Panama  unite  in  freeing  them  to  become  members  of 
the  federated  states  of  the  new  world  ?  Would  they  at 
tempt  to  free  themselves  by  their  own  unaided  efforts  ? 
If  so,  could  they  remain  free?  If  not,  to  whom  would 
they  appeal  for  assistance, — to  their  sister  Spanish- 
American  states,  to  the  United  States,  or  to  England? 
Would  the  price  of  such  assistance  be  absorption  by 
the  power  which  gave  it? 

"In  1825  the  London  Courier  described  Cuba  as  the 
'  Turkey  of  trans-Atlantic  politics,  tottering  to  her  fall, 
and  kept  from  falling  by  those  who  contend  for  the 
right  of  catching  her  in  her  descent.' }>i  The  uncer 
tainty  and  the  wide-spread  interest  in  the  subject  fur 
nished  an  occasion  for  Clay  just  after  he  had  taken 
charge  of  the  State  Department  to  engage  in  one  of 
the  most  far-reaching  and  most  interesting  diplomatic 
games  ever  played  by  an  American  secretary  of  state. 
In  order  to  appreciate  fully  the  situation  when  he  took 
control  it  is  necessary  to  study  briefly  some  of  the 

1  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  140. 

Temperley  says :  "  Cuba  has  well  been  termed  the  '  Turkey 
of  transatlantic  politics/  for  the  destiny  of  Cuba  was  the 
problem  which  engaged  the  attention  of  all  the  diplomats  of 
the  age.  .  .  .  Thus  arose  a  strange  kind  of  triangular  duel, 
France  suspecting  England  and  the  United  States,  the  United 
States  suspecting  England  and  France,  England  suspecting 
France  and  the  United  States."  Temperley,  "  Later  American 
Policy  of  George  Canning,"  American  Historical  Review,  XI, 
789.  And  see  Latane,  United  States  and  Spanish  America,  89. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  gi 

communications  concerning  Cuba  that  had  passed  in 
the  two  or  three  years  preceding. 

American  statesmen  had  for  some  time  been  look 
ing  forward  with  confident  expectancy  to  a  time  when 
Cuba  should  belong  to  the  United  States ;  but  how  and 
when  the  acquisition  should  be  brought  about  no  one 
attempted  to  foretell.  The  recent  acquisition  of  Flor 
ida  after  more  than  a  decade  of  agitation  and  negotia 
tion  made  the  addition  of  Cuba  seem  the  next  logical 
step.  As  early  as  1809,  when  Napoleon  seeming  to  be 
firmly  established  in  Spain  was  expected  to  attempt  to 
extend  his  system  to  the  Spanish  colonies,  Jefferson, 
who  had  just  retired  from  the  presidency,  wrote  to 
Madison,  his  successor,  that  Napoleon  would  have  to 
acquiesce  in  our  seizure  of  the  Floridas  if  we  wished 
to  take  them,  and  would  also,  he  thought,  "  consent  to 
our  receiving  Cuba  into  our  Union  to  prevent  our  aid 
to  Mexico  and  the  other  provinces."2  Similar  senti 
ments  were  frequently  expressed  by  many  American 
public  men  during  the  following  years  of  Spanish- 
American  confusion. 

In  the  autumn  of  1822  the  advisability  of  the  early 
annexation  of  Cuba  was  discussed  in  the  cabinet.  A 
secret  agent  from  Havana  had  tried  to  get  assurance 
that  Cuba  would  be  admitted  to  the  union  in  case  she 
should  declare  her  independence,  as  was  contemplated, 
and  should  ask  admission.  "  Calhoun  expressed  great 
anxiety  to  get  Cuba  as  a  part  of  the  United  States  in 

2  Chadwick,  United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  216;  La- 
tane,  United  States  and  Spanish  America,  90-93. 


92  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

order  to  avert  the  danger  of  its  revolution  by  negroes, 
and  its  possession  by  the  English — but  as  we  were  not 
then  ready  to  risk  a  war  with  England,  which  the  an 
nexation  of  Cuba  might  have  occasioned,  he  advised 
that  the  Havana  overtures  should  be  answered  by  per 
suading  them  for  the  present  to  adhere  to  Spain.  He 
thought,  however,  that  there  could  be  no  more  objec 
tion  to  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  than  to  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana,  and  suggested  that  the  matter  should  be 
made  the  subject  of  a  communication  to  Congress." 
Adams,  then  secretary  of  state,  opposed  Calhoun's 
policy  because  of  the  danger  of  complications  with 
England,  which  would  probably  result  in  British  pos 
session  of  Cuba.  He  "  thought  it  best  to  advise  noth 
ing,  but  simply  to  say  that  the  Executive  was  not  com 
petent  to  promise  the  Cubans  admission  into  the  Union, 
and  that  our  relations  to  Spain  would  not  allow  us  to 
encourage  such  a  proposal — at  the  same  time  men 
tioning  our  friendly  sentiments  to  Cuba,  and  the  '  com 
mon  interests  which  point  to  intimate  connections  be 
tween  Cuba  and  the  United  States/"  The  policy  of 
Adams  was  adopted.3  Early  in  the  following  year  the 

3  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  124 ;  Adams, 
Memoirs,  VI,  70-72. 

Forsyth  to  Adams,  Madrid,  November  20,  1822,  told  of  fears 
that  the  Spanish  government  entertained  of  a  Cuban  inde 
pendence  movement  being  fostered  in  the  United  States. 
Same  to  same,  December  13,  1822,  told  of  Spanish  reinforce 
ments  having  been  sent  to  the  West  Indies.  Adams  to  For 
syth,  December  17,  1822,  told  of  suspicions  that  England  was 
treating  with  Spain  for  Cuba,  and  asked  him  to  obtain  correct 
information  on  the  subject,  and  if  he  should  find  it  true  to 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  93 

Mexican  minister,  lately  arrived  at  Washington,  re 
ported  to  his  government  that  Cubans  were  in  the 
United  States  to  promote  a  union  with  this  country, 
and  that  the  proposition  was  very  pleasing  to  the 
people  of  the  republic.4 

In  returning  from  the  visit  which  he  had  made  to 
Mexico  in  the  autumn  of  1822,  Poinsett  spent  a  few 
days  in  Cuba  in  January,  1823.  He  gave  a  glowing 
report  of  the  picturesqueness,  fertility,  and  resources 
of  the  island.  He  said  he  had  "never  seen  so  much 
shipping  and  such  an  appearance  of  business,  in  any 
port  in  the  United  States,  except  New  York."  He  en 
larged  on  the  danger  to  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  if  any  great  maritime  power  should  obtain  pos 
session  of  the  island,  saying  it  would  tend  to  provoke 
a  war  with  that  power  and  at  the  same  time  give  such 
power  an  advantage.  He  continued,  "  Cuba  is  not 
only  the  key  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  but  of  all  the 
maritime  frontier  south  of  Savannah,  and  some  of  our 
highest  interests,  political  and  commercial,  are  in 
volved  in  its  fate.  We  ought  to  be  satisfied  that  it 
should  remain  dependent  on  Spain ;  or  in  good  time 
be  entirely  independent  of  every  foreign  nation."5 

declare  that  the  United  States  wished  Cuba  to  remain  in  its 
connection  with  Spain.  House  Executive  Documents,  32  Con 
gress,  i  session,  number  121,  pages  3-5. 

4Zozaya  to  Secretario,  n  de  enero  de  1823,  La  Diplomacia 
Mexicana,  I,  105. 

5  Poinsett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  209-223.  He  gives  statistics 
concerning  the  population  showing  the  proportion  of  whites, 
free  colored,  and  slaves;  and  discusses  the  fear  of  a  servile 
revolt.  He  speculates  on  the  probability  of  a  revolution 


94  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

When  in  1823  French  armies  were  again  marching 
into  Spain,  commissioned  this  time  by  the  European 
powers  recently  assembled  in  the  Congress  of  Verona, 
it  was  apprehended  that  Cuba  would  probably  be  the 
price  which  France  would  exact  for  restoring  Spanish 
absolutism.  In  case  England  should  assist  Spanish 
liberalism  against  France,  Adams  supposed  that  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico  would  be  England's  reward.  In  his 
instructions  to  the  American  minister  at  Madrid  on 
April  28,  1823,  Adams  declared:  "Cuba,  almost  in 
sight  of  our  shores,  from  a  multitude  of  considera 
tions  has  become  an  object  of  transcendent  importance 
to  the  commercial  and  political  interests  of  our  Union. 
...  In  looking  forward  to  the  probable  course  of 
events  for  the  short  period  of  half  a  century,  it  is 
scarcely  possible  to  resist  the  conviction  that  the  an 
nexation  of  Cuba  to  our  federal  republic  will  be  indis 
pensable  to  the  continuance  and  integrity  of  the  Union 
itself."  He  said  the  United  States  were  not  at  the 
time  prepared  to  take  the  island;  "but  there  are 
laws  of  political  as  well  as  of  physical  gravitation, 
and  if  an  apple,  severed  by  the  tempest  from  its  native 
tree,  cannot  choose  but  to  fall  to  the  ground,  Cuba, 
forcibly  disjoined  from  its  own  unnatural  connection 
with  Spain,  and  incapable  of  self  support,  can  gravi 
tate  only  toward  the  North  American  Union,  which, 
by  the  same  law  of  nature,  cannot  cast  her  off  from 
its  bosom."  The  minister  was  instructed  to  declare 

against  Spain  and  the  possibility  of  an  attack  by  Mexico  and 
Colombia. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  95 

to  the  Spanish  government  the  wish  of  his  govern 
ment  "  that  Cuba  and  Puerto  Rico  may  continue  in 
connection  with  independent  and  constitutional 
Spain."6 

A  month  before  Adams  sent  the  above  instructions, 
the  British  minister  in  Washington  wrote:  "'With  re 
spect  to  Cuba,  an  idea  has  gone  abroad  that  Spain  is 
to  put  us  in  possession  of  that  island,  and  Clay  and 
his  friends  in  the  West  conceive  that  such  an  arrange 
ment  might  interfere  with  the  comfortable  navigation 
of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  newspapers  have  taken 
up  the  question,  and  it  is  gravely  debated  among  them 
whether  the  President  ought  or  ought  not  to  interfere 
to  prevent  so  formidable  an  increase  of  British 
power."7  In  April  there  was  submitted  to  George 
Canning  a  memoir  relating  to  the  advisability  and 
feasibility  of  a  seizure  of  Cuba  by  the  British  govern- 

6  Adams  to  Nelson,  April  28,  1823,  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  32  Congress,  I  session,  number  121,  page  6;  Chadwick, 
United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  183 ;  Callahan,  Cuba  and 
International  Relations,  129 ;  Latane,  United  States  and  Spanish 
America,  97;  McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United 
States,  V,  435. 

7  Stratford  Canning  to  Bagot,   March  30,   1823,   in  Bagot, 
George  Canning  and  his  Friends,  II,  163. 

The  French  minister,  Neuville,  had  told  Crawford,  the  sec 
retary  of  the  treasury,  confidentially  in  June,  1822,  that  his 
government  knew  for  a  certainty  that  Great  Britain  had  for 
two  years  been  negotiating  with  Spain  for  Cuba,  and  had 
offered  Gibraltar  and  a  large  sum  of  money.  This  was  dis 
cussed  in  a  cabinet  meeting  of  November  28,  1822.  Adams, 
Memoirs,  VI,  112.  Latane,  United  States  and  Spanish  Amer 
ica,  93,  discusses  the  attitude  of  England  late  in  1822  in  view 
of  the  piracy  in  the  West  Indies. 


g  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

ment  in  compensation  for  the  increase  in  French  pres 
tige  due  to  the  contemplated  invasion  of  Spain.  The 
memorialist,  in  discussing  "the  ambition  and  aims  of 
the  United  States,  points  out  that  the  possession  of 
Cuba  would  counterpoise  the  acquisition  of  the  Flori- 
das  by  the  States,  which  enlargement  of  the  dominion 
in  itself  menaced  the  British  West  Indies."  He  dis 
cusses  the  probability  that  the  island  would  be  seized 
by  the  United  States,  or  be  wrested  by  France  under 
one  pretext  or  another  from  the  puppet  government 
of  Spain ;  and  "  wonders  that  Great  Britain  has  not  be 
stirred  herself  before."  He  enlarges  on  the  value  the 
islands  would  have  for  England  and  the  ease  from  a 
military  standpoint  with  which  they  could  be  seized. 
He  then  "sets  out  at  full  length  all  the  arguments 
which  morally  and  politically  might  be  insisted  upon 
to  justify  the  annexation  of  Cuba  by  Great  Britain."8 
Concerning  the  Cuban  situation  Jefferson  wrote  to 
Monroe  on  June  n,  1823,  that  "he  thought  its  pos 
session  by  England  would  be  a  calamity  and  he  sug 
gested  that  if  the  United  States  could  get  England  to 
join  us  in  a  guaranty  of  Cuba's  independence  against 
all  the  world  except  Spain  it  would  be  nearly  as  valu 
able  to  the  United  States  as  if  she  owned  it."  Mon 
roe  replied  on  June  30 :  "  I  have  always  concurred  with 
you  in  the  sentiment  that  too  much  importance  could 
not  be  attached  to  that  island,  and  that  we  ought  if 

8  Colonel  Evans  to  Canning,  April  g,  1823,  in  E.  J.  Staple- 
ton,  Official  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  I,  116.  This 
is  the  editor's  condensed  summary  of  Evans's  memoranda. 
See  also  Latane,  United  States  and  Spanish  America,  96. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  97 

possible  to  incorporate  it  into  our  Union,  availing  our 
selves  of  the  most  favorable  moment  for  it,  hoping 
also  that  one  would  arise  when  it  might  be  done  with 
out  a  rupture  with  Spain  or  any  other  power."9  In 
October,  1823,  Monroe  asked  Jefferson's  advice  con 
cerning  the  reply  that  should  be  made  to  the  well- 
known  proposals  which  Canning  had  made  to  Rush 
during  the  preceding  summer.  The  successful  ter 
mination  of  the  French  invasion  of  Spain  had  precipi 
tated  the  decision  of  Canning  to  throw  the  weight  of 
England  into  the  scale  to  prevent  France  and  her  al 
lies  from  restoring  to  Spain  her  American  colonies. 
Therefore  he  proposed  in  these  conferences  with  Rush 
that  England  and  the  United  States  make  the  joint 
declaration  of  the  principles  on  which  they  would  act 
with  reference  to  the  new  states.  The  principle  which 
was  of  special  interest  with  reference  to  Cuba  was  that 
in  which  Canning  proposed  that  each  power  should  de 
clare  that  "  it  aimed  not  at  the  possession  of  any  por- 

9  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  131. 

On  March  17,  1823,  Monroe  himself  had  proposed  that  the 
United  States  should  offer  to  Great  Britain  to  make  a  mutual 
pledge  that  neither  power  would  take  Cuba.  Adams  and  Cal- 
houn  both  opposed ;  but  no  conclusion  was  reached.  Adams, 
Memoirs,  VI,  138.  On  April  2  Calhoun  declared  that  he  was 
in  favor  of  going  to  war,  if  necessary,  to  prevent  Great  Britain 
from  taking  Cuba,  provided  the  islanders  were  united  against 
England.  Ibid.,  139. 

On  learning  that  there  were  few  in  Cuba  who  favored  Eng 
land  and  many  who  favored  the  United  States,  Jefferson 
changed  his  mind  about  the  joint  guaranty  and  retracted  his 
advice  of  June  n.  See  Latane,  United  States  and  Spanish 
America,  98. 

8 


98  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

tion  of  them."10  In  giving  the  advice  which  Monroe 
requested,  Jefferson  showed  that  he  was  reluctant  to 
abandon  his  hope  that  Cuba  might  some  time  belong  to 
the  United  States.  He  said,  "  I  candidly  confess  that 
I  have  ever  looked  on  Cuba  as  the  most  interesting 
addition  which  could  ever  be  made  to  our  system  of 
states."  Yet,  as  he  had  advised  in  the  preceding 
June,  he  added  now,  "  I  have  no  hesitation  in  abandon 
ing  my  first  wish  to  future  chances,  and  accepting  its 
independence,  with  peace  and  the  friendship  of  Eng 
land,  rather  than  its  association  at  the  expense  of  war 
and  her  enmity.  I  could  honestly,  therefore,  join  in 
the  declaration  proposed."  Madison,  whose  advice 
was  also  asked,  agreed  that  Canning's  propositions 
should  be  accepted;  but  he  seemed  to  think  that  they 
would  apply  only  to  those  former  possessions  of  Spain 
that  had  already  declared  their  independence.  For 
he  raised  the  question:  "What  is  the  extent  of  Mr. 
Canning's  disclaimer  as  to  '  the  remaining  possessions 
of  Spain  in  America  ? '  Does  it  exclude  further  views 
of  acquiring  Puerto  Rico,  etc.,  as  well  as  Cuba?"11 
The  adroit  suggestion  of  Adams  that  he  thought  it 
would  be  better,  since  the  two  countries  now  under 
stood  each  other,  for  each  to  enunciate  its  principles 
separately  had  its  origin  largely  in  his  desire  to  avoid 

10  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  VI,  386-392 ;  Tem- 
perley,  Life  of  Canning,   179;  Chadwick,  United  States  and 
Spain,  Diplomacy,  187;  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Re 
lations,   135;  or  any  careful  study  of  the  evolution  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.     See  also  the  chapter  on  British  Influence 
in  Mexico,  above. 

11  Chadwick,  United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  190-195. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  99 

doing  anything  that  would  make  it  impossible  to  ac 
cept  Cuba  in  case  the  "laws  of  political  gravitation" 
should  cast  that  island  into  the  bosom  of  the  United 
States.  He  said:  "The  object  of  Canning  appears  to 
have  been  to  obtain  some  public  pledge  from  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States,  .  .  .  against  the  ac 
quisition  to  the  United  States  themselves  of  any  part 
of  the  Spanish-American  possessions."12 

Mexico  was  no  less  interested  than  the  United 
States  in  the  fate  of  Cuba.  In  this  same  month  of 
October,  1823,  Torrens,  the' Mexican  charge  at  Wash 
ington,  wrote  his  government  that  he  had  learned 
through  the  minister  from  Colombia  of  the  intention  of 
that  government  soon  to  send  an  expedition  to  promote 
revolutionary  movements  in  Cuba,  to  prevent  that 
island's  being  used  as  a  base  of  operations  for  Spanish 
attacks.  /  Torrens  expressed  his  belief  that  if  Mexico 
would  join  Colombia  they  could  together  undertake 
the  enterprise  which  perhaps  would  result  in  the  liberty 
of  the  island  and  dislodge  the  Spaniards  from  their 
last  stronghold.13  )  One  of  the  duties  with  which  Obre- 
gon  was  charged  when  in  1824  he  was  sent  as  the  new 
Mexican  representative  at  Washington  was  to  study 
movements  going  on  in  Cuba,  learn  the  disposition  of 
its  inhabitants,  endeavor  to  establish  good  relations 

12  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  177 ;  Temperley,  "  Later  American 
Policy  of  Canning,"  American  Historical  Review,   XI,   790. 
For  Adams's  reply  to  Rush,  see  chapter  on  British  Influence 
in  Mexico,  above. 

13  Torrens  to  Secretario,  13  de  octubre  de  1823,  La  Diplo- 
macia  Mexicana,  II,  42. 


100  CUBA  SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

with  them,  and  encourage  the  party  favoring  inde 
pendence.14  At  the  same  time,  Torrens,  who  was  be 
ing  transferred  from  the  post  of  Mexican  charge  at 
Washington  to  a  similar  position  at  Bogota,  was  also 
instructed  to  establish  communications  with  the  people 
of  the  island  if  he  had  opportunity,  using  every  effort 
to  encourage  and  strengthen  the  party  which  seemed 
to  exist  there  favorable  to  union  with  Mexico.  He 
was  also  to  learn  the  views  of  Colombia  and  discover 
whether  that  country  was  maintaining  relations  with 
Cuba  or  was  forming  plans  to  foster  movements  fav 
orable  to  a  union  of  the  island  to  its  own  dominions.15 
'  Before  reaching  his  post  Torrens  reported  from  Cara 
cas  in  January,  1825,  that  a  "Habanero"  who  had 
accompanied  him  from  Philadelphia  had  introduced 
him  to  others  at  Caracas  who  were  on  their  way  to 
solicit  from  Colombia  the  equipment  of  an  expedition 
to  assist  in  liberating  their  island.  Torrens  thought 
they  would  succeed,  and  had  prepared  to  establish  re 
lations  with  the  societies  that  should  be  formed  to  pro 
mote  the  independence  of  Cuba.16  $  In  May  he  re 
ported  that  when  he  got  to  Bogota  he  found  a  Cuban 
who  had  been  there  a  year  soliciting  aid;  but  having 
failed  to  get  the  hoped  for  aid  there  the  Cuban  had 
now  determined  to  approach  Mexico,  and  would  start 

14  Instrucciones  mui  reservadas  de  Obregon  [30  de  agosto 
de  1824],  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

15  Instrucciones  Reservadas  de  Torrens   [30  de  agosto  de 
1824],  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

16  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Caracas,  28  de  enero  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  JQJ 

for  that  country  in  a  few  days.  Torrens  had  loaned 
him  money  for  the  journey  and  hoped  the  Mexican 
government  would  obtain  large  advantages  through 
him.17  On  hearing  of  the  triumphant  conclusion  of 
Bolivar's  campaign  in  Peru  and  his  defeat  of  the  last 
Spanish  army  on  the  continent,  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  supposed  that  the  "Liberator"  would  now  de 
vote  his  entire  strength  to  getting  possession  of  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico.  The  Mexican  minister  in  London 
was  told  by  his  government  that  Mexico  ought  to  take 
possession  of  Cuba  herself  if  possible,  or  should  at 
least  see  to  it  that  the  island  should  remain  independ 
ent  and  prevent  any  neighboring  nation  from  being 
aggrandized  by  the  acquisition  of  so  rich  a  possession. 
For  this  reason  General  Bustamante  had  been  de 
spatched  as  quickly  as  possible  as  a  fully  accredited 
minister  to  Bogota  to  propose  that  Mexico  and  Colom 
bia  should  unite  their  forces  and  operate  in  concert  to 
make  Cuba  independent  under  their  joint  protection.18 
Several  months  before  Mexico  had  made  this  pro 
posal,  the  British  government  suspected  that  such  had 
been  made;  and  Canning  remarked  to  Michelena,  the 

17  Torrens  to  Secretario,  Bogota,  10  de  mayo  de  1825,  same 
to  same,  20  de  mayo  de   1825,  MS.,   Relaciones  Exteriores. 
It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  bearer  of  these  despatches 
from  Torrens  was  Basadre  and  that  he  was  to  go  by  way  of 
Jamaica.     It  was  Basadre  who  sent  from  Jamaica  the  sensa 
tional   despatches    concerning  the   French   operations   in   the 
West  Indies  two  months  later,  studied  below  in  this  chapter 
and  in  note  38. 

18  Secretario  to  Michelena,  in  cipher  [  ?  de  marzo]  de  1825, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


IO2  GJUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

Mexican  envoy,  that  he  had  heard  that  Mexico  and 
Colombia  had  combined  their  naval  forces  to  operate 
against  Cuba.19  England  had  for  more  than  a  year 
been  endeavoring  to  induce  Spain  to  recognize  the  in 
dependence  of  her  revolted  possessions  in  America,  of 
fering  as  an  inducement  to  guarantee  to  Spain  the  pos 
session  of  Cuba,  and  urging  that  it  would  be  well 
worth  while  to  do  so  in  order  to  prevent  that  island 
from  falling  into  Yankee  clutches.20 

In  a  conference  at  the  British  Foreign  Office  in 
March,  1825,  Michelena  revealed  more  of  the  hopes 
and  intentions  of  his  government  concerning  Cuba 
than  he  was  authorized  to  do.  He  stated  several 
reasons  why  he  thought  Cuba  would  soon  be  liberated 
from  Spain.  The  first  was  Spain's  impotence  to  pro 
tect  her  islands  from  the  scandal  of  piracy ;  the  second 
was  their  great  distance  from  the  center  of  power ; 
the  third  was  the  desire  for  independence  aroused  by 
the  example  of  the  new  states  on  the  continent;  and 
the  fourth  was  the  spirit  of  liberalism  carried  to  the 
island  from  the  Peninsula.  Its  small  population,  he 
said,  would  not  permit  it  to  maintain  complete  inde 
pendence.  Mexico  would  like  the  opinion  of  Great 
Britain  on  the  question  whether  that  power  would  be 
willing  to  see  it  attached  to  some  power  on  the  con 
tinent.  He  declared  that  it  was  near  Mexico  by  way 
of  Yucatan;  that  it  had  always  been  dependent  on 

19  Conference  of  30  de  noviembre  de  1824,  enclosed  with 
Michelena  to  Secretario,  Londres,  7  de  diciembre  de  1824,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  124. 

20  Temperley,  Life  of  Canning,  184. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  1 03 

Mexico ;  that  it  might  be  considered  a  vast  storehouse 
and  dockyard  provided  by  nature  for  Mexico;  and 
that  it  was  the  key  to  the  great  gulf  around  which 
the  Mexican  people  extended.  For  these  reasons 
Mexico,  he  insisted,  had  the  best  right  to  Cuba  in  case 
it  should  be  separated  from  Spain,  an  event  which 
must  be  foreseen.  He  explained  in  conclusion  that 
Mexico  wished  to  put  herself  in  accord  with  Great 
Britain  in  an  affair  of  such  transcendent  importance.21 
When  the  government  in  Mexico  received  a  copy  of 
this  communication  they  rebuked  Michelena,  saying 
it  would  have  been  better  if  he  had  not  touched  upon 
the  subject,  since  he  had  announced  pretentions  and 
hopes  which  it  would  have  been  better  to  conceal  until 
a  more  definite  plan  should  be  formed.22 

Michelena's  bold  step  had  been  inspired  by  news 
that  he  had  received  from  Obregon  in  Washington 
telling  of  a  bill  that  had  been  introduced  in  Congress 
for  the  suppression  of  piracy  in  the  West  Indies. 
Comments  in  newspapers,  Obregon  said,  showed  that 
the  Anglo  American  people  desired  Cuba,  or  that  they 
desired  to  see  the  island  independent  at  least.  He 
thought  the  suppression  of  piracy  was  only  a  pretext. 
Considering  that  this  matter  was  likely  to  lead  to  war 
between  Washington  and  Madrid  and  to  the  seizure 
of  Cuba  by  the  United  States,  and  thinking  that  he 
ought  to  discover  the  attitude  of  the  English  govern- 

21  Michelena  to  Planta,  4  de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 

22  Secretario  to  Rocafuerte,  7  de  junio  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela 
ciones  Exteriores. 


IO4  CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

ment  in  such  event,  Michelena  asked  for  and  was 
granted  the  conference.23  The  government  in  Mex 
ico  had  been  equally  panic-stricken  by  Obregon's  re 
ports  of  the  congressional  discussions  and  on  their 
receipt  wrote  Michelena  that  the  proposed  action 
against  the  pirates  was  probably  but  an  excuse  for 
provoking  hostilities  with  Spain  in  order  to  acquire 
the  island.2*  After  telling  his  government  of  Pom- 
sett's  appointment  as  United  States  minister  to  Mex 
ico,  Obregon  said  that  Poinsett  had  introduced  a  pro 
posal  into  Congress  to  promote  the  independence  of 
Cuba  as  the  surest  means  of  exterminating  piracy 
there.  His  proposition  had  not  been  accepted  since 
the  policy  of  the  government  was  peace.  The  piracy 
bill  had  been  passed  but  in  a  modified  form,  merely 
authorizing  the  President  to  increase  the  number  of 
ships  to  protect  American  commerce.  Thus,  he  said, 
had  ended  a  matter  which  in  the  beginning  had  ap 
peared  to  look  toward  the  seizure  of  Cuba.25 

23  Michelena  to  Secretario,  6  de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  160.    The 
conference  occurred  on  March  2.    On  account  of  Canning's 
sickness   Planta,  his  under  secretary,  represented  him.    Be 
cause  of  the  great  importance  of  the  matter  Planta  asked  for 
a  memorandum  which  he  could  hand  to  Canning.    The  memo 
randum  was  given  on  March  4,  as  cited  in  note  21. 

24  Obregon  to  Secretario,  13  de  enero  de  1825,  same  to  same, 
10  de  f ebrero  de  1825,  Secretario  to  Michelena,  in  cipher,  [  ?] 
de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

25  Obregon  to  Secretario,  7  de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela 
ciones  Exteriores. 

For  the  methods,  the  boldness,  and  the  wealth  of  the  Cuban 
pirates  and  the  Spanish  officials'  tolerance  of  the  outrage,  see 
Poinsett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  220. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  IO5 

From  the  foregoing  discussion  it  is  seen  that  the 
United  States,  Mexico,  and  England  each  feared  at 
the  beginning  of  1825  that  the  others  were  planning 
to  take  Cuba.  Each  was  determined  if  possible  to 
prevent  either  of  the  others  from  getting  Cuba.  And 
each  desired  if  possible  to  get  Cuba  itself.  But  each 
would  rather  see  Cuba  independent  than  in  the  posses 
sion  of  either  of  the  others.  France  and  Colombia 
were  almost  as  much  interested  and  as  much  feared  as 
the  other  three.  Spain  was  vitally  concerned  as  the 
rightful  possessor.  Russia  was  soon  to  be  drawn  in  as 
a  disinterested  umpire.  Thus  seven  nations  were  in 
volved  in  the  negotiations  that  are  studied  in  the  fol 
lowing  pages. 

Shortly  after  Clay  had  taken  up  his  duties  as  secre 
tary  of  state  the  Washington  government  matured  its 
plan  with  reference  to  Cuba.  Before  the  end  of  the 
first  month,  in  instructing  Poinsett  for  the  mission  to 
Mexico,  Clay  said :  "  The  United  States  have  no  de 
sire  to  aggrandize  themselves  by  the  acquisition  of 
Cuba.  And  yet  if  that  island  is  to  be  made  a  depend 
ency  of  any  one  of  the  American  states,  it  is  impos 
sible  not  to  allow  that  the  law  of  its  position  proclaims 
that  it  should  be  attached  to  the  United  States."  ]  He 
thought  if  Spain  would  not  make  peace  it  was  not  un 
likely  that  a  combined  effort  would  be  made  by  Mex 
ico  and  Colombia  to  seize  the  islands.  The  United 
States  could  not  see  this  without  apprehensions.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  productions,  he  argued,  those 
powers  could  not  want  them;  while  to  the  United 


IO6  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

States  from  that  standpoint  they  would  be  very  desir 
able.  If  they  should  pass  under  the  domination  of 
any  European  power  except  Spain  the  United  States 
would  have  just  cause  for  alarm.  It  would  probably 
be  best  for  all  parties  if  Cuba  were  independent, 
provided  she  could  maintain  her  independence.  The 
United  States,  he  continued,  "  are  not  disposed  them 
selves  to  interfere  with  its  present  actual  state;  but 
they  could  not  see  with  indifference  any  change  that 
may  be  attempted  in  it."  Poinsett  was  authorized  to 
disclose  frankly  the  feelings  and  interests  of  the  United 
States  if  it  should  become  necessary.  He  was  to  use 
every  endeavor  to  learn  the  purpose  of  Mexico,  and  to 
keep  a  vigilant  eye  on  every  movement  toward  Cuba.26 
Having  taken  this  step  to  reveal  to  Mexico  his  pol 
icy,  Clay  next  disclosed  it  to  the  parent  country,  en 
deavoring  to  use  it  to  induce  Spain  to  terminate  the 
hopeless  struggle  and  recognize  the  newr  American 
states.  Everett,  the  new  minister  to  Spain,  was  in 
structed,  April  27,  1825,  to  approach  that  court  in  the 
most  conciliatory  manner  possible ;  but  to  express  the 
feeling  of  the  United  States  that  the  cause  of  Spain 
in  her  former  continental  possessions  in  America  was 
irretrievably  lost,  and  that  there  was  danger  of  her 
losing  what  she  still  feebly  held  in  the  Antilles  if  the 
war  should  continue.  Clay  declared  that  the  armies 

26  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  26,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  225.  This  portion  of  Poinsett's  instruc 
tions  is  not  printed  in  the  extracts  in  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  908,  nor  in  the  House  Executive  Documents,  25 
congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  5. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  IO/ 

of  the  new  states  no  longer  had  employment  on  the 
continent,  but  could  not  be  disbanded  so  long  as  peace 
was  not  made.  "And  from  the  proximity  and  great 
value  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  is  it  not  to  be  antici 
pated  that  they  will  aim,  and  aim  a  successful  blow 
too,  at  those  Spanish  islands?  Whilst  they  could  op 
erate  from  without,  means  would  doubtless  be  [em 
ployed]  at  the  same  time  to  stimulate  the  population 
within  to  revolt.  And  that  the  disposition  exists 
among  the  inhabitants,  to  a  considerable  extent,  to 
throw  off  the  Spanish  authority,  is  well  known.  It  is 
due  to  the  United  States  to  declare  that  they  have 
constantly  declined  to  give  any  countenance  to  that 
disposition.  ...  If  the  war  should  continue  between 
Spain  and  the  new  republics,  and  those  islands  should 
become  the  object  and  the  theatre  of  it,  their  fortunes 
have  such  a  connection  with  the  prosperity  of  the 
United  States  that  they  could  not  be  indifferent  spec 
tators;  and  the  possible  contingencies  of  such  a  pro 
tracted  war  might  bring  upon  the  government  of  the 
United  States  duties  and  obligations,  the  performance 
of  which,  however  painful  it  should  be,  they  would 
not  be  at  liberty  to  decline."  If  Mexico  and  Colombia 
should  seize  them,  their  navies,  he  argued,  were  not 
strong  enough  to  hold  them.  The  people  of  the  islands 
were  incapable  of  maintaining  self-government.  The 
result,  should  this  country  not  interfere,  would  prob 
ably  be  that  they  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  some 
European  power  friendly  to  Spain.  "As  the  views 
and  policy  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  those 


I08  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

islands  may  possibly  have  some  influence,  you  are 
authorized  frankly  and  fully  to  disclose  them.  The 
United  States  are  satisfied  with  the  present  condition 
of  those  islands,  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and  with 
their  ports  open  to  our  commerce  as  they  are  now  open. 
This  government  desires  no  change  of  that  condition.". 
It  was  not  for  the  sake  of  the  new  republics  that  the 
President  wished  to  see  the  war  terminated,  since  it 
would  probably  be  to  their  interest  to  have  it  continue, 
but,  he  told  Everett,  for  the  sake  of  Spain,  for  the 
cause  of  humanity,  and  for  the  repose  of  the  world.27 
Clay  was  not  satisfied  with  direct  efforts  alone  to 
induce  Mexico  and  Colombia  to  keep  hands  off  Cuba, 
and  to  convince  Spain  that  she  ought  to  make  peace  to 
save  Cuba.  He  endeavored  to  bring  indirect  pressure 
to  bear  upon  the  court  of  Madrid  through  those  Euro 
pean  powers  which  were  supposed  to  exert  a  powerful 
influence  on  Spanish  policy.  He  began  with  that 
power  whose  influence  had  for  more  than  a  decade 
been  dominant  in  the  councils  of  the  reactionary  states. 
On  May  10,  1825,  Henry  Middleton,  the  minister  to 
Russia,  was  given  instructions  for  the  purpose,  which 
he  was  authorized  to  communicate  to  the  court  at  St. 
Petersburg.  They  spoke  in  complimentary  terms  of 
Russia's  influence  on  world  affairs,  of  her  disinter 
ested  position  in  the  existing  conflict  between  Spain 
and  her  former  possessions,  and  of  the  emperor's 

27  Clay  to  Everett,  April  27, 1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  X,  302;  extracts  in  American  State  Papers,  For 
eign,  V,  866;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  430; 
Chadwick,  United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  206. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  1 09 

great  influence  at  Madrid;  and  asked  him  to  employ 
that  influence  in  a  pacific  mediation  between  Spain 
and  the  new  American  states.  The  philanthropic  Clay 
appealed  through  his  minister  to  the  humanitarian 
instincts  of  the  great  Alexander.  The  latter  was  re 
minded  of  the  great  length  of  the  conflict;  of  its  in- 
evitableness  sooner  or  later  had  it  not  occurred  when 
it  did;  of  the  fact  that  there  was  absolutely  no  hope 
that  Spain  would  ever  be  able  to  recover  control  on 
the  continent ;  and  of  the  further  fact  that  she  was  in 
imminent  danger  of  losing  her  remaining  possessions 
in  the  Antilles.  It  would  be  well  worth  while  for 
Spain  to  sacrifice  her  pride  and  make  peace  in  order 
to  save  these  valuable  islands.  He  was  also  reminded 
of  the  great  international  importance  of  and  interest 
in  Cuba,  and  was  told  that,  "If  peace  should  be  longer 
deferred,  and  the  war  should  take  the  probable  direc 
tion  which  has  been  supposed,  during  its  further 
progress  other  powers  not  now  parties  may  be  col 
laterally  drawn  into  it.  From  much  less  considerable 
causes  the  peace  of  the  world  has  been  often  disturbed. 
From  the  vicinity  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States,  its 
valuable  commerce,  and  the  nature  of  its  population, 
their  government  cannot  be  indifferent  to  any  political 
change  to  which  that  island  may  be  destined.  Great 
Britain  and  France  also  have  deep  interests  in  its  for 
tunes,  which  must  keep  them  wide  awake  to  all  those 
changes.  In  short,  what  European  state  has  not  much 
at  stake,  direct  or  indirect,  in  the  destiny,  be  it  what 
it  may,  of  the  most  valuable  of  the  West  India  islands  ? 


IIO  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

The  reflection  and  the  experience  of  the  Emperor  on 
the  vicissitudes  of  war  must  have  impressed  him  with 
the  solemn  duty  of  all  governments  to  guard  against 
even  the  distant  approach  of  that  most  terrible  of  all 
scourges  by  every  precaution  with  which  human  pru 
dence  and  foresight  can  surround  the  repose  and  safety 
of  states. 

"  Such  is  the  view  of  the  war  between  Spain  and 
the  new  republics  which  the  President  desires  you 
most  earnestly,  but  respectfully,  to  present  to  his  Im 
perial  Majesty.  From  this  view  it  is  evident  that  it 
is  not  so  much  for  the  new  states  themselves  as  for 
Spain  that  peace  has  become  absolutely  necessary. 
Their  independence  of  her,  whatever  intestine  divi 
sions  may,  if  intestine  divisions  shall,  yet  unhappily 
await  them,  is  fixed  and  irrevocable.  She  may,  in 
deed,  by  a  blind  and  fatal  protraction  of  the  war,  yet 
lose  more:  gain,  for  her,  is  impossible.  In  becoming 
the  advocate  for  peace  one  is  the  true  advocate  of 
Spain.  If  the  Emperor  shall,  by  his  wisdom,  enlighten 
the  councils  of  Spain,  and  bring  home  to  them  a  con 
viction  of  her  real  interests,  there  can  be  no  fears  of 
the  success  of  his  powerful  interposition.  You  are 
authorized,  in  that  spirit  of  the  most  perfect  frank 
ness  and  friendship  which  have  ever  characterized  all 
the  relations  between  Russia  and  the  United  States, 
to  disclose,  without  reserve,  the  feelings  and  the  wishes 
of  the  United  States  in  respect  to  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico.  They  are  satisfied  with  the  present  condition 
of  those  islands,  now  open  to  the  commerce  and  en- 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  III 

terprise  of  their  citizens.  They  desire  for  themselves 
no  political  change  in  them.  If  Cuba  were  to  declare 
itself  independent,  the  amount  and  the  character  of 
its  population  render  it  improbable  that  it  could  main 
tain  its  independence. 

"  Such  a  premature  declaration  might  bring  about  a 
renewal  of  those  shocking  scenes  of  which  a  neighbor 
ing  island  was  the  afflicting  theatre.  There  could  be 
no  effectual  preventive  of  those  scenes,  but  in  the 
guaranty,  and  in  a  large  resident  force,  of  foreign 
powers.  The  terms  of  such  guaranty,  and  the  quotas 
which  each  should  contribute  of  such  force,  would 
create  perplexing  questions  of  very  difficult  adjust 
ment;  to  say  nothing  of  the  continual  jealousies  which 
would  be  in  operation.  In  the  state  of  possession 
which  Spain  has,  there  would  be  a  ready  acquiescence 
of  those  very  foreign  powers,  all  of  whom  \vould  be 
put  into  angry  activity  upon  the  smallest  prospect  of  a 
transfer  of  those  islands.  The  United  States  could 
not,  with  indifference,  see  such  a  transfer  to  any 
European  power.  And  if  the  new  republics,  or  either 
of  them,  were  to  conquer  them,  their  maritime  force 
as  it  now  is,  or  for  a  long  time  to  come  is  likely  to  be, 
would  keep  up  constant  apprehensions  of  their  safety. 
Nor  is  it  believed  that  the  new  states  desire,  or  will 
attempt,  the  acquisition,  unless  they  shall  be  compelled 
in  their  own  defence,  to  make  it,  by  the  unnecessary 
prolongation  of  the  war.  Acting  on  the  policy  which 
is  here  unfolded,  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
although  they  would  have  been  justified  to  have  seized 


112  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  in  the  just  protection  of  the  lives 
and  the  commerce  of  their  citizens,  which  have  been  a 
prey  to  infamous  pirates  finding  succor  and  refuge 
in  Spanish  territory,  have  signally  displayed  their 
patience  and  moderation  by  a  scrupulous  respect  of 
the  sovereignty  of  Spain,  who  was  herself  bound,  but 
has  utterly  failed,  to  repress  those  enormities. 

"Finally  the  President  cherishes  the  hope  that  the 
Emperor's  devotion  to  peace,  no  less  than  his  friend 
ship  for  Spain,  will  induce  him  to  lend  the  high  author 
ity  of  his  name  to  the  conclusion  of  a  war  the  further 
prosecution  of  which  must  have  the  certain  effect  of 
an  useless  waste  of  human  life."  This  remarkable 
despatch  contained  more  than  three  thousand  words. 
The  above  quotation  includes  about  one  fourth  of  it. 
Middleton  was  authorized  to  communicate  it  all  at 
once  or  a  little  at  a  time  as  his  judgment  should  dic 
tate.28 

The  sentiments  of  the  Russian  government  were  not 
unknown  to  Clay  and  Adams.  Many  communications 

28  Clay  to  Middleton,  May  10,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  331 ;  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores ;  Amer 
ican  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  846;  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XIII,  403. 

"To  guard  against  any  accident  which  might  befall  the 
original,"  a  copy  of  this  instruction  of  May  10  was  mailed 
by  separate  conveyance  a  little  more  than  a  fortnight  lat<  . 
See  Brent  to  Middleton,  May  26,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  365. 

The  careful  editor  of  the  very  interesting  correspondence  of 
the  Russian  Ministers  in  Washington,  1818  to  1825,  states  in 
correctly  that  this  despatch  is  not  in  the  American  State  Pa 
pers.  See  American  Historical  Review,  XVIII,  561. 


CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN  113 

had  passed  between  the  two  governments  during  the 
years  immediately  preceding.29  The  Russian  minister, 
to  whom  Middleton's  instructions  were  shown  a  few 
days  after  they  were  written,  "  spoke  in  terms  of  high 
commendation  of  this  measure,  and  said,  without  be 
ing  able  to  anticipate  what  the  Emperor's  determina 
tion  upon  it  may  be,  he  is  quite  sure  that  it  will  be 

29  See  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  191-222,  passim ;  and  "  Corre 
spondence  of  the  Russian  Minister  in  Washington,  1818-1825," 
American  Historical  Review,  XVIII,  309-345,  and  537-562.  On 
November  9/21,  1818,  ibid.,  317,  Nesselrode  wrote  from  Aix- 
la-chapelle  to  Poletica  in  Washington :  "  Si  done,  a  Votre  ar- 
rivee  a  Washington,  le  gouvernement  Americam  n'a  point 
encore  resolu  la  reconnaissance  des  Colonies  Espagnoles  in- 
surgees,  il  Vous  est  tres-expressement  recommande  de  cher- 
cher  a  dissuader  le  Cabinet  de  Washington  de  cet  acte  d'hos- 
tilite  envers  1'Espagne." 

On  July  13/25,  1822,  ibid.,  342,  Nesselrode  wrote  Baron 
Tuyll  in  Washington :  "  Si  la  connaissance  du  desir  qu'aurait 
I'Empereur  de  voir  cet  etat  de  paix  se  prolonger,  pouvoit 
porter  le  Gouvernement  des  Etats-Unis  a  ne  modifier  en  rien 
les  dispositions  qu'il  a  manifestoes  envers  1'Espagne  et  a  ne 
pas  s'armer  centre  elle  dans  le  lutte  que  soutiennent  ses  prov 
inces  d'Outre-mer,  vous  n'hesiteriez  point  a  exprimer  les 
voeux  de  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale." 

On  December  2/14,  1822,  ibid.,  540,  Nesselrode  again  wrote 
Tuyll :  "  Nous  ne  pretendons  pas  arreter  la  marche  de  1'avenir ; 
1'affranchisement  de  1'Amerique  Meridionale  est  probable,  il 
est  imminent  peut-etre,  mais,  je  le  repete,  c'etait  une  raison 
f|e  plus  aux  yeux  de  I'Empereur,  pour  souhaiter  que  Son 
Ivlinistre  engageat  le  gouvernement  des  Etats-Unis  a  suivre 
un  systeme  inoffensif  a  1'egard  de  1'Espagne."  These  com 
munications  show  a  desire  to  maintain  peace,  although  in 
other  respects  they  differ  radically  from  the  position  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  their  spirit,  at  least, 
was  made  known  to  the  government  at  Washington. 


114  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

received  and  treated  by  him  with  great  consideration, 
and  as  an  act  equally  marked  by  moderation,  candor, 
and  friendly  feeling  towards  him  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States.  He  said  he  was  very  desirous  that 
there  should  be  time  for  this  measure  to  have  its  full 
effect,"  and  asked  Adams's  consent  for  him  to  com 
municate  it  to  the  Russian  ambassadors  at  Paris  and 
London,  hoping  through  them  to  exert  some  friendly 
influence  at  Madrid  earlier  than  could  be  done  through 
St.  Petersburg  to  dissuade  Spain  from  doing  anything 
further  to  precipitate  the  apprehended  attack  by  Mex 
ico  and  Colombia.  Adams  consented,  and  conversed 
at  length  with  the  baron  on  the  occasion  for,  the  char 
acter  of,  and  the  motives  for  the  proposed  mediation.30 
In  his  conversations  with  Adams,  Baron  Tuyll  seems 
to  have  gotten  a  more  definite  notion  than  Middle- 
ton's  instructions  gave  of  how  far  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  might  in  certain  contingencies  carry 
them.  At  least  Nesselrode  understood  Tuyll  to  re 
port  that  Adams  had  declared  that  if  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico  were  to  become  the  possession  of  any  American 
power  the  United  States  might  find  it  necessary  to 
insist  on  being  that  power.31  This  is  however  no 
more  than  the  despatch  to  Middleton  darkly  hints  at. 
The  instructions  to  Everett  at  Madrid  contain  a 
stronger  hint  at  such  a  feeling;  and  those  to  Poinsett 
at  Mexico  openly  suggest  it. 

On  the  day  after  he  had  written  Middleton's  instruc- 

30  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII,  8-10. 

31  Nesselrode  to  Tuyll,  le  4  de  septembre  1825,  American 
Historical  Review,  XVIII,  562. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  I  I  5 

tions,  Clay  told  Rufus  King,  who  was  just  ready  to 
set  out  on  his  second  mission  to  the  court  of  St.  James, 
that  the  coincidence  in  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
and  England  with  reference  to  the  war  between  Spain 
and  the  new  states  required  frankness  in  our  inter 
course  with  that  court.  In  this  spirit  he  was  to  make 
known  the  desire  of  the  President  to  see  the  war  hon 
orably  terminated.  He  was  told  of  the  above  in 
structions  to  Poinsett,  Everett,  and  Middleton,  and  a 
copy  of  the  last  was  enclosed.  In  concluding  the 
brief  note  Clay  said :  "  If  Great  Britain,  and  the  other 
principal  European  powers,  would  heartily  unite  with 
the  United  States  in  these  pacific  endeavors,  the  Pres 
ident  entertains  the  confident  hope  that  a  stop  would 
be  put  to  the  further  and  unnecessary  effusion  of 
human  blood."32 

Two  days  later  James  Brown,  the  minister  to  the 
French  court,  was  told  that  Poinsett  and  the  other 
ministers  to  the  new  states  had  been  instructed  to  use 
their  best  efforts  to  bring  about  peace  between  Spain 
and  those  states.  "But  it  is  in  Europe  more  than  in 
America  that  our  efforts  must  be  directed.  And  the 
strong  ground  to  take  is  that  peace  is  more  necessary 
to  Spain  than  to  the  new  republics."  He  was  told  that 
Everett  was  to  endeavor  to  convince  Spain  of  such 

32  Clay  to  King,  May  11,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  X,  345. 

Baron  Tuyll's  communications  to  the  Russian  ambassadors 
at  London  and  Paris  concerning  the  mediation  were,  at 
Adams's  request,  carried  by  King  in  order  that  the  matter 
might  first  reach  the  English  court  through  the  United  States 
minister.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII,  10. 


Il6  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

necessity;  Middleton  was  to  enlist  the  sympathy  and 
good  offices  of  Russia;  and  King  had  similar  instruc 
tions  with  reference  to  Great  Britain.  A  copy  of  Mid- 
dleton's  instructions  was  enclosed,  and  Brown  was  re 
quested  to  open  the  matter  with  the  French  govern 
ment.  In  concluding  this  despatch,  which  was  also 
brief,  Clay  said :  "  By  a  concerted  system  of  action, 
direct  and  collateral  on  Spain,  it  is  hoped  that  she 
may  be  made  to  see  the  necessity  of  peace.  And  great 
confidence  would  be  placed  in  this  hope,  if  Russia  and 
France,  the  powers  most  likely  to  influence  the  coun 
cils  of  Spain,  would  lend  their  hearty  cooperation."33 
As  a  part  of  the  concerted  action  being  brought  to 
bear  on  Spain,  Clay  mentioned  in  this  letter  to  Brown 
the  fact  that,  "Information  has  reached  us  that  the 
local  authorities  of  Cuba  have  petitioned  the  King  of 
Spain  to  acknowledge  the  new  republics  and  close  the 
war."  The  Mexican  minister  in  Washington  had  told 
his  government  the  same  on  May  8.  He  said  the 
ayuntamiento  of  Havana  had  some  time  before  peti 
tioned  the  Madrid  government  for  reinforcements  to 
enable  them  to  hold  the  island ;  but  now,  fears  having 
increased,  that  body  had  petitioned  the  parent  gov 
ernment  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  conti 
nental  states  as  the  only  means  of  saving  the  island. 
In  explanation  of  the  reason  for  these  increasing  fears 
Obregon  said  that  the  spirit  of  independence  was  in 
creasing  in  the  island  because  of  the  good  order  which 
they  saw  established  in  those  continental  states  and 

33  Clay  to  James  Brown,  May  13,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  356. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  I  I  / 

the  disorderly  condition  of  affairs  which  the  blunders 
of  the  Spanish  government  allowed  to  prevail  in  the 
island.34 

Before  Clay's  efforts  at  combined  mediation  had 
time  to  produce  any  results  a  series  of  events  occurred 
in  the  West  Indies  which  caused  him  considerable 
anxiety  and  threw  Mexico  into  a  fever  of  excitement. 
These  were  connected  with  certain  mysterious  move 
ments  of  French  naval  vessels  which  strengthened 
suspicions  already  existing  of  French  intentions  on 
Cuba.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  year  reports  had 
been  coming  from  various  sources  that  Spain  was 
gathering  reinforcements  in  the  ports  of  the  Peninsula 
to  send  to  Havana  for  protecting  and  preserving  order 
in  the  islands  and  operating  from  there  against  Mex- 
co,  Central  America,  and  Colombia.35  The  fact  that 

3*Obregon  to  Secretario,  8  de  mayo  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

35  The  Mexican  minister  in  Washington  wrote  his  govern 
ment  on  February  2  that  reports  had  reached  him  of  two 
ships  fitting  out  in  Ferrol.  Six  days  later  he  enclosed  a  clip 
ping  from  the  Washington  Gazette  saying  that  a  frigate,  three 
sloops  of  war,  and  several  transports  had  already  reached 
Havana  from  Spain,  and  others  were  coming  to  make  an  at 
tack  from  there  on  Vera  Cruz.  On  March  ,30  he  told  of  the 
arrival  of  the  new  reinforcements  in  Cuba.  In  this  letter  he 
said  he  had  offered  rewards  to  Cuban  exiles  whom  he  was  in 
touch  with  to  induce  them  to  burn  the  Spanish  ships  that  had 
recently  come.  On  July  n  he  reported  three  thousand  men 
on  their  way  from  Corufia  to  reinforce  the  garrison  of  San 
Juan  de  Ulua  in  Vera  Cruz  harbor,  the  only  remaining  Spanish 
post  in  Mexico.  Obregon  to  Secretario,  2  de  febrero,  8  de 
febrero,  30  de  marzo,  11  de  junio  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 


Il8  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

reinforcements  were  coming,  though  learned  with  re 
gret  and  fear,  occasioned  no  surprise.  But  when  cer 
tain  transports  reached  Havana  they  were  accom 
panied  by  a  French  war  vessel.  This  was  disquieting. 
Alaman,  the  foreign  minister  in  Mexico,  reported  the 
fact  to  Rocafuerte,  the  charge  in  London,  saying  that 
the  transports  had  apparently  come  from  the  Canary 
islands  without  naval  convoy,  trusting  in  the  protec 
tion  of  French  ships  to  get  to  their  destination.  This 
was  regarded  as  a  violation  of  neutrality,  since  the 
troops  were  evidently  directed  against  Mexico  and  Co 
lombia.  It  looked  to  him  like  another  bit  of  double 
dealing  and  bad  faith  similar  to  placing  the  cordon  of 
French  sanitary  police  along  the  Pyrenees  before  the 
invasion  of  Spain.  Rocafuerte  was  asked  to  bring 
the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  English  government 
and  ask  that  cabinet  to  solicit  an  explanation  from 
France.36  Obregon  writing  from  Washington  of  the 
matter  said  all  that  was  certainly  known  was  that  the 

Michelena  reported  from  London  that,  in  a  conference  of 
May  21,  Canning  had  told  him  that  the  troops  being  collected 
at  Coruna  ostensibly  for  Peru  were  really  going  to  Havana; 
and  Michelena  had  replied  that  opinion  in  the  island  was  be 
coming  unfavorable  to  the  Peninsula  because  of  the  unwise 
measures  of  the  Madrid  government.  Rocafuerte  wrote  on 
July  9  that  merchants  of  Cadiz  and  Havana  had  agreed  to 
stand  the  cost  of  an  expedition  of  12,000  men  against  Panama 
or  Mexico.  One  vessel  had  left  Cadiz  and  three  more  were 
about  to  sail.  Michelena  to  Secretario,  21  de  marzo  de  1825; 
Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  9  de  julio  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 

36  Alaman  to  Rocafuerte,  I  de  junio  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  1 19 

French  vessel  had  pursued  the  same  course  at  the 
same  time  and  entered  the  harbor  of  Havana  with 
the  Spanish  transports.  In  acknowledging  and  com 
menting  on  this,  the  despatch  from  the  Mexican  for 
eign  office  said  there  must  have  been  a  design  in  the 
meeting;  and  Obregon  was  asked  to  bring  the  matter 
to  the  attention  of  the  United  States  government.37 

Before  any  explanation  of  the  above  had  been  made 
another  French  movement  in  West  Indian  waters 
roused  new  and  more  serious  suspicions.  A  Mexican 
agent  in  Jamaica  reported  to  his  government  late  in 
July  that  a  French  fleet  of  twenty-eight  vessels  had 
suddenly  appeared  at  Martinique,  and  its  movements 
were  mysterious.  A  French  ship  had  just  brought  to 
Santiago  de  Cuba  the  new  Spanish  governor.  Some 
of  the  French  ships  had  been  seen  off  the  island  of 
Santo  Domingo  moving  in  the  direction  of  Havana. 
He  enclosed  a  clipping  from  a  Jamaica  paper  saying 
that  French  troops  had  disembarked  in  Cuba.38 

This  startling  news  reached  Mexico  August  15, 
1825.  The  next  day  Alaman  hastened  to  show  the 
correspondence  to  Ward,  the  British  charge,  and 
then  to  Poinsett.  Ward  and  Poinsett,  whose  relations 
had  been  harmonious  up  to  this  time,  conferred  re 
garding  the  matter,  and  the  former  talked  with  Presi- 

37  Obregon  to  Secretario,  2  de  julio  de  1825,  and  reply,  7  de 
septiembre  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

38  Basadre  to   [Secretario],  Kingston,  24  de  julio  de  1825, 
and  27  de  julio  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones   Exteriores.    See 
note  17,  above. 

Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  142,  discusses 
briefly  the  appearance  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  West  Indies. 


I2O  CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

dent  Victoria.  As  a  motive,  Poinsett  suggested  to 
Alaman  that  possibly  Spain  had  decided  to  cede  the 
island  to  France  rather  than  have  it  wrested  from  her 
through  an  independence  movement  encouraged  from 
Mexico.  To  confirm  his  suspicion  he  alluded  to  the 
fact  that  a  Cuban,  who  had  visited  Santa  Anna  in 
Yucatan  some  months  earlier  and  had  represented 
himself  to  be  an  agent  of  the  Cuban  patriots  and  sug 
gested  to  Santa  Anna  the  invasion  of  Cuba  for  which 
the  latter  immediately  began  preparations,  was  now 
back  in  Cuba  and  in  favor  with  the  Spanish  authori 
ties.  Poinsett  told  Alaman  that  this  might  have  been 
but  a  ruse  to  discover  the  intentions  of  Mexico,  which, 
thus  discovered,  would  doubtless  be  considered  such 
"as  would  justify  any  measures  Spain  and  France 
might  think  proper  to  take  for  its  preservation." 

In  the  hurried  conferences  mentioned  above  it  was 
arranged  that  identical  notes  should  be  presented  to 
Ward  and  Poinsett  with  reference  to  the  matter.  The 
notes  declared  that  the  President  of  Mexico  saw  in 
these  movements  of  French  war  vessels  an  act  hostile 
to  the  independent  states  of  America;  .they  referred 
to  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  against  the 
interference  of  any  third  power  in  the  conflict  be 
tween  Spain  and  her  former  dominions;  argued  that 
this  conduct  of  France  was  certainly  such  interfer 
ence  ;  and  asked  that  each  bring  the  matter  to  the  at 
tention  of  his  government  in  order  that  his  govern 
ment  might  demand  of  France  such  explanations  as 
the  case  required.  Poinsett  objected  to  the  language 


CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN  121 

of  the  note  in  one  particular  as  the  note  was  originally 
drawn  because,  he  said,  it  implied  that  the  declara 
tion  of  Monroe  gave  Mexico  the  right  to  demand  that 
the  United  States  should  interfere  on  behalf  of  the 
new  states.  It  was  modified  so  as  to  remove  the  im 
plication  and  the  change  was  also  indicated  to  Ward. 
Alaman  had  shown  some  hesitancy  in  making  the  notes 
to  the  governments  of  England  and  the  United  States 
identical.  Ward  and  Poinsett  appealed  to  President 
Victoria  and  were  assured  that  the  notes  should  be 
identical.  He  "expressed  his  dissatisfaction  at  the 
conduct  of  Mr.  Alaman  and  declared  that  he  himself 
was  ignorant  of  the  arrival  of  this  important  intelli 
gence  until  he  saw  it  published  in  the  '  Sol.'  Such 
conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary  is  inexplicable 
and  almost  incredible."39  This  evidence  of  discord 
between  the  President  and  his  chief  adviser  occurred 
six  weeks  before  the  latter's  resignation,  discussed  in 
the  preceding  chapter. 

The  newspaper  which  had  published  the  correspond 
ence  was  owned,  and  presumably  also  edited,  by  Ala 
man.  An  editorial  of  the  same  day  on  which  the  cor 
respondence  was  published  (also  the  same  on  which 

39  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  17,  1825,  and  enclosures,  Ala 
man  to  Poinsett,  August  16,  1825,  and  Poinsett  to  Alaman, 
August  17,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  II;  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  364;  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  995.  And  see  also  Poinsett 
to  Clay,  August  21,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  I ;  extracts  are  in  American  State  Papers,  For 
eign,  V,  909,  and  in  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII, 
488. 


122  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

the  hurried  conferences  occurred)  had  declared :  "  In 
our  opinion  this  movement  can  have  no  other  object 
than  to  cover  the  island  of  Cuba  from  the  designs  of 
the  United  States  and  from  those  attributed  to  Colom 
bia  and  Mexico."  On  the  same  day  Poinsett  addressed 
a  spirited  note  to  Alaman  protesting  that  in  the  edi 
torial  the  designs  of  Colombia  and  Mexico  were  rep 
resented  as  hypothetical,  while  those  of  the  United 
States  were  represented  as  positive.  Poinsett  declared 
that  the  United  States  never  did  entertain  such  de 
signs  and  had  disavowed  all  such ;  and  asked  Alaman 
to  use  his  influence  with  the  editor  to  have  the  mis 
taken  impression  corrected.  Alaman's  reply,  also  of 
the  same  day,  promised,  if  possible,  to  have  an  article 
inserted  in  the  next  day's  issue  correcting  public  opin 
ion  on  the  matter.40 

The  alarm  caused  by  these  French  movements  in 
the  West  Indies  proved  happily  to  be  a  false  one. 
When  the  explanations  called  for  by  England  and  the 
United  States  at  Mexico's  request  were  made  it  was 
affirmed  that  the  convoying  of  the  Spanish  transports 
from  Martinique  to  Havana  by  the  French  cruiser  had 
been  solely  on  the  order  and  responsibility  of  the 
French  commander  at  Martinique ;  and  had  been  dis 
avowed  by  the  government  and  prohibited  for  the  fu 
ture.41  Canning  in  writing  to  the  British  representa- 

40  Poinsett  to  Alaman,  August  16,  1825 ;  Alaman  to  Poinsett, 
August  16,  1825 ;  and  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  17,  1825,  MS., 
Department  of  State,  Duplicate  Despatches  from  Poinsett. 

41  Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  9  de  agosto  de  1825,  saying  that 
Canning  had  promised  to  question  France,  but  that  no  expla- 


CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN  123 

tive  at  Paris  said  he  hoped  this  explanation  which 
Villele  and  Damas  had  given  was  true ;  "  But,"  he 
continued,  "  I  confess  I  have  my  doubts,  whether  it 
was  not  (a  prescribed  I  will  not  say)  a  permitted  ex 
periment,  to  see  how  far  a  French  force  might  be  in 
cidentally  and  imperceptibly  slipped  into  Havannah. 
Villele  ought  to  know  that  our  eyes  are  open  to  the 
possibility  of  such  a  manoeuvre.  He  ought  to  know, 
too,  that  we  would  not  put  up  with  it."42 

The  large  French  fleet  whose  movements  had  occa 
sioned  by  far  the  greater  alarm  had  gone  to  the  West 
Indies,  ostensibly,  at  least,  to  attend  and  solemnize  the 
ceremonies  connected  with  French  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  Hayti.  After  performing  that  cere 
mony  it  had  touched  at  Havana,  then  visited  Norfolk, 
and  sailed  from  there  late  in  August,  part  of  it  re 
turning  to  France  and  the  rest  to  the  naval  station  at 
Martinique.43  The  Spanish  government  declared  to 

nation  had  yet  been  given  him ;  Obregon  to  Secretario,  18  de 
septiembre  de  1825,  enclosing  Rocafuerte  to  Obregon,  12  de 
agosto  de  1825,  telling  what  the  French  government  had 
declared  to  the  English.  All  in  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

42  Canning  to  Granville,  June  21,  1825,  in  Stapleton,  Official 
Correspondence  of  Canning,  I,  376.     This  shows  that  the  ex 
planation  had  been  asked  and  given  long  before  the  Mexican 
government's  note  of  June  i,  requesting  such,  could  have  been 
received.     Before  the  French  movement  had  occurred  Can 
ning  had  said :  "  I  have  some  reason  to  believe  that  Polignac 
is  instructed,  or  is  disposed  without  instruction  (I  would  not 
undertake  to  say  which)  to  hint  at  the  possibility  of  the  occu 
pation  of  the  Havannah  by  France.    That  will  never  do." 
Ibid,  265. 

43  Obregon  to  Secretario,  18  de  septiembre  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores.    The  address  of  President  Boyer  of 


124  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

Nelson,  the  retiring  United  States  minister  at  Madrid, 
that  "His  Majesty  has  at  no  time  thought  of  conced 
ing  to  any  power  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico, 
and,  so  far  from  such  a  purpose,  is  firmly  determined 
to  keep  them  under  the  dominion  and  authority  of  his 
legitimate  sovereignty."44  After  the  uncertainty  con 
cerning  the  French  operations  had  been  cleared  up 
and  the  excitement  had  passed,  Clay  declared  to  the 
French  government  through  Brown,  the  minister  at 
Paris :  "  The  President  conceives  it  due  to  the  friendly 
relations  which  happily  subsist  between  the  two  na 
tions,  and  to  the  frankness  by  which  he  wishes  all 
their  intercourse  to  be  characterised,  that  the  purpose 
of  any  similar  movement  hereafter,  made  in  a  season 
of  peace  should  be  communicated  to  this  government. 
.  .  .  The  President  cannot  suppose  a  state  of  things 
in  which  either  of  the  great  maritime  powers  of 
Europe,  with  or  without  the  consent  of  Spain,  would 
feel  itself  justified  to  occupy,  or  attempt  the  occupa 
tion  of  Cuba  or  Porto  Rico  without  the  concurrence 
or  at  least  the  knowledge  of  the  United  States."45  In 

July  n,  1825,  accepting  the  Ordinance  of  the  King  of  France 
recognizing  independence  is  in  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XIII,  999.  Temperley,  "  Later  American  Policy  of 
Canning,"  American  Historical  Review,  XI,  791,  says  the 
French  fleet  "  came  ostensibly  to  collect  a  debt  from  Hayti." 

44  Clay  to  Poinsett,  September  24,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X;  extracts  from  this  letter  not  including 
this  portion  are  in  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  581, 
and  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  num 
ber  42,  page  7. 

45  Clay  to  James  Brown,  October  25,  1825,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  X,  404;  British  and  Foreign  State  Pa 
pers,  XIII,  424. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  125 

carrying  out  these  instructions  Brown  declared,  as  he 
was  authorized  to  do,  that  the  United  States  "could 
not  consent  to  the  occupation  of  those  islands  by  any 
other  European  power  than  Spain,  under  any  con 
tingency  whatever."  The  French  minister  admitted 
that  the  United  States  had  a  right  to  be  informed 
of  the  reason  for  such  a  movement  as  that  of  the 
French  fleet  and  said  it  was  "a  departure  from  the 
rule,  but  that,  in  future,  the  United  States  should  be 
duly  apprised  of  the  objects  of  every  such  squadron 
sent  into  their  vicinity."46 

In  the  same  letter  in  which  Canning  expressed  his 
suspicions  of  the  French  explanation  of  the  matter  of 
the  French  convoy  of  Spanish  troop  ships,  he  stated 
positively  England's  policy  with  reference  to  Cuba, 
which  was  practically  the  same  as  that  of  the  United 
States,  namely,  "  As  to  Cuba,  you  cannot  too  soon,  nor 

The  greatest  interest  attaching  to  this  French  movement  in 
the  West  Indies  so  far  as  students  of  the  history  of  the 
United  States  are  concerned  grows  out  of  the  fact  that  it 
furnished  an  opportunity  for  what  is  usually  thought  of  as 
Clay's  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  See  Man 
ning,  "  Statements,  Interpretations,  and  Applications  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  from  1823  to  1845  "  in  the  Proceedings  of 
the  American  Society  of  International  Law  for  1914,  pages 
34-59.  See  also  below,  the  chapter  on  Negotiations  for  a 
Commercial  Treaty  and  footnote  16  of  that  chapter. 

In  December  Clay's  letter  to  James  Brown  of  October  25 
was  shown  to  the  Mexican  minister.  Obregon  to  Secretario, 
15  de  diciembre  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

46  Brown  to  Damas,  January  2,  1826,  American  State  Pa 
pers,  Foreign,  V,  882 ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII, 
444.  Brown  to  Clay,  January  10,  1826,  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  881 ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  443. 


126  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

too  amicably,  of  course,  represent  to  Villele  the  im 
possibility  of  our  allowing  France  (or  France  us,  I 
presume),  to  meddle  in  the  internal  affairs  of  that 
colony.  We  sincerely  wish  it  to  remain  with  the 
mother  country.  Next  to  that  I  wish  it  independent, 
either  singly  or  in  connection  with  Mexico.  But 
what  cannot  or  must  not  be,  is  that  any  great  mari 
time  power  should  get  possession  of  it.  The  Amer 
icans  (Yankees,  I  mean)  think  of  this  matter  just  as  I 
do."47 

Canning  assumed  a  cynical  and  suspicious  attitude 
toward  Clay's  effort  at  combined  mediation  between 
Spain  and  her  former  possessions.  After  an  inter 
view  on  the  subject  he  said  he  found  King,  the  United 
States  minister,  "  relying  with  a  simpleness  which  ap 
peared  quite  childish  on  the  good  sense  of  the  conti 
nental  powers,  for  the  advice  which  they  would  give 
to  Spain,  and  on  the  awakened  good  sense  of  Spain 
for  listening  to  that  advice  when  given.  I  set  him 
right  upon  these  points;  on  which  if  his  government 
blunder  as  sincerely  as  he  appears  to  do,  there  is  per 
haps  no  harm  done  beyond  the  loss  of  time,  but  if — 

47  Canning  to  Granville,  June  21,  1825,  in  Stapleton,  Official 
Correspondence  of  Canning,  I,  276.  Latane,  United  States 
and  Spanish  America,  101.  See  also  Stapleton,  A.  G.,  Life 
of  Canning,  III,  142-150;  and  Temperley,  "Later  American 
Policy  of  Canning,"  American  Historical  Review,  XI,  790, 
which  says  that  Canning  feared  the  United  States  more  than 
France.  Temperley,  Life  of  Canning,  188,  says  that  Eng 
land's  recognition  of  the  Spanish-American  states  "  restrained 
the  pretensions  of  the  Yankees,  and  preserved  Cuba  to 
Spain." 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  I2/ 

as  the  suspicion  sometimes  comes  across  me — this 
bonhomie  is  affected  by  the  U[nited]  S[tates]  G[ov- 
ernment]  for  the  express  purpose  of  being  enabled 
to  cry  out  and  take  a  new  line  on  the  disappointment 
of  their  groundless  expectations,  why  then  the  Yan 
kees  may  be  just  the  rogues  that  we  have  always 
hitherto  taken  them  to  be,  but  which  I  was  willing  to 
hope  they  might  have  resolved  to  be  no  longer."48 
i^Fully  persuaded  that  Clay's  plan  would  fail,  as  a 
counter  proposition  he  proposed  that  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  the  United  States  should  unite  in  dis 
claiming  any  intentions  on  the  islands,  thus  calming 
the  fears  of  Spain  and  preparing  her  for  receiving 
peace  proposals.  But  as  Adams  had  evaded  the  issue 
two  years  earlier  when  Canning  tried  to  get  the  United 
States  government  to  commit  itself  against  the  an 
nexation  of  any  former  Spanish  possessions,  so  Clay 
evaded  it  now.  He  replied  through  King  that  Can 
ning's  proposal  was  likely  to  defeat  its  avowed  pur 
pose  and  encourage  Spain  to  continue  the  war  since  it 
would  relieve  her  of  the  fear  of  seizure  by  any  of  these 
three  powers.  A  few  days  later,  after  he  had  learned 
that  France  had  refused  to  accede  to  Canning's  pro 
posal,  Clay  sent  through  King  a  copy  of  the  letter  of 
October  25  to  Brown  at  Paris  warning  the  French 
government  that  the  United  States  "  could  not  consent 
to  the  occupation  of  those  islands  by  any  other  Euro 
pean  power  than  Spain " ;  and  said  if  Great  Britain 

48  Canning  to  Liverpool,  August  6,  1825,  in  Stapleton,  Offi 
cial  Correspondence  of  Canning,  I,  283. 


128  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

should  direct  her  ambassador  at  Paris  to  protest  in 
like  manner  nothing  more  would  be  necessary.49 

When  the  excitement  concerning  the  movements  of 
the  French  fleet  was  at  its  height  Clay  took  steps  to 
reveal  to  Mexico  the  efforts  he  had  begun  some  months 
earlier  to  induce  Russia,  France,  and  England  to  bring 
pressure  to  bear  on  Spain  to  prevail  on  her  to  ac 
knowledge  the  independence  of  her  former  continental 
possessions  in  order  to  save  the  islands.  At  a  con 
ference  early  in  August  he  read  to  the  Mexican  min 
ister  portions  of  the  instructions  which  he  had  sent 
for  the  purpose  to  the  American  ministers  to  those 
three  courts;50  and  in  September  he  sent  to  Poinsett 
in  Mexico  a  copy  of  the  instructions  to  Middleton 
given  May  10,  authorizing  him  to  communicate  it  to 
the  Mexican  cabinet.51 

Cubans  who  desired  to  revolutionize  the  island  and 
join  it  to  the  United  States  had  come  to  Baltimore 

49  Clay  to  King,  October  17, 1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  X,  394;  and  same  to  same,   October  26,   1825, 
ibid.,  405. 

For  Canning's  proposal  see  also  Latane,  United  States  and 
Spanish  America,  101 ;  and  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International 
Relations,  147-151.  On  page  152  this  last  writer  says  that 
Canning,  on  receipt  of  Clay's  suggestion  that  England  should 
declare  to  France  her  unwillingness  to  see  Cuba  pass  to  any 
other  European  power  than  Spain,  declared  that  he  had  already 
stated  to  France  practically  the  same  thing  in  the  previous 
July,  and  so  there  was  no  reason  now  for  repeating  it  at 
someone  else's  suggestion. 

50  Obregon  to  Secretario,  8  de  agosto  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

51  Clay  to  Poinsett,  September  24,  1825,  as  cited  in  note  44. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 


during  this  same  exciting  summer  and  solicited  aid 
from  the  United  States,  ostensibly  for  suppressing  an 
apprehended  slave  insurrection.  According  to  Obre- 
gon's  report  the  Cubans  were  given  to  understand  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  would  not  vio 
late  its  neutrality  by  assisting  a  revolt;  but  that  the 
island  would  be  received  if  it  should  become  inde 
pendent  and  offer  itself.  Obregon  added  that  if  the 
island  should  be  taken  by  the  United  States  thus  it 
would  have  to  be  at  the  cost  of  a  war  with  England 
and  probably  writh  France. 

At  the  same  time  Cuban  revolutionary  agents  were 
operating  in  Mexico.  On  July  5  President  Victoria 
had  been  informed  by  eleven  natives  of  Cuba  that  they 
had  determined  to  form  an  association  named  a 
"Junta  for  the  promotion  of  Cuban  Liberty,"  to  be 
composed  of  Cubans  resident  in  Mexico  and  of  Mex 
icans  desiring  the  liberty  of  Cuba.  They  wrished  his 
approbation.  In  reply  they  were  told  that  the  presi 
dent  saw  with  satisfaction  their  efforts  for  the  liberty 
of  their  country;  but  that  he  could  not  authorize  the 
formation  of  the  junta  since  that  fell  under  the  juris 
diction  of  the  government  of  the  Federal  District. 
The  matter  was  taken  up  with  the  local  authorities, 
and  after  some  deliberation  the  organization  was 
authorized.  It  was  effected  on  the  very  day  on  which 
the  news  of  the  appearance  of  the  French  fleet  in  the 
West  Indies  was  published.  Two  days  later  the  gov 
ernor  of  the  Federal  District  wrote  the  minister  for 
foreign  relations  that  on  the  evening  of  August  16  an 
10 


I3O  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

officer  of  the  district  government  had  attended  and 
presided  over  a  meeting  of  the  Cubans;  that  a  pres 
ident  and  secretary  had  been  elected  from  their  own 
number;  and  that  among  the  Mexicans  elected  to 
membership  were  Bravo,  the  vice-president,  and  Santa 
Anna.  In  reply  the  governor  was  told  that  the  pres 
ident  wished  him  to  take  care  that  the  meetings  of 
the  junta  should  be  orderly ;  that  the  name  of  the  gov 
ernment  be  not  used;  and  that  nothing  be  said  about 
intervention,  either  in  the  meetings  or  in  the  manifesto 
which  the  junta  was  going  to  send  to  their  com 
patriots.52  Poinsett  reported  in  September  that  "the 
principal  officers  in  the  army  and  many  of  the  most 
distinguished  members  of  both  houses  of  Congress  " 
had  united  with  the  Cuban  junta.53 

Although  Santa  Anna's  preparations  in  the  early 
spring  to  invade  and  revolutionize  Cuba  from  Yucatan 
had  been  on  his  own  responsibility,54  and  he  had  been 

52  Eleven  Cubans  to  Victoria,  5  de  julio  de  1825,  to  which 
the  names  of  all  are  signed  and  a  list  attached  of  twenty- 
three  Cubans  resident  in  Mexico  City;  Victoria  to  Cubans, 
15  de  julio  de  1825;  Governor  of  Federal  District  to  Secre- 
tario,  3  de  agosto  de  1825,  and  reply  of  6  de  agosto  de  1825 ; 
Governor  of  Federal  District  to  Secretario,  18  de  agosto  de 
1825,  and  reply  of  20  de  agosto  de  1825;  all  in  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones    Exteriores.    And    see    Zavala,    Ensayo    Historico,    I, 
387-408. 

53  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  13,  1825,  in  cipher,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.    An  extract 
from  this  despatch  but  not  including  the  cipher  portion  is  in 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  852;  and  in  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  415. 

54  Obregon  to  Secretario,  21  de  mayo  de  1825,  enclosing  clip 
pings  from  American  papers  commenting  on  the  expedition, 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

cashiered  for  his  conduct,  yet  a  few  weeks  later  the 
government  had  itself  decided  to  undertake  the  same. 
Just  before  the  end  of  May  the  foreign  office  in  Mex 
ico  wrote  Obregon  that  the  president  had  decided  to 
assist  with  Mexican  forces  in  effecting  the  liberation 
of  Cuba,  and  had  promised  the  Cubans  that  it  should 
be  done  the  following  winter.55  A  few  days  later  a 
letter  to  Rocafuerte  in  London  said  recent  news  from 
Havana  had  caused  the  government  to  decide  on  this 
step.  Relations  had  been  established  with  the  island 
to  facilitate  a  happy  outcome  of  the  enterprise,  and 
nothing  would  be  omitted  to  assure  it.  To  that  end 
he  was  urged  to  hasten  the  coming  of  ships  being 
purchased  in  England,  since  they  would  be  the  chief 
reliance.  He  was  told  to  say  nothing  to  the  British 

some  saying  Bolivar  was  behind  it,  and  others  believing  Eng 
land  was  furthering  it,  and  mentioning  England's  ambition  to 
get  control  of  Panama  to  construct  a  canal  there ;  same  to 
same,  8  de  Julio  de  1825;  and  Secretario  to  Obregon,  [  ?]  de 
agosto  de  1825,  telling  of  Santa  Anna's  removal  from  his 
command  because  of  this  and  other  acts;  all  in  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

"  II  avait  etc  grand  bruit  dernierement  d'une  expedition,  qui 
devait  sortir  de  Campeche,  sous  les  ordres  de  General  Santa- 
Anna,  et  etait  destinee  a  envahir  1'ile  de  Cuba.  Les  feuilles 
Americaines  contenaient  meme  une  proclamation,  que  ce 
General  avait  addressee  a  cette  ocasion  a  ses  troupes.  Mais 
cette  nouvelle  est  aujourd'hui  contradite  et  Ton  pretend  que 
ce  plan  a  etc  abandonne."  Tuyll  to  Nesselrode,  Washington, 
le  14/26  Mai  1825,  American  Historical  Review,  XVIII,  559. 

55  Obregon  to  Secretario,  17  de  septiembre  de  1825,  in  cipher, 
acknowledging  receipt  of  a  letter  of  28  de  mayo,  telling  the 
decision  of  the  president  of  Mexico,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exte 
riores. 


132  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

government  of  the  matter  till  plans  should  be  com 
pleted.56  In  the  middle  of  June  Poinsett  said  Bolivar 
was  urging  that  the  Panama  congress  assemble  three 
months  earlier  than  had  been  planned,  and  he  believed 
the  purpose  was  to  concert  plans  for  attacking  Cuba. 
The  Colombian  minister  had  made  proposals  to  Mex 
ico  for  a  joint  attack  on  Cuba,  and  the  Congress  had 
discussed  the  matter  in  secret  session,  deciding  that 
such  action  would  be  inexpedient  at  present.  In  cipher 
Poinsett  declared  the  fact  was  that  the  Colombian  pro 
posal  was  refused  because  Mexico  was  ambitious  to 
undertake  the  enterprise  alone;  and  this  Mexican  jeal 
ousy  of  Colombia  was  the  greatest  reason  for  hoping 
that  nothing  would  be  undertaken  at  present.  In 
order  to  avert  the  attack  Poinsett  suggested  that  this 
jealousy  ought  to  be  cultivated  and  that  the  people  of 
Cuba  ought  to  be  encouraged  to  resist  Mexican  or  Co 
lombian  interference.57  The  excitement  about  the 
middle  of  August  over  the  French  fleet  in  the  West 
Indies  caused  Congress  to  devote  another  secret  ses 
sion  to  the  proposed  invasion.  Numerous  military 
juntas  had  been  held  to  consider  the  matter.  The 
wish  to  anticipate  Colombia  was  manifest.58 

56  [Secretario]  to  Rocafuerte,  8  de  junio  de  1825,  in  cipher, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.    He  was  told  that  the  subject  was 
to  be  discussed  by  the  conference  at  Panama  and  it  was  still 
uncertain   whether   the   enterprise   would   be   undertaken   by 
Mexico  alone  or  by  the  allied  countries. 

57  Poinsett  to  Clay,  June  15, 1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

58  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  21,  1825,  as  cited  in  note  39,  pre 
ceding.    This    portion   of    the   letter   is    in    cipher   and   not 
printed. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO  SPAIN  133 

About  the  middle  of  September  Poinsett  told  in 
cipher  that  the  Cuban  Junta  had  presented  a  memorial 
to  the  Congress  urging  that  the  expedition  be  sent 
at  once.  He  said  it  would  have  the  support  of  the 
executive,  and  it  was  probable  that  the  Congress  would 
act  favorably.59  The  Mexican  Eagle,  the  organ  of 
the  executive,  told  on  September  19  of  the  arrival 
of  one  of  the  ships  purchased  in  England,  and  said : 
"  The  navy  of  Mexico  begins  to  figure  among  those 
of  the  new  republics  of  America.  The  happy  union 
of  the  island  of  Cuba  to  the  Mexican  confederation 
would  give  us  in  time  the  most  powerful  navy  in 
America  and  one  of  the  most  brilliant  that  floats  on 
the  seas."60  At  the  end  of  October  Poinsett  told  Clay, 
again  in  cipher,  that  the  Mexican  cabinet  "has  re 
solved,  on  the  arrival  of  the  vessels  of  war  now  fitting 
out  in  the  United  States  and  of  a  squadron  which  is 
expected  daily  from  Colombia  and  which  has  been 
subsidized  by  Mexico,  to  put  on  board  of  these  vessels 
two  thousand  men  to  send  them  to  cruise  off  Cuba 
and  to  land  the  men  on  some  convenient  point  of  the 
island  where  they  expect  to  be  joined  by  the  patriots." 
He  said  however  that  the  project  had  met  with  some 
opposition  in  the  Congress,  and  if  carried  out  it  would 
have  to  be  solely  on  executive  authority  and  with  in 
adequate  supplies.  He  expected  the  project  to  fail 
and  produce  only  the  most  disastrous  consequences, 

59  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  13,  1825,  as  cited  in  note  53, 
preceding. 

GOAguila  Mejicana,  19  de  septiembre  de  1825,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


134  CUBA  SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

for  he  feared  that  one  or  both  parties  might  arm  the 
blacks  as  auxiliaries.  The  Mexican  government  did 
not  know  that  he  was  acquainted  with  their  plans,  so 
he  could  not  speak  openly  on  the  subject;  he  would 
endeavor,  however,  to  discourage  the  attempt.61  In 
an  all  cipher  despatch  of  December  2,  1825,  Poinsett 
said:  "The  Cabinet  of  Mexico  immediately  after  the 
surrender  of  the  Castle  of  Ulloa  [Ulua]  proposed 
[again]  to  Congress  to  undertake  an  expedition  against 
the  island  of  Cuba."  The  lower  house  debated  the 
matter  for  two  days  in  secret  session  and  rejected  it 
by  the  narrow  margin  of  two.  When  defeat  was 
seen  to  be  inevitable  the  ministry  tried  to  withdraw 
the  proposition  without  a  vote,  in  order  that  the  execu 
tive  might  undertake  a  partial  expedition  as  outlined 
above  without  appearing  to  act  in  direct  contradiction 
to  the  Congress.  But  the  house  insisted  on  deciding 
the  issue.62 

During  the  last  three  months  of  1825  frequent  re 
ports  from  Obregon  and  Rocafuerte  indicated  that 
Spain,  very  far  from  thinking  of  ceding  Cuba  to  a 
European  power  or  permitting  it  to  be  seized  by  an 
American  power,  was  collecting  new  reinforcements 
in  the  ports  of  Spain  and  despatching  them  under 
convoy  to  Havana  to  defend  the  islands  against  all 
comers.63  Obregon,  knowing  what  the  Mexican  cab- 

61  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  29,  1825,  in  cipher,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

62  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  2,  1825,  in  cipher,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

63  Obregon  to  Secretario,  8  de  octubre  de  1825,  and  same  to 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  135 

inet  was  planning  to  do,  and  not  knowing  that  Poinsett 
was  on  the  inside  \and  reporting  the  plans  to  the  cab 
inet  at  Washington,  declared  to  his  government  on 
November  30  that  the  loss  to  Spain  of  the  islands  was 
nearer  than  the  United  States  supposed  and  feared. 
He  suspected  that  Spain  would  seemingly  yield  to  the 
diplomatic  pressure  being  brought  to  bear  on  her  and 
enter  into  negotiations  as  she  was  being  urged  to  do ; 
but  with  no  other  object  than  to  neutralize  the  projects 
of  Colombia  and  Mexico  for  invading  and  freeing  the 
island.  Obregon's  opinion  was  confirmed  a  few  days 
later  by  a  Colombian  who  told  him  that  a  large  force 
was  being  prepared  at  Cartagena  supposedly  to  aid  in 
liberating  Cuba.64  As  a  suggestion  of  the  probable 
reception  awaiting  a  Mexican  liberating  expedition 
Obregon  told  of  the  sensation  produced  at  Havana 
when  on  December  5  a  Mexican  war  vessel  had  ar 
rived  bearing  the  former  Spanish  commander  of  the 
fort  of  Ulua  in  Vera  Cruz  harbor,  which  had  surren 
dered  to  the  Mexican  forces  a  little  more  than  a  fort 
night  before.  The  two  Mexican  commissioners  in 

same,  10  de  octubre  de  1825;  Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  19  de 
octubre  de  1825,  saying  that  three  thousand  recruits  forced 
against  their  wish  to  embark  at  Ferrol  had  sailed  for  Havana 
convoyed  by  two  frigates  and  three  brigs ;  Obregon  to  Secre 
tario,  13  de  noviembre  de  1825,  reporting  the  same  as  the  last ; 
same  to  same,  12  de  diciembre  de  1825,  saying  that  a  letter 
from  Porto  Rico  of  November  20  told  of  the  arrival  there  of 
the  expedition;  same  to  same,  7  de  enero  de  1826,  enclosing 
a  newspaper  report  that  a  fleet  of  four  vessels  had  reached 
Havana  on  December  18,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

64  Obregon  to  Secretario,  30  de  noviembre,  and  10  de  diciem 
bre  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


136  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN        * 

charge  who  had  landed  from  the  vessel  received  an 
ovation  everywhere,  expressive  of  the  joy  which  the 
Cuban  people  felt  at  having  them  in  the  city.  The 
Spaniards  were  amazed  and  frightened  at  this  display 
of  attachment  to  Mexicans,  and  at  the  sight  of  the 
Mexican  flag  in  port.  The  friend  who  had  written 
this  news  told  Obregon  that  the  strength  of  the  inde 
pendence  party  was  colossal.  It  would  be  more  ac 
curate,  the  friend  had  added,  to  say  that  it  included 
all  the  island  except  half  of  the  city  of  Havana,  which 
was  European.  A  powerful  but  ill  equipped  army 
was  waiting  to  join  the  invader  who  should  come  to 
liberate  them.65 

On  the  last  day  of  the  year  Obregon  reported  that 
Clay  in  a  recent  conference  had  shown  much  un 
easiness,  had  asked  if  Obregon  thought  there  was  any 
danger  of  Cuba's  being  attacked  that  winter,  had  said 
there  were  rumors  that  Mexican  and  Colombian  agents 
were  raising  an  expedition  in  the  United  States  for 
the  purpose,  and  declared  that  such  action  could  not 
be  permitted  under  the  neutrality  law.  With  refer 
ence  to  Clay's  efforts  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on 
Spain  through  Russia  and  other  European  powers, 
Obregon  said  he  believed  that  this  country  was  merely 
negotiating,  intriguing,  and  inspiring  fear  to  prevent 
Mexico  and  Colombia  from  freeing  Cuba.66  On  Feb- 

65  Obregon  to  Secretario,  28  de  enero  de  1826,  enclosing  a 
letter  dated  Havana,  28  de  diciembre  de   1825,   MS.,   Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

66  Obregon  to  Secretario,  31  de  diciembre  de  1825,  MS.,  Re- 
laciones  Exteriores. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  137 

ruary  i,  1826,  he  wrote  that  news  had  come  that  a 
Spanish  fleet  of  six  vessels  was  about  to  sail  from 
Havana  for  Cartagena  to  blockade  the  latter  harbor 
and  prevent  the  departure  of  the  expedition  there  pre 
paring  against  Cuba.  Since  the  surrender  of  Ulua, 
and  because  of  the  consequent  increase  of  the  inde 
pendent  spirit  in  Cuba  he  feared  Spain  might  yield  to 
the  influence  of  the  combined  mediation  and  make 
peace  to  save  the  islands.67 

Early  in  December,  1825,  Clay  had  given  instruc 
tions  to  a  resident  of  New  Orleans  who  was  to  visit 
Cuba  as  a  confidential  agent,  because  of  "the  very 
great  interest  which  the  United  States  have  in  the 
future  fortunes  of  Cuba,  and  the  present  dangers  to 
which  that  island  is  exposed  from  foreign  attack  as 
well  as  from  internal  commotion."  The  character 
and  condition  of  the  population,  the  natural  resources 
of  the  island,  the  political  sentiment  of  the  people  and 
especially  their  attitude  toward  Mexico  and  Colombia, 
and  the  probable  ability  of  the  Spanish  authorities  to 
resist  foreign  attack  or  internal  commotion  were  the 
matters  which  he  was  especially  charged  to  report 
upon.  He  was  merely  to  study  and  report  movements 
and  not  to  promote  or  encourage  them.  "  Our  posi 
tion  being  that  of  peace  with  Spain  and  neutrality  in 
the  existing  war  between  her  and  the  new  republics, 
fixes  our  duties  in  reference  to  any  commotions  which 
may  be  either  meditated,  or  in  fact  may  arise  in  the 
island.  And  if  they  should  happen  to  be  of  a  char- 

67  Obregon  to  Secretario,  28  de  enero  de  1826,  and  same  to 
same,  I  de  febrero  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


138  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

acter,  or  take  a  turn,  which  would  require  of  the 
United  States,  from  the  relations  in  which  they  stand 
to  the  island,  to  interpose  their  power,  it  will  be  time 
enough  for  the  government  here  to  consider  and  de 
cide  the  nature  of  their  intervention  when  the  exi 
gency  arises."68 

The  effect  of  Clay's  overture  to  Russia  did  not  be 
come  known  to  him  until  nearly  the  end  of  the  year 
1825.  His  instruction  of  May  10  to  Middleton 
reached  the  latter  July  10.  Four  days  later  Mid 
dleton  addressed  a  note  to  Count  Nesselrode,  the  Rus 
sian  foreign  minister,  enclosing  with  it  the  entire  letter 
of  instructions  from  Clay.69  In  the  reply  which  was 
given  after  seven  weeks  of  deliberation  Nesselrode 
declared:  "His  Imperial  Majesty  felicitates  himself 

68  Clay  to  Thomas  B.  Robertson,  December  7,  1825,  MS., 
Department   of    State,    Instructions,    X,   418.    Robertson   de 
clined  the  mission ;  but  a  little  more  than  a  year  later  a  simi 
larly  instructed  secret  agent  did  go.     See  Adams,   Memoirs, 
VIII,  20,  and  below  in  this  chapter. 

69  In   this    long   complimentary   note,    Middleton   said,    "  il 
croit  ne  pouvoir  mieux  faire  que  de  lui  envoyer  ci-pres  copie 
d'une  depeche  en  forme  d'Instruction  qu'il  vient  de  recevoir, 
et  de  le  prier  de  vouloir  bien  la  mettre  sous  les  yeux  de  Sa 
Majeste    1'Empereur,    done    1'intervention    amicale,    invoquee 
avec  succes  dans  plus  d'une  ocasion,  peut  encore  en  ce  moment 
servir  a  la  fois  les  interets  de  1'Europe  et  de  1'Amerique.  .  .  . 
Mais  si  les  Etats  Unis  ont  vu  avec  satisfaction  les  efforts  des 
Nations  du  Contenent  Americain,  pour  se  soustraire  au  Joug 
de  la  Domination  Espagnole,  il  n'en  est  pas  de  meme  pour  ce 
qui  regarde  les  lies  de  Cuba  et  de  Porto  Rico.     Le  caractere 
de  la  population  de  ces  lies  rend  extremement  problematique 
leur    capacite    de    maintenir    1'Independance."    Middleton    to 
Nesselrode,  le  2/14  Juillet,   1825,  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XIII,  490;  Middleton  to  Clay,  July  15/27,  1825,  ibid., 
409,  and  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  849. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  139 

with  having  inspired  this  confidence  in  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  the  undersigned  is  charged  to 
invite  Mr.  Middleton  to  convey  to  his  government  the 
assurance  of  the  high  value  at  which  the  Emperor  es 
timates  those  sentiments,  of  which  new  evidence  is 
furnished  by  its  present  propositions.  The  opinions 
of  His  Imperial  Majesty  as  to  the  question  discussed 
by  Mr.  Clay  in  his  despatch  cannot  be  concealed  from 
the  Cabinet  of  Washington.  '-,  His  Imperial  Majesty 
has  ever  thought  that  justice,  the  law  of  nations,  and 
the  general  interest  in  having  the  indisputable  titles  of 
sovereignty  respected,  could  not  allow  the  determina 
tions  of  the  mother  country  in  this  important  case  to 
be  prejudged  or  anticipated.  On  the  other  side,  when 
ever  Spain  has  wished  to  discuss  the  future  condition 
of  South  America  she  has  addressed  overtures  to  all 
the  allied  powers  of  Europe.  It  will  not  be  possible, 
therefore,  for  His  Imperial  Majesty  to  change  prin 
ciples  in  this  negotiation  nor  to  institute  it  separately ; 
and  until  positive  information  has  been  received  of 
the  ulterior  views  of  Spain  in  regard  to  her  American 
possessions,  of  her  decision  upon  the  proposition  of 
the  United  States,  and  of  the  opinions  of  her  allies  in 
relation  to  the  same  subject,  Russia  cannot  give  a 
definite  answer."  In  the  meantime  he  hoped  the 
United  States  would  "  use  their  influence  in  defeating, 
as  far  as  may  be  in  their  power,  every  enterprise 
against  these  islands."70  Middleton  wrote  Clay  that 

70  Nesselrode  to  Middleton,  August  2O/[ September  i],  1825, 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  850;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XIII,  410. 


I4O  CUBA  SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

the  position  of  the  Russian  government  was  such  that 
nothing  more  definite  or  satisfactory  could  be  said 
officially.  But  he  understood  that  the  emperor  would 
use  his  influence  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  and  that 
instructions  had  been  communicated  for  that  purpose 
to  the  Russian  representatives  at  Madrid  and  the 
other  allied  courts.71  Adams  understood  the  Russian 
minister  in  Washington  to  corroborate  Middleton's 
opinion  of  the  emperor's  attitude.72 

In  commenting  on  the  Russian  reply  Clay  agreed 
with  Middleton  in  believing  that  the  appeal  to  Russia 
"  has  not  been  without  favorable  effect."  It  was  "  per 
haps  not  to  be  expected  that  previous  to  consultations 
with  them  [the  allied  powers]  language  more  explicit 
should  be  held.  ...  It  authorizes  the  belief  that  the 
preponderating  influence  of  Russia  has  been  thrown 
into  the  scale  of  peace.  Notwithstanding  predictions 
of  a  contrary  result  confidently  made  by  Mr.  Secre 
tary  Canning,  this  decision  of  the  Emperor  corre 
sponds  with  the  anticipations  which  have  been  con 
stantly  entertained  here  ever  since  the  President  re- 

71  Middleton  to  Clay,  August  27/September  8,  1825,  Ameri 
can  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  849;  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XIII,  410. 

72  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII,  88.    Nesselrode  wrote  Tuyll,  le  4 
7bre  1825,  "L'Empereur  desire  que  vous  y  puisiez  des  argu- 
mens  pour  demontrer  d'une  part  a  Mr.  Clay  qu'il  nous  etait 
impossible  de  faire  un  autre  accueil  a  ses  propositions,  et  pour 
lui  prouver  combien  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  se  plait  a  recon- 
naitre  la  confiance  et  1'amitie,  que  lui  temoignent  les  Etats 
Unis ;  combien  Elle  souhaite  que  ces  sentimens  president  tou- 
jours   aux   relations   existantes   entre   les   deux    Puissances." 
American  Historical  Review,  XVIII,  561. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  14! 

solved  to  invoke  his  intervention."  Clay  then  told  of 
the  efforts  which  he  was  making  to  induce  Mexico 
and  Colombia  to  suspend  their  anticipated  operations 
against  Cuba  till  the  final  results  of  the  mediation  could 
be  learned,  and  declared :  "  On  this  subject  it  is  proper 
that  we  should  be  perfectly  understood  by  Russia. 
For  ourselves  we  desire  no  change  in  the  possession 
of  Cuba,  as  has  been  heretofore  stated.  We  cannot 
allow  the  transfer  of  the  islands  to  any  European 
power.  But  if  Spain  should  refuse  to  conclude  peace, 
and  obstinately  resolve  on  continuing  the  war,  al 
though  we  do  not  desire  that  either  Colombia  or  Mex 
ico  should  acquire  the  island  of  Cuba,  the  President 
cannot  see  any  justifiable  ground  on  which  we  can 
forcibly  interfere.  ...  If  the  war  against  the  islands 
should  be  conducted  by  those  republics  in  a  desolating 
manner;  if  contrary  to  all  expectations  they  should 
put  arms  in  the  hands  of  one  race  of  the  inhabitants 
to  destroy  the  lives  of  another;  if  in  short  they  should 
countenance  and  encourage  excesses  and  examples, 
the  contagion  of  which  from  our  neighborhood  would 
be  dangerous  to  our  quiet  and  safety,  the  government 
of  the  United  States  might  feel  itself  called  upon  to 
interpose  its  power."73  This  veiled  threat  conveyed 

73  Clay  to  Middleton,  December  26,  1825,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  X,  424;  American  State  Papers,  For 
eign,  V,  850;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  412. 

In  the  debates  in  Congress  on  the  mission  to  Panama,  Calla- 
han  says  that  Forsyth  declared  "  he  desired  to  see  Spain  hold 
Cuba,  but  he  opposed  any  interference  against  the  rights  of 
Mexico  and  Colombia  to  conquer  it  in  order  to  end  the  con 
test  with  Spain;  Cuba  was  'the  jungle  in  which  the  Royal 


142  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

through  Russia  was  probably  intended  to  frighten 
Spain  into  making  peace.  Furthermore  in  case  the 
apprehended  attack  by  Colombia  and  Mexico  should 
occur,  the  United  States  government  would  be  able  to 
point  to  this  warning  as  a  justification  for  seizing 
Cuba  should  that  step  be  decided  on,  as  was  likely. 

Although  Clay  felt  that  the  United  States  could 
not,  in  case  the  war  should  long  continue,  interfere 
to  prevent  the  anticipated  attack,  yet  he  determined 
to  do  all  he  could  in  a  friendly  manner  to  forestall 
it  for  the  present.  On  December  20  he  handed  iden 
tical  notes  to  the  Mexican  and  Colombian  ministers  in 
Washington  asking  the  suspension  for  a  limited  time 
of  any  projects  which  their  respective  countries  might 
be  forming  against  Cuba,  in  order  to  give  Russia  time 
to  act.74  A  copy  of  the  identical  note  was  sent  to 
Poinsett  in  Mexico  and  another  to  Anderson,  the 
American  minister  to  Colombia,  with  the  request  that 
each  further  the  purpose  of  it  as  far  as  might  be  in 
his  power.75  The  Colombian  minister  replied  on  De 
cember  30  that  he  would  send  the  note  to  his  govern 
ment  ;  but  said  he  thought  the  reports  of  preparations 

Tiger  hides  himself,'  and  they  had  a  right  to  drive  the  tiger 
out"  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  155. 

74  Clay  to  Obregon,  December  20,  1825,  enclosed  with  Obre- 
gon  to  Secretario,  14  de  enero  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exte- 
riores.     Clay  to  Salazar,  identical  with  this,  is  in  American 
State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  851 ;  and  in  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XIII,  414. 

75  Clay  to  -^— j ,  December  30,  1825,  MS.,  Department 

of  State,  Instructions,  X,  426. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  143 

in  Colombia  for  attacking  Cuba  had  little  or  no  truth 
in  them.  He  argued  at  length  that  such  an  attack  by 
Colombia  on  the  headquarters  of  the  enemy  would  be 
entirely  justified.  He  expected  the  congress  at  Pan 
ama  to  decide  the  fortunes  of  the  islands.76 

Poinsett  had  not  mentioned  to  the  Mexican  cabinet 
until  December  10  the  efforts  of  his  government  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Spain  through  Russia.  On 
that  date  he  communicated  a  copy  of  the  instructions 
to  Middleton  given  just  seven  months  earlier.  The 
reply  from  Camacho,  then  minister  for  foreign  rela 
tions,  expressed  the  satisfaction  of  President  Vic 
toria.77  On  February  i,  1826,  Poinsett  reported  that 
Victoria,  after  asking  and  receiving  a  full  explanation 
of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  regarding  Cuba, 
had  expressed  himself  as  satisfied  and  declared  that 
Mexico  "  had  no  intention  to  conquer  or  keep  posses 
sion  of  the  island,  [but]  that  the  object  of  the  expe 
dition  which  they  contemplated  was  to  assist  the  revo 
lutionists  of  Cuba  to  drive  out  the  Spaniards,  and  in 
case  they  succeeded  to  leave  that  people  to  govern 
themselves."  Poinsett  told  him  it  was  to  be  regretted 

76  Salazar  to  Clay,  December  30,  1825,  American  State  Pa 
pers,  Foreign,  V,  856;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII, 
426.    Obregon's  reply  merely  stated  that  he  would  transmit 
the  proposal  to  his  government.     Obregon  to  Clay,  January  4, 
1826,  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  V,  857;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  428. 

77  Poinsett  to  Camacho,  December  10,  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores ;  Camacho  to  Poinsett,  December  31,  1825,  enclosed 
with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  14,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


144  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

that  this  declaration  had  not  been  made  earlier,  since 
a  very  different  notion  of  Mexico's  intentions  had 
been  held.  A  report  had  recently  come  from  the  Mex 
ican  charge  at  Bogota  saying  that  a  Colombian  expedi 
tion  was  about  ready  to  start  to  foment  a  revolution 
in  Cuba ;  and  the  charge  had  advised  Mexico  to  antici 
pate  Colombia  in  this  movement,  because  he  believed 
it  to  be  the  object  of  Colombia  to  attach  that  island 
to  her  already  vast  possessions.78  A  few  days  earlier 
the  question  of  the  invasion  of  Cuba  had  been  again 
agitated  in  Congress  in  connection  with  a  motion  in 
the  Senate  to  permit  the  executive  to  send  troops  out 
of  the  country.  This  motion  was  rejected.  But  the 
Senate  passed  another  motion  granting  permission  to 
the  executive  to  undertake  an  expedition  against  Cuba 
jointly  with  Colombia.  This  motion  was  in  the  form 
of  two  resolutions  that  had  been  drawn  by  a  commit 
tee  after  consultation  with  the  executive.  The  reso 
lutions  declared :  "  First — The  government  is  hereby 
authorized  in  combination  with  that  of  the  republic  of 
Colombia  to  undertake  a  military  expedition  in  order 
to  assist  the  efforts  of  the  inhabitants  of  Cuba  to 
achieve  their  independence.  Secondly — In  the  event 
of  the  cause  of  liberty  succeeding  in  the  island  the  gov 
ernment  is  particularly  directed  to  cause  to  be  estab 
lished  in  it  a  national  representation  on  the  basis  of 
the  rights  of  the  people  of  the  new  republics  of  Amer 
ica."  When  these  resolutions  came  before  the  Cham- 

78  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  I,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  145 

her  of  Deputies  that  house  voted  "  to  postpone  the 
further  consideration  of  the  question  until  the  execu 
tive  could  submit  to  the  consideration  of  Congress  the 
plans  which  may  be  agreed  upon  at  Panama."79 

Early  in  March  Poinsett  communicated  to  the  Mex 
ican  cabinet  the  reply  of  Nesselrode  to  Middleton  and 
the  inferences  drawn  from  it  by  both  Middleton  and 
Clay.  But  the  communication  was  received  with  cool 
ness.  The  reasons  which,  at  Clay's  suggestion,  Poin 
sett  had  urged  for  suspending  the  expedition  he  feared 
would  rather  tend  to  hasten  it.  The  Mexican  gov 
ernment,  he  said,  did  not  fear  Spain  and  was  indif 
ferent  whether  that  government  recognized  Mexican 
independence  or  not.  Neither  did  they  longer  fear  a 
European  alliance,  since  they  took  it  for  granted  that 
any  designs  of  those  powers  would  be  kept  in  check 
by  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The  greatest 
apprehension  was  lest  the  powers  might  compel  Spain 
to  make  peace  on  condition  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  be 
ing  guaranteed  to  her,  "  which  would  deprive  Mexico 
of  the  advantage  and  glory  of  emancipating  those 

79  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  28,  1826,  and  February  i,  1826 ; 
Poinsett  to  Brent,  February  10,  and  Poinsett  to  Clay,  Feb 
ruary  25,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  I.  In  the  last  Poinsett  says  that  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  were  opposed  to  the  measure,  and  this  postponement 
was  to  avoid  having  it  carried  over  the  adverse  vote  of  that 
house.  The  constitution  provided  that  "  if  an  act  which  origi 
nates  in  one  house  be  rejected  in  the  other,  it  shall  again  be 
taken  up  by  the  house  in  which  it  originated,  and  if  it  passes 
by  a  majority  of  two  thirds,  it  shall  become  a  law,  unless  re 
jected  by  more  than  two  thirds  of  the  other  house."  The  vote 
in  the  Deputies  was  36  to  20,  a  little  less  than  two  thirds. 
II 


146  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

islands."  The  reason  the  Mexican  government  was 
so  ready  to  grant  every  assistance  in  their  power  to 
Colombia  was  that  they  feared  that  power  might  lib 
erate  the  islands  unassisted  and  hold  them.  "  The 
only  assistance,  however,  the  executive  can  grant, 
without  consulting  Congress,  is  to  send  their  fleet  to 
cooperate  with  that  of  Colombia,  which  I  think  they 
will  be  disposed  to  do  if  they  can  do  no  more."80 

Discouraged  by  the  indefinite  postponement  of  the 
official  assistance  which  they  were  expecting,  the 
Cuban  patriots  determined  to  organize  a  private  ex 
pedition,  asking  the  Mexican  executive  for  financial 
assistance.  If  disappointed  in  this  they  expected  to 
go  to  the  United  States  and  endeavor  to  raise  an  ex 
pedition,  borrowing  money  in  England.  They  were 
determined  if  possible  to  anticipate  Colombia  in  rais 
ing  the  standard  of  revolt.  If  then  Colombia  should 
come  to  their  assistance  that  power  could  only  claim 
compensation  and  would  have  no  sufficient  excuse 
for  retaining  the  island.  Late  in  March  Poinsett  re 
ported  that  these  Cubans,  thinking  they  had  not  been 
very  well  treated  by  the  Mexican  government,  had  de 
cided  to  leave  the  country  and  go  to  offer  their  serv- 

80  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  8,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

Temperley's  notion  of  the  real  desire  of  Mexico  concern 
ing  Cuba  and  Spanish  recognition  is  exactly  the  reverse  of 
what  Poinsett  understood.  Temperley  says :  "  It  is  probable 
that  even  the  much  vaunted  project  of  an  attack  upon  Cuba 
by  the  Spanish-Americans  was  only  a  threat  to  dispose  Spain 
toward  recognition."  "  Later  American  Policy  of  Canning," 
American  Historical  Review,  XI,  792. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  147 

ices  to  Colombia.  This  they  did  in  spite  of  the  efforts 
of  the  Mexican  executive  to  detain  them  in  hope  of 
gaining  some  advantage  from  their  being  on  board  the 
Mexican  vessels  that  it  was  still  hoped  might  go  to 
liberate  their  island.81  A  messenger  had  recently 
brought  news  from  Colombia  which,  though  great 
secrecy  was  supposed  to  be  observed,  Poinsett  had 
learned  related  to  the  large  squadron  then  fitting  out  in 
Cartagena  for  Cuba.  Bolivar  himself,  it  was  said, 
would  arrive  in  April  to  take  command.  Poinsett  still 
believed  that  the  Mexican  fleet  would  be  sent  by  the  ex 
ecutive  to  cooperate  with  Colombia,  and  that  as  many 
troops  would  be  put  on  board  as  might  by  a  forced 
interpretation  be  considered  marines.  This  Poinsett 
believed  would  be  done  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  had 
communicated  to  the  President  and  the  secretary  for 
foreign  relations  Clay's  request  that  all  projects  against 
Cuba  be  suspended  until  the  results  of  the  joint  media 
tion  be  known.  To  his  proposals  and  arguments  Vic 
toria  had  replied  coldly  that  he  would  give  the  sug 
gestions  their  due  weight.82 

As  late  as  April,  1826,  Clay  had  not  learned  that 
Russia  had  made  any  effort  at  Madrid  in  response  to 
his  overture  of  nearly  a  year  before.  He  attributed 
this  partly  to  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Alexander; 
but  Nicholas  had  announced  his  intention  of  carrying 
out  his  brother's  policies.  Through  Everett,  the  min- 

81  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  24,   1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

82  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  18,  March  24,  and  April  8,  1826, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


148  CUBA  SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

ister  at  Madrid,  Clay  informed  that  court  of  his  re 
quest  to  Colombia  and  Mexico  to  suspend  operations 
against  Cuba,  and  of  the  announcements  to  England 
and  France  declaring  that  the  United  States  could 
not  see  any  European  power  acquire  them  either  with 
or  without  the  consent  of  Spain.  "And  the  forbear 
ance  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  them  may  be 
fully  relied  on  from  their  known  justice,  from  their 
patience  and  moderation  heretofore  exhibited,  and  from 
their  established  pacific  policy.  If  the  acquisition  of 
Cuba  were  desirable  to  the  United  States,  there  is  be 
lieved  to  be  no  reasonable  prospect  of  effecting  at  this 
conjunction  that  object.  And  if  there  were  any  the 
frankness  of  their  diplomacy,  which  has  induced  the 
President  freely  and  fully  to  disclose  our  views  both 
to  Great  Britain  and  France,  forbids  absolutely  any 
movement  whatever  at  this  time  with  such  a  pur 
pose."  This  he  said  was  "almost  equivalent  to  an 
actual  guarantee  of  the  islands  to  Spain.  But  we 
can  enter  into  no  stipulations  by  treaty  to  guarantee 
them."83 

This  declaration  against  any  treaty  guaranty  was 
in  reply  to  a  suggestion  which  Everett  had  made  in  a 
despatch  of  January  I  preceding  that  he  thought  Spain 
might  like  to  have  the  United  States  or  the  Spanish- 
American  states  offer  to  guarantee  to  Spain  the  pos 
session  of  the  islands  in  return  for  recognizing  the  in 
dependence  of  the  continental  states.  It  had  been  in 

83  Clay  to  Everett,  April  13,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XI,  21 ;  extract  in  House  Executive  Documents, 
32  congress,  I  session,  number  121,  page  18. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  149 

the  latter  part  of  September,  1825,  that  Everett  had 
found  his  first  opportunity  to  approach  the  Spanish 
government  with  the  suggestion  that  the  United  States 
would  like  to  see  Spain  make  peace  with  and  recog 
nize  the  independence  of  her  former  possessions,  as 
he  had  been  instructed  by  Clay  in  April  of  that  year. 
The  Spanish  minister,  Zea,  had  listened  respectfully 
but  had  replied  most  positively  that  the  king  would 
never  abandon  his  claim  to  the  colonies ;  that  the  in 
dependent  party  was  not  so  strong  in  them  as  was  gen 
erally  supposed  and  a  reversion  to  the  Spanish  cause 
was  expected ;  that  the  cause  of  Spain  was  just  and  for 
that  reason  Providence  would  interpose  in  Spain's  be 
half  ;  and  that  the  king  was  ready  to  sacrifice  every 
thing  rather  than  surrender  what  he  knew  to  be  his 
right.  Everett  expressed  his  regret  but  considered  it 
useless  to  enter  into  an  extended  argument.84  On  Oc 
tober  20,  1825,  Everett  reported  that  the  Spanish  gov 
ernment  had  just  learned  for  the  first  time  of  the 
overture  which  the  United  States  had  made  to  Russia 
asking  that  power  to  use  its  good  offices  to  bring 
about  peace.  At  Zea's  request  Everett  had  told  what 
he  knew  of  the  instruction  to  Middleton.  Zea  "re 
plied  that  these  proceedings  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  placed  him  under  the  necessity  of  de 
claring,  in  the  most  positive  manner,  the  King's  un 
alterable  resolution  never  to  abandon  his  rights,  and 
to  reject  all  offers  of  mediation,  or  of  amicable  inter- 

84  Everett  to  Clay,  September  25,  1825,  American  State  Pa 
pers,  Foreign,  V,  795 ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII, 
432. 


I5O  CUBA   SAVED   TO  SPAIN 

vention,  which  should  contemplate  an  acknowledge 
ment  of  the  independence  of  the  new  states."  He 
added  that  Spain  was  ever  ready  to  listen  to  any  pro 
posal  or  treat  those  states  with  the  greatest  indul- 
ence  on  the  basis  of  a  return  to  their  former  allegi 
ance.85  Late  in  November  Everett  told  of  a  minis 
terial  change  which  he  had  for  a  time  hoped  might 
cause  Spain  to  listen  more  favorably  to  the  mediation ; 
but  he  found  that  the  sentiment  had  not  changed 
though  the  Duke  del  Infantado,  the  new  minister, 
was  less  positive  in  his  declarations.86  In  his  letter 
of  January  i,  alluded  to  above,  Everett  told  of  the 
reorganization  of  the  Council  of  State  with  a  number 
of  prominent  American  loyalists  among  its  member 
ship  and  said  he  hoped  this  indicated  a  more  favorable 
attitude  toward  the  new  states ;  but  there  was  no  cer 
tainty  that  it  did.87  Before  the  ministerial  change 
Zea  had  asked  Everett  to  put  in  writing  a  statement 
of  the  principles  upon  which  his  government  based  its 
attitude.  After  that  change  the  Duke  del  Infantado 
expressed  his  willingness  to  receive  such  a  statement. 
Everett  was  very  careful  and  very  deliberate  in  pre 
paring  his  note.  Finally  on  January  20,  1826,  he  pre 
sented  it.  It  contained  more  than  twelve  thousand 
words,  reviewing  at  great  length  the  revolt  of  the  col- 

85  Everett  to  Clay,  October  20,  1825,  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  795 ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  433. 

86  Everett   to    Clay,    November   21,    1825,    American    State 
Papers,  Foreign,  V,  879;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XIII,  439- 

87  Everett  to  Clay,  January  I,  1826,  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  880;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  44L 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  151 

onies  and  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward 
the  new  states  and  toward  Spain,  and  enlarging  upon 
all  of  the  arguments  which  Clay  had  suggested  to  in 
duce  Spain  to  recognize  the  continental  states  in  order 
to  save  to  herself  the  possession  of  the  islands.88 

Everett  had  tried  to  learn  from  the  Russian  minis 
ter  at  Madrid  what  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  gov 
ernment  was  toward  the  proposal  of  the  United  States 
that  the  emperor  should  try  to  induce  Spain  to  recog 
nize  the  new  states;  but  d'Oubril,  the  Russian  envoy, 
was  very  guarded  in  his  language.  He  would  not 
admit  that  the  emperor  intended  to  encourage  Spain 
to  persist  in  her  policy;  but  Everett  said  it  was  gen 
erally  understood  that  Russia's  influence  was  being  so 
employed.89 

On  April  21,  1826,  Clay  asked  Middleton  to  ascer 
tain  from  the  Russian  government  what  had  been  done 
by  it  with  reference  to  the  proposed  mediation,  saying 
Everett's  reports  indicated  that  the  Russian  minister's 
influence  at  Madrid  seemed  to  favor  the  continuance 
of  the  war.90  A  little  more  than  a  month  later,  in  tell 
ing  Middleton  that  the  Colombian  government  had 

88  Everett  to  Duke  del  Infantado,  January  20,  1826,  Ameri 
can   State   Papers,   Foreign,   VI,    1006;   British   and   Foreign 
State  Papers,  XVI,  856. 

89  Everett  to  Clay,  October  20,  1825,  as  cited  in  note  85, 
above.     On    December    12    Everett    wrote    that    word    from 
Brown  at  Paris  indicated  a  favorable  reception  at  St.  Peters 
burg  of  Middleton's  overture  and  a  prospect  for  a  favorable 
effect. 

90  Clay  to  Middleton,  April  21,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XI,  23. 


152  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

agreed  to  suspend  hostilities  against  Cuba,  Clay  said : 
"  You  will  avail  yourself  of  this  note  to  urge  the  Rus 
sian  government  to  new  efforts  to  bring  about  peace, 
as  well  as  to  let  you  know  the  result  of  those  which 
you  expected  would  be  employed  at  the  instance  of  the 
late  Emperor  in  the  course  of  the  last  summer."91 

But  notwithstanding  these  suspicions  and  indica 
tions  to  the  contrary,  Russia's  influence  at  Madrid 
had  been  pacific,  although  it  had  yielded  no  results. 
In  June,  1826,  Rocafuerte  in  London  wrote  his  gov 
ernment  that  England  and  the  United  States  were  ad 
vocating  the  cause  of  the  new  states  with  vigor;  and 
France,  Austria,  and  Russia  were  in  accord  and  urging 
Spain  to  yield  to  reason  and  circumstances.92  In  July 
Everett  wrote  Clay  that  the  Russian  minister  at 
Madrid  had  told  him  of  receiving  new  instructions  to 
urge  Spain  to  give  an  answer  to  the  overtures  which 
he  had  made  the  preceding  October  when  he  handed 
to  the  Spanish  court  a  copy  of  Clay's  letter  to  Middle- 
ton  requesting  Russia's  mediation.  As  an  additional 
motive  the  minister  was  now  asked  by  his  govern 
ment  to  urge  the  effort  of  the  United  States,  hitherto 
successful,  to  restrain  the  new  states  from  attacking 

91  Clay  to  Middleton,  May  26,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XI,  81. 

92  Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  10  de  junio  de  1826,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones    Exteriores.    Everett   had   told    Clay   on    October   20, 
1825  (see  note  85),  that  he  had  learned  from  the  British  min 
ister  at  Madrid  that  the  British  government  was  making  no 
attempt  to   influence   the   decision   of    Spain.    He   said   that 
France  and  some  other  European  powers  were  trying  to  pre 
vail  on  Spain  to  alter  her  policy. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  153 

Cuba.  In  keeping  with  these  new  instructions  d'Oubril 
had  urged  the  Spanish  cabinet  to  give  a  reply,  but 
without  effect.93  Middleton  wrote  Clay,  also  in  July, 
1826,  that  Nesselrode  had  declared  in  reply  to  his 
inquiry  that  the  original  request  of  Clay  had  been  for 
warded  at  once  to  Madrid,  accompanied  by  observa 
tions  which  should  have  assured  a  favorable  recep 
tion,  but  that  no  reply  had  been  given.  Notwith 
standing  the  fact  that  the  Russian  envoy  had  again 
been  instructed  to  urge  Spain  to  make  reply,  since 
courtesy  demanded  a  reply  from  Russia  to  the  United 
States,  still  no  reply  had  come.94  Two  months  later 
Middleton  said  he  felt  sure  that  for  the  entire  year 
the  counsels  of  Russia  to  Spain  had  been  pacific ;  and 
that  it  could  have  been  only  through  a  misapprehen 
sion  that  the  Russian  minister  at  Madrid  was  thought 
to  be  exerting  an  influence  adverse  to  peace.95  Maltitz, 
the  Russian  representative  in  Washington,  told  Clay 
in  November,  1826,  that  the  Emperor  Alexander  had 
instructed  d'Oubril  to  urge  Spain  to  consider  the  pro 
posal  of  the  United  States  and  give  an  answer;  that 
d'Oubril  had  scrupulously  executed  the  instructions; 
and  that  the  present  Emperor  Nicholas  had  twice 
instructed  d'Oubril  to  the  same  effect.96  In  reply  to 

93  Everett  to  Clay,  July  7,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 
This  letter  and  those  cited  in  the  four  following  notes  were 
enclosed  with  Obregon  to  Secretario,  9  de  abril  de  1827. 

94  Middleton  to  Clay,  July  18/30,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Ex 
teriores. 

95  Middleton  to  Clay,  September  8/20,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 

96  Maltitz  to  Clay,  November  18/30,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 


154  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

the  last,  Clay  said  it  was  gratifying  to  know  that  the 
new  emperor  was  pursuing  the  same  policy  as  the 
old ;  and  affirmed  that  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
with  regard  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  remained,  un-^ 
changed.  But,  he  added,  although  the  new  states  at 
the  request  of  the  United  States  had  refrained  from 
attacking  the  islands,  yet  Spain  had  sent  a  formidable 
new  fleet  from  Havana  to  attack  those  states.  If 
Spain  should  persist  in  this  policy  and  the  new  states 
should  find  it  necessary  for  their  own  safety  to  at 
tack  the  islands  the  United  States  could  not  then  inter 
pose,  except  in  their  own  interests.97 

Although  Clay's  efforts  with  Spain  seconded  by 
European  powers  had  proved  fruitless,  his  efforts  with 
Colombia  and  Mexico  were  proving  more  successful. 
At  the  end  of  May,  1826,  Poinsett  had  written  that 
President  Victoria  had  created  a  sensation  by  making 
a  statement  in  his  message  to  Congress  which  indi 
cated  that  the  projected  expedition  against  Cuba  had 
been  abandoned  for  the  present  at  least.  In  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  matter  was  to  be  discussed  at  the 
congress  at  Panama  the  Mexican  government  had 
shown  some  anxiety  to  know  what  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  would  be  in  case  the  invasion  of  Cuba 
should  be  decided  on  by  that  congress.  Poinsett 
thought  a  firm  stand  taken  by  the  United  States  would 
prevent  such  decision.98  Thus  Mexico  had  practically 

97  Clay  to  Maltitz,  December  23,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Ex- 
teriores. 

98  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  31,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  155 

complied  with  Clay's  request  though  it  had  not  prom 
ised  to  do  so  and  no  official  communication  of  the  fact 
had  been  made.  Colombia  not  only  complied  with  the 
request  but  sent  through  the  American  minister  at 
Bogota  an  express  declaration  that  the  projected  in 
vasion  had  been  postponed  until  the  sense  of  the 
congress  at  Panama  should  be  known." 

It  was  to  look  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
respecting  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  which  President 
Adams  urged  as  the  chief  reason  for  the  United  States 
sending  representatives  to  the  congress  at  Panama. 
In  the  congressional  discussions  in  the  spring  of  1826 
over  the  Panama  mission  the  fate  of  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico  was  also  the  matter  of  most  vital  concern.  The 
nearness  of  Cuba  to  the  southern  states,  the  presence 
there  of  a  large  slave  population,  the  certainty  that 
the  slaves  would  be  liberated  if  Cuban  independence 
should  be  established  by  the  new  states,  and  the  dire 
consequences  that  might  ensue  in  the  southern  states 
as  a  result,  made  it  imperative  that  the  government 
should  be  vitally  concerned  in  the  matter.  The  repre 
sentatives  of  the  United  States  \vere  pledged  by 
Adams's  promises  to  Congress  to  use  their  influence  to 
restrain  the  new  states  from  attacking  the  islands.100 

The  representative  whom  England  was  invited  to 

99  Clay  to  Poinsett,  June  23,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XI,  139. 

100  por  discussions  of  the  Panama  mission  in  its  relations 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba,  see  Chad  wick, 
United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  209-215;  and  Callahan, 
Cuba  and  International  Relations,  153-156. 


156  CUBA   SAVED  TO   SPAIN 

send  to  Panama  was  instructed  to  pursue  a  very  dif 
ferent  course.  Canning  apparently  hoped  thereby  to 
gain  favor  with  the  new  states  and  increase  their  al 
ready  existing  suspicion  of  the  motives  of  the  United 
States.  After  reminding  that  representative  that  the 
United  States,  France,  and  Great  Britain  all  earnestly 
desired  that  Cuba  remain  a  colony  of  Spain,  he  de 
clared  that  the  last,  "  so  far  from  denying  the  right  of 
the  new  states  of  America  to  make  a  hostile  attack 
upon  Cuba,  .  .  .  uniformly  refused  to  join  with  the 
United  States  in  remonstrating  with  Mexico  and  Co 
lombia  against  the  supposed  intention,  or  intimating 
that  we  should  feel  displeasure  at  the  execution  of  it. 
We  should  indeed  regret  it  but  we  arrogate  to  our 
selves  no  right  to  control  the  operations  of  one  bellig 
erent  against  another.  The  government  of  the  United 
States  however  professes  itself  of  a  different  opinion. 
It  conceives  that  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
would  be  so  directly  affected  by  either  the  occupation 
of  Havana  by  an  invading  force,  or  by  the  conse 
quences  which  an  attack  upon  Cuba,  even  if  success 
ful,  might  produce  in  the  interior  of  the  island,  that 
the  cabinet  of  Washington  hardly  disguises  its  inten 
tion  to  interfere  directly,  and  by  force,  to  prevent  or 
repress  such  an  operation.  Neither  England  nor 
France  could  see  with  indifference  the  United  States 
in  occupation  of  Cuba."101 

101  Canning  to  Dawkins,  March  18,  1826,  quoted  by  Tem- 
perley,  American  Historical  Review,  XI,  792.  Temperley  says 
that  Vaughn,  the  English  minister  at  Washington,  had  actually 
suggested  to  Clay  an  interference  by  the  United  States  to  dis- 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  157 

As  is  well  known  the  congress  at  Panama  amounted 
to  very  little.  Neither  the  English  nor  the  American 
representatives  were  present.  Only  a  few  of  the 
Spanish-American  countries  were  represented.  Pom- 
sett  wrote:  "I  have  been  assured  that,  although  the 
present  condition  of  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Puerto 

suade  Mexico  and  Colombia  from  attacking  Cuba;  but  that 
Canning  disavowed  the  act  and  wrote  Vaughn  fresh  instruc 
tions,  saying,  "  If  it  had  been  intended  that  you  should  treat 
.  .  .  in  a  matter  so  delicate,  as  the  proposed  interference  of 
neutral  powers  to  controul  the  legitimate  operations  of  bel 
ligerents  against  each  other,  you  would  not  have  been  left 
without  instructions,  upon  a  point  of  as  much  novelty,  as 
delicacy  and  importance.  If  the  United  States  think  their 
interests  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  continuance  of  the  war 
between  Spain  and  the  new  transatlantick  States  they  are 
probably  right,  and  perfectly  at  liberty  to  employ  their  good 
offices  to  bring  about  a  pacification. 

"  We  have  long  endeavored  to  do  so  but  in  vain ;  and  Spain 
has  been  uniformly  the  recusant  party.  If  the  United  States 
think  that  particular  interests  of  their  own  require  that  a 
certain  operation  of  war  should  not  be  undertaken  by  one 
of  the  belligerents, — it  is  a  question,  and  a  very  nice  one  for 
them,  .  .  .  but  it  is  manifest  that  we  have  not  the  like  interest 
either  to  induce  or  to  justify  us  in  so  unusual  an  interposi 
tion.  ...  If  it  be  merely  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
that  are  concerned,  that  ground  of  interference  can  only  be 
long  to  them,  nor  is  there  any  obligation  on  us,  to  share  the 
odium  of  such  an  interposition."  Ibid.,  791,  citing  a  Public 
Record  Office  MS. 

See  above,  note  92,  for  Everett's  statement  of  what  he  had 
learned  at  Madrid  concerning  England's  attitude.  Callahan, 
Cuba  and  International  Relations,  144,  says  that  England  had 
in  1824  and  1825  made  several  attempts  to  dissuade  Mexico 
and  Colombia  from  this  very  movement  against  Cuba.  See 
the  preceding  chapter  on  British  influence  in  Mexico  for 
Canning's  opposition  to  the  influence  of  the  United  States. 


I$8  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

Rico  was  considered  by  the  American  plenipotentiaries 
at  Panama,  to  be  incompatible  with  the  safety  of  these 
countries,  and  the  policy  of  subduing  them  by  force 
formed  a  frequent  topic  of  conversation  in  that  as 
sembly,  still  no  decisive  measures  with  respect  to  them 
were  resolved  upon,  nor  are  they  mentioned  in  the 
secret  convention  concluded  between  the  Spanish 
American  states.  The  plenipotentiaries  were  prob 
ably  deterred  from  acting  upon  this  very  important 
subject  both  by  the  language  which  has  been  held  by 
the  president  [of  the  United  States]  with  regard  to 
these  islands,  and  by  the  inability  of  the  governments 
of  Mexico  and  Colombia,  at  this  time,  to  undertake 
any  expensive  expedition."102  A  month  later  Poin- 
sett  wrote:  "Although  the  secret  treaty  of  Panama 
contains  no  direct  provisions  respecting  Cuba,  still  it 
is  understood  that  its  ratification  will,  by  combining 
the  two  squadrons  of  Mexico  and  Colombia,  enable 
this  government  to  undertake  the  long  projected  expe 
dition  against  that  island."103 

Cuban  patriots  in  Mexico  did  not  yet  abandon  hope 
of  obtaining  help  in  freeing  their  island.  Adopting  a 
plan  that  had  been  successfully  employed  to  get  funds 
in  various  European  states  to  promote  the  recent  revo 
lution  in  Greece,  a  group  of  Cubans  residing  in  Vera 
Cruz  made,  in  October,  1826,  a  systematic  appeal  to 

102  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  23, 1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II ;  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XIII,  990. 

103  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  21,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  159 

all  lovers  of  liberty  to  contribute  privately  funds  to 
equip  an  expedition.  A  collector  was  named  for  each 
state  of  the  Mexican  federation.  In  most  cases  he 
was  a  high  official.  For  example,  Esteva,  secretary 
of  the  national  treasury,  was  made  collector  for  the 
Federal  District.  Money  thus  collected  was  to  be  for 
warded  to  an  agent  in  New  York  to  be  used  in  pur 
chasing  supplies  for  an  expedition.  Nothing  of  im 
portance  came  from  their  plans.104 

Again  in  May,  1827,  Poinsett  said  a  new  report 
had  come  "that  an  expedition  is  fitting  out  in  Colom 
bia  for  the  invasion  of  either  Cuba  or  Porto  Rico," 
and  he  would  not  be  surprised  if  something  of  the 
kind  would  yet  be  attempted.  The  Mexican  govern 
ment  would  view  such  an  attempt  with  great  jeal 
ousy.105  At  the  same  time  Obregon  in  Washington 
was  urging  his  government  to  seize  Cuba,  arguing  that 
Spanish  dominion  in  the  islands  was  incompatible  with 
the  tranquility  and  welfare  of  Mexico  and  there  was 

104  Lemus  to  Commandant  de  Queretaro,  Veracruz,  9  de  octu- 
bre  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.    In  most  of  the  states 
the  Commandant  General  was  chosen.     A  copy  of  this  letter 
was  sent  to  each.     Before  accepting  the  charge  these  officials 
consulted  the   central   government.     See    Pedraza,    secretario 
de  guerro,  to  secretario  de  relaciones,  27  de  octubre  de  1826, 
enclosing  a  letter  from  the  Commandant  de  Queretaro  dated 
24  de  octubre  de  1826,  and  a  copy  of  Lemus  to  the  latter,  cited 
above.     Sanchez   y   Coro   to    Secretario,    Guadalajara,    18   de 
noviembre  de  1826,  says  that  a  deputy  in  the  congress  of  the 
state  of  Jalisco  had  been  asked  to  collect  funds  for  the  Cuban 
Junta,   and  asks   advice.    All  these  are  in   MS.,   Relaciones 
Exteriores. 

105  Poinsett  to    Clay,   May  12,   1827,   MS.,   Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


160  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

no  other  way  to  terminate  the  war.  Furthermore  he 
declared  that  if  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  some 
other  European  power  it  would  endanger  Mexico; 
but  if  possessed  by  Mexico  it  would  balance  Euro 
pean  influence  in  the  Antilles.106  Poinsett  wrote  in 
December  that  the  Mexican  government  was  prepar 
ing  to  send  the  fleet  to  Cartagena  to  join  that  of  Co 
lombia  ;  but  he  understood  that  it  was  with  the  inten 
tion  of  sailing  against  the  coast  of  Spain  instead  of 
attacking  Cuba.107  The  most  serious  obstacle  which 
had  hitherto  stood  in  the  way  of  the  Mexican  execu 
tive's  sending  the  expedition  to  Cuba  was  removed  by 
a  law  of  May  12,  1828,  granting  permission  for  the 
executive  at  its  discretion  to  send  national  troops  out 
side  the  bounds  of  the  republic,  mentioning  as  the  ex 
press  purpose  the  waging  of  war  against  the  island  of 
Cuba  or  other  points  still  dependent  on  the  govern 
ment  of  Spain.108  But  in  this  year  1828  a  period  of 
internal  disorder  and  factional  strife  began  in  both 
Mexico  and  Colombia  which  rendered  any  foreign 
enterprise  impracticable. 

In  1827  another  danger  had  threatened  Cuba  and 

106Obregon  to  Secretario,  9  de  abril  de  1827,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores.  The  next  month  he  told  of  a  Cuban  named 
Montenegro  whom  he  had  met  in  Philadelphia  and  who,  he 
thought,  would  be  useful  to  Mexico  in  any  enterprise  against 
Cuba.  Same  to  same,  18  de  mayo  de  1827,  ibid. 

107  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  6,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

108  Mexico,    Leyes,    Decretos,    y    Ordenes    que    forman    el 
Derecho  International,  1164.     It  is  addressed  to  Pedraza,  sec- 
retario  de  guerra,  and  signed  by  the  president  and  secretary 
of  each  of  the  chambers  of  Congress. 


CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN  l6l 

had  given  Adams  and  Clay  considerable  anxiety  for  a 
time.  There  was  a  probability  that  England  and 
Spain  would  be  involved  in  war  over  their  conflicting 
policies  and  interests  in  Portugal.  On  October  6, 
1826,  Canning  wrote  Liverpool:  "One  single  word  I 
must  add  in  the  deepest  secrecy.  God  forbid  war; 
but  if  Spain  will  have  it,  ought  not  we  to  think  of  the 
Havannah?  Where  else  can  we  strike  a  blow?  and 
what  other  blow  would  be  so  effectual?  It  would 
settle  all  better  than  half  a  dozen  Peninsular  cam 
paigns."109  Gallatin  then  in  London  was  approached 
by  the  Mexican  minister,  it  seems,  with  a  suggestion 
to  make  Cuba  independent  under  the  joint  guaranty 
of  Great  Britain  and  all  of  the  American  states.  It 
is  said  that  Gallatin  favored  the  plan  and  recommended 
it  to  Clay ;  and  that  he  also  approached  Canning  on  the 
matter  but  found  him  noncommittal.110  In  spite  of 
Canning's  secrecy  his  plans  became  known.  On 
August  17,  1827,  Everett  in  Madrid  wrote  Clay  that 
England  was  planning  to  effect  a  revolution  in  the 
Canary  islands  and  Cuba  in  order  "  to  establish  the 
British  influence  in  these  islands  [and]  in  the  end, 
probably,  to  obtain  territorial  possession  of  them." 
The  sources  of  information  were  such,  Everett 
thought,  as  to  leave  no  doubt  of  the  facts.111  Everett 

109  Canning  to  Liverpool,  October  6,  1826,  in  Stapleton,  Offi 
cial  Correspondence  of  Canning,  II,  144. 

110  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  157. 

111  Everett  to  Clay,  August  17,  1827,  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  32  congress,  I  session,  number  121,  page  19.    As  evi 
dence,  Everett  enclosed  a  copy,  which  had  been  given  him  in 

12 


1 62  CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN 

took  advantage  of  the  first  good  opportunity  that  pre 
sented  itself  to  declare  to  the  Spanish  government,  "  it 
is  impossible  for  them  [the  United  States]  to  view 
with  indifference  these  movements  of  the  British  gov 
ernment,  considering  it,  as  they  do,  as  a  settled  prin 
ciple  that  the  island  of  Cuba  must  in  no  event,  and 
under  no  pretext,  pass  into  the  possession  of,  or  under 
the  protection  of,  any  European  power  other  than 
Spain."112 

Adams  and  Clay  thought  this  danger  together  with 
that  which  was  threatening  from  Mexico  and  Colom 
bia  justified  them  in  sending  a  secret  agent  to  Havana 
to  report  confidentially  on  the  sentiment  in  the  islands 
toward  the  various  nations  concerned.  Besides  re 
peating  the  instructions  which  he  had  written  for  a 
secret  agent  late  in  1825,  Clay  asked  this  agent  to 
learn  what  the  attitude  of  the  inhabitants  would  be 
toward  a  colonial  connection  with  Great  Britain,  in 
case  the  existing  relations  of  that  power  and  Spain 
should  result  in  war  and  England  should  attack  Ha- 

the  strictest  confidence,  of  a  despatch  dated  June  I  from  the 
Spanish  minister  at  London.  That  minister  had  said  that  the 
information  had  been  given  to  him  by  the  Duke  of  Welling 
ton.  Everett  said  it  was  strange  that  the  duke  should  have 
revealed  such;  but  thought  it  "was  probably  owing  to  the 
strong  feeling  of  disgust  and  bitterness  with  which  he  has 
been  inspired  by  the  late  change  in  the  administration."  See 
also  Chadwick,  United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  216. 

112  Everett  to  Salmon,  December  10,  1827,  enclosed  with 
Everett  to  Clay,  December  12,  1827,  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  32  congress,  i  session,  number  121,  pages  22  and  21. 
And  see  Chadwick,  United  States  and  Spain,  Diplomacy,  217. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  163 

vana ;  and  he  was  also  to  learn  the  Spanish  means  for 
resisting  such  attack.113 

During  the  last  year  of  the  Adams-Clay  adminis 
tration  anxiety  concerning  Cuba  was  not  entirely  re 
lieved  ;  but  no  important  diplomatic  communications 
passed.  The  Jackson  administration  continued  prac 
tically  unchanged  the  policy  of  their  predecessors.  In 
October,  1829,  Van  Buren  said  to  Van  Ness,  the  new 
minister  to  Madrid  :  "  As  it  is  not  impossible  that  Spain, 
in  her  present  embarrassed  and  dependent  situation, 
might  be  induced  to  yield  her  assent  to  a  temporary 
occupation  of  it  [Cuba],  as  a  pledge  for  the  fulfill 
ment  of  her  engagements,  or  to  part  with  her  right 
of  property  in  it  for  other  considerations  affording 
immediate  relief  in  the  hour  of  her  distress  it  is  the 
wish  of  the  President  that  the  same  watchfulness 
which  had  engaged  the  attention  of  your  predecessors 
in  relation  to  this  subject  should  be  continued  during 
your  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  legation." 
He  was  told  that  the  United  States  could  not  enter 
into  engagements  to  guarantee  the  possession  of  Cuba 
to  Spain;  but,  alluding  to  the  danger  from  Mexico 

113  Clay  to  Daniel  P.  Cook,  March  12,  1827,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Instructions,  XI,  267.  This  shows  that  Adams 
and  Clay  were  aware  of  the  English  designs  long  before  the 
information  from  Everett  came.  For  the  instructions  to 
Robertson  in  1825,  see  above,  this  chapter,  and  note  68.  The 
former  agent  did  not  go;  but  Cook  went,  had  several  inter 
views  with  the  Spanish  governor,  Vives,  and  reported.  This 
confidential  mission  was  the  subject  for  a  congressional  inves 
tigation  in  the  next  year,  and  occasioned  considerable  embar 
rassment  for  the  administration.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII, 
20-21, 


164  CUBA  SAVED  TO  SPAIN 

and  Colombia,  Van  Buren  declared:  "This  govern 
ment  has  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  same 
influence  which  once  averted  the  blow  ready  to 
fall  upon  the  Spanish  islands  would  again  be  found 
effectual  on  the  recurrence  of  similar  events."114  In 
this  same  month  of  October  Poinsett  told  of  a  new 
movement  of  the  Mexican  government  the  purpose 
of  which,  he  thought,  was  to  incite  a  slave  revolt 
in  Cuba.115  Six  weeks  later  Van  Buren  instructed 
Butler,  who  was  to  replace  Poinsett  at  Mexico,  to 
remonstrate  against  the  alleged  intention  of  Mexico 
to  excite  the  slave  rebellion.116  Late  in  1830  the 
minister  at  Madrid  was  told  that  Mexico  had  given 
"assurance  that  no  such  measures  will,  in  any  event 
be  resorted  to."  In  this  same  letter  he  was  told  that 
the  new  states  had  given  notice  that  if  Spain  persisted 
in  her  refusal  to  make  peace  and  recognize  them,  they 
would  find  it  necessary  to  attack  the  islands.  In 
view  of  this  he  reaffirmed  the  position  of  Adams  and 
Clay  that  the  United  States  was  content  to  have  Cuba 
remain  in  the  possession  of  Spain ;  could  not  consent  to 
its  transfer  to  any  European  power ;  and  greatly  pre 
ferred  that  it  should  not  pass  to  either  of  the  South 
American  states;  but  "the  President  does  not  see  on 

114  Van  Buren  to  Van  Ness,  October  2,  1829,  House  Execu 
tive  Documents,  32  congress,  I  session,  number  121,  pages  27 
and  28. 

115  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  October  14,  1829,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

116  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  November  30,  1829,  enclosing  the 
despatch  to  Butler,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instructions, 
XIV,  148. 


CUBA   SAVED   TO   SPAIN  165 

what  ground  he  would  be  justified  in  interfering  with 
any  attempts  which  the  South  American  states  might 
think  it  for  their  interest,  in  the  prosecution  of  a  de 
fensive  war,  to  make  upon  the  islands,"  unless  the 
slaves  should  be  armed.117 

117  Van  Buren  to  Van  Ness,  October  13,  1830,  House  Ex 
ecutive  Documents,  32  congress,  I  session,  number  121,  page  28. 


CHAPTER  V 

DIPLOMACY  CONCERNING  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  SANTA 
FE  TRAIL 

Among  the  early  matters  to  furnish  occasion  for 
diplomatic  communications  between  Poinsett  and  the 
Mexican  government  was  one  providing  for  the  sur 
vey,  marking  out,  and  protection  of  a  road  leading 
from  the  frontier  settlements  of  the  United  States  on 
the  Missouri  river  to  the  nearest  settlements  in  New 
Mexico.  In  the  years  immediately  following  the  col 
lapse  of  Spanish  power  in  Mexico  the  trade  which 
had  previously  maintained  a  precarious  and  fitful  ex 
istence  by  way  of  this  route  grew  by  leaps  and  bounds.1 

1  The  purpose  here  is  to  study  the  diplomatic  relations  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Mexico  concerning  the  opening 
of  the  Santa  Fe  Road.  No  attempt  is  made  to  trace  the 
growth,  extent,  or  importance  of  the  Santa  Fe  trade.  Much 
less  is  any  space  given  to  recounting  the  hardships  suffered 
by  the  traders  or  the  many  interesting  and  tragic  events  of 
which  they  left  accounts.  A  brief  summary  of  such  matters 
may  be  found  in  Bancroft's  "History  of  Arizona  and  New 
Mexico,"  page  329  and  following.  In  the  footnotes  to  these 
pages  Bancroft  gives  the  sources  which  he  used.  One  of  the 
most  extensive,  interesting,  and  important  of  them,  Josiah 
Gregg's  "  Commerce  of  the  Prairies,  or  the  Journal  of  a  Santa 
Fe  Trader  during  eight  Expeditions,  .  .  ."  in  two  volumes, 
Second  Edition,  published  by  Langley,  New  York,  1845,  has 
recently  been  made  easily  available  in  the  collection  of  re 
prints  of  "  Early  Western  Travels  "  by  the  late  R.  G.  Thwaites, 
published  by  A.  H.  Clark  Company,  1905,  volumes  XIX  and 

166 


OPENING   OF   THE   SANTA   FE  TRAIL  l6/ 

Under  Spanish  dominion  it  had  been  hampered  by  the 
usual  unreasonable  restrictions.  In  the  period  of  un 
certainty  and  confusion  during  the  rapidly  changing 
provisional  governments  in  Mexico  between  1821  and 
1824  these  restrictions  were  not  enforced.  They  were 
not,  however,  formally  removed.  Neither  did  the  of 
ficials  at  Mexico  welcome  the  news  of  the  growing 
intercourse  on  the  far  northern  frontier.2 

About  the  middle  of  1823,  Torrens,  the  Mexican 
charge  at  Washington,  reported  that  an  expedition  was 
about  to  set  out  from  Kentucky  for  Santa  Fe.  Its 
purpose  seemed  to  be  to  open  up  a  mine  which  had 
been  discovered.  It  appeared  too  that  they  were  going 
to  take  with  them  wagons  loaded  with  merchandise. 
He  thought  that  if  orders  were  not  given  to  prohibit 
or  regulate  this  traffic  numberless  other  adventurers 
would  soon  undertake  it.  If  so  they  would  introduce 
a  contraband  trade,  and  would  trick  the  simple  na 
tives  into  parting  with  their  scanty  earnings.3  Two 
months  later,  he  said,  a  subsequent  report  had  stated 
that  the  mine  which  the  expedition  was  intended  to 
exploit  was  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States.4 

XX.  Henry  Inman's  "  Old  Santa  Fe  Trail,"  Macmillan  Com 
pany,  1898,  repeats  many  of  Gregg's  most  exciting  stories  and 
adds  others. 

2  Bancroft,    History   of    Arizona    and    New    Mexico,    329, 
incorrectly  says :  "  With  the  end  of  Spanish  rule  ceased  all 
opposition  to  the  traffic  on  the  part  of  the  Mexican  authorities." 

3  Torrens   to   Secretario   de   Relaciones   Exteriores,   21    de 
junio  de  1823,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  13. 

4  Torrens  to  Secretario,  21  de  agosto  de  1823,  La  Diplomacia 
Mexicana,  II,  21. 


1 68  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING   THE 

Shortly  after  receiving  the  first  of  these  notes  from 
Torrens,  the  government  at  Mexico  sent  instructions 
concerning  the  matter  to  the  political  chief  of  New 
Mexico.  He  was  told  that  both  the  working  of  the 
mine  and  the  contraband  trade  in  which  Torrens 
thought  the  expedition  from  Kentucky  would  engage 
were  contrary  to  the  laws;  and  that  foreigners  were 
expressly  prohibited  from  working  mines  until  they 
should  have  become  naturalized  citizens.  He  was  in 
structed  to  see  that  the  regulations  governing  these 
matters  be  enforced  and  that  the  establishment  of 
foreigners  there  be  prevented  until  a  colonization  law 
should  be  passed  establishing  rules  for  their  admis 
sion.5  Toward  the  end  of  the  same  year  Torrens  re 
ported  that  a  mercantile  expedition  to  Santa  Fe  had 
returned  with  more  than  four  hundred  horses  and 
mules,  a  quantity  of  beaver  skins,  and  a  considerable 
amount  of  money.6 

With  the  substitution  in  1824  of  trains  of  wagons 
for  the  earlier  trains  of  mules  or  other  pack-animals 
the  trade  passed  the  experimental  stage  and  henceforth 
attracted  the  attention  of  merchants  with  more  capital 
to  invest  and  more  influence.  Memorials  from  Mis 
souri  people  demanded  provision  for  and  protection 
of  the  trade.  In  January,  1825,  Senator  Benton  in 
troduced  a  bill  into  Congress  (which  was  passed  shortly 
after  and  approved  on  the  last  day  of  the  Monroe  ad- 

5  Alaman  to  Jefe  Politico  de  Nuevo  Mexico,  20  de  agosto  de 
1823,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  17. 

6  Torrens  to  Secretario,  16  de  diciembre  de  1823,  La  Diplo 
macia  Mexicana,  II,  70. 


OPENING   OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  169 

ministration)  providing  for  a  commission  to  survey 
and  mark  out  a  road  from  the  Missouri  river  to  the 
Arkansas  river,  which  was  the  international  boundary 
according  to  the  treaty  with  Spain.  The  President 
was  also  authorized  to  cause  the  marking  of  the  road 
to  be  continued  from  the  boundary  to  Santa  Fe  under 
regulations  to  be  agreed  upon  between  the  two  gov 
ernments.  The  consent  of  the  Indian  tribes  along 
the  route  was  to  be  obtained  for  the  marking  of  the 
road  and  its  use  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  and 
Mexico.  Treaties  were  to  be  made  with  the  Indians 
pledging  protection  for  them.7 

The  measures  taken  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  early  in  1825  to  establish  and  protect  the  trade 
with  northern  Mexico  were  watched  with  jealous  in 
terest  by  Obregon,  who  had  reached  Washington  in 
the  preceding  autumn  as  minister  from  Mexico.  He 
reported  that  the  commerce  from  Missouri  was  attract 
ing  much  attention ;  that  consuls  had  been  appointed  to 
go  to  Santa  Fe,  Chihuahua,  and  Saltillo  to  look  after 
the  interests  of  the  traders ;  that  no  salaries  were  pro 
vided  for  them ;  and  that,  since  the  fees  would  be  in 
sufficient  to  support  them,  they  were  to  be  permitted 
to  engage  in  trade  themselves.  These  facts  and  the 
character  of  the  persons  who  were  likely  to  desire 
such  posts  made  it  certain,  he  thought,  that  contraband 
trade  would  be  engaged  in.  This  necessitated  the  es 
tablishment  at  St.  Louis  of  a  Mexican  consul  to  watch 

7  For  the  text  of  the  bill,  see  Gales  and  Seaton's  Register  of 
Debates,  18  congress,  2  session,  I,  appendix,  102.  See  also 
Bancroft,  History  of  Arizona  and  New  Mexico,  333. 


I/O  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING  THE 

the  trade,  and  to  prevent  fraud  and  the  introduction 
of  Anglo-American  settlers.8  On  the  receipt  of  this 
letter  from  Obregon  the  government  at  Mexico  ap 
proved  the  establishment  of  a  Mexican  consul  at  St. 
Louis ;  and  said  that  the  United  States  consuls  which 
had  been  appointed  for  Santa  Fe,  Chihuahua,  and  Sal- 
tillo  would  not  be  granted  their  exequaturs  until  the 
treaty  between  the  two  countries  establishing  provi 
sions  for  the  purpose  had  been  agreed  upon.9  Obre 
gon  had  been  instructed  to  undertake  no  negotiation 
for  such  a  treaty,  and  was  told  that  it  would  have  to 
await  the  arrival  in  Mexico  of  the  minister  whom  the 
United  States  government  was  sending  to  Mexico. 

The  instructions  which  Poinsett  had  received  just 
before  his  departure  for  Mexico  included  a  copy  of 
the  act  of  Congress  providing  for  the  road.  He  was 
asked  to  assure  the  Mexican  government  that  the  pro 
ject  for  the  construction  of  this  road  had  originated 
in  a  spirit  of  friendship  for  Mexico  and  a  desire  to 
open  up  commerce  and  friendly  intercourse  between 
the  two  countries  by  way  of  that  route.  It  was  sup 
posed,  Clay  added,  that  Mexico  would  be  willing  to 
bear  the  expense  of  constructing  the  road  within  Mex 
ican  territory.10 

On  June   17,  1825,  a  little  more  than  two  weeks 

8  Obregon  to  Secretario,  30  de  marzo  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

9  Secretario  to  Obregon,  28  de  mayo  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

10  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  26,   1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X. 


OPENING  OF  THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  17! 

after  Poinsett's  reception  by  the  President  of  Mexico, 
he  addressed  Alaman  on  the  subject  of  the  road,  en 
closing  a  copy  of  the  act  of  Congress.  He  said  that 
three  commissioners  had  been  appointed  by  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  and  were  proceeding  to  their 
work;  that  they  were  not  to  pass  the  boundary  until 
an  agreement  had  been  reached  with  Mexico  for  the 
purpose ;  and  that  although  the  boundary  was  not  yet 
agreed  upon  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico 
yet  the  road  was  for  mutual  benefit  and  it  would 
make  little  difference  so  far  as  it  was  concerned  where 
the  boundary  should  ultimately  be  located.  He  em 
phasized  the  friendly  spirit  in  which  the  enterprise 
had  been  undertaken,  and  said  he  was  authorized  to 
receive  from  the  Mexican  government  propositions 
for  its  completion  and  for  regulating  intercourse  be 
tween  the  two  countries.  He  described  the  route 
hitherto  taken  by  the  caravans,  named  the  Indian  tribes 
along  it,  told  of  the  treaties  being  made  with  them, 
and  said  that  the  enterprise  would  probably  have  a 
wholesome  effect  on  the  Indians.11  In  his  despatch 
to  Clay  of  the  next  day  enclosing  a  copy  of  this  note, 
Poinsett  said  that  Alaman  was  opposed  to  making  any 
arrangement  with  reference  to  the  proposed  road  until 
the  question  of  the  boundary  line  should  be  settled.12 
It  was  more  than  a  month  after  receiving  Poinsett's 

11  Poinsett  to  Alaman,  June  17,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.    A  copy  of  the  same  is  in 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

12  Poinsett  to  Clay,  June  18, 1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING   THE 


note  before  the  Mexican  government  replied.  On 
July  20  Alaman  said  that  he  had  delayed  in  the  hope 
of  being  able  to  make  proposals  at  the  same  time 
concerning  other  very  important  related  matters  ;  that 
it  would  not  be  easy  to  separate  the  negotiations  con 
cerning  the  road  from  those  concerning  limits  and  a 
general  commercial  treaty;  that  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  was  convinced  that  the  road  would  be  useful  and 
beneficial  for  both  countries;  and  that  Mexico  would 
be  disposed  to  concur  in  the  plan  of  the  United  States. 
But  the  President  thought  that  it  would  be  better  to 
undertake  first  the  negotiation  of  the  treaties  of  com 
merce  and  limits,  leaving  the  arrangement  for  the  road 
as  a  dependent  matter.13  In  his  despatch  transmitting 
Alaman's  note  to  Washington,  Poinsett  said  he  feared 
that  the  Mexicans  were  resolved  to  postpone  marking 
out  the  road  until  a  commission  should  have  examined 
that  portion  of  the  country  with  a  view  to  the  settle 
ment  of  the  boundary  line.14  On  July  27,  in  replying 
to  Alaman's  note,  Poinsett  said  that  he  regretted  the 
delay  it  would  cause  in  marking  out  the  road  if  the 

13  Alaman  to  Poinsett,  July  20,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.    The  same  in  Spanish  is 
in  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.    In  this  note  Alaman  declared 
the  unwillingness  of  Mexico  to  make  a  boundary  treaty  until 
a  commission  should  be  sent  to  examine  the  country  near  the 
proposed  boundary.     He  suggested  that  this  should  be  a  joint 
commission,  and  that  it  should  be  charged  with  completing  the 
construction  of  the  road.     See  below,  the  chapter  on  Texas 
and  the  Boundary  Issue,  and  also  that  on  Negotiations  for  a 
Commercial  Treaty. 

14  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  22,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


OPENING  OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  173 

Mexican  government  should  insist  on  concluding  first 
the  treaties  of  commerce  and  limits,  or  on  waiting 
until  a  commission  should  explore  the  country ;  and 
that  such  postponement  would  injure  the  profitable 
commerce  just  coming  into  existence  between  New 
Mexico  and  the  western  states  of  the  United  States. 
He  still  hoped,  he  said,  that  the  President  of  Mexico 
would  alter  his  determination  and  authorize  Alaman 
to  enter  into  negotiations  on  the  subject  of  the  road.15 
About  two  weeks  passed  after  receiving  Poinsett's 
note  before  Alaman  responded  to  it.  In  the  mean 
time  information  had  come  which  strengthened  the 
determination  of  the  Mexican  government. 

On  August  5  that  government  had  received  from  the 
governor  of  Chihuahua  a  report  concerning  the  north 
eastern  frontier  country.  This  report  had  been  written 
on  May  13  in  response  to  a  request  which  the  govern 
ment  had  made  on  April  19  preceding.  It  described 
the  country  drained  by  the  Missouri  and  the  Arkansas 
rivers,  telling  of  the  contour  and  appearance  of  the 
prairie  lands,  of  the  numerous  rivers  affording  drain 
age  and  water  communication,  of  the  crops  for  which 
the  region  was  adapted,  of  the  birds  and  animals,  and 
of  the  Indian  tribes  inhabiting  the  country.  The 
Anglo-Americans,  he  said,  knew  the  region  better  than 
the  Spaniards  and  Mexicans  did ;  and  because  they  knew 
of  its  resources  they  had  taken  advantage  of  Spanish 
ignorance  to  obtain  it.  The  government  of  the  United 

15  Poinsett  to  Alaman,  July  27,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.  The  same  is  in  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 


DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING   THE 

States  was  encouraging  settlement  in  this  country, 
the  writer  of  the  report  added,  and  he  thought  the  plan 
to  open  commerce  with  Mexico  was  for  the  purpose 
of  fostering  such  settlements.  When  the  old  restric 
tions  were  relaxed,  he  said  that  goods  began  to  come 
from  the  United  States  into  the  northern  Mexican  set 
tlements  at  one  third  of  their  former  cost;  and  that 
because  of  this  the  people  welcomed  the  Anglo-Amer 
icans.  He  thought  this  trade  would  help  to  civilize 
the  troublesome  Indians,  and  would  be  to  the  advan 
tage  of  the  distant  and  detached  territory  of  New 
Mexico;  but  he  believed  the  consequent  increase  of 
Anglo-Americans  in  the  neighboring  territory  of  the 
United  States  might  crowd  more  Indians  back  on  the 
unprotected  Mexican  frontier.  He  thought  that  an 
effort  should  be  made  to  preserve  harmony  with  the 
United  States;  but  that  only  such  advantages  should 
be  conceded  as  would  be  compatible  with  Mexican 
interests.  The  country  on  the  Mexican  side,  he  de 
clared,  should  be  colonized  by  Mexico,  and  for  this 
purpose  an  increase  of  forces  was  needed.16 

16  Governor  Urquidi  of  Chihuahua  to  Secretario,  13  de 
mayo  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.  The  transcript  of 
the  report  of  which  this  is  a  condensed  translation  covers 
seven  typewritten  pages.  Accompanying  this  report  in  the 
archives  are  numerous  orders  to  various  officials  enclosing 
copies  of  it  or  portions  of  it  and  commenting  on  its  signifi 
cance.  The  most  interesting  is  that  to  the  secretary  for  war 
of  August  5,  1825,  asking  that  the  necessary  precautionary 
measures  be  taken.  On  October  26,  following,  Pedraza  of 
the  war  department  wrote  to  the  office  of  foreign  relations 
saying  that  troops  had  been  sent  to  Chihuahua  and  New 
Mexico, 


OPENING   OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  1/5 

It  was  on  August  10,  five  days  after  receiving  this 
report,  that  Alaman  wrote  in  reply  to  Poinsett's  note 
of  July  27,  saying  that  the  President  found  it  impos 
sible  to  hasten  the  time  for  concluding  the  arrange 
ments  concerning  the  road.  He  said  that  it  would 
help  to  shorten  the  necessary  delay  and  make  it  pos 
sible  to  afford  some  protection  in  the  meantime,  if 
Poinsett  would  be  so  kind  as  to  report  as  soon  as  pos 
sible  the  results  of  the  United  States  commission 
which  was  surveying  the  portion  of  the  road  on  their 
side  of  the  present  boundary.17  In  transmitting  Ala- 
man's  note  to  Clay,  Poinsett  said  that  he  had  made  no 
further  proposition  since  he  considered  it  useless.18 

When  Clay  received  Poinsett's  reports  of  the  diffi 
culties  that  he  was  encountering  in  trying  to  get  the 
Mexican  government  to  consent  to  the  opening  of  the 

17  Alaman  to  Poinsett,  August  10,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,    Duplicate    Despatches    from    Poinsett.     The    same   in 
Spanish  is  in  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.     Having  decided  to 
postpone  the  opening  of  the  road,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  the 
additional  reason  which  Alaman  discovered  and  urged.     Poin 
sett  had  tried  to  spur  the  Mexicans  to  activity  by  saying  that 
if  the  matter  were  not  soon  arranged  still  further  delay  would 
be  occasioned  because  it  would  be  necessary  for  Congress  to 
act  again  and  make  additional  provision.    Alaman  now  said 
that  because  of  the  similarity  of  the  Mexican  constitution  to 
that  of  the  United  States  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  presi 
dent  of  Mexico  to  submit  to  the  Mexican  Congress  the  matter 
of  the  road,  just  as  the  United  States  Congress  had  acted  on 
the  measure.     But  that  could  not  be  done  until  the  next  regu 
lar  session,  since  the  existing  special  session  was  prohibited 
by  the  constitution  from  considering  any  matter  not  named  in 
the  call  for  the  special  session. 

18  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  17,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Duplicate  Despatches  from  Poinsett. 


DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING  THE 


road,  he  said  in  reply  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  regretted  to  learn  of  the  reluctance  of  Mexico 
to  agree  to  the  measure.  Clay  declared  that  the  road 
was  intended  for  purely  commercial  purposes,  and 
that  no  misconception  could  be  greater  than  that  it 
had  originated  in  a  desire  for  territorial  acquisition. 
The  road,  he  added,  would  be  to  the  advantage  of 
both  countries;  and  if  either  could  lose  anything  it 
would  probably  be  the  United  States,  since  many  en 
terprising  citizens  were  likely  to  be  induced  to  emi 
grate  to  the  Mexican  provinces.  He  observed  that 
the  road  already  existed  in  fact.  It  was  merely  pro 
posed  to  render  it  plainer  and  more  useful.19 

The  local  authorities  in  New  Mexico  were  vitally 
interested  in  the  trade  with  the  Anglo-Americans.  In 
September,  1825,  Storrs,  one  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  who  was  then  at  Santa  Fe,  and  whose 
report  of  the  preceding  year  had  been  presented  to 
Congress  by  Senator  Benton  early  in  1825  when  the 
latter  was  urging  his  bills  for  protecting  the  trade, 
wrote  to  Narbona,  the  governor  of  New  Mexico,  in 
reply  to  inquiries  received  shortly  before.  After  an 
swering  specific  questions  concerning  the  trade  and 
concerning  the  reports  which  he  had  made  to  his  own 
government  about  it,  Storrs  insisted  that  the  traders 
from  the  United  States  had  not  knowingly  violated 
any  of  the  laws  of  Mexico.  He  emphasized  the  sym 
pathy  which  the  United  States  had  shown  for  the 
Spanish-American  states  while  they  were  struggling 

19  Clay  to  Poinsett,  September  24,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  225. 


OPENING   OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  177 

against  Spain ;  cited  the  declaration  of  President  Mon 
roe  against  the  expected  interference  of  the  European 
powers  to  assist  Spain ;  and  declared  that  the  desire 
to  open  the  proposed  road  arose  not  merely  out  of  a 
wish  to  profit  from  the  trade  but  to  bind  closer  the 
interests  of  the  two  sister  republics.20 

In  the  spring  of  1825,  Escudero,  a  member  of  the 
legislature  of  the  state  of  Chihuahua,  set  out  from  the 
city  of  that  name  to  travel  in  the  United  States.  He 
was  interested  in  the  trade  and  wished  to  study  the 
institutions  of  the  neighboring  republic.  He  went  by 
way  of  El  Paso  and  Santa  Fe.  On  June  9,  while  at 
the  latter  place,  he  was  given  a  commission  by  Baca, 
then  political  chief  of  New  Mexico,  authorizing  him 
to  enter  into  arrangements  with  the  authorities  in  the 
United  States  to  check  robberies  and  murders  by  In 
dians  along  the  borders.21  In  accepting  the  commis 
sion  Escudero  said  he  would  bear  all  of  the  expense 
himself.22  After  his  arrival  at  St.  Louis  he  entered 
into  relations  with  William  Clark,  the  superintendent 
of  Indian  affairs.  The  latter  addressed  a  courteous 
note  to  Escudero  on  September  25  saying  that  the 
United  States  was  desirous  of  seeing  peace  and  secur 
ity  maintained  along  the  border,  telling  of  the  com 
mission  which  was  at  that  time  engaged  in  marking 

20  Augustus  Storrs  to  Governor  Narbona,  Santa  Fe,  25  de 
septiembre  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

21  Baca  to  Escudero,   Santa  Fe,  9  de  junio  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

22  Escudero  to  Baca,   Santa  Fe,  9  de  junio  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

13 


178  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING   THE 

out  the  road  and  making  treaties  with  the  Indians  for 
the  protection  of  the  citizens  of  both  countries,  and 
adding  that  there  was  a  project  on  foot  for  establish 
ing  a  military  post  on  the  Arkansas  to  protect  the  trade 
route;  but  declaring  that  he  had  no  power  to  treat 
with  Escudero.83  Obregon  in  Washington,  seeing 
newspaper  accounts  of  the  arrival  of  Escudero  at  St. 
Louis  and  of  his  attempt  to  treat  with  the  authorities 
there,  sent  a  despatch  concerning  the  matter  to  his  gov 
ernment  on  October  i.24  Another  report  was  sent  by 
Obregon  on  January  16,  1826,  saying  that  Escudero 
had  come  on  to  Washington  and  had  there  endeavored 
to  take  up  the  matter  with  the  government.  After 
conferring  with  him  Obregon  was  convinced  that  the 
commission  which  he  bore  did  not  confer  on  him 
authority  sufficient  to  treat  with  the  United  States  gov 
ernment.  Escudero  had  thereupon  abandoned  his  ef 
forts  and  returned  to  Mexico,  asking  Obregon  to  ex 
plain  his  mission  to  the  government.  Obregon  added 
the  suggestion  that  the  central  authorities  at  Mexico 
should  inform  the  officials  of  the  provinces  concerning 
the  proper  method  of  treating  with  foreign  powers.25 
As  soon  as  Obregon's  first  report  of  the  matter, 
dated  October  i,  reached  Mexico  the  central  govern 
ment  wrote  to  the  political  chief  of  New  Mexico  de- 

23  Clark  to  Escudero,  St.  Louis,  September  25,  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

24  Obregon  to  Secretario,  i  de  octubre  de  1825,  MS.,  Rela 
ciones  Exteriores. 

25  Obregon  to  Secretario,  16  de  enero  de  1826,  MS.,  Rela 
ciones  Exteriores. 


OPENING   OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  1 79 

manding  a  full  and  circumstantial  account  of  the  mis 
sion.26  In  the  meantime  Baca  had  been  replaced  at 
Santa  Fe  by  Narbona.  The  latter  referred  the  matter 
to  the  former,  and  on  January  30,  1826,  received  a  re 
ply  enclosing  a  copy  of  the  commission  which  had  been 
conferred  on  Escudero  on  June  9,  preceding.  Baca 
gave  as  his  motive  his  insatiable  desire  for  the  happi 
ness  of  the  region.  Furthermore,  he  explained  that 
the  expedition  involved  no  cost  to  the  government, 
since  Escudero  bore  all  of  the  expense  himself.27  On 
February  4  Narbona  despatched  his  predecessor's  ex 
planation  to  the  government  at  Mexico.28 

The  commission  which  the  Congress  at  Washington 
had  provided  for  early  in  1825  was  appointed  on 
March  16,  by  James  Barbour,  secretary  of  war,  and 
proceeded  to  survey  the  portion  of  the  road  within 
the  limits  of  the  United  States  as  established  by  the 
treaty  with  Spain.  The  commission  consisted  of 
George  C.  Sibley  and  two  others.29  They  employed  a 

~26  Secretario  to  Jefe  Politico,  9  de  diciembre  de  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

27  Baca  to  Narbona,  Santa  Fe,  30  de  enero  de  1826,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

28  Narbona  to  Secretario,  Santa  Fe,  4  de  febrero  de  1826, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.     In  the  documents   Narbona   is 
usually  addressed  as  Governor  instead  of  Political  Chief,  the 
term  applied  to  Baca. 

For  a  brief  account  of  Escudero's  mission,  see  Bancroft, 
History  of  Arizona  and  New  Mexico,  334.  He  says :  "  Not 
much  is  definitely  stated  as  to  the  nature  and  results  of  this 
mission." 

29  A  copy  of  James  Barbour  to  Benjamin  H.  Reeves,  George 
C.  Sibley,  and  Pierre  Menard,  Department  of  War,  March  16, 


I8O  DIPLOMACY    CONCERNING   THE 

surveyor  and  several  assistants.  The  survey  was  be 
gun  on  June  17,  1825,  at  Fort  Osage,30  on  the  Mis 
souri  river.  It  was  completed  to  the  Arkansas  river, 
a  distance  of  416  miles,  by  September  n.  The  docu 
ment  which  conferred  the  commission  on  them  had 
informed  them  that  arrangements  would  be  made  with 
the  Mexican  government  for  continuing  their  work 
from  there  to  Santa  Fe,  and  that  additional  instruc 
tions  for  the  purpose  would  reach  them  by  the  time 
they  got  to  the  boundary  so  they  could  continue  with 
out  delay.  But  their  instructions  were  not  there. 
They  waited  eleven  days  hoping  to  receive  some  word 
concerning  them.  Then  two  of  the  commissioners 
and  most  of  the  party  returned  to  Missouri ;  but  Sib- 
ley  and  the  surveyor  and  a  few  others  went  on  to 

1825,  is  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Alaman,  June  17,  1825,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

Bancroft,  History  of  Arizona  and  New  Mexico,  334,  and 
G.  C.  Broadhead,  "  The  Santa  Fe  Trail "  in  Missouri  Histor 
ical  Review,  IV,  314,  both  give  Thomas  Mather  instead  of  Me- 
nard  as  the  third  member  of  the  commission.  The  treaties  made 
with  the  Osage  and  the  Kansas  Indians  in  1825  were  signed 
by  Reeves,  Sibley,  and  Mather.  See  American  State  Papers, 
Indian  Affairs,  II,  610.  Doubtless  Menard  did  not  accept  the 
commission,  or  resigned,  and  Mather  was  appointed  instead. 
J.  C.  Brown  of  St.  Louis  was  employed  as  surveyor.  Brown's 
"  Field  Notes,"  giving  minute  descriptions  of  the  route,  includ 
ing  directions  for  travelers,  distances  between  camping  places, 
supplies  of  fresh  water  and  of  wood  for  fuel  and  other  mat 
ters,  have  recently  been  published  in  the  Eighteenth  Biennial 
Report  of  the  Kansas  State  Historical  Society,  117-125. 

30  Broadhead,  in  the  Missouri  Historical  Review,  IV,  314, 
says  that  Fort  Osage  was  on  the  site  of  the  present  town  of 
Sibley,  Missouri,  near  the  Missouri  river,  twenty-five  miles 
east  of  the  western  boundary  of  the  state. 


OPENING   OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  l8l 

Santa  Fe  to  be  ready  to  cooperate  in  the  following 
spring  in  any  measures  which  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  might  have  taken  by  that  time. 

Sibley  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Santa  Fe  late 
in  October.  From  there  he  wrote  to  Poinsett  at  Mex 
ico,  telling  what  had  been  done,  saying  that  the  author 
ities  in  New  Mexico  had  no  instructions  or  advice  con 
cerning  the  survey,  and  urging  Poinsett  to  tell  him  as 
soon  as  possible  what  the  government  at  Mexico  in 
tended  to  do  about  the  matter.  He  explained  to 
Poinsett  that  the  whole  length  of  the  proposed  road 
would  be  about  seven  hundred  and  forty  miles ;  "  and," 
he  said,  "  in  the  whole  distance  there  is  not  an  obstruc 
tion  that  ten  men  cannot  easily  remove  in  a  few  hours. 
In  fact  there  cannot  be  said  to  be  any  obstruction. 
The  country  is  level  and  the  surface  is  firm ;  and,  with 
the  exception  of  some  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  only, 
the  whole  distance  is  through  an  open  prairie.  ...  A 
few  hundred  dollars  will  be  sufficient  to  remove  all  ob 
structions  that  lie  in  the  way  in  the  mountains.  And 
if  the  Mexican  government  will  take  measures  to  se 
cure  the  good  conduct  of  the  Indian  tribes  within  their 
territory  (who  are  in  the  habit  of  infesting  the  route 
and  robbing  travellers  who  are  engaged  in  this  trade 
to  and  from  Missouri),  there  cannot  be  a  doubt  but 
the  establishment  of  this  great  national  highway  will 
prove  greatly  beneficial  to  the  citizens  of  both  repub 
lics,  and  particularly  to  those  of  New  Mexico."31 

31  Sibley  to  Poinsett,  San  Fernando,  New  Mexico,  Novem 
ber  12,  1825,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Camacho,  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Relations,  January  18,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exte- 
riores. 


1 82  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING   THE 

After  Sibley  had  been  for  about  two  months  in  New 
Mexico  he  submitted  to  Governor  Narbona  a  report 
of  his  work  and  a  map  showing  the  route.  Besides 
the  facts  contained  in  the  report  to  Poinsett,  this  told 
of  the  treaties  made  with  the  Indian  tribes  within  the 
United  States  and  of  the  intention  of  the  United 
States  government  to  establish  a  military  post  on  the 
Arkansas  river  for  the  protection  of  the  route  against 
Indian  attacks,  and  suggested  that  the  lawless  Indians 
within  the  Mexican  borders  could  be  easily  restrained 
by  the  establishment  of  two  similar  posts  between  the 
Arkansas  and  the  mountains,  for  which  suitable  sites 
could  be  found.  He  added  that  he  could  not  for  a 
moment  doubt  that  the  government  of  Mexico  would 
not  only  sanction  the  establishment  of  the  contemplated 
road  but  would  also  take  effective  measures  to 
secure  it  from  the  depredations  of  Indian  tribes 
within  its  jurisdiction.32  On  the  next  day  after  he 
had  received  Sibley's  report  Governor  Narbona  for 
warded  it  to  the  government  at  Mexico  asking  that  the 
proper  instructions  be  sent  to  him  for  dealing  with 
the  situation.33 

On  January  18,  1826,  shortly  after  receiving  Sib- 
ley's  letter  of  November  12,  Poinsett  handed  it  to  the 
secretary  for  foreign  relations.  At  the  same  time  he 
communicated  to  the  government  the  content  of  Clay's 
note  of  September  24,  1825,  expressing  the  regret  of 

32  Sibley  to  Narbona,  Santa  Fe,  January  5,  1826,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

33  Narbona  to  Secretario,  Santa  Fe,  6  de  enero  de  1826,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 


OPENING  OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  183 

the  government  of  the  United  States  at  learning  of  the 
reluctance  of  the  Mexican  government  to  cooperate  in 
opening  the  road,  and  saying  that  it  was  intended  for 
purely  commercial  purposes  and  would  have  no  effect 
whatever  on  the  location  of  the  boundary.  To  defer 
marking  out  the  road,  Poinsett  added,  and  thereby 
deny  to  the  merchants  the  benefit  of  it  until  a  future 
arrangement  could  be  made  to  which  it  had  no  neces 
sary  relation  did  not  seem  politic  or  advisable.  In 
conclusion  Poinsett  declared:  "As  the  commissioners 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  are  on  the  spot,  I  can 
not  reject  the  hope  that  this  government  will  revise  its 
former  decision  on  this  subject  and,  if  it  does  not  aid 
the  efforts  of  the  commissioners  of  the  United  States, 
will  at  least  permit  them  to  accomplish  the  object  of 
their  appointment  and  complete  the  demarkation  of 
this  road  from  the  frontier  of  New  Mexico  to  the 
city  of  Santa  Fe."34  In  writing  to  Clay  on  the  same 
day  Poinsett  said  that  the  President  of  Mexico  had 
submitted  to  the  Congress  the  question  of  opening 
the  road,  and  had  promised  to  endeavor  to  obtain  an 
early  decision.  But  the  deliberations  of  that  body, 
Poinsett  added,  were  interminable.  However  as  soon 
as  a  decision  should  be  reached  he  would  communi 
cate  it  to  the  United  States  commissioner  then  wait 
ing  at  Santa  Fe.35 

Three  months  more  passed  without  a  decision.     Fi- 

34  Poinsett  to  Camacho,  January  18,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores. 

35  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  18,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


1 84  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING  THE 

nally  on  April  17,  1826,  Poinsett  wrote  to  the  secretary 
for  foreign  relations  saying  that  he  was  compelled 
again  to  bring  to  the  latter's  notice  the  matter  of  the 
opening  of  the  road.  He  said  that  the  commissioner 
of  the  United  States,  after  waiting  for  several  months 
at  Santa  Fe  for  an  answer  from  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  was  about  to  return  to  the  state  of  Missouri. 
"It  would  be  a  subject  of  regret,"  he  added,  "that 
the  expense  of  making  the  journey  to  Santa  Fe  with 
surveyors  and  the  necessary  instruments  should  have 
been  incurred  in  vain;  and  I  beg  Your  Excellency  to 
solicit  the  consent  of  His  Excellency,  the  President  of 
the  United  Mexican  States,  to  the  survey  and  marking 
out  of  the  western  section  of  the  proposed  road  from 
Santa  Fe  to  Missouri  by  Mr.  Sibley  on  his  return 
homeward."36 

A  little  less  than  a  month  later,  on  May  13,  1826, 
the  Mexican  government  wrote  to  Governor  Narbona 
of  New  Mexico  saying  that  in  view  of  a  note  from  the 
plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  the  President  of 
Mexico  had  decided  to  authorize  Narbona  to  permit 
Mr.  Sibley  to  survey  the  western  part  of  the  road. 
The  work  was  to  be  limited,  however,  to  the  survey 
alone.  He  was  not  to  cut  down  trees  or  erect  marks 
along  the  route.37  On  the  same  day,  Poinsett  was  in 
formed  of  the  orders  which  had  been  sent  to  the  au 
thorities  at  Santa  Fe.  He  was  told  that  for  the  pres- 

36  Poinsett  to   Secretary  for  Foreign  Relations,  April  17, 
1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

37  Secretario  to  Gobernador  del  Nuevo  Mexico,  13  de  mayo 
de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


OPENING  OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  185 

ent  it  was  impossible  for  the  Mexican  government  to 
send  an  agent  to  cooperate  with  Mr.  Sibley  in  the  sur 
vey.38  When  these  orders  reached  Santa  Fe,  Gover 
nor  Narbona  transmitted  them  on  June  14  to  Mr.  Sib- 
ley,  who  acknowledged  them  five  days  later,  saying 
that  he  would  determine  what  he  should  do,  in  view 
of  the  very  restricted  permission,  as  soon  as  his  col 
leagues,  who  were  expected  soon,  should  arrive.39 

The  writer  does  not  have  at  hand  certain  proof  of 
just  what  was  done  by  the  commission  on  the  return. 
But  it  seems  that  the  restricted  instructions  were 
obeyed  to  the  letter,  that  the  route  was  surveyed  from 
the  neighborhood  of  Santa  Fe  to  the  border  on  the 
Arkansas,  but  that  no  monuments  were  erected.40 

38  Camacho  to  Poinsett,  13  de  mayo  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores.    An  English  translation  of  this  note  is  in  MS., 
Department  of   State,   Despatches   from  Mexico,   I,   enclosed 
with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  17,  1826. 

39  Sibley  to  Narbona,  Taos,  June  19,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores.     He   acknowledges   Narbona's  note  of  June   14, 
communicating  the  permission.     Narbona  to  Secretario,  30  de 
junio  de  1826,  transmitted  Sibley's  reply  to  the  government  at 
Mexico. 

40  Broadhead,  in  Missouri  Historical  Review,  IV,  315,  says : 
"  During  1826  the  commissioners  obtained  authority  from  the 
Mexican  government  to  examine  routes  in  their  territory;  and 
a  survey  was  begun  at  Fernando  de  Taos  and  ran  to  connect 
with  the  survey  of  the  year  before.  ...  A  map  of  the  survey 
was  placed  in  the  office  of  the  War  Department  at  Washington 
City  and  was  seen  there  only  a  few  years  ago."    This  article 
then  goes  on  to  describe  two  maps  made  by  J.  G  Brown,  the 
surveyor  employed  by  the  commission,  showing  the  route  from 
Fort  Osage  to  Santa  Fe,  and  a  third  map  showing  the  route 
from  the  United  States  boundary  to  Santa  Fe.    One  of  the 
first  two,  Broadhead  says,  is  dated  October  27,  1827,  and  bears 


1 86  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING  THE 

When  Clay  received  Poinsett's  report  concerning  the 
authorization  which  had  been  sent  to  Santa  Fe  for 
Sibley's  return  survey,  he  said :  "  The  restricted  per 
mission  given  in  regard  to  the  proposed  road  from 
Missouri  into  the  territories  of  the  United  Mexican 
States  does  not  seem  likely  to  be  productive  of  much 
good."41 

From  this  time,  the  middle  of  1826,  until  the  early 
part  of  1830,  with  which  date  this  study  closes,  very 
little  mention  is  made  in  diplomatic  communications 
concerning  the  Santa  Fe  road  or  the  Santa  Fe  trade. 
In  April,  1827,  Poinsett  wrote  to  Clay  concerning 
a  claim  against  the  Mexican  government  which  he  had 
been  asked  to  present  for  losses  to  merchants  of  the 
United  States  occasioned  by  an  attack  of  Comanche 

an  endorsement  by  Colonel  John  I.  Abert  of  the  corps  of  engi 
neers  in  1844  saying  that  it  is  the  original  plat  of  the  survey. 
He  continues:  "A  manuscript  atlas  in  the  hand  writing  of 
Geo.  C.  Sibley  shows  route  from  boundary  of  Missouri  to 
Fernando  de  Taos  with  notes  and  directions  for  travelers." 

Bancroft,  History  of  Arizona  and  New  Mexico,  334,  says: 
"The  road  was  never  marked  by  mounds  beyond  the  Arkansas, 
and  only  in  part  to  that  river,"  citing  Gregg  and  Prince  as 
authority.  He  says  also :  "  It  does  not  appear,  however,  that 
the  traders  ever  made  use  of  the  road  as  surveyed,  preferring 
to  follow  the  earlier  trail." 

The  Eighteenth  Biennial  Report  of  the  Kansas  State  His 
torical  Society  for  1911-1912,  pp.  107-125,  contains  a  valuable 
"  Report  of  a  Committee  Appointed  to  prepare  a  correct  Map 
of  the  Old  Santa  Fe  Trail  across  the  State  of  Kansas."  To 
this  is  appended  the  map  and  the  "  Field  Notes "  of  J.  C. 
Brown,  the  surveyor,  cited  in  footnote  29,  above. 

41  Clay  to  Poinsett,  June  23, 1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XI. 


OPENING  OF   THE   SANTA   FE  TRAIL  l8/ 

Indians.  He  said  that  those  Indians  were  as  likely 
to  attack  citizens  of  Mexico  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  If  the  latter  should  press  claims  which  the 
former  alike  suffered  he  feared  that  Mexico  might 
prevent  such  trade  altogether,  either  by  directly  pro 
hibiting  it  or  indirectly  hampering  it.  Further  he 
said  if  such  claims,  even  though  always  bona  fide, 
should  be  pressed  against  the  government  of  Mexico, 
then  Mexican  citizens  might  press  similar  but  ficti 
tious  claims  against  the  United  States  for  losses  within 
the  borders  of  the  latter.  He  believed  a  claim  to  be 
fraudulent  which  Escudero  had  made  and  received  in 
demnity  for  on  the  ground  that  he  had  been  plundered 
by  Osage  Indians.  He  said  that  Mexico  was  suspi 
cious  of  the  United  States,  and  did  not  really  desire 
the  trade  by  way  of  the  interior.  The  government 
was  continually  making  complaint  of  the  insolence  of 
the  traders  from  the  United  States  and  their  sale  of 
arms  to  the  Indians;  and  was  trying  to  put  into  the 
treaty  an  article  prohibiting  all  trade  with  the  In 
dians.42 

In  spite  of  insufficient  protection,  and  consequent 
losses  by  Indian  attacks,  the  Santa  Fe  trade  continued 
to  grow,  with  a  few  reverses.  In  1829  the  long  ex 
pected  military  force  was  furnished  by  the  United 
States  to  escort  the  traders.43  In  April,  1830,  Van 

42  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  13, 1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches   from   Mexico,   II.     For  payment  of   Escudero's 
claim  see  Clay  to  Poinsett,  January  5,  1827,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  XI,  227. 

43  In  response  to  a  resolution  of  the  United  States  Senate, 


1 88  DIPLOMACY   CONCERNING  THE 

Buren,  then  secretary  of  state,  wrote  to  Butler,  the 
charge  at  Mexico,  telling  of  the  army  contingent  which 
the  United  States  was  equipping  to  protect  the  trade 
with  northern  Mexico;  and  instructed  him  to  en 
deavor  to  induce  the  Mexican  government  to  supply 
a  similar  force  to  meet  the  caravans  on  the  frontier 
and  escort  them  to  the  civilized  settlements  in  Mexico. 
Or  if  this  was  impossible  he  was  to  try  to  get  the 
consent  of  that  government  for  the  United  States 
troops  to  guard  the  caravans  to  the  nearest  civilized 
Mexican  settlements.  The  last,  he  was  told,  would 
be  a  very  delicate  matter.44 

a  report  was  made  by  the  War  Department  January  10,  1827, 
on  the  "  expediency  of  providing  for  the  establishment  of  a 
military  post  on  the  trading  route  between  Missouri  and 
Mexico  for  the  protection  of  that  trade."  The  report  advised 
against  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  post  because  of  the 
great  length  of  the  route  to  be  protected,  the  great  distance  a 
post  on  the  Arkansas  would  be  from  the  nearest  settlements, 
and  the  consequent  difficulty  of  keeping  the  post  supplied.  It 
suggested  instead  that  an  armed  force  should  be  provided  to 
travel  with  the  caravans,  having  a  place  of  rendezvous,  only,  on 
the  Arkansas.  See  American  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs, 
III,  615. 

Major  Riley  was  in  command  of  this  first  escort.  He  and 
his  command  accompanied  the  wagon  train  in  1829  to  the 
Arkansas  where  he  expected  to  turn  back.  But  Indians  at 
tacked  the  train  a  few  miles  beyond  the  Arkansas,  and  the 
traders  appealed  to  Riley  for  protection.  He  crossed  into 
Mexican  territory  and  drove  away  the  Indians,  and  continued 
with  the  train  as  far  as  the  Cimarron  [Semirone  in  the  docu 
ment],  where  he  turned  back.  After  his  return  to  Ft.  Leaven- 
worth  he  sent  a  report  to  the  War  Department.  See  Ameri 
can  State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  IV,  277. 

44  Van  Buren  to  Butler,  April  i,  1830,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions  to  American  States,  XIV,  176. 


OPENING  OF   THE   SANTA   FE   TRAIL  189 

The  commercial  treaty  which  Butler  concluded  with 
the  Mexican  government  on  April  5,  1831,  and  which 
was  ratified  just  a  year  later  contained  an  article  in 
tended  to  regulate  the  trade  by  this  route.  It  de 
clared  :  "  For  the  purpose  of  regulating  the  interior 
commerce  between  the  frontier  territories  of  both  re 
publics,  it  is  agreed  that  the  executive  of  each  shall 
have  power,  by  mutual  agreement,  of  determining  on 
the  route  and  establishing  the  roads  by  which  such 
commerce  shall  be  conducted ;  and  in  all  cases  where 
the  caravans  employed  in  such  commerce  may  require 
convoy  and  protection  by  military  escort,  the  supreme 
executive  of  each  nation  shall,  by  mutual  agreement, 
in  like  manner,  fix  on  the  period  of  departure  for  such 
caravans,  and  the  point  at  which  the  military  escort 
of  the  two  nations  shall  be  exchanged.  And  it  is  fur 
ther  agreed,  that,  until  the  regulations  for  governing 
this  interior  commerce  between  the  two  nations  shall 
be  established,  the  commercial  intercourse  between 
the  state  of  Missouri  of  the  United  States  of  Amer 
ica,  and  New  Mexico  in  the  United  Mexican  States, 
shall  be  conducted  as  heretofore,  each  government 
affording  the  necessary  protection  to  the  citizens  of 
the  other."45 

Writers  of  popular  narratives  of  events  along  the 
trail  tell  of  United  States  troops  escorting  wagon 
trains  to  the  Arkansas,  and  sometimes  into  Mexican 
territory,  and  of  the  coming  of  Mexican  troops  to  meet 
and  escort  traders  to  Santa  Fe.46 

45  United  States,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  1776-1909, 1, 1095. 

46  In  the  books  cited  in  footnote  i,  above. 


CHAPTER  VI 

DENUNCIATION  OF  POINSETT  BECAUSE  OF  His  RELA 
TIONS  WITH  THE  YORK  MASONS 

In  spite  of  clerical  opposition,  Masonry  was  already 
flourishing  in  Mexico  before  Poinsett's  arrival  in 
1825.  But  all  of  the  lodges  hitherto  fully  organized 
and  having  a  charter  belonged  to  the  Scottish  rite. 
The  secrecy  of  the  lodges  made  them  a  fertile  field 
for  the  growth  and  spread  of  political  doctrines.  The 
centralista  faction  dominated  them  everywhere  and 
their  influence  was  reactionary.  Federalistas  felt  that 
it  was  necessary  to  oppose  their  influence  in  order  to 
prevent  a  return  to  the  monarchical  system. 

Just  at  the  time  when  the  changes  were  occurring 
in  the  government  which  Poinsett  spoke  of  as  the  or 
ganization  of  an  American  party,  and  when  that  party 
was  getting  control  of  the  cabinet,1  lodges  of  York 
rite  Masons  began  to  be  organized.  They  immediately 
spread  with  great  rapidity,  were  everywhere  controlled 
by  federalista  partisans,  and  soon  began  a  violent  po 
litical  agitation  against  the  supposed  European  and 
monarchical  tendencies  of  the  centralistas  exerted 
through  the  Scottish  rite  lodges.  A  bitter  hostility 
sprang  up  between  the  two  rites,  which  shortly  either 
absorbed  or  obscured  all  other  issues  and  caused  the 

1  Discussed  above  in  the  chapter  entitled  British  Influence 
in  Mexico,  and  Poinsett's  Struggle  Against  it. 

190 


DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT 


two  chief  political  parties  to  abandon  their  old  names 
for  the  respective  designations  of  the  rival  rites. 
Poinsett's  relations  with  the  York  rite  leaders,  which 
became  manifest  at  the  time  when  they  were  securing 
control  of  the  government,  were  the  chief  cause  of  the 
fierce  denunciations  which  the  defeated  faction  soon 
began  to  hurl  at  him,  and  which  interfered  so  seriously 
with  the  conduct  of  his  negotiations. 

In  his  correspondence  at  the  time  of  their  forma 
tion,  Poinsett  did  not  hesitate  to  acknowledge  that  he 
had  taken  part  in  their  organization.  In  a  letter  of 
October  14,  1825,  to  Rufus  King  in  London,  he  said 
he  had  encouraged  and  assisted  in  their  organization 
and  had  entertained  the  members  at  his  home.  The 
meeting  had  been  reported  to  Ward,  the  British 
charge,  by  Tornel  as  having  been  entirely  poli 
tical;  and  that  gentleman  had  been  given  a  false 
notion  of  the  toasts.  Subsequenly  Ward  had  given 
a  diplomatic  dinner  to  the  secretaries  of  state  and 
foreign  ministers  to  which  he  had  not  invited  Poin 
sett.  At  this  dinner  Ward's  friends  had  indulged  in 
toasts  allusive  to  pending  negotiations  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  of  not  a  very  friendly  tenor, 
and  those  toasts  had  been  published  at  Ward's  request. 
The  factions  which  Poinsett  classed  as  the  enemies  of 
the  government,  —  the  European  Spaniards,  the  Bour- 
bonistas,  and  the  centralistas,  —  had  been  displeased, 
he  said,  at  the  good  understanding  that  had  hitherto 
existed  between  the  representatives  of  England  and 
the  United  States,  and  had  worked  on  Ward  to  break 


192  DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT 

it  up.  In  closing,  Poinsett  said  he  would  await  infor 
mation  from  King  concerning  opinion  in  London  about 
Ward's  activities  before  he  attempted  to  retaliate  for 
the  insult  which  he  felt  Ward  had  offered.2 

Later  in  explaining  to  Clay  the  attack  of  the  legis 
lature  of  the  state  of  Vera  Cruz  upon  him,  discussed 
below  in  this  chapter,  Poinsett  said  the  most  serious 
charge  made  against  him  was  that  he  had  established 
the  York  Masons ;  and  explained  to  Clay  just  what 
part  he  had  taken  in  their  organization.  He  regretted 
that  Masonry  should  have  been  made  an  instrument  of 
political  intrigue.  He  said  that  lodges  of  York  Masons 
had  already  existed  in  Mexico  before  his  arrival,  but 
that  they  were  without  charters.  Members  of  these 
had  asked  him  to  secure  a  charter  from  the  grand 
lodge  of  New  York,  which  he  had  not  hesitated  to  do. 
The  persons  who  made  the  request  were  all  members 
of  the  government  or  interested  in  maintaining  the 
existing  order  of  things  and  in  preserving  the  tran- 
quility  of  the  country.  He  said  they  were  General 
Guerrero,  a  distinguished  revolutionary  officer;  Es- 
teva,  secretary  of  the  treasury ;  Arispe,  secretary  of 
grace  and  justice;  Zavala,  a  member  of  the  Senate 
and  later  governor  of  the  state  of  Mexico ;  and  Al- 
puche,  a  member  of  the  Senate.  He  said  he  had  no 
notion  that  such  men  had  in  view  any  project  to  dis 
organize  the  government.  As  soon  as  the  Yorkinos 
were  publicly  accused  of  perverting  the  organization 
to  political  purposes,  he  said  he  had  withdrawn  from 

2  Poinsett  to  Rufus  King,  October  14,  1825,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT  1 93 

their  meetings.  But  he  excused  them  by  saying  that 
the  Scottish  rite  Masons  had  long  been  organized, 
and  that  their  opponents  had  only  followed  their 
example  in  political  activity.  He  said  further  that 
the  progress  of  the  Yorkino  cause  had  been  so  rapid 
as  to  lead  the  people  to  attribute  it  to  some  secret 
cause.  They  see  in  this  "the  direction  of  some  able 
hand,  and  have  thought  proper  to  attribute  the  success 
of  the  republican  party,  the  consolidation  of  the  fed 
eral  system,  and  the  establishment  of  liberal  prin 
ciples  exclusively  to  my  influence."3 

Zavala,  to  whom  Poinsett  referred  as  friendly  and 
useful  and  a  leading  member  of  the  Yorkino  lodge, 
later  published  a  brief  account  of  the  formation  of  the 
lodges.  He  says  the  project  was  formed  by  Alpuche 
and  joined  by  Esteva,  Arispe,  Victoria  and  others; 
that  its  purpose  was  to  oppose  the  Escoceses  (Scots)  ; 
that  five  lodges  were  formed;  and  that  Poinsett  was 
then  asked  to  obtain  for  them  a  charter  from  the  grand 
lodge  of  New  York.  This  step  and  the  installation  of 
the  grand  lodge  in  Mexico,  he  says,  was  the  only  in 
terference  by  this  American,  who,  he  continues,  be 
cause  of  his  share  in  the  movement  has  been  calum 
niated  by  aristocrats  and  various  European  agents  in 
Mexico  who  have  taken  more  part  than  he  in  the  af 
fairs  of  the  country.4  Tornel,  the  bitter  enemy  of 

3  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  8,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

4  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  346.    This  was  published  in 
1831.     On  page  385  he  says:  "los  periodicos  del  otro  bando  le 
acusaban  de  haber  faltado  a  la  primera  obligacion  de  un  min- 


194  DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT 

Poinsett,  gives  an  account  as  prejudiced  against  him 
as  Zavala's  is  in  his  favor.5  Nearly  every  writer  on 
Mexican  history  of  this  period  has  expressed  an  opinion 
on  Poinsett's  merit  or  demerit  in  the  matter.  Most 
of  these  writers  have  followed  either  Tornel  or  Zavala, 
and  show  their  prejudice  either  for  or  against  him.6 
Poinsett  did  not  say  that  the  purpose  of  the  move 
ment  was  political,  neither  did  he  say  that  it  was  not, 

istro  extrangero,  que  es  la  de  no  mezclarse  en  las  cuestiones 
interiores  del  pais  en  que  egercen  su  rnision,  y  en  donde  no 
estan  de  consiguiente  sugetos  a  los  leyes  comunes.  La  acusa- 
cion  en  el  fondo  era  injusta."  On  page  339,  he  pays  a  glowing 
tribute  to  Poinsett's  ability  and  acknowledges  his  uninterrupted 
friendship,  which  shows,  of  course,  that  he  is  a  prejudiced 
witness. 

5  Tornel,  Breve  Resefia,  45. 

6  Accounts  bitterly  condemning  him  are :  Alaman,  Historia 
de  Mejico,  V,  822,  824;  Bocanegra,  Memorias  para  la  Historia 
de  Mexico,  I,  382,  389-395,  II,  13,  17-22;  Rivera,  Historia  de 
Jalapa,  II,  366-369;  and  Zamacois,  Historia  de  Mejico,  XI,  620. 

H.  H.  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  V,  32,  quotes  Zavala 
and  exonerates  Poinsett.  Romero,  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  349,  says,  "  It  seems  that  while  he  desired  the  success 
of  the  Yorkinos,  he  was  not  the  founder  of  that  lodge."  Rob 
inson,  Mexico  and  Her  Military  Chieftains,  shows  his  lack 
of  accuracy  by  saying,  page  146,  "  Mr.  Poinsett,  it  may  be  pre 
sumed,  never  had  any  connection  with  either  branch  of  the 
order  in  Mexico."  McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the. 
United  States,  V,  540,  states  correctly  but  very  briefly  the. 
part  Poinsett  took  in  organizing  the  lodges.  Yoakum,  in 
Comprehensive  History  of  Texas,  I,  124,  gives  a  brief  and. 
substantially  correct  statement. 

Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  164-165,, 
also  gives  a  brief  and  substantially  correct  account,  though  he 
seems  unnecessarily  harsh  in  his  criticism  of  Poinsett,  and. 
says  little  about  the  extenuating  circumstances. 

Justin  H.  Smith  has  recently  published  a  defense  of  Poinsett. 
in  the  Proceedings  of  the  American  Antiquarian  Society. 


DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT  195 

although  he  said  that  it  had  been  reported  to  be  such. 
However,  the  fact  that  the  organization  was  ef 
fected  at  the  very  time  that  he  was  forming  what  he 
repeatedly  spoke  of  as  an  American  party,  and  that 
the  leaders  of  that  party  were  also  leaders  in  the 
lodges,  is  presumptive  evidence  that  he  had  some  no 
tion  of  the  use  to  which  they  would  be  put.  But 
later  when  the  Yorkinos  had  enjoyed  a  phenomenal 
growth  and  when  the  names  of  the  old  centralista 
and  federalista  parties  had  everywhere  been  aban 
doned  for  the  respective  designations,  Escoceses  and 
Yorkinos,  he  said,  in  August,  1826,  that  he  was  sorry 
the  Masonic  meetings  had  become  political.  But 
he  suggested  an  excuse  for  the  faction  which  he 
favored  by  saying  that  the  Escoceses  had  long  existed 
and  been  hostile  to  the  United  States  before  the  York 
inos  were  organized.7  Two  months  later  he  reported 
that  the  election  which  had  just  taken  place  for  mem 
bers  of  the  state  legislatures  had  gone  generally  in 
favor  of  the  Yorkinos.  The  legislature  of  the  state  of 
Mexico,  hitherto  controlled  by  the  Escoceses,  all  of 
whom  had  been  defeated  in  the  election,  refused  to 
yield  their  seats  to  their  victorious  rivals.  Thus  tri 
umphant  in  the  state  elections  of  1826,  the  Yorkinos 

7  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  26,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II.  In  this  he  said  there  was 
a  third  party  called  Los  Piadosos,  opposed  to  all  Masonic 
influence,  but  that  it  received  almost  no  support.  In  January 
he  had  written  that  Masonry  was  flourishing  and  that,  except 
the  president,  all  the  cabinet  and  all  the  leading  men  in  the 
country  were  Masons,  even  some  of  the  higher  clergy  being 
members. 


196  DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT 

planned  already  to  capture  the  presidency  two  years 
later;  and  Poinsett  knew  their  plans.  In  a  cipher 
paragraph  of  this  despatch  of  October  21,  1826,  he 
said :  "  The  man  who  is  held  up  as  ostensible  head  of 
the  party  and  who  will  be  their  candidate  for  the  next 
presidency  is  General  Guerrero,  one  of  the  most  dis 
tinguished  chiefs  of  the  revolution.  Guerrero  is  un 
educated  but  possesses  excellent  natural  talents,  com 
bined  with  great  decision  of  character  and  undaunted 
courage.  His  violent  temper  renders  him  difficult  to 
control,  and  therefore  I  consider  Zavala's  presence 
here  indispensably  necessary,  as  he  possesses  great 
influence  over  the  general."  He  had  just  told  of 
Zavala's  having  been  offered  the  position  of  Mex 
ican  minister  to  the  United  States  and  said :  "  I  was 
not  sorry  that  he  declined  it;  he  is  one  of  the  most 
efficient  leaders  of  the  party  friendly  to  the  United 
States,  the  Yorkinos,  and  is  more  useful  here  than  he 
would  be  in  Washington."  He  told  of  the  schemes 
of  those  in  the  cabinet  who  were  endeavoring  to  rid 
that  body  of  the  Yorkino  dominance,  said  they  exer 
cised  great  influence  over  the  indecisive  character  of 
the  President,  and  declared  that  if  their  schemes  suc 
ceeded  that  official  would  find  himself,  as  before  Pom- 
sett's  arrival,  surrounded  by  a  few  supporters  hostile 
to  the  majority  in  Congress  and  the  country.8  A 
month  later  he  reported  that  there  were  election  dis 
turbances;  but  that  he  did  not  expect  a  violent  rup- 

8  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  21,  1826,  nearly  all  of  the  facts 
here  given  being  in  cipher,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT  I9/ 

ture,  and  was  using  every  effort  on  his  part  to  prevent 
such.9 

In  the  latter  part  of  June,  1827,  Poinsett  was  pub 
licly  and  violently  arraigned  in  a  long  manifesto  is 
sued  by  the  legislature  of  the  state  of  Vera  Cruz.  It 
declared  that  "a  sagacious  and  hypocritical  foreign 
minister  as  zealous  for  the  prosperity  of  his  own  coun 
try  as  inimical  to  ours,"  being  jealous  of  Mexican 
prosperity  which  would  soon  eclipse  that  of  his  own 
country,  and  jealous  also  of  the  friendly  relations  of 
Mexico  with  Great  Britain  which  might  prove  disad 
vantageous  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  had 
established  the  York  Masons,  a  hundred  times  more 
dangerous  than  twenty  battalions  of  the  tyrant  of 
Spain.  For  an  invading  army  would  be  met  as  an 
enemy  by  a  united  country ;  but  the  Yorkinos  had  been 
organized  to  destroy  the  Escoceses  and  the  consequent 
internal  dissensions  were  diffusing  a  want  of  confi 
dence  throughout  the  country,  dividing  it  against  it 
self.  It  declared  that  the  Escoceses  well  deserved  de 
struction  for  their  ambition  and  centralist  tendencies ; 
but  that  many  moderate  men  of  that  faction  had  been 
displaced  that  their  positions  might  fall  to  their  more 
ambitious  opponents.  It  declared  both  Yorkinos  and 
Escoceses  injurious,  and  demanded  the  enforcement 
of  laws  already  existing  which  prohibited  all  Masonic 
associations.10 

9  Poinsett  to  Clay,  November  15,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

10  Manifesto  of  the  Congress  of  Vera  Cruz  to  the  Mexican 
Nation,  June  19,  1827,  translation  covering  twenty-six  manu- 


198  DENUNCIATION   OF   POINSETT 

A  short  time  after  this  violent  attack,  Poinsett  pub 
lished  in  Spanish  a  pamphlet  which  he  called  "  An  Ex 
position  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  toward  the 
Republics  of  America,"  replying  to  the  charges  in  the 
manifesto.  He  reviewed  at  length  the  uniformly 
friendly  policy  of  the  United  States  and  of  himself 
for  Mexico,  and  declared  that  far  from  being  inimical 
to  the  prosperity  of  Mexico  or  the  other  republics  the 
United  States  "are  desirous  to  see  their  neighbors 
wealthy  and  powerful  in  order  that  they  may  be  more 
efficient  allies  and  more  profitable  customers."  He 
quoted  from  a  discourse  which  he  had  himself  pro 
nounced  in  favor  of  the  recognition  of  these  states  in 
which  he  had  expressly  refuted  the  argument  that 
their  prosperity  would  hurt  the  United  States.  Fur 
ther  the  United  States  were  far  from  thinking  the 
friendship  of  Great  Britain  for  Mexico  injurious  to 
them.  On  the  contrary  the  United  States  invited 
Great  Britain  to  join  them  in  recognizing  the  new 
states;  and  when  that  was  not  done  urged  Great 
Britain  to  follow  their  example,  and  rejoiced  when 
she  did.  In  answer  to  the  charge  that  he  was  con 
script  pages,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  8,  1827, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.  A 
printed  copy  in  Spanish  is  in  the  volume  of  Duplicate  De 
spatches  from  Poinsett.  The  manifesto  declared  also  that 
many  Iturbidistas  were  members  of  the  York  lodges,  and  that 
their  purpose  was  to  bring  about  the  return  of  the  empire 
with  Iturbide's  son  at  its  head.  This  Poinsett  considered  too 
absurd  to  need  argument.  It  is,  however,  a  fact  that  later 
Iturbidistas  cooperated  with  the  Yorkinos ;  but  that  was 
probably  because  Bourbonistas  cooperated  with  the  Escoceses. 


DENUNCIATION   OF  POINSETT  199 

trolling  the  prevailing  party  in  the  federal  govern 
ment,  he  argued  that  the  vexatious  delays  in  his  nego 
tiations  proved  the  falsity  of  it.  He  declared  that  he 
had  had  no  part  in  the  perversion  of  the  Masonic 
lodges  to  political  purposes,  and  that  since  they  had 
been  so  perverted  he  had  withdrawn  from  their  meet 
ings.  He  insisted  that  he  had  not  interfered  with  the 
internal  concerns  of  the  country  unless  advocating  the 
superiority  of  republican  institutions  and  explaining 
the  workings  of  United  States  institutions  be  consid 
ered  interfering.11 

In  his  long  letter  of  July  8,  1827,  already  mentioned, 
Poinsett  explained  to  Clay  the  situation  and  the  events 
that  led  up  to  it.  He  said  he  had  abstained  from  de 
manding  satisfaction  for  this  unprovoked  and  unjus 
tifiable  insult  because  the  state  of  Vera  Cruz  had  re 
cently  committed  acts  of  rebellion  against  the  sov 
ereignty  of  the  federal  government  and  was  then  main 
taining  a  defiant  attitude.  There  was  hardly  any  way 
short  of  civil  war  that  the  federal  government  could 
have  forced  the  state  to  give  satisfaction.  If  he  had 
demanded  satisfaction  and  had  not  promptly  received 
it  he  would  have  been  compelled  to  demand  his  pass 
ports  and  leave  the  country,  placing  the  United  States 

11  Poinsett's  Exposition  of  the  Policy  of  the  United  States 
toward  the  Republics  of  America,  dated  July  4,  1827,  enclosed 
with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  8,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.  A  printed  copy  in  Spanish  is 
in  the  volume  of  Duplicate  Despatches  from  Poinsett.  It  is 
also  in  print  in  pamphlet  form,  though  rare.  English  transla 
tions  of  it  were  printed  in  various  newspapers  at  the  time. 
The  manuscript  copy  covers  sixteen  pages. 


2OO  DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT 

and  Mexico  in  collision,  which  he  thought  the  govern 
ing  faction  in  Vera  Cruz  desired.  He  regretted  that 
the  legislature  of  Vera  Cruz  had  thus  violated  the  law  of 
nations  and  every  principle  of  decency  and  good  faith 
by  publishing  suspicions  derogatory  to  the  character  of 
a  friendly  nation  and  the  reputation  of  a  foreign  min 
ister.  But  they  were  also  guilty  of  violating  the  fed 
eral  constitution.  The  maintenance  of  the  federal 
form  was  sure  to  involve  the  central  and  local  govern 
ments  in  disputes  concerning  sovereignty.  The  other 
states  were  giving  proofs  of  attachment  to  the  federal 
government  and  the  state  of  Vera  Cruz  would  have  to 
submit.  The  general  government  had  lamented  the 
attack  but  was  slow  in  acting  and  hitherto  had  lacked 
the  energy  to  make  itself  obeyed  in  the  state  of  Vera 
Cruz.  He  said  the  errors  of  Mexico  ought  to  be 
viewed  with  indulgence.  Their  long  period  of  political 
tutelage  to  Spain  and  their  lack  of  experience  in  deal 
ing  with  foreign  nations  was  their  only  excuse.  It 
was  not  strange  that  they  should  confuse  the  duties 
and  rights  of  different  organs  of  government.  He 
said  he  had  always  made  every  effort  to  show  the 
friendly  disposition  of  the  United  States,  and  ren 
dered  cheerful  service  to  those  who  applied  for  ad 
vice  or  assistance  in  the  framing  of  laws  or  in  under 
standing  the  working  of  constitutional  principles.  He 
had  uniformly  exhorted  them  to  submit  to  any  tem 
porary  evil  rather  than  resort  to  violence.  This  con 
duct  had  drawn  upon  him  the  odium  of  those  who 
sought  to  overthrow  liberal  institutions.  The  neces- 


DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT  2OI 

sity  for  thus  defending  his  conduct  was  painful,  he 
said,  but  there  was  no  alternative.12 

Before  this  explanation  had  been  received  at  Wash 
ington,  Sergeant  had  returned  from  Mexico  where  he 
had  gone  to  cooperate  with  Poinsett  in  the  mission  to 
the  congress  at  Tacubaya,  the  unsuccessful  attempt 
at  a  continuation  of  the  Panama  congress  of  the  pre 
ceding  year.  President  Adams  entered  in  his  diary 
on  August  i  the  statement  that  "  Mr.  Sergeant  thinks 
not  favorably  of  the  proceedings  of  Mr.  Poinsett  dur 
ing  his  residence  in  Mexico."  Adams  also  says  that 
Sergeant  had  handed  him  a  private  letter  from  Poin 
sett  in  which  the  latter  said  he  had  received  an  inti 
mation  from  the  President  of  Mexico  that  his  recall 
would  be  demanded.13  Obregon  wrote  his  govern 
ment  that  in  a  conference  some  time  in  August  Clay 
had  expressed  disapproval  of  Poinsett's  conduct  in  so 
far  as  he  had  mixed  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
country.  When  the  news  of  the  Vera  Cruz  attack 
first  arrived,  about  the  middle  of  August,  the  National 

12  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  8,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches    from    Mexico,    III.     This    letter    covers    twenty 
manuscript  pages.     Much  of  it  is  occupied  with  a  review  of 
the  origin,  composition,  and  principles  of  the  Scottish  party, 
of  the  part  Poinsett  had  taken  in  the  organization  of  the  York 
Masons,   and  of  the  political  activities   of  the  Yorkinos  to 
counteract  that  of  the  Escoceses.     See  above,  this  chapter. 

Rivera,  Historia  de  Jalapa,  II,  426,  gives  a  brief  study  of 
the  Vera  Cruz  Manifesto  and  the  attendant  rebellious  move 
ments  in  the  state  of  Vera  Cruz.  Most  of  the  other  Mexican 
historians  cited  in  notes  4-6,  above,  also  discuss  the  manifesto. 

13  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII,  312. 


2O2  DENUNCIATION   OF   POINSETt 

Journal  had  expressed  the  same  sentiment  as  Clay ; 
but  on  August  31  the  National  Gazette  had  praised 
Poinsett's  conduct,  and  a  few  days  later  both  the  Na 
tional  Intelligencer  and  the  National  Journal  approved 
it.  Consequently  Obregon  thought  the  government 
must  have  received  further  information  convincing 
them  that  Poinsett's  conduct  was  excusable,  since  one 
of  these  papers  was  official  and  the  others  were  sup 
porting  the  administration.  The  action  of  the  legisla 
ture  of  Vera  Cruz  was  looked  upon  as  revolutionary, 
he  said,  and  as  showing  a  lack  of  respect  for  the  federal 
government.  It  had  been  intimated  to  him  that  Poin- 
sett  would  probably  be  recalled  in  spite  of  his  conduct 
being  approved.14  It  was  on  August  31  that  the  De 
partment  of  State  received  Poinsett's  letter  of  July  8 
with  the  enclosed  manifesto  and  his  answer. 

But  Adams  and  Clay  did  not  act  precipitately  nor 
enthusiastically  in  exonerating  Poinsett.  It  was  al 
most  three  months  after  the  receipt  of  his  explanation 
before  they  passed  judgment.  On  November  19, 
1827,  Clay  wrote  Poinsett  that  the  President  approved 
his  conduct  and  did  not  consider  that  he  had  inter 
fered  in  the  politics  of  Mexico,  since  no  complaint 
had  come  from  the  Mexican  government  of  his  con 
duct.  It  was  thought  best  to  make  no  formal  com 
plaint  of  the  act  of  the  Vera  Cruz  legislature.  But 
Poinsett  was  asked  to  remonstrate  informally  with  the 

14  Obregon  to  Secretario,  13  de  septiembre  de  1827,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 


DENUNCIATION    OF   POINSETT  2O3 

President  of  Mexico,  and  say  that  if  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  had  any  complaint  to  make  concerning  Poin- 
sett  the  government  of  the  United  States  was  ready  to 
receive  such  complaint  in  the  regular  manner.  In 
conclusion  Clay  said  that  the  President  did  not  desire 
the  termination  of  Poinsett's  mission;  but  if  his  posi 
tion  had  become  unpleasant,  and  if  he  desired  to  re 
turn,  he  might  do  so.  It  had  been  rumored,  he  was 
told,  that  he  was  thinking  of  returning.  The  matter 
was  left  entirely  to  his  own  feelings  and  discretion.15 

While  the  polite  circumlocution  of  Clay  left  the 
matter  optional  with  Poinsett,  yet  it  was  not  very  far 
removed  from  a  gentle  hint  that  Poinsett's  voluntary 
return  might  be  more  desirable  than  his  remaining  at 
Mexico.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  only  reason 
given  why  the  President  did  not  consider  that  Poin 
sett  had  interfered  in  the  politics  of  Mexico  was  the 
fact  that  "no  complaint  had  come  from  the  Mexican 
government  of  his  conduct."  If  that  government  had 
been  as  friendly  toward  Poinsett  as  the  opposition 
supposed  and  charged,  it  would  not  have  been  ex 
pected  to  complain  of  his  conduct,  although  he  should 
have  been  doing  what  the  opposition,  or  even  an  un 
prejudiced  judge,  might  have  called  interfering  in  the 
politics  of  Mexico. 

It  is  the  writer's  belief  that  in  this,  as  in  other  acts 
for  which  Poinsett  was  severely  criticized,  he  was  con 
scientiously  doing  what  he  thought  was  for  the  highest 

15  Clay  to  Poinsett,  November  19,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XII,  36. 


2O4  DENUNCIATION   OF   POINSETT 

good  of  Mexico,  even  at  the  risk  of  incurring  hostile 
criticism  or  of  doing  what  might  be  technically  termed 
interfering.  Far  from  being  the  only,  or  the  last,  pub 
lic  criticism  of  his  conduct  the  Vera  Cruz  manifesto 
was  destined  to  be  followed  by  many,  and  more  violent, 
attacks.16 

16  See  below,  chapter  X. 


CHAPTER  VII 

OBSTACLES  IN  THE  WAY  OF  CONCLUDING  A  COMMER 
CIAL  TREATY 

The  instructions  which  were  to  guide  Poinsett  in 
negotiating  a  treaty  of  amity,  commerce,  and  naviga 
tion  with  Mexico  were  contained  in  his  general  in 
structions  given  by  Clay  on  March  26,  I825.1  It  will 
be  recalled  that  he  was  instructed  to  say  that  the 
United  States  had  not  claimed  and  would  not  claim 
any  special  favors  or  concessions  in  return  for  the 
service  rendered  Mexico  and  other  Spanish-Amer 
ican  states  by  recognizing  them  before  other  powers 
were  willing  to  take  such  a  step  and  by  warning  other 
powers  against  aiding  Spain  to  regain  her  lost  col 
onies.  But  the  United  States  government  did  expect 
that  those  states,  and  especially  Mexico,  would  not 
extend  to  any  European  states  "any  favors  or  privi 
leges  which  shall  not  be  equally  extended  to  us."  As 
a  model  which  Poinsett  should  follow  in  a  general 
way,  he  was  given  a  copy  of  a  treaty  which  had  been 
concluded  in  the  preceding  October  with  the  republic 
of  Colombia.2  A  copy  of  the  instructions  which  had 

1  See  above,  chapter  II,  on  Tardy  Appointment  and  Cool 
Reception  of  the  First  United  States  Minister  to  Mexico. 

2  For  the  treaty  with  Colombia,  see  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  697. 

205 


2O6  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

guided  Anderson  in  negotiating  that  treaty  were  in 
cluded  as  a  part  of  Poinsett's  instructions.8 

About  six  weeks  after  his  reception  in  Mexico,  Poin- 
sett  had  his  first  conference  with  Alaman,  then  secre 
tary  for  foreign  relations,  on  the  proposed  treaty  nego 
tiations.  At  that  meeting  it  was  agreed  to  separate 
the  two  most  important  matters,  commerce  and  boun 
daries,  and  conclude  a  special  treaty  for  each.  A  dif 
ference  of  opinion  concerning  the  method  of  procedure 
in  locating  the  boundary  line  made  it  impossible  to 
reach  a  speedy  conclusion  in  that  matter.4  Poinsett 
expressed  a  wish  that  the  commercial  treaty  might  be 
concluded  early  enough  to  enable  the  Mexican  Con 
gress  to  approve  it  in  time  to  send  it  to  Washington 
before  the  opening  of  the  next  session  of  the  Congress 
there.  Alaman  said  that  was  one  of  the  objects  in 
calling  the  special  session  of  the  Mexican  Congress 
which  was  to  convene  the  following  month.5 

On  August  10,  1825,  Alaman  informed  Poinsett  that 
the  Mexican  negotiators  were  ready  to  proceed  at  once 
with  the  negotiations  for  the  commercial  treaty. 
President  Victoria  had  appointed  Esteva,  secretary 
of  the  treasury,  to  act  with  Alaman  in  the  negotia- 

3  Clay  to  Poinsett,  Instructions,  March  26,  1825,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Instructions,  X,  225;  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  908,  or  VI,  578. 

4  See  below,  chapter  IX,  on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue. 

5  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  18,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I;  House  Executive  Documents,  25 
congress,  i  session,  number  42,  page  19;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XXVI,  831. 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  2O/ 

tion.6  On  August  22,  the  negotiators  had  their  first 
conference,  atftvhich  their  respective  full-powers  were 
exchanged,  and  an  agreement  was  reached  that  Pom- 
sett  should  draw  up  a  pro  jet  of  a  treaty  and  present 
it  at  the  next  conference  as  a  basis  for  discussion.7 

The  second  conference  was  held  on  September  13, 
about  three  weeks  after  the  first.  In  the  meantime 
Poinsett  had  drawn  the  pro  jet  as  agreed.  The  fourth 
article  contained  a  provision  to  which  the  Mexican 
negotiators  immediately  objected.  Its  purpose  was  to 
define  the  privileges  which  United  States  merchants, 
vessels,  and  goods  should  enjoy  in  the  ports  of  Mex 
ico,  and,  reciprocally,  the  privileges  which  Mexican 
merchants,  vessels,  and  goods  should  enjoy  in  the 
ports  of  the  United  States.  In  drawing  this  article, 
Poinsett  had  followed  the  instructions  \vhich  he  had 
received  from  the  State  Department  before  leaving 
Washington. 

In  those  instructions  Clay  had  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  Colombian  treaty  which  he  was  en 
closing  as  a  model  for  Poinsett  to  follow  in  most  re 
gards  contained  a  provision  securing  the  "  most , 
favored  nation"  treatment  for  the  merchants  of  each 
in  the  ports  of  the  other.8  This,  he  said,  was  the  old 

6  Alaman  to  Poinsett,  August  10,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Duplicate  Despatches  from  Poinsett. 

7  Protocol  of  First  Conference,   August  22,   1825,  Mexico, 
Tratados   y   Convenciones,    II,   61    and   90 ;    American    State 
Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  583.    For  Poinsett's  projet,  see  the  last,  601. 

8  The  provision  of  the  Colombian  treaty  was  as  follows : 
Article  3,  "  The  citizens  of  the  United  States  may  frequent  all 
the  coasts  and  countries  of  the  republic  of  Colombia,  and 


2O8  OBSTACLES    IN    THE   WAY   OF 

rule  but  its  application  frequently  involved  nations  in 
difficulties  and  misunderstandings.  It  was  often  very 
difficult  for  one  government  to  learn  just  what  favors 
or  privileges  had  been  granted  by  the  government  of 
another  nation  to  the  merchandise  of  a  third  nation. 
Poinsett  was  instructed  to  endeavor  to  establish  "the 
more  liberal  footing  of  reciprocity  between  the  resi 
dent  citizen  and  the  foreigner.  ...  By  placing  the 
admission  into  the  ports  of  Mexico  of  a  vessel  of  the 
United  States  and  her  cargo,  being  of  their  produce 
or  manufacture,  upon  the  same  footing  with  the  ad 
mission  into  those  ports  of  a  like  cargo  imported  in  a 
vessel  owned  by  a  resident  citizen  of  Mexico,  and  vice 
versa,  the  simplicity  which  it  is  desirable  the  rule 
should  possess  will  be  secured."  Just  before  stating 
the  new  rule  Clay  said :  "  It  is  better  to  avoid  sowing 
the  seeds  of  all  collisions  and  misunderstandings ;  and 
that  desirable  object  the  President  thinks  will  be  best 
accomplished  by  adopting  a  plain  and  familiar  rule 
for  the  two  parties  themselves,  instead  of  referring 
each  of  them  to  that  complicated  rule  which  may  hap- 

reside  and  trade  there  in  all  sorts  of  produce,  manufactures, 
and  merchandise,  and  shall  pay  no  other  or  greater  duties, 
charges,  or  fees  whatsoever,  than  the  most  favored  nation  is 
or  shall  be  obliged  to  pay;  and  they  shall  enjoy  all  the  rights, 
privileges,  and  exemptions  in  navigation  and  commerce  which 
the  most  favored  nation  does  or  shall  enjoy,  submitting  them 
selves,  nevertheless,  to  the  laws,  decrees,  and  usages  there 
established,  and  to  which  are  submitted  the  subjects  and  citi 
zens  of  the  most  favored  nations. 

"  In  like  manner  the  citizens  of  the  republic  of  Colombia," 
etc.,  as  above,  the  names  only  being  changed.  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign,  V,  697. 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  209 

pen  to  exist  between  either  and  third  parties."  It  was 
anticipated  that  Poinsett  would  experience  no  diffi 
culty  in  inducing  Mexico  to  adopt  the  new  simple 
rule.  But  if  he  should  be  unable  to  induce  Mexico 
to  treat  on  this  basis,  then  he  was  authorized  to  follow 
the  "  most  favored  nation "  rule  of  the  Colombian 
treaty.9 

The  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  declared  the  new  rule 
inadmissable  in  the  present  state  of  their  commercial 
marine;  for,  on  account  of  the  very  superior  tonnage 
of  the  merchant  marine  of  the  United  States,  the 
principle  of  reciprocity  would  work  wholly  to  the 
latter's  advantage.  Poinsett  did  not  easily  yield  the 
point.  He  urged  that  his  government  desired  to  in 
troduce  the  principle  into  their  treaties  with  all  na 
tions.  Ten  European  states,  some  large  and  some 
small,  had  already  admitted  it.  Between  some  of 
them  and  the  United  States  as  great  disparity  of  ton 
nage  existed  as  between  the  United  States  and  Mex 
ico.10  The  Mexican  negotiators  said  that  the  British 
plenipotentiaries  had  endeavored  to  introduce  into  the 
treaty  between  Great  Britain  and  Mexico  the  same 
principle  which  Poinsett  was  urging ;  but  the  Mexican 
government  had  refused  for  the  "reasons  just  as 
signed,  and  therefore  could  not,  with  propriety  or 

9  Clay  to  Poinsett,  Instructions,  March  26,  1825,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Instructions,  X,  225;  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  908,  or  VI,  578. 

10  The   nations    were    Great   Britain,    Russia,    Netherlands, 
Prussia,  Hamburg,  Bremen,  Liibeck,  Oldenburg,  Norway,  and 
Sardinia. 

15 


2IO  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

consistency,  agree  to  introduce  it  into  a  treaty  with  the 
United  States."  Still  Poinsett  was  not  ready  to  yield ; 
and  it  was  agreed  that  he  should  present  a  note  ex 
plaining  his  views  on  the  matter.11 

Instead  of  the  article  which  they  objected  to  in 
Poinsett's  pro  jet  the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  urged 
the  substitution  of  the  fourth  article  of  the  treaty, 
just  referred  to,  which  had  been  concluded  with  Great 
Britain  but  not  yet  ratified.  Besides  providing  for  the 
"most  favored  nation"  treatment  of  the  merchandise 
of  either  nation  in  the  ports  of  the  other  (which  Poin 
sett  wa's  authorized  to  agree  to  and  would  probably 
have  accepted),  it  contained  an  additional  provision  to 
which  Poinsett  objected  most  emphatically.  This  was 
in  the  form  of  an  exception  to  the  "  most  favored  na 
tion  "  rule,  and  was  intended  by  Mexico  to  be  a  means 

11  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  13,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I ;  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  852;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  455. 
Protocol  of  Second  Conference,  September  13,  1825 ;  Ameri 
can  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  583;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Con- 
venciones,  II,  62  and  91. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  rejection 
of  the  British  treaty  was  the  provision  in  its  seventh  article 
defining  what  should  be  considered  a  Mexican  vessel,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that,  when  in  this  second  conference  the 
Mexican  negotiators  insisted  on  introducing  the  same  pro 
vision  into  the  treaty  with  the  United  States,  Poinsett  said 
the  British  plenipotentiaries  had  in  this  matter  conceded  a 
great  deal;  but  since  his  government  desired  to  foster  the 
commerce  of  the  American  republics,  he  would  act  with  equal 
liberality  and  admit  an  article  in  the  same  terms.  For  the 
rejection  of  the  British  treaty,  see  above,  chapter  III  on 
British  Influence  in  Mexico. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  211 

for  strengthening  the  bonds  of  sympathy  between 
Mexico  and  the  other  new  Spanish- American  countries. 
After  the  customary  statement  of  the  rule  and  the 
declaration  that  any  concession  or  particular  favor 
granted  by  either  to  any  third  nation  should  be  imme 
diately  extended  to  the  other  of  the  contracting  powers, 
it  added  "  excepting  only  the  American  nations  which 
were  formerly  Spanish  possessions,  to  which  on  ac 
count  of  the  fraternal  relations  that  unite  them  to  the 
United  Mexican  States  the  latter  may  grant  special 
privileges  which  shall  not  be  extended  to  the  do 
minions  and  subjects  of  H[is]  B[ritannic]  M[ajesty]." 
Poinsett  objected  to  the  exception,  declaring  that  no 
distinctions  should  be  introduced  into  the  relations  of 
the  different  members  of  the  American  family  of  na 
tions.  It  was  to  the  interest  of  the  European  powers, 
he  argued,  to  introduce  such  distinctions ;  but  he  in 
sisted  that  the  republics  of  America  were  all  united 
by  the  same  interests  to  oppose  the  European  system. 
The  policy  of  the  United  States,  he  said,  gave  them  a 
right  to  expect  that  no  such  distinctions  should  be 
made.  Furthermore  he  declared  that  the  United 
States  already  had  a  treaty  with  Colombia  which  did 
not  contain  any  such  provision,  hence  the  exception 
would  be  rendered  nugatory  so  far  as  that  state  was 
concerned.  Probably  the  treaties  with  Chile  and 
Buenos  Ayres  were  also  concluded ;  and  certainly  they 
would  contain  no  such  provision.  The  Mexican  pleni 
potentiaries  injudiciously  suggested  that  war  might 
dissolve  the  treaties  between  the  United  States  and 


212  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

those  Spanish- American  countries,  in  which  case  Mex 
ico  might  wish  to  show  her  sympathies  with  the  latter. 
Poinsett  replied  that  this  was  conclusive  evidence  why 
his  nation  should  never  accede  to  such  a  provision. 

This  exception  to  the  "most  favored  nation"  rule 
and  also  the  new  "  perfect  reciprocity "  rule  were 
reserved  for  further  discussion.  After  disposing 
of  several  minor  matters  this  second  conference  ad 
journed.  In  Poinsett's  letter  to  the  government  at 
Washington,  written  the  same  day  on  which  this  con 
ference  was  held,  he  declared  in  cipher,  "I  most 
strenuously  opposed  the  exception  above  cited,  and,  as 
at  present  advised,  will  never  sign  a  treaty  on  such 
terms."  He  added  the  statement  that  the  President 
and  plenipotentiaries  of  Mexico  were  obstinately  bent 
on  carrying  this  point,  and  earnestly  asked  if  Clay 
thought  he  ought  to  yield  it. 

Five  days  after  the  second  conference  Poinsett  ad 
dressed  to  the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  his  note  set 
ting  forth  his  views  in  support  of  his  claim  that  the 
"perfect  reciprocity"  rule  of  the  projet  was  superior 
to  the  "most  favored  nation"  principle  which  they 
desired  to  substitute  for  it.12  On  the  following  day, 
September  19,  the  third  conference  was  held.  Most 
of  the  remaining  articles  of  the  projet  were  consid 
ered.  Some  were  adopted.  Others  were  reserved 
for  future  discussion.13 

12  Poinsett  to  Mexican  Plenipotentiaries,  September  18,  1825, 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  585 ;  Mexico,  Tratados  y 
Convenciones,  II,  95. 

13  Protocol  of  Third  Conference,  September  19,  1825,  Ameri- 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  213 

At  this  juncture  the  progress  of  the  negotiation  was 
disturbed  by  the  ministerial  revolution  which  Poinsett 
took  an  active  part  in  and  which  replaced  what  he 
called  the  British  party  with  what  he  referred  to  as  an 
American  party,  composed  of  those  who  were  friendly 
to  him,  to  the  federal  system,  and  to  the  influence  of 
the  United  States.  Alaman,  the  minister  for  foreign 
relations  and  chief  negotiator  of  the  treaty  then  being 
discussed  with  Poinsett,  resigned.14  To  succeed  Ala 
man,  Camacho  was  chosen.  He  was  not  in  Mexico  at 
the  time.  His  absence  threatened  to  suspend  Poin- 
sett's  negotiation.  Being  anxious  to  conclude  it  in 
time  for  it  to  reach  Washington  before  President 
Adams's  annual  message  to  Congress,  Poinsett  urged 
President  Victoria  to  permit  Alaman  to  continue  the 
discussions.  If  that  were  impossible  he  asked  that 
some  one  be  appointed  temporarily  to  act  as  negotia 
tor.  Pedraza,  the  secretary  for  war,  was  thereupon 
made  minister  for  foreign  relations  ad  interim  and 
given  full  powers.  He  presented  his  credentials  at 
the  fourth  conference,  on  September  27,  and  the  ne 
gotiation  proceeded.  Several  minor  matters  were  dis 
posed  of  and  some  time  was  spent  in  consideration  of 
the  most  important  unsettled  matter,  that  is,  the  ex 
ception  in  favor  of  the  Spanish-American  States.15 

can  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  586;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Con- 
venciones,  II,  66  and  97. 

14  For  the  ministerial  changes,  see  above,  chapter  III. 

15  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  28,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I;  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  V,  852;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  416. 


214  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

At  the  fifth  conference,  which  occurred  on  Septem 
ber  28,  an  earnest  effort  was  made  to  conclude  the 
negotiation  immediately.  The  secretary  of  the  treas 
ury,  who  was  one  of  the  negotiators,  had  found  it 
necessary  to  leave  Mexico  city  and  spend  some  time  at 
Vera  Cruz.  If  it  were  not  concluded  before  his  de 
parture  the  delay  would  defeat  the  plan  to  get  it  to 
Washington  before  Congress  should  assemble.  The 
proposed  exception  in  favor  of  the  commerce  of  the 
former  Spanish  colonies  occupied  the  entire  time  of 
this  fifth  conference.  The  Mexican  plenipotentiaries 
said  that  President  Victoria  was  so  decided  with  ref 
erence  to  the  exception  that  they  feared  it  would  be 
impossible  to  conclude  a  treaty  without  it. 

In  the  forenoon  of  this  day,  before  the  conference 
began,  an  attempt  was  made  through  an  unofficial  agent 
to  reach  a  compromise.  This  agent  was  the  priest 
Arispe  with  whom  Poinsett  claimed  to  be  on  intimate 
terms  and  who  had  been  useful  to  him  in  effecting 
the  ministerial  revolution.  It  will  be  recalled  that  in 
the  earlier  conferences  one  of  Poinsett's  chief  argu 
ments  against  the  exception  was  that  Colombia,  and 
probably  also  other  Spanish-American  states,  had 
made  treaties  which  would  render  the  exception  nuga- 

The  last  paragraph  of  Poinsett's  letter  is  omitted  in  the  pub 
lished  documents.  Protocol  of  the  Fourth  Conference,  Sep 
tember  27,  1825,  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  588; 
Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  II,  69  and  101.  Protocol 
of  the  Fifth  Conference,  September  28,  1825,  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  588;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones, 
II,  71  and  102. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  215 

tory.  The  compromise  which  Arispe  was  sent  to  sug 
gest  to  Poinsett  was  "to  annex  a  condition,  that  the 
exception  should  extend  only  to  those  Spanish-Amer 
ican  nations  who  would  treat  with  Mexico  on  the 
same  terms."  Poinsett  replied  that  he  would  have  to 
persist  in  his  objection,  since  any  distinctions  at  all 
among  the  nations  of  America  would  in  his  opinion 
be  destructive  of  the  best  interests  of  the  hemisphere. 
Poinsett's  visitor  appeared  to  be  convinced  and  went 
away  promising  to  use  his  influence  to  induce  the  Pres 
ident  and  plenipotentiaries  to  yield  the  point. 

To  meet  Poinsett's  objection  that  Great  Britain 
would  probably  refuse  to  ratify  the  exception  the 
plenipotentiaries  proposed  the  insertion  in  the  treaty 
with  the  United  States  of  a  proviso  declaring,  "with 
respect  to  the  exception  ...  it  shall  be  understood  in 
the  same  terms  which  finally  shall  be  agreed  upon  .  .  . 
between  Mexico  and  England."  But  Poinsett  an 
swered  that  he  would  rather  leave  it  as  it  stood  than 
consent  to  be  governed  by  the  decision  of  Great  Britain. 
They  then  raised  the  question  as  to  their  situation  in 
case  their  treaty  with  England,  contrary  to  Poinsett's 
belief,  should  be  ratified  after  they  had  consented  to 
make  a  treaty  with  the  United  States  without  the  ex 
ception.  Poinsett  did  not  reply  directly;  but  he  ar 
gued  the  improbability  that  Great  Britain  would  ratify 
it.  However  he  urged  that  the  interests  of  Great 
Britain  were  European,  and  if  she  did  ratify  the  ex 
ception  it  would  doubtless  be  with  the  express  purpose 
of  introducing  dissensions  between  the  American  na* 


2l6  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

tions.  On  the  other  hand  the  interests  of  the  United 
States,  he  repeated,  were  distinctly  American ;  and  the 
desired  union  between  all  of  the  American  republics 
could  exist  only  "on  the  basis  of  the  most  perfect 
equality  and  reciprocity."  He  urged  that  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  the  struggling 
Spanish-American  states  had  been  such  as  to  entitle 
his  country  to  expect  privileges  at  least  as  great  as 
those  of  any  of  the  Spanish- American  countries. 

The  Mexican  negotiators  then  declared  that  "we 
had  no  right  to  insist  upon  being  placed  on  the  same 
footing  with  the  Spanish-American  states  unless  we 
were  willing  to  take  part  with  them  in  their  contest 
with  Spain."  Poinsett  replied  that  this  would  be  in 
the  highest  degree  impolitic.  It  was  true,  he  admitted, 
that  the  United  States  could  crush  and  annihilate 
Spain  and  put  an  end  at  once  to  the  conflict,  provided 
other  European  countries  should  not  interfere.  But 
such  a  step  would  be  sure  to  precipitate  a  union  of  the 
European  powers  against  the  American,  to  the  decided 
detriment  of  all  concerned. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  this  conference  occurred 
Poinsett  reported  to  Clay  that  the  disagreement  over 
the  proposed  exception  had  prevented  the  conclusion 
of  the  negotiations  for  the  present.  After  recounting 
the  arguments  at  great  length  he  said  he  had  broken 
up  the  conference  "with  a  positive  declaration  that, 
putting  out  of  view  my  duty  as  representative  of  the 
United  States,  I  regarded  the  proposed  exception  in 
favor  of  the  nations  which  were  formerly  Spanish 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  2I/ 

possessions  so  contrary  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
Americas  that  I  never  would  agree  to  its  insertion 
in  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  any  of  the 
American  republics."  He  concluded  his  letter  by  de 
claring  his  own  opinion  to  be  "  that  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  will  be  better  consulted  by  having 
no  treaty  at  all  with  Mexico  than  by  concluding  one 
with  this  condition."  He  would  persist,  as  a  sine 
qua  non}  in  his  opposition  to  the  insertion  of  the  ex 
ception.  If  Adams  and  Clay  differed  from  him  he 
asked  to  be  informed.  Even  if  they  should,  he  said  he 
would  yield  with  infinite  reluctance. 

They  did  not  differ  from  him.  On  November  9, 
1825,  the  very  next  day  after  receiving  Poinsett's  let 
ter  of  September  13  reporting  the  discussions  at  the 
second  conference  when  the  difference  concerning  the 
exception  first  arose,  Clay  replied:  "The  President 
approves  of  your  refusal  to  accede  to  that  exception." 
He  declared  that  the  United  States  felt  themselves  jus 
tified,  because  of  the  attitude  they  had  preserved  to 
ward  the  new  states,  in  demanding  of  Mexico  perfect 
reciprocity  in  this  respect.  He  argued  that  there  was 
nothing  in  the  former  common  dependence  that  should 
govern  nations  no  longer  bound  by  any  ties  of  common 
allegiance.  "  But  if  the  fact  of  the  Spanish  dominion 
having  once  stretched  over  the  new  states  is  to  create 
an  exception  of  commercial  privileges  in  their  behalf, 
the  United  States  upon  a  similar  ground  have  a  right 
to  demand  the  benefit  of  it ;  for  the  same  Spanish 
dominion  once,  and  at  no  very  distant  day,  extended 


21 8  OBSTACLES    IN    THE   WAY   OF 

over  the  larger  part  of  their  territories,  and  all  of 
that  part  which  is  coterminous  with  those  of  the 
United  Mexican  States." 

Concerning  the  claim  that  the  new  states  had  been 
waging  a  common  war  against  a  common  enemy,  Clay 
argued,  "  The  United  Mexican  States  have,  it  is  true, 
been  waging  a  war  with  Spain  contemporaneously 
with  the  other  states,  but  hitherto  there  has  been  no 
cooperation  of  arms  between  them.  The  United  Mex 
ican  States  have  alone  sustained  their  contest.  If  the 
idea  of  those  fraternal  relations  is  to  be  sought  for  in 
the  sympathy  between  the  American  belligerents,  this 
sympathy  has  been  equally  felt  and  constantly  ex 
pressed  throughout  the  whole  struggle  by  the  United 
States.  They  have  not  indeed  taken  up  arms  in  sup 
port  of  the  independence  of  the  new  states;  but  the 
neutrality  which  they  have  maintained  has  enabled 
them  more  efficaciously  to  serve  the  cause  of  inde 
pendence  than  they  could  have  done  by  taking  part  in 
the  war.  Had  they  become  a  belligerent  [he  declared, 
as  Poinsett  had  done  to  the  plenipotentiaries]  they 
would,  probably,  have  drawn  into  the  war  on  the  other 
side  parties  whose  force  would  have  neutralized,  if  it 
had  not  overbalanced  their  exertions."  By  maintain 
ing  neutrality,  he  declared,  the  United  States  had  been 
enabled  to  render  assistance  more  valuable  than  mili 
tary  cooperation.  They  had  disconcerted  the  designs 
of  the  European  alliance  by  declaring  against  the  in 
terference  of  such  powers  in  support  of  Spain. 

"  There  is  a  striking  inconsistency,"  Clay  continued, 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  2 19 

"  in  the  line  of  policy  which  the  United  Mexican  States 
would  seem  disposed  to  pursue  toward  the  United 
States.  They  would  regard  these  states  as  an  Amer 
ican  nation  or  not  accordingly  as  it  shall  suit  their 
own  purposes.  In  respect  to  commerce  they  would 
look  upon  us  as  an  European  nation,  to  be  excluded 
from  the  enjoyment  of  privileges  conceded  to  other 
American  nations.  But  when  an  attack  is  imagined  to 
be  menaced  by  Europe  upon  the  independence  of  the 
United  Mexican  States,  then  an  appeal  is  made  to 
those  fraternal  sympathies  which  are  justly  supposed 
to  belong  to  our  condition  as  a  member  of  the  Amer 
ican  family."16 

In  concluding  the  letter  to  Poinsett  Clay  declared: 
"  The  President  indulges  the  confident  expectation  that 
upon  reconsideration  the  Mexican  government  will 
withdraw  the  exception.  But  if  it  should  continue  to 
insist  upon  it  you  will,  upon  that  ground,  abstain  from 
concluding  any  treaty  and  put  an  end  to  the  negotia 
tion.  It  is  deemed  better  to  have  no  treaty,  and  abide 
by  the  respective  commercial  laws  of  the  two  countries, 
than  to  subscribe  to  a  principle  wholly  inadmissable, 
and  which,  being  assented  to  in  the  case  of  Mexico, 
might  form  a  precedent  to  be  extended  to  others  of 
the  new  states."17 

16  He  alludes  here  to  the  episode  of  the  French  fleet  in  the 
West  Indies  in  the  preceding  summer  and  Mexico's  appeal  to 
the  declaration  of   Monroe's  message   of   1823.      See  above, 
chapter  IV  on  Cuba  Saved  to  Spain,  and  footnote  45. 

17  Clay  to  Poinsett,  November  9,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  407;  American  State  Papers,  Foreign, 
VI,  582;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  421. 


22O  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  the  complete  agreement 
between  the  views  of  Poinsett  and  of  the  government 
at  Washington.  Even  the  words  of  this  concluding 
paragraph  of  Clay's  instruction  of  November  9  agree 
almost  exactly  with  the  concluding  words  of  Poinsett's 
despatch  of  September  28.  When  exactly  a  month 
after  writing  this  instruction  Clay  received  that  de 
spatch,  he  replied  on  the  same  day,  December  9,  merely 
referring  to  his  instruction  of  November  9  as  a  com 
plete  reply.  He  added  the  assertion  that  no  power 
except  Mexico  had  attempted  to  reserve  the  right 
to  grant  special  favors  to  other  Spanish-American 
powers.18 

It  was  more  than  seven  months  before  negotiations 
were  resumed  where  they  had  been  broken  off  by  Poin 
sett's  refusal  to  admit  the  provision  allowing  Mexico 
to  grant  special  favors  to  other  Spanish-American 
powers  which  might  not  be  claimed  by  the  United 
States  under  the  "most  favored  nation"  clause.  In 
February,  Poinsett  had  told  Clay  that  he  thought  it 
would  not  be  politic  to  evince  great  anxiety  to  renew 
the  negotiation;  for  he  considered  it  more  important 
to  make  a  treaty  on  liberal  principles  than  to  make  it 
quickly.  However  he  still  hoped  to  have  it  before  the 
end  of  the  session  of  Congress.19 

At  the  sixth  conference,  held  on  May  6,  1826,  the 

18  Clay  to  Poinsett,  December  9,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  420;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XIII,  494. 

19  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  18,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  221 

Mexican  plenipotentiaries  yielded  their  demand  for 
the  exception  in  favor  of  the  Spanish- American  states ; 
and  at  the  seventh  conference  on  May  17  Poinsett 
reciprocated  by  yielding  the  point  he  had  urged  pro 
viding  for  perfect  reciprocity  of  tonnage  dues.  There 
upon  the  "  most  favored  nation "  principle  was  ac 
cepted  by  both  parties  without  modification  and  em 
bodied  in  the  treaty.  These  two  difficulties  being 
removed  by  mutual  concessions,  the  next  six  confer 
ences  followed  in  fairly  rapid  succession  through  the 
month  of  June.  The  fourteenth  and  last,  at  which 
the  treaty  was  signed,  occurred  on  July  10,  i826.20 
Most  of  the  thirty-four  articles  were  agreed  to  with 
little  or  no  discussion  and  only  slight  modifications. 
There  were  however  a  few  matters  that  occasioned  ex 
tended  discussions  and  exchanges  of  notes. 

In  Poinsett's  pro  jet  which  formed  the  basis  for 
the  discussions  he  had  embodied  the  principle,  "  free 
ships  shall  make  free  goods."  But  he  had  added  an 
exception  intended  to  exclude  from  the  advantages  of 
the  provision  property  belonging  to  subjects  of  a  gov 
ernment  that  did  not  recognize  the  principle.  Poin 
sett's  exception  was  directed  chiefly  against  Great 
Britain,  which  government  still  stubbornly  refused  to 
admit  the  principle.  The  Mexican  plenipotentiaries 
did  not  object  in  the  least  to  the  principle ;  nor  did  they 
object  to  the  exception  in  itself.  But  negotiations 
were  then  pending  for  a  commercial  treaty  with  Great 

20  For  the  protocols  of  the  Sixth  to  the  Eleventh  Confer 
ences,  see  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  592  to  600; 
or  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  II,  74  to  128. 


222  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

Britain  also ;  and  they  feared  that  if  they  admitted  the 
exception  it  would  interrupt  their  negotiation  with 
that  power.  They  thought  under  the  circumstances 
that  Poinsett  ought  not  to  insist  on  the  exception  as  a 
sine  qua  non.  He  said  he  would  not;  but  convinced 
of  its  justice  and  importance  he  urged  it  strenuously. 
Finally  he  yielded  and  struck  out  the  exception.21  In 
explaining  to  Clay  his  efforts  to  get  the  exception  in 
troduced  he  said,  "  The  opposition  to  it  was  much 
more  formidable  than  would  appear  from  the  proto 
cols  ;  and  although  I  hinted  that  I  should  adhere  to  its 
introduction  into  the  treaty,  I  should  not  have  felt  my 
self  justified  in  making  it  a  sine  qua  non.  The  estab 
lishment  of  the  principle  I  deemed  of  paramount  im 
portance,  and  yielded  the  exception  only  on  convic 
tion  that  the  Mexican  government  would  not  agree  to 
it,  pending  their  present  negotiations  with  Great 
Britain."22 

Another  point  over  which  serious  discussion  arose 
was  a  provision  in  the  third  article  allowing  the  mer 
chants  and  traders  of  each  nation  to  enter  freely  and 
conduct  their  business  in  the  ports  and  territories  of 
the  other.  The  Mexicans  endeavored  to  add  a  pro 
vision  excepting  from  the  privileges  of  this  article  all 
European  Spaniards  who  had  been  naturalized  in  the 
United  States  since  1820,  because  they  feared  that 

21  Poinsett    to    Mexican    Plenipotentiaries,    June    16,    1826, 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  597.     Protocol  of  Thir 
teenth  Conference,  June  17,  1826,  ibid.,  598. 

22  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  12,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


CONCLUDING  A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  223 

Spain  would  introduce  Spaniards  into  Mexico  under 
the  guise  of  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
Poinsett  strenuously  opposed  the  exception.  In  ex 
plaining  the  matter  to  Clay,  he  said :  "  I  induced  them 
to  waive  the  discussion  at  that  time  by  declaring  that 
I  never  would  consent  to  insert  any  exception  to  this 
article  in  the  body  of  the  treaty,  and  that  all  allusion 
to  it  must  be  postponed  until  we  had  concluded  the 
treaty.  I  consented  to  it  at  length  as  an  additional 
article,  because  from  the  manner  in  which  the  Mex 
ican  plenipotentiaries  persisted  in  introducing  it,  I  felt 
convinced  that  they  considered  it  essential  to  the  liber 
ties  of  this  country  to  preserve  the  right  they  con 
tended  for;  nor  do  I  think  them  wrong  in  their  esti 
mate  of  the  danger  of  admitting  indiscriminately  all 
Spaniards,  wherever  established  and  at  all  times.  Cir 
cumstances  may  arise  which  might  render  it  extremely 
dangerous  to  throw  their  country  open  to  such  persons. 
There  are  too  many  of  them  here  now;  and  I  never 
have  met  with  one  European  Spaniard,  wherever 
domiciliated,  favorable  to  the  cause  of  American  in 
dependence.  I  yielded,  however,  not  to  their  argu 
ments,  but  to  the  necessity  and  urgency  of  the  case." 
In  introducing  the  matter  Poinsett  had  said  to  Clay: 
"I  am  fully  aware  of  the  objections  which  will  occur 
to  you  on  reading  the  first  additional  article  to  this 
treaty.  They  are  weighty ;  but  this  government  would 
have  made  no  treaty  without  such  a  provision."23 

23  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  12,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II.  And  Protocol  of  the  Thirteenth 
Conference,  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  598;  Mex 
ico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  II,  85. 


224  OBSTACLES    IN   THE   WAY   OF 

With  his  letter  of  July  12,  Poinsett  enclosed  copies 
of  the  treaty  signed  two  days  earlier.24  The  original 
was  retained  to  be  sent  as  soon  as  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  should  indicate  its  readiness  to  exchange  rati 
fications.  In  this  as  in  so  many  other  cases  Poinsett 
found  that  government  intolerably  slow.  Late  in  Oc 
tober  he  wrote  Clay  that  the  treaty  was  not  yet  sub 
mitted  to  the  Mexican  Congress,  in  spite  of  repeated 
promises  that  it  should  be.  He  said  there  seemed  to 
be  a  jealous  dread  of  too  intimate  relations  with  the 
United  States.  This  unfriendliness  of  the  executive, 
he  added,  was  not  shared  by  the  people  or  the  Con 
gress.25  Two  months  later  Poinsett  had  to  report  that 
the  treaty  was  still  unratified  by  the  Mexican  Congress. 
In  spite  of  that  fact  he  had  judged  it  advisable  to  send 
the  official  copy  by  his  secretary  of  legation,  Mr. 
Mason.  He  did  not  mean  by  doing  this  that  he  thought 
the  United  States  ought  to  ratify  it  first.  In  fact  he 
advised  the  contrary.  His  purpose  in  sending  Mr. 
Mason  at  that  time  was  that  he  might  converse  freely 
with  Clay  and  Adams  on  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries.26 

24  For  the  text  of  the  treaty,  see  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  VI,  608.    A  copy  of  Poinsett's  projet  precedes. 

25  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  21,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

26  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  29,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches   from  Mexico,   II.     Most  of  this  six-page 
letter  was  a  reply  to  one  which  Clay  had  addressed  to  him 
on  September  27,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instructions, 
XI,  159.     Clay  had  understood  from  the  protocols  which  ac 
companied  the  copy  of  the  treaty  that  Mexico  had  reserved 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  225 

On  March  12,  1827,  Clay  wrote  to  Poinsett  ex 
pressing  great  surprise  that  the  intent  of  Mexico  re 
garding  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  had  not  been  com 
municated  within  the  prescribed  time,  eight  months, 
which  had  expired  two  days  before  Clay  wrote  this 
letter.  This  unaccountable  delay  was  less  justifiable 
on  the  part  of  Mexico,  he  said,  than  it  would  have 
been  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  since  the  treaty 
had  been  made  under  the  constant  and  immediate 
supervision  of  the  Mexican  government.  Further 
more  the  ratifications  were  to  have  been  exchanged  in 
Washington.  If  it  had  been  agreed  that  they  should 
take  place  at  Mexico,  he  declared,  the  United  States 
government  would  have  made  some  response  within 
the  prescribed  time. 

On  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Mason  with  the  official  copy 
of  the  treaty  the  President  had,  on  February  12,  sub 
mitted  it  to  the  Senate.27  This  was  done,  Clay  ex 
plained,  so  that  if  the  Senate  had  advised  ratification, 
and  if  the  Mexican  ratification  had  arrived  within  the 
prescribed  time,  the  President  could  have  exchanged 

the  right  to  subject  United  States  shipping  to  exorbitant  dis 
criminating  duties  for  the  benefit  of  Mexican  shipping,  but 
that  the  United  States  was  not  to  retaliate.  Poinsett's  long 
letter  was  to  explain  that  his  argument  in  the  protocol  was  to 
show  how  unequally  the  "most  favored  nation  "principle  might 
operate.  He  did  not  intend,  nor  was  he  understood,  he  said, 
to  pledge  the  United  States  not  to  meet  with  countervailing 
duties  any  discriminations  in  favor  of  Mexican  tonnage. 

27  Adams  to  the  Senate,  February  12,  1827,  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  578,  communicating  the  treaty  and  docu 
ments. 

16 


226  OBSTACLES   IN    THE   WAY   OF 

the  ratifications  even  if  the  Senate  had  not  then  been 
in  session.  Furthermore,  if  the  Senate  desired  to  sug 
gest  changes  or  amendments  this  could  be  done  with 
better  grace  before  it  was  known  whether  or  not  the 
Mexican  government  desired  modifications.  But  even 
if  the  Senate  had  consented  to  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  unchanged,  and  if  notice  should  come  that  the 
Mexican  government  had  agreed  to  do  the  same,  it 
would  now  be  necessary  to  resubmit  it  to  the  Senate 
since  the  time  had  expired. 

The  Senate  had,  by  the  resolutions  adopted  Feb 
ruary  26,  advised  and  consented  to  the  ratification  of 
most  of  the  provisions;  but  there  were  certain  parts 
which  had  not  received  the  approbation  of  that  body. 
The  Senate,  as  Poinsett  had  anticipated  would  be  the 
case,  objected  to  the  first  additional  article,  which  ex 
cluded  from  Mexico  "persons  born  in  the  European 
dominions  of  His  Catholic  Majesty."  This  was  de 
clared  to  be  repugnant  to  the  constitution,  which  pro 
vided  that  the  native  and  the  naturalized  citizen,  "  with 
few  exceptions  applicable  to  ourselves  alone,"  have 
the  same  rights.  The  Senate  proposed  to  substitute 
in  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  the  word  "  citizens  " 
for  the  word  "  inhabitants."  That  would  leave  only  a 
very  few  who  would  be  affected  by  the  first  additional 
article;  and  it  was  hoped  that  this  would  obviate  the 
repugnance  of  the  Mexican  government  to  the  omis 
sion  of  that  additional  article. 

Clay  further  said  that  the  consent  of  the  Senate  to 
the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  articles,  which  embodied 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  22/ 

the  principle,  "  free  ships  shall  make  free  goods,"  de 
pended  on  the  addition  to  the  sixteenth  of  the  follow 
ing  :  "  Provided,  however,  and  it  is  hereby  agreed, 
that  the  stipulations  in  this  article  contained  declaring 
that  the  flag  shall  cover  the  property  shall  be  under 
stood  as  applying  to  those  powers  only  who  recognize 
this  principle ;  but  if  either  of  the  two  contracting  par 
ties  shall  be  at  war  with  a  third,  and  the  other  neutral, 
the  flag  of  the  neutral  shall  cover  the  property  of  the 
enemies  whose  governments  acknowledge  this  prin 
ciple  and  not  of  others."  This  was  the  exception  which 
Poinsett  had  tried  in  vain  to  introduce.  Clay  said 
such  was  the  limitation  on  the  principle  in  the  treaty 
with  Colombia ;  and  it  would  be  simply  refusing  to  a 
power  the  benefits  of  a  principle  to  which  it  would  not 
subscribe.  The  objection  which  the  Mexican  pleni 
potentiaries  had  urged  to  so  limiting  this  principle 
when  the  treaty  was  being  negotiated  had  been  re 
moved;  for  the  treaty  between  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  and  England  had  now  been  ratified. 

The  third  amendment  proposed  by  the  Senate  was 
that  the  duration  of  the  treaty  should  be  fixed  at  six 
years  instead  of  twelve  as  the  treaty  provided.  To 
make  this  change  more  palatable  to  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment,  Poinsett  was  authorized  to  agree  that  it 
should  remain  in  force  beyond  the  term  of  six  years 
until  one  of  the  parties  should  give  six  months'  written 
notice  of  a  desire  to  terminate  it. 

In  concluding  his  long  instruction  to  Poinsett  Clay 
declared :  "  If  the  Mexican  government  will  not  agree 


228  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

to  the  amendments  proposed  by  the  Senate,  no  alter 
native  will  then  remain  but  to  terminate  the  negotia 
tions."  He  had  previously  said  that  the  Senate  at 
tached  most  importance  to  the  first  and  third  amend 
ments,  and  added :  "  It  is  believed  that,  without  these, 
the  Senate  would  never  advise  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty.  You  will  use  your  best  exertions  to  prevail 
on  the  Mexican  government  to  consent  to  all  the  pro 
posed  amendments."28 

Not  only  had  the  Mexican  ratifications  not  reached 
Washington  when  Clay  wrote  the  above  instruction 
two  days  after  the  time  limit  for  exchanging  the  rati 
fications  had  expired,  but  the  Mexican  Chamber  of 
Deputies  had  not  even  acted  on  the  treaty  at  that  time. 
Nearly  a  month  later,  on  April  10,  1827,  Poinsett 
wrote  that  the  Mexican  Chamber  had  not  yet  acted. 
He  enclosed,  however,  a  report  that  had  been  made 
some  time  before  by  the  committee  on  foreign  rela 
tions  of  that  Chamber.  This  report  never  was 
adopted;  but  it  is  interesting  as  showing  the  senti 
ment  of  the  members  of  the  Chamber  who  were  most 
informed  upon  and  responsible  for  its  foreign  policy. 
The  report  declared  that  the  committee  had  considered 
the  treaty  daily  for  three  months.  It  had  wished  to 
report  earlier;  but  did  not  wish  to  make  an  incom 
plete  or  ill  advised  report.  Difficulties  in  securing  de 
sired  documents,  inexact  translations  of  some  articles, 
and  obscure  meanings  of  others  all  had  caused  delays. 
Repeated  conferences  had  been  held  with  the  Mexican 

28  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  12,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XI,  261. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY 


negotiators  of  the  treaty.  The  committee  had  dis 
trusted  its  own  ability;  and  was  the  more  scrupulous 
because  "  the  treaty  is  made  with  a  nation  whose 
existence  was  half  a  century  earlier  than  ours,  and 
which  is  skilful  in  the  mazes,  ambiguities,  and  trans 
formations  (sic)  of  diplomacy,  while  we  are  beginning 
this  difficult  career  with  the  candour  of  youth." 

They  first  considered  whether  the  time  had  come 
when  a  treaty  should  be  made  with  the  United  States  ; 
and  decided  in  the  affirmative,  since  it  would  increase 
the  prestige  of  the  country  among  foreign  powers 
and  also  increase  the  internal  stability.  This  had  been 
recognized  by  the  sister  Spanish-American  states,  who 
had  not  only  concluded  treaties  among  themselves  but 
with  the  United  States  and  England.  They  recognized 
the  fact  that  Mexico  owed  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the 
United  States  for  first  showing  sympathy  with  and 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  new  states. 
"  Even  now  its  government  acts  with  greater  frank 
ness  than  others,  since  it  receives  a  Minister  Plenipo 
tentiary  of  Mexico  in  which  character  our  agent  in 
England  is  not  considered."  The  treaty  would  es 
tablish  confidence  and  invite  foreign  capital,  and  thus 
increase  the  wealth,  population,  and  prosperity  of  the 
country. 

All  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty  were  reviewed  and 
commented  upon.  Slight,  immaterial  modifications  of 
many  were  suggested;  but  few  serious  objections  were 
raised,  until  they  came  to  the  thirty-third  article. 
That  article  declared  :  "  It  is  likewise  agreed  that,  in 


230  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY  OF 

the  event  of  any  slaves  escaping  from  their  owners, 
residing  in  the  States  or  Territories  of  one  of  the  con 
tracting  parties,  and  passing  over  into  the  States  or 
Territories  of  the  other,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the 
owner  or  owners  of  such  slaves,  or  their  lawful  agents, 
to  require  the  assistance  of  the  authorities  of  the 
country  where  they  may  be  found  for  their  arrest,  de 
tention,  and  custody,  and  for  that  purpose  the  pro 
prietors,  or  their  agents,  shall  address  themselves  to 
the  nearest  magistrate  or  competent  officer.  On  such 
demand  being  made,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  magis 
trate  or  competent  officer  to  cause  the  said  slaves  to 
be  arrested  and  detained;  and  if  it  shall  appear  that 
such  slaves  be  actually  the  property  of  the  claimant, 
the  magistrate  or  competent  officer  shall  surrender 
them  to  the  proprietors,  or  their  agents,  to  be  con 
veyed  back  to  the  country  from  whence  they  had  es 
caped."  The  same  article  provided  for  the  extradi 
tion  of  murderers  and  forgers.29 

For  some  unaccountable  reason  this  article  had  been 
adopted  by  the  negotiators  without  discussion.  All 
that  is  said  in  the  protocol  is:  "The  thirty-third  ar 
ticle,  relating  to  the  delivery  of  fugitive  slaves  and  of 
murderers  and  forgers  taking  refuge  in  the  territories 
of  either  of  the  contracting  parties,  was  read  and 
agreed  to."30  But  whatever  was  the  motive  for  this 
silence  on  the  part  of  the  Mexican  negotiators,  whether 
inadvertence,  indifference,  or  fear  of  obstructing  the 

29  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  612. 

30  See  Protocol  of  the  Twelfth  Conference,  June  16,  1826, 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  595. 


CONCLUDING  A   COMMERCIAL  TREATY  23! 

negotiations,  the  committee  on  foreign  relations  of  the 
Chamber  did  not  pass  over  it  in  silence.  It  declared 
unequivocally :  "  The  Committee  trusts  that  the  Cham 
ber  will  be  pleased  to  reject  the  thirty-third  article  re 
specting  the  restoration  of  slaves.  The  slave  makes 
use  of  the  inalienable  right  which  the  author  of  nature 
has  conceded  to  him,  when  he  procures  his  liberty. 
The  chambers  have  showrn  themselves  determined  to 
erase  this  stain  and  to  preserve  our  institutions.  It  is 
also  to  be  observed  that  the  reciprocity  which  is  estab 
lished  in  this  article  is  nominal,  since  there  are  no 
slaves  belonging  to  Mexico  on  the  frontiers  of  the 
States  of  the  North. 

"The  Committee  is,  moreover,  aware  that  in  the 
colonies  of  our  neighbors  on  the  frontiers,  slaves  are 
worked,  who  alone  can  withstand  the  labors  to  which 
they  are  condemned  by  their  deplorable  fate.  Who 
will  not  allow  that  it  is  expedient  for  us  to  remove 
our  neighbors  from  the  frontiers  even  by  indirect 
means?"31 

They  advised  the  insertion  as  additional  articles  of 
the  two  following  provisions  :  "  that  the  treaty  of  limits 
between  the  two  nations  shall  be  concluded  at  the  latest 
within  two  years " ;  and  that  "  until  the  contracting 
parties  fix  definitely  the  limits  within  the  time  ap 
pointed,  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  amity,  settle 
ment  of  differences,  and  limits  between  His  Catholic 

31  For  further  attempts  to  check  the  settlement  of  Anglo- 
Americans  on  the  Texas  frontier  by  making  it  illegal  to  retain 
or  reclaim  slaves  in  Mexican  territory,  see  below,  chapter  on 
Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue. 


232  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

Majesty  and  the  United  States  of  America  signed  on 
the  twenty-second  of  February,  1819,  by  Don  Luis 
Onis  and  John  Quincy  Adams  shall  be  in  force."32 

Before  the  Mexican  Chamber  of  Deputies  had  acted 
on  this  report  of  its  committee  on  foreign  relations, 
Clay's  instruction  of  March  12,  studied  above,  reached 
Poinsett.  On  May  10  the  latter  acknowledged  its  re 
ceipt,  and  replied:  "I  have  already  signified  to  this 
government  the  resolutions  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  with  regard  to  the  treaty,  and  proposed  to  re 
new  the  negotiations."  The  treaty  was  still  before 
the  house,  he  added,  but  would  be  withdrawn  by  the 
executive.  In  conclusion  he  declared  he  was  not  sur 
prised  at  the  Senate's  action  with  the  treaty.  His  only 
motive  for  allowing  the  insertion  of  the  additional  ar 
ticle  was  to  avoid  breaking  off  negotiations  a  second 
time  and  leaving  the  field  entirely  to  the  British. 
"You  can  form  no  idea  of  the  difficulties  of  treating 
with  these  people.  They  want  good  faith  themselves, 
and  are  constantly  afraid  of  being  deceived."33 

Three  months  later  Poinsett  wrote  that  President 
Victoria  had  invited  him  to  a  conference,  received  him 
cordially,  and  expressed  an  earnest  desire  to  reopen 
negotiations  at  once,  indicating  that  there  was  a  dis 
position  to  yield  the  points  which  the  United  States 

32  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  on  the  Treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  10,  1827, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

33  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  10,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  233 

Senate  considered  necessary.34  After  another  three 
months  had  passed  without  renewing  the  negotia 
tions,  Poinsett  again  wrote,  "The  President  repeated 
to  me  the  other  day  his  disposition  to  conclude  them 
as  soon  as  possible  and  his  willingness  to  cede  the 
points  in  dispute  between  the  two  governments,"  say 
ing  the  delay  had  been  caused  by  the  illness  of  one  of 
the  negotiators.35  One  month  later  still,  Victoria  re 
peated  his  explanation,  assuring  Poinsett,  however, 
that  the  negotiations  would  be  resumed  within  a 
week.36  But  nearly  two  months  more  passed  before 
the  first  conference  occurred  in  the  renewed  commer 
cial  negotiations. 

The  sickness  of  the  negotiator  was  not  the  only  or 
the  most  serious  obstacle.  In  April,  1827,  when  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  was  considering  whether  it  would 
ratify  the  commercial  treaty  which  had  been  concluded 
July  10,  1826,  studied  above,  a  resolution  had  been 
adopted  declaring  against  further  consideration  of 
that  treaty  until  an  article  should  be  inserted  settling 
the  boundary  dispute.  Finally  concluding  that  it  was 
useless  to  try  further  to  secure  the  cession  of  Texas  or 
any  portion  of  it,  Poinsett  conceded  the  Mexican  de 
mands  and  hastily  concluded  a  boundary  treaty  which 
was  signed  January  12,  i828.37  This  insuperable  ob- 

34  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  10,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

35  Poinsett  to  Clay,  November  10,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

36  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  8,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

37  See  below,  chapter  on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue. 


234  OBSTACLES    IN   THE   WAY   OF 

stack  being  removed,  the  commercial  negotiations  were 
shortly  resumed  and  concluded  almost  as  rapidly  as 
the  boundary  treaty  had  been. 

The  first  conference  occurred  on  February  4.  Poin- 
sett  read  a  note  setting  forth  the  resolutions  of  the 
United  States  Senate.  The  first  disputed  matter 
settled  was  that  in  the  first  additional  article  of  the 
rejected  treaty  concerning  the  exclusion  from  Mexico 
of  persons  living  in  the  United  States  who  had  been 
born  in  the  European  dominions  of  the  king  of  Spain. 
Poinsett  urged  the  constitutional  point  that  the  United 
States  was  under  the  necessity  of  securing  for  natural 
ized  citizens  the  same  privileges  as  for  native-born 
citizens.  He  offered,  as  the  Senate  had  proposed,  to 
substitute  in  the  third  article  the  word  "  citizens  "  in 
stead  of  the  word  "  inhabitants  "  in  order  to  limit  the 
privilege  to  bona  fide  naturalized  citizens.  The  Mex 
ican  negotiators  showed  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing 
between  real  and  pretended  citizens.  Poinsett  prom 
ised  that  this  would  be  accomplished  by  care  in  issuing 
and  scrutinizing  passports.  The  first  additional  ar 
ticle  was  thereupon  withdrawn  and  the  proposed  sub 
stitution  made  in  the  third  article. 

The  next  disputed  point  settled  was  one  which  Poin 
sett  had  held  out  for  strenuously  in  the  first  negotia 
tion,  in  obedience  to  his  original  instructions  from  Clay, 
but  which  he  had  finally  yielded,  and  which  the  United 
States  Senate  had  allowed  to  pass.  Poinsett  found 
the  Mexicans  now  not  only  willing  but  glad  to  yield 
the  point  in  principle  for  the  future ;  but  for  the  pres 
ent  they  found  a  way  to  retain  the  less  liberal  provi- 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  235 

sion.  This  secured  the  "  perfect  reciprocity "  in 
stead  of  the  "  most  favored  nation "  treatment  as 
between  United  States  and  Mexican  importers  with 
respect  to  tonnage  dues,  port  charges,  etc.,  and  was 
accomplished  by  substituting  instead  of  articles  five 
and  six  of  the  former  treaty  the  fifth  and  sixth  articles 
of  the  treaty  which  had  since  been  concluded  and  rati 
fied  between  Mexico  and  Great  Britain.38  An  addi 
tional  article  of  that  treaty,  however,  suspended  the 
operation  of  the  "perfect  reciprocity"  clause  for  ten 
years  on  account  of  the  backward  state  of  the  Mexican 
merchant  marine.  That  additional  article  was  also 
included  in  this  treaty.  In  the  meantime  Mexico  was 
required  to  accord  only  the  "most  favored  nation" 
treatment. 

The  next  point  discussed  was  the  demand  of  the 
United  States  Senate  for  the  insertion  in  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  articles,  embodying  the  principle, 
"  free  ships  shall  make  free  goods,"  of  the  provision 
limiting  its  advantages  to  the  property  of  enemies 
whose  governments  acknowledge  the  principle.  The 
Mexicans  were  not  prepared  to  yield  this  without  re 
sistance,  and  consequently  no  agreement  was  reached 
at  the  first  conference.  It  was  arranged  that  the  Mex 
ican  plenipotentiaries  should  present  in  writing  the 
next  day  their  arguments  against  the  exception.39 

38  For  the  British  Treaty,   see  British  and  Foreign   State 
Papers,  XIV,  614.     For  the  original  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  see  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI, 
608;  and  for  the  revised,  see  the  last,  952. 

39  Protocol  of  the  First  Conference,  February  4,  1828,  en 
closed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  8,  1828,  MS.,  Department 


236  OBSTACLES    IN    THE   WAY   OF 

It  will  be  remembered  that  this  exception  was  di 
rected  principally  at  Great  Britain  and  that  the  Mex 
icans  refused  in  the  former  negotiation  to  admit  it 
for  fear  it  would  prevent  England  from  ratifying  the 
treaty  then  pending  between  that  government  and 
Mexico  but  subsequently  ratified.  In  their  note  which 
was  dated  February  6  the  plenipotentiaries  referred 
to  Poinsett's  arguments  of  two  days  earlier  in  favor 
of  the  exception  and  declared :  "  The  undersigned 
have  to  observe  that  the  reasons  alleged  are  reduced 
simply  to  the  same  which  were  advanced  by  your  ex 
cellency,  with  the  same  intention,  in  the  conferences 
held  on  the  I3th  and  I7th  of  June,  1826,  and  which 
were  extended  with  more  exactness  in  your  note  of 
the  last  date;  but  as  all  these  were  refuted  at  that 
time  by  the  arguments  of  the  undersigned,  and  as  your 
excellency,  on  that  account,  agreed  to  adopt  the  stipu 
lation  of  the  principle  without  any  limitation,  they  do 
not  perceive  any  reasonable  motive  at  present  which 
could  justify  their  conduct  if  they  were  to  change 
their  opinion  and  accede  to  the  exception  proposed  by 
your  excellency,  in  conformity  to  the  wishes  of  your 
government.  It  is  true  that  the  Mexican  United 
States  have  not  now  the  powerful  obstacle  which,  at 
the  period  of  the  first  negotiations,  prevented  them 
from  admitting  an  exception  in  some  manner  odious, 
and  which  might,  on  that  account,  have  retarded  the 
conclusion  of  pending  treaties  with  a  third  power. 

of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.  This  letter  of  March 
8  is  printed  in  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  950; 
but  the  protocol  is  omitted. 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  237 

But  it  is  likewise  true  that,  after  having  celebrated 
those  treaties,  the  good  faith  and  honor  of  the  govern 
ment  are  interested ;  that,  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  there 
should  be  no  variation  in  the  principle  of  conduct 
which  it  had  proposed  to  follow  invariably,  and  which 
probably  had  an  influence  on  the  minds  of  the  other 
party  in  settling  those  conventions.  The  undersigned, 
in  virtue  of  these  reasons,  cannot  persuade  themselves 
that  the  government  of  the  United  States  of  America 
should  insist  on  the  insertion  of  the  proposed  addition 
to  the  sixteenth  article  as  a  sine  qua  non.  .  .  ."4 

In  replying  to  the  Mexican  note  Poinsett  said  he 
"did  not  consider  the  arguments  he  had  used  during 
the  former  conferences  and  in  his  note  of  the  I7th  of 
June,  1826,  as  refuted  by  the  Mexican  Plenipoten 
tiaries.  He  yielded  the  point  in  dispute  at  that  time 
to  his  earnest  desire  not  to  embarrass  the  negotiations 
then  pending  between  Mexico  and  Great  Britain." 
He  then  argued,  by  citing  a  supposed  state  of  war, 
the  injustice  of  applying  the  rule  without  the  excep 
tion,  and  the  advantage  it  would  be  to  an  infant  mari 
time  state  to  extend  the  rule,  and  continued:  "The 
rule  is  alike  politic  and  humane ;  but  to  make  it  just 
the  qualification  proposed  is  absolutely  essential.  It 
has  been  adopted  in  this  manner  by  all  the  new  repub 
lics  of  America  with  whom  the  United  States  have 
celebrated  treaties,  and  it  would  be  unjust  towards 
them  to  form  a  convention  with  Mexico  wherein  the 

40  Camacho  and  Esteva  to  Poinsett,  February  6,  1828,  Amer 
ican  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  948. 


238  OBSTACLES    IN    THE    WAY    OF 

principle  was  admitted  without  the  exception.  The 
only  alternative  the  undersigned  can  offer  is  to  omit 
the  principle  altogether.  If  it  be  inserted  at  all  in 
the  treaty,  it  must  be  accompanied  by  the  proposed 
qualification.  With  respect  to  the  obligation  which  it 
is  supposed  that  Mexico  has  contracted  in  her  nego 
tiations  with  Great  Britain,  the  undersigned  will 
merely  observe  that  there  exists  the  most  positive 
proof  that  Mexico  would  have  obtained  the  same  terms 
from  that  nation  even  if  the  principle  and  proposed 
qualification  had  been  introduced  into  the  former 
treaty.  Great  Britain  had  no  right  to  exact  or  expect 
that  Mexico  should  renounce  an  important  rule,  af 
fecting  her  most  vital  interests,  after  having  made  a 
treaty  with  Colombia,  subsequent  to  that  concluded 
between  the  United  States  and  that  republic,  in  which 
the  principle  of  '  free  ships  making  free  goods,'  to 
gether  with  the  proposed  qualification,  had  been  intro 
duced.  It  is  not  probable,  therefore,  that  the  circum 
stance  of  the  omission  of  the  proposed  qualification  in 
our  former  treaty  had  any  influence  on  the  negotia 
tions  between  this  country  and  Great  Britain.  If  the 
great  maritime  powers,  with  only  one  exception,  have 
deemed  it  politic  to  adopt  this  salutary  rule,  how  much 
more  important  must  it  be  to  the  rising  but  infant 
states  of  America.  To  the  undersigned  it  appears  of 
the  last  importance  to  settle  by  treaty,  in  this  hemi 
sphere,  a  question  which  has  occasioned  so  many  acts 
of  violence  and  so  many  wars  in  the  other.  The 
states  of  America  ought  to  be  governed  in  their  inter- 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  239 

course  with  each  other  by  the  strictest  rules  of  human 
ity  and  justice,  and  every  means  [ought  to  be]  re 
sorted  to  that  human  wisdom  can  suggest  in  order  to 
avoid  future  cause  of  war,  of  which  the  converse  of 
the  principle  here  contended  for  has  proved  so  fruitful 
a  source."41 

At  the  second  conference,  which  took  place  on  Feb 
ruary  10,  the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  consented  to 
admit  the  exception  to  the  sixteenth  article  rather 
than  abandon  entirely  the  principle,  "  free  ships  shall 
make  free  goods,"  which  Poinsett  had  declared  was 
the  only  alternative.  A  minor  matter  concerning  In 
dian  tribes  was  also  settled  at  this  conference.42  Four 
days  later,  on  February  14,  1828,  the  treaty  was 
signed.43 

In  Poinsett's  letter  of  February  22,  transmitting  this 
treaty  and  that  of  limits  which  had  been  concluded 
January  12,  preceding,  Poinsett  told  Clay  that  all  of 
the  alterations  suggested  by  the  United  States  Senate 
had  been  introduced  into  the  treaty  except  that  re 
lating  to  the  duration  of  the  treaty.  This  Poinsett  had 
not  insisted  upon  because  the  term  of  ten  years  was 

41  Poinsett  to  Camacho  and  Esteva,  February  8,  1828,  Amer 
ican  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  949.    This  note  and  that  of 
February  6  to  which  it  replied  were  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to 
Clay,  February  23,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  III. 

42  Protocol  of  Second  Conference,  February  10,   1828,  en 
closed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  8,  1828,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

43  For  the  treaty,  see  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI, 
952.    A  Spanish  version  follows  the  English. 


24O  OBSTACLES   IN    THE   WAY   OF 

specified  in  the  additional  article  suspending  the  "  per 
fect  reciprocity"  clause.  This  had  been  borrowed 
from  the  British  treaty,  and  had  been  embodied  by 
Mexico  in  other  treaties  containing  the  same  provi 
sion.  For  the  sake  of  uniformity  the  Mexicans  were 
very  anxious  to  have  it  in  the  treaty  with  the  United 
States  also.  Poinsett  agreed  to  let  the  twelve  year 
period  of  the  original  treaty  stand;  but  he  accom 
plished  the  essential  purpose  of  the  Senate  by  intro 
ducing  into  the  thirty-fourth  article  a  provision  that  at 
the  end  of  six  years  from  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
alterations  could  be  made  in  the  treaty  and  would  be 
considered  a  part  of  it,  having  the  same  force  as  those 
provisions  now  agreed  upon.44 

Again  the  thirty-third  article  relating  to  the  arrest 
and  return  of  fugitive  slaves  had  been  adopted  without 
any  indication  in  the  protocols  that  it  was  even  dis 
cussed  by  the  negotiators.  On  March  I,  two  weeks 
after  the  treaty  had  been  signed  and  almost  one  week 
after  Poinsett  had  despatched  it  to  Washington,  a 
special  conference  was  held  between  him  and  Camacho 
at  the  latter's  request  in  order  that  an  explanation 
might  be  given  of  some  matters  concerning  which 
doubts  had  arisen  in  the  minds  of  members  of  the 
Mexican  government.  Some  minor  misunderstand- 

44  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  22,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III;  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  VI,  948.  A  second  additional  article  provided  that 
the  treaty  should  remain  in  force  even  beyond  the  term  of 
twelve  years  until  six  months  after  one  of  the  contracting 
governments  should  give  notice  of  its  desire  to  terminate  the 
treaty. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  24! 

ings  were  easily  removed  concerning  the  interpreta 
tion  of  provisions  relating  to  blockades  and  to  the  ad 
mission  of  consuls.  Then  coming  to  the  most  im 
portant  point,  Camacho  urged  the  objections  of  his 
government  to  the  thirty-third  article,  and  proposed 
that  it  be  modified  so  as  not  to  come  into  such  violent 
collision  with  the  feelings  of  the  Mexican  people.  He 
proposed  to  accomplish  this  "either  by  an  agreement 
'on  the  part  of  Mexico  to  pay  for  such  fugitive  slaves, 
or  in  some  other  manner."  Poinsett  replied  that  the 
thirty-third  article  seemed  to  him  to  be  indispensable. 
He  argued  that  the  United  States  government  was 
compelled  to  protect  its  citizens  in  the  possession  of 
their  property.  The  provision  in  the  Mexican  consti 
tution  for  the  emancipation  of  slaves,  he  said,  would 
be  considered  by  the  slaves  as  an  invitation  to  them 
to  escape.  If  there  were  no  treaty  provision  for  their 
return  their  owners,  he  insisted,  would  be  compelled 
to  pursue  them  across  the  border  and  recover  them. 
This  would  continually  disturb  the  peace  along  the 
borders.  If  Mexico  should  undertake  to  remunerate 
the  owners  of  escaped  slaves  for  their  loss,  it  would 
be  a  constant  and  heavy  drain  on  the  resources  of 
Mexico,  and  besides  would  involve  the  two  govern 
ments  in  continual  difficulties.  The  supposition  that 
the  absence  of  a  provision  for  the  return  of  slaves 
would  discourage  slave  owners  from  settling  on  or 
near  the  borders  of  Mexico  and  hence  be  beneficial 
was,  he  argued,  not  well  founded.  Furthermore,  he 
urged  that  the  real  interests  of  Mexico  demanded  that 
17 


242  OBSTACLES    IN    THE   WAY   OF 

the  region  near  the  border  be  settled  by  an  orderly 
and  law  abiding  population,  for  if  it  should  not  be 
settled  by  such  a  people  it  would  become  a  rendezvous 
for  disorderly  characters.  Slave  owners,  he  insisted, 
were  an  especially  desirable  and  orderly  class.  In 
conclusion  he  said  he  would  not  have  insisted  on  the 
provision  as  a  sine  qua  non;  but  the  only  alternative 
that  he  could  have  accepted  would  have  been  com 
pensation  for  escaped  slaves.  The  serious  objections 
to  that  he  had  already  urged.45  The  proposed  change 
was  not  made. 

In  his  letter  to  Clay  of  March  8,  1828,  with  which 
the  protocol  of  this  conference  was  enclosed,  Poinsett 
said:  "With  regard  to  the  article  relative  to  fugitive 
slaves,  I  used  very  strong  language,  because  I  thought 
it  politic,  so  to  do.  I  do  certainly  consider  that  ar 
ticle  as  very  important  to  the  future  good  understand 
ing  between  the  two  nations,  and  shall  use  every  means 
in  my  power  to  have  it  ratified  by  this  Congress." 

The  complete  satisfaction  of  the  administration  and 
the  Senate  at  Washington  with  Poinsett's  negotiation 
of  the  revised  treaty  is  reflected  by  the  promptness 
with  which  it  was  approved.  On  April  21,  1828,  Clay 
acknowledged  receipt  of  the  treaties  and  said  they 

45  Protocol  of  a  conference  between  Poinsett  and  Camacho, 
March  i,  1828,  enclosure  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  8,  1828, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 
This  protocol  is  in  both  Spanish  and  English  in  parallel 
columns,  and  extends  over  more  than  twenty  pages.  It  is  not 
printed  in  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  950,  with 
Poinsett's  brief  letter  of  March  8,  with  which  it  was  an 
enclosure. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  243 

would  be  immediately  laid  before  the  Senate  for  their 
advice.46  Three  days  later  Adams  transmitted  the 
commercial  treaty  to  that  body  ;4T  and  on  the  same  day 
it  was  received  by  the  Senate  and  referred  to  the  com 
mittee  on  foreign  relations.48  One  week  later,  May  i, 
1828,  the  committee  on  foreign  relations  reported  the 
treaty  without  amendment.  On  the  same  day  it  was 
considered  by  the  committee  of  the  whole,  likewise 
without  amendment,  and  reported.  Immediately,  by 
unanimous  consent,  a  motion  was  considered  to  ad 
vise  and  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  The 
motion  was  carried  without  a  dissenting  vote, — forty 
yeas,  and  no  nays.49  It  is  worthy  of  mention  here  that 
the  treaty  of  limits  received  at  almost  the  same  time 
the  same  prompt  treatment,  and  almost  as  enthusiastic 
approval.50 

In  the  Congress  at  Mexico  action  was  very  different 
from  this  in  the  Senate  at  Washington.  In  spite  of 
Poinsett's  efforts  to  secure  its  ratification,  he  had  to 
write  Clay  on  May  21,  1828,  more  than  three  months 
after  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  that  the  Mexican 
Congress  had  adjourned  that  day,  and,  he  was  sorry 
to  say,  without  ratifying  the  treaty.  The  lower  house 
had  acted  on  it,  rejecting  two  articles.  The  first  was 
that  relating  to  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves.  It 

46  Clay  to  Poinsett,  April  21, 1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XII,  98. 

47  Adams  to  Senate,  April  24,  1828,  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  VI,  952.    The  treaty  follows. 

48  Senate  Executive  Journal,  April  24,  1828,  III,  605. 

49  Senate  Executive  Journal,  May  i,  1828,  III,  606. 

50  See  below,  chapter  on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue. 


244  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

had  been  rejected,  he  said,  entirely  on  philanthropic 
principles,  and  added :  "  Such  are  most  likely  to  in 
fluence  the  young  legislators  of  a  young  nation."  The 
other  rejected  article  related  to  the  maintenance  of 
peace  between  the  Indians  on  either  side  of  the  border. 
This  action  was  not  final,  however,  and  he  hoped  to  be 
able  to  carry  both  articles  at  the  coming  extraordinary 
session  of  the  Congress,  which  would  take  place  in 
August.51  Two  weeks  later  he  wrote  that  the  secre 
tary  for  foreign  relations  had  most  ably  and  zealously 
defended  the  rejected  articles ;  and  added,  that  offi 
cial  "thinks  that  we  shall  succeed  in  passing  them 
through  the  Senate  in  a  manner  that  will  secure  their 
passage  in  the  House  on  a  question  of  reconsidera 
tion."52 

Late  in  September  Poinsett  wrote:  "I  am  waiting 
with  great  impatience  for  the  Senate  of  Mexico  to  con 
clude  their  discussions  on  the  treaty  "  ;53  and  early  in 
October  he  addressed  a  note  to  Cafiedo,  the  secretary 
for  foreign  relations,  asking  an  explanation  for  the 
delay,  and  complaining  that  other  treaties  subsequently 
negotiated  had  been  acted  upon.  He  added  that  while 
all  governments  were  entitled  to  sufficient  time  for 
deliberation,  it  was  unreasonable  and  contrary  to  prac- 

51  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  21,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

52  Poinsett  to  Clay,  June  4,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

53  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  25,   1828,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


CONCLUDING  A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  245 

tice  to  allow  the  time  set  in  the  treaty  for  ratification 
to  pass  without  action  or  explanation.54 

Poinsett's  impatient  outburst  was  followed  a  few 
days  later  by  action ;  but  the  action  was  very  different 
from  what  he  desired.  The  Senate  had  discussed  the 
treaty  for  three  days  in  secret  session, — October  10, 
n,  and  13.  Instead  of  rejecting  only  two  articles,  as 
the  lower  house  had  done  earlier,  it  rejected  fourteen, 
namely,  the  sixteenth  to  the  twenty-fifth,  the  thirtieth, 
the  thirty-second,  thirty-third,  and  thirty- fourth.  The 
extract  from  the  proceedings  of  the  Senate  which 
Poinsett  sent  to  Clay  indicate,  however,  that  the  most 
serious  and  perhaps  the  only  insuperable  obstacles 
were  found  in  the  same  articles  which  the  lower  house 
had  rejected.  The  first  of  these,  article  32,  agreed 
that  each  nation  would  restrain  the  Indians  within 
its  borders  from  making  incursions  into  the  terri 
tories  of  the  other.  It  was  urged  that  it  was  impos 
sible  to  prevent  incursions  of  Mexican  Indians  at 
times  into  the  Mexican  states ;  and  it  would  be  much 
more  difficult  to  prevent  them  from  making  incursions 
into  the  United  States,  which  this  article  bound  Mex 
ico  to  do. 

It  was  article  33,  providing  for  the  rendition  of 
fugitive  slaves,  that  was  most  severely  attacked.  The 
extract  from  the  Senate  proceedings  says:  "Against 
the  33d  article  were  objected  all  the  arguments  which 
militate  against  slavery,  and  the  horror  which  it  has 

54  Poinsett  to  Canedo,  October  4,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poin 
sett  to  Van  Buren,  July  2, 1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


246  OBSTACLES    IN    THE   WAY   OF 

always  inspired  in  the  Mexican  Republic,  and  which 
their  Congress  has  manifested  by  a  multitude  of  de 
crees;  and  it  would  be  most  extraordinary  that  in  a 
treaty  between  two  free  republics  slavery  should  be 
encouraged  by  obliging  ours  to  deliver  up  fugitive 
slaves  to  their  merciless  and  barbarous  masters  of 
North  America.  It  was  added  that  even  the  second 
part  [concerning  the  extradition  of  murderers  and 
forgers],  could  not  be  approved,  because  a  perfect 
reciprocity  could  never  be  effected,  it  being  the  well- 
known  custom  of  the  United  States  of  the  North  never 
to  deliver  up  their  criminals  to  the  powers  who  de 
mand  them ;  and  this  it  is  which  has  considerably  aug 
mented  their  population.  The  only  reply  made  was 
that  in  nations  where  slavery  exists  the  slaves  are  the 
property  of  their  masters ;  and  that  security  for  prop 
erty  ought  to  be  stipulated  for  between  two  friendly 
nations ;  and  that  facilities  ought  not  to  be  afforded  to 
criminals  to  commit  offences  with  impunity,  because 
in  that  case  crimes  would  be  so  multiplied  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  restrain  them;  and  that  this 
must  take  place  if  by  the  rejection  of  the  article  our 
criminals  can  take  refuge  in  the  United  States  of  the 
North,  and  those  of  that  country  come  here."  Against 
the  thirty-fourth  article  it  was  urged  that  if  the  two 
powers  should  wish  to  enter  into  any  new  negotiation 
they  would  find  their  hands  tied  by  this  treaty  until 
after  the  long  period  of  six  years.55 

55  Extract  from  a  debate  in  the  Mexican  Senate,  October  10, 
II,  and  13,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  November  15, 
1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  247 

In  a  letter  to  Clay  on  October  22,  1828,  Poinsett 
said :  "  This  result  was  not  altogether  unexpected  by 
me.  A  majority  in  the  Senate  have  always  been  ex 
ceedingly  adverse  to  any  connection  with  the  United 
States.  They  dislike  our  republican  institutions,  es 
pecially  as  they  were  the  occasion  of  their  adoption  in 
this  country.  They  are  and  ever  have  been  essen 
tially  monarchical  and  European  in  their  principles ; 
and  while  they  affect  to  believe  that  the  United  States 
are  jealous  of  the  rising  greatness  and  prosperity  of 
this  Empire,  are  in  reality  envious  and  apprehensive 
of  their  neighbors.  If  the  treaty  be  again  passed  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies  by  a  majority  of  two  thirds, 
it  will  be  returned  to  the  Senate,  when  one  third  of 
the  votes  of  that  body  will  be  sufficient  for  its  ratifi 
cation."56 

This  shows  that  Poinsett  had  not  utterly  abandoned 
hope.  Now  he  turned  to  the  lower  house  to  use  his 
best  efforts.  On  November  15,  he  wrote  that  he  had 
"  furnished  a  member  of  the  House  with  the  necessary 
arguments  to  rebut  those  used  by  the  Senate.  It  is 
very  vexatious  to  have  to  contend  with  the  extreme 
ignorance  and  presumption  of  this  body ;  and  it  is  per 
fectly  impossible  to  anticipate  their  objections."57 
Some  nine  months  later,  Poinsett  said  that  the  Mex 
ican  Senate,  when  it  rejected  the  above  mentioned 
articles,  declared  that  it  would  agree  to  no  treaty 

56  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  22,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

57  Poinsett  to  Clay,  November  15,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


248  OBSTACLES    IN    THE   WAY   OF 

with  the  United  States  which  contained  any  provisions 
other  than  those  in  the  treaty  between  Mexico  and 
Great  Britain. 

In  this  same  letter,  which  was  addressed  on  July  22, 
1829,  to  Secretary  of  State  Van  Buren,  and  which  re 
viewed  at  length  all  of  Poinsett's  negotiations  with 
Mexico  for  the  information  of  the  new  Jackson  ad 
ministration,  Poinsett  said  that  after  the  Senate  action 
of  the  preceding  October  the  treaty  had  been  sent  back 
to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  where  it  still  remained 
when  this  letter  was  written  without  having  been  acted 
upon.  In  explaining  the  motive  for  the  Senate's  ac 
tion,  he  repeated  practically  what  he  had  said  to  Clay 
nine  months  before:  "A  majority  of  the  Mexican 
Senate,  elected  during  the  reign  of  the  monarchical 
faction  throughout  this  union,  are  opposed  to  the  es 
tablishment  of  friendly  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico ;  and  now,  aware  of  the  determina 
tion  of  the  executive  to  return  the  treaty  to  Congress 
with  such  observations  as  will  probably  lead  to  the 
restoration  of  the  liberal  principles  it  contains,  they 
will  delay  its  despatch  as  long  as  they  possibly  can, 
both  in  the  expectation  of  creating  an  unfriendly  feel 
ing  between  the  two  countries  and  of  wearing  out  my 
patience."58 

A  week  before  writing  this  long  review  Poinsett  had 
said  that  General  Guerrero,  the  new  President  of  Mex 
ico,  "  told  me  a  few  days  ago  that  he  was  determined 

58  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  July  22,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


CONCLUDING   A   COMMERCIAL   TREATY  249 

the  plans  of  these  men  should  not  prevail."  As  a 
means  for  counteracting  their  influence  President 
Guerrero  had  signified  his  desire  for  an  extraordi 
nary  session  of  Congress.  "  One  of  the  objects  is  de 
clared  to  be  the  immediate  despatch  of  the  treaty  of 
navigation  and  commerce  between  our  two  repub 
lics."59 

The  Congress  met  in  special  session  a  few  days  later, 
but  its  attention  was  absorbed  by  other  matters,  the 
chief  of  which  was  the  Spanish  invasion.  The  long 
growing  but  hitherto  covert  opposition  to  the  supposed 
influence  of  Poinsett  over  the  government  of  Guerrero 
burst  into  open  and  public  declarations  of  hostility 
and  demands  for  his  removal  from  the  country. 
President  Guerrero,  whose  hold  on  the  government 
had  been  very  precarious  from  the  time  of  his  inaugu 
ration  in  the  spring,  was  weakening.  Even  before  the 
public  attacks  on  Poinsett,  Guerrero  had  yielded  to 
the  opposition  and  written  a  letter  asking  the  Washing 
ton  government  to  recall  him.60  Under  these  circum 
stances  nothing  further  was  done  with  the  pending 
commercial  treaty  during  the  brief  remainder  of  Poin- 
sett's  residence  in  Mexico. 

On  October  16,  1829,  Secretary  Van  Buren,  in  in 
structing  Anthony  Butler,  who  was  being  sent  as  charge 
to  succeed  Poinsett,  declared  that  the  conduct  of  Mex 
ico,  whether  caused  by  a  mistaken  policy,  an  un- 

59  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  July  15,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

60  For  a  full  account  of  these  matters,  see  below,  chapter 
on  Public  Attacks  on  Poinsett  and  his  Recall. 


25O  OBSTACLES   IN   THE   WAY   OF 

friendly  disposition,  or  the  influence  of  foreign  na 
tions  hostile  to  the  United  States,  had  deeply  wounded 
the  sensibilities  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
After  reviewing  the  slow  progress  of  the  fruitless  four 
year  negotiation  and  contrasting  the  promptness  of 
the  Washington  government  in  acting  on  the  two 
treaties  with  the  dilatory  policy  of  Mexico,  he  de 
clared  that  the  latter  had  again  permitted  the  time 
allowed  for  exchanging  ratifications  to  pass  without 
action.  He  added  that  they  still  had  not  acted,  and 
declared:  "The  solemn  compact  has  again  been  can 
celled  ;  and  if,  by  the  law  of  nations,  blame  is  incurred 
by  a  state  which  refuses  to  sanction  the  obligation 
which  its  authorized  agent  has  contracted  in  its  name, 
that  blame  rests  on  Mexico,  by  whose  act  this  obliga 
tion  has  twice  been  disregarded."61 

Thus  within  the  period  which  this  study  properly 
covers  no  treaty  of  commerce  was  concluded.  But  to 
show  that  the  negotiations  were  not  wholly  fruitless 
it  should  be  added  that  on  April  5,  1831,  while  Butler 
was  representing  the  United  States  in  Mexico,  a  treaty 
was  signed  which  was  ratified  by  both  powers  and  of 
which  the  ratifications  were  exchanged  exactly  one 
year  later,  the  last  day  on  which  they  could  be  ex 
changed  according  to  the  provision  limiting  the  time 
within  which  the  exchange  must  be  effected.  Butler's 
treaty  of  1831  embodied  nearly  all  of  the  articles  con 
tained  in  Poinsett's  treaty  of  February  14,  1828.  In 

61  Van  Buren  to  Butler,  October  16,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  American  States,  XIV,  149;  House 
Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  53,  page  51. 


CONCLUDING   A    COMMERCIAL   TREATY  2$  I 

many  of  them  there  were  immaterial  verbal  changes. 
A  few  important  changes  were  made.  The  most 
striking  as  well  as  important  was  the  entire  omission 
of  the  article  requiring  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves. 
The  agreement  to  restrain  the  frontier  Indians  re 
mained  practically  as  Poinsett  had  drawn  it.  The 
thirty-second  article  of  Butler's  treaty  was  entirely 
new.  Its  purpose  was  to  regulate  and  protect  the 
commerce  between  Missouri  and  New  Mexico, — the 
Santa  Fe  trade.  The  twelve  year  period  for  which 
Poinsett's  treaty  was  to  endure  was  changed  to  eight 
years  in  Butler's,  and  beyond  that  time  until  one  year 
after  either  power  should  serve  notice  of  an  intention 
to  terminate  it,  instead  of  six  months  as  Poinsett  had 
arranged.  For  the  exchange  of  ratifications  instead 
of  six  months,  an  entire  year  was  allowed,  and,  as 
stated  above,  they  were  not  exchanged  until  the  last 
day.  The  additional  article  suspending  the  operation 
of  the  "perfect  reciprocity"  arrangement  of  the  fifth 
and  sixth  articles  was  limited  to  six  years  instead  of 
ten  as  in  Poinsett's  treaty.62 

62  United  States,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  from   1776  to 
1909,  I,  688;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  I,  150  and  163. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

COMMERCIAL  CONTROVERSIES 

In  the  absence  of  a  treaty  to  regulate  the  commerce 
between  the  two  countries,  continual  disputes  arose 
over  the  rights  and  privileges  of  United  States  mer 
chants  and  merchandise  in  Mexico.  Importers,  ship 
owners,  and  masters  of  vessels  complained  of  mis 
treatment  at  the  hands  of  Mexican  officials  at  the  ports 
of  entry.  On  the  other  hand  Mexican  officials  com 
plained  of  violations  of  Mexican  laws  by  those  who 
brought  goods  from  the  United  States.  Much  of 
Poinsett's  time  while  in  Mexico  was  occupied  in  at 
tempts — frequently  vain  attempts — to  adjust  such 
disputes. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  when  Obregon  set  out  from 
Mexico  in  September,  1824,  to  represent  his  govern 
ment  in  the  United  States  he  was  instructed  to  appoint 
and  supervise  Mexican  consuls  in  the  United  States 
and  through  them  enforce  regulations  governing  the 
shipment  of  goods  to  Mexico.1  To  make  sure  that 
these  consuls  would  have  opportunity  effectually  to 
supervise  shipments  and  enforce  regulations,  he  was 
instructed  to  require  that  every  invoice  for  such  goods 
should  be  certified  by  a  Mexican  consul  at  the  port  of 
origin.  To  make  sure  that  shippers  would  submit 

1  See  above,  the  chapter  on  Beginnings :  Early  Mexican 
Representatives  at  Washington. 

252 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES  253 

to  this  requirement,  a  drastic  penalty  was  provided 
for  its  violation.  Any  goods  found  in  a  Mexican 
port  of  entry  for  which  such  consular  certificate  could 
not  be  produced  was,  because  of  that  fact,  to  be  seized 
as  contraband.  Obregon  was  instructed  to  cause  to 
be  published  in  the  papers  of  the  United  States  both 
the  requirement  concerning  the  consular  certificates 
and  the  penalty  for  its  violation.  In  order  to  insure 
the  faithful  enforcement  of  these  regulations  by  the 
consuls,  Obregon  was  instructed  to  exercise  great  care 
in  their  selection,  choosing  persons  of  known  credit 
and  good  reputation,  preferring  always  Mexican  citi 
zens  if  such  were  available,  and  avoiding  naming  any 
Spaniard.2 

As  instructed,  Obregon  appointed  consuls  for  the 
principal  exporting  cities  of  the  United  States,3  and 
they  proceeded  to  obey  their  instructions  regarding  the 
issuance  of  consular  certificates.  Their  diligence  in 

2  Secretario  to  Obregon,  Instrucciones,  30  de  agosto  de  1824, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.     In  the  rough  draft  of  these  in 
structions  from  which  the  transcript  was  made  there  is  oppo 
site  the  beginning  of  the  third  paragraph,  which  relates  to  the 
consular  certificates,  a  marginal  note  reading  "  3*  Suprimida  " ; 
but  the  paragraph  must  have  been  restored,  since  its  instruc 
tions  were  obeyed. 

3  Obregon  to  Clay,  May  n,  1825,  tells  of  the  appointment 
of  vice-consuls  for  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  Baltimore, 
and  requests  exequaturs  for  them.     Same  to  same,  February 
5,   1827,  announced  a  new  vice-consul  for  Philadelphia  and 
requested  an  exequatur  for  him.     Same  to  same,  July  2,  1827, 
announced  an  appointment  for  Charleston.     Montoya  to  Clay, 
October  22,  1828,  did  the  same  for  New  Orleans.     Same  to 
same,  January  2,  1829,  did  likewise  for  the  Florida  ports,  MS., 
Department  of  State,  Notes  from  Mexican  Legation,  I. 


254  COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES 

the  matter  is  partially  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that 
there  was  a  fee  of  two  dollars  to  be  paid  for  issuing 
each  certificate.  Every  separate  invoice  had  to  have  its 
own  certificate.  Merchants  were  in  the  habit  of  send 
ing  two  invoices  with  each  shipment.  A  single  ship 
frequently  carried  as  many  as  sixty  different  ship 
ments.  This  meant  a  tax  of  two  hundred  and  forty 
dollars  paid  to  Mexican  officials  on  a  merchant  vessel 
before  it  even  started  for  Mexico.*  Many  vessels 
neglected  to  secure  these  certificates  in  spite  of  the 
drastic  penalty,  expecting  to  evade  it  in  some  way 
when  they  reached  the  Mexican  port.  Probably  some 
vessels  left  port  before  Mexican  consuls  had  been 
established  there.  Possibly  some  were  ignorant  of 
the  regulation. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1825  the  Mexican 
port  officials  began  to  enforce  the  regulation  and  to 
apply  the  penalty  if  the  certificates  were  not  forth 
coming.  On  October  29  Poinsett  wrote  to  Clay  that 
three  vessels  from  Philadelphia  had  been  seized  at 
Alvarado  because  they  were  without  the  certificates. 
On  Poinsett's  bringing  the  matter  to  the  attention  of 
the  government  at  Mexico  the  goods  had  been  re 
leased  to  the  consignees  on  bond,  until  the  legality  of 
the  procedure  should  have  been  determined.  The 
central  government  had  taken  the  matter  under  ad 
visement,  Poinsett  said,  and  some  general  measures 

4  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  November  16,  1826,  enclosed  with 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  23,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES  2$  5 

would  be  determined  upon.5  A  few  days  later  one 
member  of  the  ministry  wrote  to  another  saying  that 
he  believed  an  injustice  had  been  done  to  United 
States  shipping  by  requiring  the  certificates  and 
thought  it  would  be  expedient  to  suspend  the  measure. 
This  communication  was  handed  to  Poinsett  and  en 
closed  by  him  with  his  letter  to  Clay  on  December  i.6 
When  Clay  received  Poinsett's  report  of  the  seizures 
he  called  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  Obregon  and 
received  from  that  gentleman  a  note  of  January  4, 
1826,  defending  the  consular  certificates  and  the  regu 
lations  requiring  them,  of  which  he  was  the  author.7 
On  March  20,  1826,  Clay  told  Poinsett  of  the  seizure 
of  a  vessel  called  the  Fair  American  in  a  Mexican 
port  because  her  master  had  been  unable  to  present  a 
certificate  from  the  Mexican  consul  at  the  port  of 
origin.8  Before  the  arrival  of  Clay's  instruction  the 
case  had  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  Poinsett  and 
he  had  explained  it  to  the  Mexican  government  and 
demanded  the  restoration  of  the  goods.9  On  April 
30  Poinsett  told  Clay  of  this  note  to  the  Mexican  gov- 

5  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  29,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

6  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  i,  1825,  enclosing  Esteva  to 
Llave,   November  7,   1825,   MS.,   Department  of    State,    De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

7  Obregon  to  Clay,  January  4,   1826,  MS.,   Department  of 
State,  Notes  from  Mexican  Legation,  I. 

8  Clay  to   Poinsett,   March  20,   1826,   MS.,   Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XI,  18. 

9  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  April  20,  1826,  enclosure  "  A  "  with 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  12,   1826,   MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


256  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

ernment  of  ten  days  earlier  and  said  the  secretary  of 
the  treasury  had  "  written  to  Ref ugio  for  a  statement 
of  the  circumstances  in  relation  to  this  extraordinary 
affair."10  About  six  weeks  later  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  affirmed  its  opinion  that  the  want  of  consular 
certificates  justified  the  seizure.  On  July  8  Poinsett 
addressed  to  the  secretary  for  foreign  relations  a  long 
and  vigorous  note  defending  the  schooner  Fair 
American,  condemning  what  he  called  the  unjust  and 
irregular  consular  regulations  of  Mr.  Obregon,  and 
demanding  the  restitution  of  the  cargo  with  indemni 
fication  for  the  owners.11  These  notes  made  it  clear 
that  the  views  of  the  two  governments  were  diametri 
cally  opposed  in  the  matter.  In  his  despatch  transmit 
ting  to  Clay  this  correspondence  with  the  Mexican 
government  Poinsett  said  he  had  always  considered 
Obregon's  consular  regulations  irregular;  had  always 
opposed  their  execution;  and  had  received  from  the 
Mexican  President  and  ministers  assurances  that  they 
should  be  modified.  Because  of  them,  trade  from 
the  United  States  had  been  repeatedly  plundered  in  a 
shameful  manner  by  Mexican  officials.  He  was  col 
lecting  evidence  in  all  such  cases  and  would  demand 
restitution.12 

10  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  30, 1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

11  Camacho  to  Poinsett,  June  12,  1826,  enclosure  "  B,"  and 
Poinsett  to  Camacho,  July  8,  1826,  enclosure  "  C  "  with  Poin 
sett  to  Clay,  July  12,   1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

12  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  12,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES  257 

Of  the  many  subsequent  seizures  for  the  same 
reason  that  one  which  elicited  the  most  vigorous  pro 
test  from  Poinsett  and  furnished  occasion  for  the 
most  extensive  correspondence  was  the  case  of  the  brig 
Delight.  After  a  second  cargo  of  this  vessel  had 
been  seized  Poinsett  protested  to  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  September  29,- 1826,  that  according  to  the  com 
mercial  usage  of  nations  these  regulations  were  illegal. 
Mexico,  he  said,  had  obligated  herself  to  observe  those 
usages  by  the  mere  fact  of  her  having  declared  herself 
an  independent  nation.  He  showed  also  that  the  regu 
lations  were  contrary  to  the  true  interests  of  Mexico 
since  they  were  turning  United  States  shipping  away 
from  Mexico.13  In  writing  to  Clay  concerning  this 
new  case,  Poinsett  dwelt  at  length  on  the  irregularity, 
illegality,  and  injustice  of  the  consular  certificates. 
There  was  not  even  a  Mexican  law  to  justify  them, 
he  said.  They  seemed  to  rest  solely  on  the  authority 
of  Mr.  Obregon,  whose  only  justification  was  an  order 
from  Alaman.  The  Mexican  cabinet  were  not  agreed 
upon  the  matter.  Some  opposed  and  some  favored 
the  continuance  and  strict  enforcement  of  the  regula 
tions.  The  dispute  concerning  the  Fair  American 
was  not  yet  adjusted.  In  these  two  and  other  similar 
claims  nearly  a  million  dollars'  worth  of  United  States 
property  were  involved.14  On  November  8  Clay  in- 

13  Poinsett  to  Esteva,   September  29,   1826,   enclosed   with 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  21,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

14  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  21,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

18 


258  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

structed  Poinsett  to  demand  the  restoration  of  the 
cargo  of  the  brig  Delight,  to  repeat  his  remonstrance 
against  the  consular  certificates,  "and  to  require  that 
they  be  either  altogether  dispensed  with  or  placed 
upon  some  less  questionable  authority."15 

Long  before  Clay's  instruction  arrived  Poinsett  had 
repeated  his  protests  several  times.  On  November 
1 6  in  view  of  new  seizures  he  declared  that  the  United 
States  government  would  "  insist  on  their  citizens  be 
ing  indemnified  for  their  losses."16  And  on  Decem 
ber  8  he  showed  the  Mexican  government  the  unfair 
ness  of  the  regulations  in  view  of  the  fact  that  this 
hardship  was  suffered  only  by  that  nation  which  had 
proved  itself  most  friendly  to  Mexico  and  had  first 
recognized  Mexican  independence,  while  those  nations 
which  had  not  yet  recognized  Mexico  were  permitted 
to  trade  without  these  hardships.17  In  transmitting 
these  notes  to  Clay,  Poinsett  declared:  "A  more 
flagrant  and  unjustifiable  violation  of  the  property  of 
our  citizens  never  occurred  in  any  country."18 

It  was  still  a  year  and  a  half  after  the  exchange  of 

15  Clay  to  Poinsett,  November  8,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XI,  187.    This  was  written  long  before  the 
receipt   of    Poinsett's    letter   of    October   21,    which   did   not 
reach  the  State  Department  until  December  24. 

16  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  November  16,  1826,  enclosure  "  A  " 
with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  23,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

17  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  December  8,  1826,  enclosure  "  B  " 
with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  23,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

18  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  23,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES  259 

these  vigorous  notes  before  the  controversy  over  the 
consular  regulations  was  settled.  ~^jQn  July  14,  1828, 
Poinsett  transmitted  to  Clay  a  note  from  the  Mexican 
secretary  for  foreign  relations  stating  that  consular 
certificates  to  the  invoices  of  goods  would  no  longer 
be  required.  Poinsett  suggested  that  notice  of  the  re 
moval  of  the  troublesome  regulations  be  published 
throughout  the  United  States.19  Thus  ended  this  con 
tention  which  had  troubled  the  commercial  and  diplo 
matic  relations  between  the  two  countries  for  three 
years. 

Another  cause  of  discord  was  unfair  tariff  charges 
in  Mexican  ports  on  merchandise  from  the  United 
States.  Difficulty  on  this  score  had  begun  long  before 
Poinsett's  arrival  in  Mexico.  In  November  of  1824 
after  a  vessel  had  unloaded  a  part  of  its  cargo  of 
cotton  goods  from  the  United  States  an  order  from 
the  secretary  of  the  treasury  arrived,  arbitrarily  in 
creasing  their  valuation  so  that  without  any  change  in 
the  tariff  rates  the  duties  were  practically  doubled. 
The  order  was  to  become  effective  immediately  and 
was  even  retroactive,  affecting  goods  already  landed. 
The  United  States  consul  protested  and  the  valuation 
was  reduced  to  the  former  standard.  Among  the 
early  notes  from  Poinsett  to  the  Mexican  government 
was  one  of  July  18,  1825,  protesting  against  the  in 
justice  of  such  a  measure,  arguing  its  irregularity  ac 
cording  to  the  practice  of  nations,  asking  that  the  in- 

19  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  14,  1828,  enclosing  Canedo  to  Poin 
sett,  June  19, 1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  IV. 


260  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

j  tired  merchants  be  reimbursed  for  excess  duties  paid 
while  the  order  was  in  force,  and  that  they  be  relieved 
from  the  payment  of  a  considerable  sum  still  due. 
In  his  report  of  the  matter  to  Clay,  Poinsett  said  that 
a  new  tariff  was  one  of  the  subjects  to  be  considered 
by  the  extraordinary  session  of  Congress  soon  to  as 
semble.  He  promised  to  use  every  effort  to  have  man 
ufactured  goods  from  the  United  States  placed  at  a 
lower  rate.20  About  three  months  later  Poinsett  re 
ported  that  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  had  refunded 
to  the  merchants  the  excess  duties  which  they  had  paid 
because  of  the  arbitrary  increase  in  valuation  in  the 
case  referred  to  above.21  But  this  was  only  one  of 
many  similar  cases.22 

This  acknowledgment  of  its  error  and  reversal  of 
its  action  in  one  case  did  not  deter  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  from  similar  action  subsequently.  Late  in 
1826  it  again  tried  suddenly  to  augment  its  income  at 
the  expense  of  foreign  merchants.  This  time  instead 

20  Poinsett  to   Clay,   July   18,    1825,   enclosing   Poinsett  to 
Alaman,  July  18,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  I. 

21  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  6,   1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

22  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  I,  1825,  enclosing  Poinsett  to 
Suberville,  November  n,  1825,  and  Poinsett  to  Camacho  [?], 
tells  of  another  claim  almost  the  same  as,  the  above,  MS., 
Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.     Clay  to 
Poinsett,  December  7,   1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  In 
structions,  XI,  218,  transmits  papers  relating  to  another  such 
claim.     Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  25,  1827,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II,  acknowledges  Clay's 
of  December  7. 


COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES  26 1 

of  increasing  the  valuation  it  increased  the  tariff  rate, 
affecting  the  increase  in  duties  directly  instead  of  in 
directly.  This  order  affected  cotton  goods  from  Eng 
land  equally  with  those  from  the  United  States.  Pro 
tests  came  from  the  merchants  of  both  countries 
against  having  the  increase  become  immediately  effec 
tive  without  previous  notice.  Poinsett  sent  a  note  of 
remonstrance  to  the  Mexican  government  on  Decem 
ber  28,  1826,  showing  the  illegality  of  the  measure  ac 
cording  to  the  practice  of  nations,  its  injustice  to  the 
foreign  merchants,  and  the  inevitable  ultimate  de 
crease  in  the  revenue  of  Mexico  since  the  duty  was 
made  practically  prohibitive.  He  demanded  the  res 
toration  of  the  old  duties  for  all  goods  then  in  the 
ports  of  Mexico  or  on  the  way  from  the  United  States. 
Through  the  United  States  consul  at  Vera  Cruz  Poin 
sett  advised  the  merchants  not  to  land  their  goods  but 
to  return  them  to  the  United  States  rather  than  pay 
the  exorbitant  duties.  He  said  if  the  British  mer 
chants  would  do  the  same  the  Mexican  government 
would  soon  submit.23 

23  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  27,  1826,  enclosing  Poinsett 
to  Secretario,  December  28,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II.  Accompanying  these  there  is 
also  a  letter  from  British  merchants  to  the  British  consul  com 
plaining  of  the  same,  and  the  letter  from  Poinsett  to  the 
consul  at  Vera  Cruz,  advising  that  the  cargoes  be  returned. 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  28,  1827,  enclosed  an  act  of  the  Mexi 
can  Congress  fixing  the  valuation  of  cotton  goods.  Same  to 
same,  June  5,  1827,  told  of  a  law  admitting  building  timber 
free  for  two  years,  which  he  suggested  should  be  published. 
Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  May  23,  1829,  told  of  a  law  prohib 
iting  the  importation  of  certain  products,  which  Poinsett 


262  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

Many  United  States  vessels  and  cargoes  were  seized 
in  Mexico  on  various  pretexts.  Some  were  released 
after  being  held  for  a  time,  others  were  confiscated 
and  sold.  The  instructions  which  Poinsett  was  given 
when  he  was  preparing  to  start  for  Mexico  told  him  of 
a  schooner  which  had  been  seized  in  Vera  Cruz  har 
bor.  It  was  supposed  that  the  Mexican  government 
would  attempt  to  justify  the  seizure  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  violating  the  Mexican  blockade  of  the 
castle  of  San  Juan  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor,  which 
castle  was  still  held  by  Spain.  Clay  declared  that 
such  an  excuse  would  not  be  valid  unless  there  had 
been  a  sufficient  naval  force  outside  the  harbor  to  make 
the  vessel's  approach  hazardous,  or  unless  she  had  been 
warned  of  the  existence  of  the  blockade  before  she 
entered.24 

In  1825  a  vessel  was  seized  on  the  ground  that  it 

thought  would  nearly  ruin  the  commerce  with  the  United 
States  and  decrease  the  Mexican  revenue  by  one  third.  He 
enclosed  a  copy  and  suggested  that  it  be  published  for  the 
protection  of  shippers,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  III  and  IV. 

24  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  26,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  225.  Clay  to  Poinsett,  April  16,  1825, 
said  that  Obregon  had  called  to  request  a  public  notification 
by  the  United  States  government  of  the  fact  that  the  Castle 
of  San  Juan  was  blockaded  by  the  Mexican  government. 
The  United  States  consul  at  Alvarado  had  declared  that  he 
would  not  respect  the  blockade  until  notified  by  his  own  gov 
ernment  of  its  existence.  Clay  declared  that  the  consul  was 
mistaken  and  that  Obregon  had  been  so  informed.  Poinsett 
was  asked  to  notify  all  United  States  consuls  in  Mexico  that 
it  was  not  necessary  for  their  government  to  notify  them  of  a 
blockade  to  make  it  worthy  of  respect. 


COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES  263 

was  carrying  goods  which  were  the  produce  of  Spain 
and  hence  excluded  from  Mexico.  Clay  said  it  was 
asserted  that  they  were  not  of  Spanish  but  French 
origin,  and  asked  Poinsett  to  take  such  steps  in  the 
case  as  he  might  think  proper  and  necessary.25  A 
similar  case  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  State 
Department  late  in  1826.  A  cargo  of  white  wax  had 
been  seized  because  it  was  thought  to  have  been  of 
Spanish  or  Cuban  origin.  The  documents  submitted 
showed  on  the  contrary  that  it  was  of  Russian  origin 
and  was  owned  by  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Clay 
asked  Poinsett  to  aid  in  procuring  the  restoration  of 
the  goods  and  damages  for  their  detention.26 

A  very  interesting  claim  was  that  of  a  New  York 
insurance  company  against  the  Mexican  government 
which  had  its  origin  in  1824  and  was  kept  pending 
for  more  than  three  years.  A  vessel  named  the  Lib 
erty,  carrying  a  cargo  of  goods  which  it  had  been  for 
bidden  to  land  after  August  20,  1824,  started  from  the 
port  of  origin  in  the  United  States  in  time  to  reach  its 
destination  before  that  date.  But  an  accident  en  route 
caused  the  owners  of  the  vessel  to  abandon  it  for  lost, 
turning  it  and  its  cargo  over  to  the  insurance  company. 
The  latter  recovered  the  vessel  and  sent  it  on  to  its 

25  Clay  to  Poinsett,  September  12,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  378. 

26  Brent  to  Poinsett,  November  29,  1826,  and  Clay  to  Poin 
sett,  December  21,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instruc 
tions,  XI,  217,  223;  and  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  7,  1827,  en 
closing  several  documents  showing  that  he  had  already  been 
working  on  the  case  for  more  than  a  year,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


264  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

destination.  In  the  meantime  the  law  had  gone  into 
effect  which  excluded  the  cargo,  and  it  was  seized  as 
contraband.  The  company  insisted  that  the  delay  was 
unavoidable  and  put  in  a  claim  to  recover.  Poinsett 
wrote  Clay  on  October  6,  1825,  that  he  was  not  sure 
of  the  justice  of  the  case  and  would  await  advice  be 
fore  presenting  the  claim.27  Clay  replied  the  follow 
ing  May,28  and  in  August  Poinsett  said  he  would  pre 
sent  the  claim  and  press  it  vigorously.  He  said  delay 
would  be  unavoidable  and  justice  was  uncertain.29 
In  November  of  the  next  year  Poinsett  sent  his  last 
report  on  the  matter  to  Clay  enclosing  correspondence 
with  the  Mexican  government.  A  note  of  June  13, 
1827,  while  not  denying  the  justice  of  the  claim,  had 
said  that  the  owners  ought  to  claim  damages  not  from 
the  government  but  from  the  offending  officials,  bas 
ing  their  decision  on  an  old  Spanish  law.30, 

One  of  the  prohibited  articles  was  sugar.  In  1826 
a  ship  owned  in  the  United  States  was  bound  from  a 
Chinese  port  for  Lima  in  Peru  with  a  cargo  of  sugar. 
It  was  compelled  by  distress  to  put  into  the  harbor 
of  San  Bias  and  land  its  cargo  to  repair  damages. 

27  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  6,  1825,  MS.,  Department,  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

28  Clay  to  Poinsett,  May  n,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XI,  70. 

29  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  26,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

30  Poinsett  to  Clay,  November  g,   1827,  enclosing  Poinsett 
to  Secretario,  May  25,  1827,  and  Espinosa  to  Poinsett,  June 
13,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mex 
ico,  III. 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES  265 

When  ready  to  continue  its  voyage  it  was  prevented 
from  reloading  its  cargo,  and,  instead,  the  government 
officials  confiscated  the  sugar.  Poinsett  addressed  a 
note  on  October  24,  1826,  to  the  secretary  for  foreign 
relations  asking  the  release  of  the  cargo.  The  request 
was  granted.31 

Even  after  goods  had  successfully  passed  the  port 
of  entry  they  were  not  sure  of  being  exempt  from 
seizure  and  confiscation  by  Mexican  officials  because 
of  some  petty  irregularity.  A  law  of  the  state  of 
Tamaulipas  had  fixed  a  definite  route  for  goods  in 
transit  from  Tampico  to  San  Luis  Potosi,  and  de 
clared  that  any  goods  found  off  this  route  would  be 
considered  contraband.  In  the  spring  of  1828  a  car 
rier  with  goods  belonging  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States  had  been  compelled  to  deviate  from  this  route 
because  of  the  scarcity  of  water.  The  goods  con 
formed  in  every  other  way  with  the  requirements. 
They  were  confiscated  by  officials  because  they  were 
found  off  the  established  route.  In  a  note  of  May  8, 
1828,  Poinsett  protested  to  the  secretary  for  foreign  re 
lations  and  demanded  the  restoration  of  the  goods  or, 
in  case  they  had  been  sold,  compensation  for  them.32 
A  few  days  later  Poinsett  addressed  another  note  ex 
plaining  that  a  small  quantity  of  arms  not  embraced 
within  the  Mexican  law  prohibiting  the  importation 

31  Poinsett  to   Clay,    December    13,    1826,    with   enclosures, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

32  Poinsett  to  Cafiedo,  May  8,  1825,  enclosed  with  Poinsett 
to  Clay,  July  15,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  IV. 


266  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

and  sale  of  arms  had  been  detained  at  San  Luis 
Potosi.  Two  days  after  this  note  was  written  asking 
their  restoration  a  reply  came  saying  that  orders  had 
been  given  to  restore  the  arms.33 

In  the  summer  of  1829  after  the  Spanish  forces 
which  had  been  occupying  Tampico  had  evacuated 
that  port,  two  schooners  from  the  United  States  ar 
rived  loaded  with  provisions  intended  for  the  Spanish 
army.  They  were  prohibited  articles  according  to 
Mexican  law,  and  both  vessels  and  cargo  were  seized. 
The  secretary  for  foreign  relations  brought  the  matter 
to  Poinsett's  attention,  saying  it  was  a  case  for  de 
cision  by  the  courts.  The  latter  replied  the  following 
day  that  the  cargoes  were  subject  to  confiscation  but 
not  the  vessels,  and  that  his  government  would  hold 
the  Mexican  government  responsible  for  any  damage 
or  loss  to  the  vessels.34  Even  money  belonging  to 
citizens  of  the  United  States  was  not  exempt  from 
seizure  by  Mexican  officials.35 

33  Poinsett  to  Canedo,  May  29,  1828,  and  Cafiedo  to  Poin- 
sett,  May  31,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  15, 
1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

34Viesca  to  Poinsett,  November  10,  1829,  and  Poinsett  to 
Viesca,  November  n,  1829,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Van 
Buren,  November  n,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

35  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  28,  1826,  told  of  the  seizure  of 
a  large  sum  of  money  belonging  to  a  certain  Jethrow  Mitchell 
while  on  its  way  from  Mexico  to  Vera  Cruz.  Eleven  docu 
ments  were  sent  in  support  of  the  claim  for  Poinsett's  use  in 
negotiating  for  the  recovery  of  the  money,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  XI,  20.  Clay  to  Poinsett,  May  26, 
1828,  sent  documents  in  support  of  the  claim  of  a  man  named 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES 


In  his  letter  to  Clay  of  August  26,  1826,  concerning 
the  claim  of  the  insurance  company  studied  above, 
Poinsett  expressed  his  regret  that  an  organized  sys 
tem  of  smuggling  from  the  United  States  to  Mexico 
went  far  to  justify  the  Mexican  officials  in  suspecting 
every  ship.  He  wished  a  stop  could  be  put  to  this  il 
legitimate  trade  in  order  to  secure  fair  treatment  for 
legitimate  traders.  The  Mexican  government  made 
frequent  complaints  to  Poinsett  because  of  the  conduct 
of  these  contraband  traders  from  his  country. 

In  January,  1826,  the  secretary  for  foreign  relations 
brought  to  Poinsett's  attention  what  he  called  the  out 
rage  committed  by  the  brig  Nile.  Her  captain  had 
been  carrying  on  a  contraband  trade  in  the  port  of 
Mazatlan.  He  was  summoned  by  the  alcalde  of  the 
port  to  answer  before  the  local  tribunal.  Learning 
that  the  custom  house  officials  were  preparing  to  in 
tercept  him,  he  retired  to  his  vessel  and  prepared  to 
resist.  He  sent  word  to  the  commissary  that  he  had 
powder  and  balls  to  sustain  the  sale  of  his  cargo,  if 
necessary.  He  hurled  curses  at  the  officers  as  he  re 
tired,  and  actually  fired  a  cannon.  He  sailed  away  with 
out  permission  and  without  examination  by  the  com 
mandant  as  the  regulations  required.  Furthermore  he 
left  unpaid  more  than  four  hundred  dollars  of  charges. 
In  closing  his  first  note  on  the  subject  Camacho  re 
quested  that  "  Your  Excellency  will  be  pleased  to  cor- 

Massacot,  of  Baltimore,  who  had  suffered  unjust  treatment 
by  Mexican  officials  at  Sisal  and  lost  more  than  fifteen  hun 
dred  dollars  in  money,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instruc 
tions,  XII,  105. 


268  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

rect  these  disorders  and  to  cause  the  subjects  of  your 
government  to  comply  with  the  laws  of  the  Republic." 
He  asked  also  that  the  offending  captain  should  be 
punished  when  the  vessel  should  arrive  in  the  United 
States.  Poinsett  apologized  promptly,  reported  the 
outrage  to  his  government,  and  said  he  had  no  doubt 
that  proper  punishment  would  follow.36  In  Sep 
tember  Obregon  brought  the  matter  directly  to  Clay's 
attention.37 

In  April,  1826,  the  Mexican  government  called 
attention  to  an  outrage  committed  by  the  schooner 
Eagle.  This  vessel  had  been  captured  at  Sisal  by 
a  Mexican  gunboat  because  she  carried  ten  thousand 
dollars'  worth  of  Spanish  goods.  She  was  placed  in 
charge  of  a  prize  crew  and  ordered  to  Campeachy  for 
adjudication.  Before  reaching  that  port  the  captain 
and  crew  of  the  vessel  mutinied  against  the  prize 
crew,  overpowered  them,  took  control  of  the  ship,  and 
sailed  away  for  New  Orleans.  Camacho  dwelt  at 
length  on  the  horrible  offense  that  had  thus  been  com 
mitted  against  the  honor  and  dignity  of  his  govern 
ment,  declared  that  the  insults  of  American  seamen 
had  been  "  frequently  repeated  and  with  a  degree  of 
insolence  and  violence  more  proper  to  banditti  than  to 
republicans,"  and  demanded  satisfaction  in  the  name 

36  Camacho  to  Poinsett,  January  24  and  31,  1826,  and  Poin 
sett  to  Camacho,  January  25,  and  March  5,  1826,  all  enclosed 
with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  8,   1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

37  Obregon  to   Clay,    September  25,    1826,    enclosing   seven 
documents  from  several  Mexican  officials  relating  to  the  case, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation. 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES  269 

of  the  President  of  Mexico.  Poinsett  replied  three 
days  later  that  he  would  lay  the  circumstances  before 
his  government  and  believed  some  means  would  be 
adopted  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment.  However  he  protested  against  the  harsh 
language  directed  at  United  States  seamen  in  general. 
He  added  that,  however  much  it  was  to  be  regretted, 
the  fact  that  smuggling  existed  was  not  to  be  wondered 
at,  since  it  had  continued  for  so  long  on  the  coasts  of 
Mexico,  and  had  even  been  encouraged  during  the  long 
independence  struggle  so  recently  ended.38  In  reply 
to  Poinsett's  report  of  the  matter  Clay  approved  his 
resentment  of  the  harsh  criticism  of  United  States 
of  the  conduct  of  the  commander  of  the  Eagle,  and 
ship  masters  in  general,  but  expressed  disapproval 
said  if  the  vessel  should  again  come  within  the  juris 
diction  of  Mexico  and  should  be  seized  the  United 
States  would  acquiesce  in  the  arrest  and  punishment 
of  the  commander.39  In  September  Obregon  in  the 
name  of  his  government  demanded  the  capture,  trial, 
and  punishment  of  the  captain  of  the  Eagle,  and 
the  restoration  to  liberty  of  the  Mexicans  whom  he 
had  made  prisoners.40 

In    September,    1827,    Poinsett   presented    a    claim 

38  Camacho   to    Poinsett,    April  24,    1826,   and   Poinsett   to 
Camacho,  April  27,  1826,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April 
30,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mex 
ico,  II. 

39  Clay  to  Poinsett.  June  23, 1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XI,  139. 

40  Obregon  to  Clay,  September  25,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 


COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

for  damages  because  of  the  long  detention  without 
adjudication  of  the  United  States  schooner  Su 
perior,  which  had  been  seized  on  a  charge  of  smug 
gling,  but  which  charge  Poinsett  claimed  was  not  well 
founded.  A  reply  of  three  weeks  later  said  that,  if 
an  injustice  had  been  done,  the  injured  parties  should 
prosecute  their  case  in  the  competent  tribunals.41  In 
April,  1828,  the  Mexican  government  complained  of 
the  conduct  of  the  master  of  the  ship  Correct,  which 
had  been  detained  at  Mazatlan  on  a  charge  of  smug 
gling,  but  had  eluded  the  officers  and  escaped  from 
custody.  He  complained  also  of  two  other  vessels, 
the  Franklin  and  the  Boston,  which  had  been  carry 
ing  on  illicit  trade  in  California  waters.  Poinsett 
promised  to  communicate  these  cases  to  his  govern 
ment.42 

The  conduct  of  Mexican  naval  vessels  and  of  Mex 
ican  privateers  in  preying  on  the  commerce  of  Spain, 
and  their  use  of  United  States  ports,  led  to  complica 
tions  in  the  diplomatic  relations.  One  of  the  most 
complicating  circumstances  was  that  Captain  Porter, 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  had  accepted  a  com 
mission  as  commander  of  the  Mexican  navy ;  and  had 
been  supplied  with  a  number  of  blank  commissions 
which  he  was  authorized  to  fill  out  and  distribute  to 

41  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  September  13,  1827,  and  Espinosa 
to  Poinsett,  October  5,  1827,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay, 
November  9, 1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  III. 

42  Cafiedo  to  Poinsett,  April  16, 1828,  and  Poinsett  to  Canedo, 
April  20,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  14,  1828, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES  2/1 

United  States  vessels  whose  owners  wished  to  under 
take  the  business  of  privateering  in  the  name  of  Mex 
ico.43  In  May,  1827,  Clay  wrote  a  note  to  Obregon 
complaining  that  Commodore  Porter  was  abusing  the 
hospitality  which  had  been  extended  to  him  at  Key 
West,  and  was  using  that  port  as  a  rendezvous  in 
which  to  recruit  the  Mexican  privateering  fleet  and 
from  which  to  prey  upon  Spanish  commerce  in  ways 
inconsistent  with  the  neutral  position  of  the  United 
States.  A  few  days  later  Obregon  promised  Clay 
that  he  would  take  the  necessary  steps  to  prevent  the 
further  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  the  United 
States,  wrote  a  letter  to  Porter  asking  him  to  respect 
that  neutrality,  and  brought  the  matter  to  the  atten 
tion  of  his  government  at  Mexico.44  Clay  instructed 
Poinsett  to  approach  that  government  also  on  the  sub 
ject.45  Poinsett  presented  his  note  concerning  the 
matter  in  July.  The  Mexican  government  communi 
cated  with  Porter,  and  in  October  informed  Poinsett 
that  he  had  left  Key  West.46 

But  this  did  not  end  the  trouble  growing  out  of 

43  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  8,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 

44  Clay  to  Obregon,  May  21,  1827,  Obregon  to  Clay,  26  de 
mayo  de  1827,  Obregon  to  Porter,  June  21,  1827,  and  Obregon 
to  Secretario,  3  de  agosto  de  1827,  the  last  enclosing  copies  of 
the  others,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

45  Clay  to  Poinsett,  May  31,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XI,  361. 

46  Poinsett  to    Secretario,   July   18,    1827,   and  Espinosa  to 
Poinsett,    October   3,    1827,   enclosed  with   Poinsett  to   Clay, 
October  5,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  III. 


272  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

Porter's  commissions  and  the  conduct  of  the  privateers 
holding  authority  from  him.  Commodore  Ridgeley  in 
the  United  States  service  stationed  at  Pensacola  wrote 
Poinsett  in  April,  1828,  that  Porter  had  published  a 
statement  offering  commissions  to  any  who  would  ac 
cept  them  to  search  for  Spanish  goods.  Poinsett's 
note  of  protest  to  the  Mexican  government  shortly 
after  receiving  this  declared  that  Porter  was  going 
further  than  ever  known  before  in  his  violation  of 
the  principle,  "  neutral  flags  cover  enemy's  goods." 
He  showed  how  injurious  this  would  be  to  the  trade  of 
the  United  States  and  how  dangerous  it  would  be  to 
the  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 
Since  the  conduct  of  Porter  had  been  based  by  the 
Mexican  government  on  an  old  Spanish  law,  Poinsett 
claimed  exemption  for  United  States  vessels  carrying 
Spanish  goods  under  the  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain  of  1895.  But,  he  added,  Mexican 
goods  could  not  claim  exemption  from  seizure  by 
Spanish  privateers  because  Mexico  did  not  recognize 
that  principle.  In  its  reply  the  Mexican  government 
merely  explained  its  regulations  governing  the  con 
duct  of  privateers  and  the  treatment  of  goods  taken 
as  prizes,  but  did  not  disavow  or  promise  to  check 
Porter's  acts.47 

4T  Ridgeley  to  Poinsett,  April  13,  1828,  Poinsett  to  Ridgeley, 
May  12,  1828,  and  Poinsett  to  Cafiedo,  May  [12],  1828,  en 
closed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  20,  1828;  and  Cafiedo  to 
Poinsett,  May  13,  1828,  and  Poinsett  to  Cafiedo,  June  3,  1828, 
enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  15,  1828,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES  273 

In  April,  1828,  Obregon  addressed  a  note  to  Clay 
complaining  that  the  collector  of  customs  at  Key  West 
had  ordered  out  of  that  port  a  Mexican  man-of-war 
which  had  arrived  there  with  a  Spanish  prize.  The 
collector  claimed  that  the  captor  had  violated  the  neu 
trality  laws.  Permission  to  repair  damages  had  even 
been  refused,  it  was  said;  and  when  the  man-of-war 
declined  to  proceed  elsewhere  its  prize  was  seized  by 
the  custom  house  officers  and  the  Mexican  flag  hauled 
down  from  her  mast.  The  Mexican  minister  de 
manded  satisfaction  for  the  insult  to  his  government 
and  indemnity  for  the  interested  parties.48  In  May 
the  Mexican  government  asked  Poinsett  to  explain 
the  occurrence.  Poinsett  replied  that  he  was  at  a  loss 
to  account  for  the  seizure  unless  some  law  of  the 
United  States  had  been  violated  by  the  captor,  or  un 
less  it  was  not  a  regularly  commissioned  vessel.  Some 
of  the  commissions  which  Porter  had  granted,  he  said, 
would  come  under  the  last  head.49  In  August  another 
note  from  the  Mexican  government  to  Poinsett  de 
scribed  the  conduct  of  the  collector  of  Key  West  as  an 

An  unsigned  note  but  apparently  in  Poinsett's  hand  written 
on  the  blank  page  following  his  signature  to  a  despatch  to 
Clay  of  June  4,  1828,  says :  "  Private  orders  have  been  given 
by  the  Commodore  not  to  molest  our  vessels  or  search  them. 
This  order  has  been  confidentially  communicated  to  me." 

48  Obregon  to  Clay,  April  18, 1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation,  I. 

49Canedo  to  Poinsett,  May  17,  1828,  and  Poinsett  to 
Cafiedo,  May  20,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July 
15,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mex 
ico,  IV. 

19 


2  74  COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES 

insult  to  Mexican  citizens  and  the  Mexican  flag,  and 
asked  reparation.  He  promised  in  turn  that  the  Mex 
ican  commanders  who  had  suffered  the  insult  should 
be  brought  to  trial  if  they  were  charged  with  improper 
conduct.  Poinsett  replied  that  the  United  States 
would  give  satisfaction  if  it  should  prove  that  the  col 
lector  had  acted  improperly.  A  letter  to  Poinsett  from 
Commodore  Ridgeley  at  Pensacola  declared  that  the 
conduct  of  the  commanders  of  the  Mexican  privateers 
had  been  disgraceful  to  Mexico,  and  enclosed  papers 
in  support  of  his  declaration.  Poinsett  answered  him 
that  the  evidence  he  had  submitted  was  insufficient 
and  asked  for  more.50  In  reporting  the  matter  to 
Clay  Poinsett  said  the  commander  of  the  English 
forces  in  the  West  Indies  had  ordered  the  seizure  of 
any  Mexican  vessel  which  should  attempt  to  take  any 
enemy  goods  from  an  English  ship.  This  he  said 
had  created  a  sensation.  He  advised  that  the  United 
States  should  take  the  same  step.51 

Porter  was  only  the  most  prominent  of  many  citi 
zens  of  the  United  States  who  entered  the  Mexican 
naval  service,  some  voluntarily  and  others  against 
their  will.  In  April,  1826,  a  note  from  Poinsett 

50  Cafiedo  to  Poinsett,  August  16,  1828,  Poinsett  to  Canedo, 
August  21,  1828,  Ridgeley  to  Poinsett,  August  18,  1828,  and 
Poinsett  to  Ridgeley,  September  7,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poin- 
s.ett  to  Clay,  September  15,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

51  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  15,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV.     This  is  not  the  letter 
referred  to  in  note  50,  but  another  of  the  same  date. 


COMMERCIAL    CONTROVERSIES  2/5 

complained  that  a  Mexican  press  gang  had  recently 
seized  in  Vera  Cruz  a  number  of  seamen  from  United 
States  merchant  vessels.  Several  others  were  being 
detained  on  Mexican  ships  of  war  after  their  term  of 
service  had  expired,  and  others  had  been  dismissed 
unpaid.  He  asked  the  punishment  of  offending  offi 
cials  and  the  release  of  the  detained  seamen.52  About 
a  year  later  Poinsett  protested  against  the  concealment 
on  a  Mexican  war  vessel  of  deserters  from  merchant 
vessels  of  the  United  States.  He  said  if  this  were 
allowed  to  continue  it  would  cause  great  injury  to 
commerce.  The  Mexican  secretary  for  war  claimed 
that  sailors  from  merchantmen  were  free  to  enter 
whatever  service  they  chose ;  but  gave  orders  for  deal 
ing  with  those  who  were  responsible  for  concealing 
the  deserters.  Poinsett  protested  vigorously  against 
the  assertion  that  sailors  from  merchantmen  were 
free  to  change  employment  whenever  they  chose.53 

Besides  the  controversies  arising  directly  out  of  com 
mercial  transactions  Poinsett  was  frequently  called 
upon  to  present  claims  against  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  for  losses  to  merchants  and  travelers  at  the 
hands  of  robbers  and  bandits.  From  the  mass  of 

52  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  April  n,  1826,  enclosed  with  Poin 
sett  to  Clay,  April  30,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  I. 

53  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  March  7,  1827,  Espinosa  to  Poin 
sett,  March  20,  1827,  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  March  26,  1827, 
enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  12,  1827,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


2/6  COMMERCIAL   CONTROVERSIES 

correspondence  concerning  claims  which  has  accumu 
lated  in  the  archives  of  the  Mexican  foreign  office 
one  is  almost  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  adjudi 
cation  of  these  claims  has  been  the  principal  business 
of  that  office  from  its  inception  to  the  present  time.54 

54  The  documents  in  the  archives  of  the  Department  of 
State  in  Washington  relating  to  these  are  too  numerous,  and 
most  of  them  of  too  little  value,  to  cite.  The  archives  of  Re- 
laciones  Exteriores  in  Mexico  contain  boxful  after  boxful  of 
correspondence  on  these  claims. 


CHAPTER  IX 

TEXAS  AND  THE  BOUNDARY  ISSUE 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  consider  diplo 
matic  relations  only.  Internal  affairs  in  Texas  will  be 
alluded  to  only  when  they  furnish  an  occasion  for  or 
exercise  an  influence  upon  diplomatic  communications. 

The  secret  instructions  given  on  October  31,  1822,  to 
Zozaya,  the  first  Mexican  minister  to  the  United  States, 
required  him  to  ask  the  views  of  that  government  with 
reference  to  the  limits  of  Louisiana.  He  wras  told 
that  the  imperial  Mexican  government  considered  the 
treaty  of  February  22,  1819,  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  valid,  and  was  disposed  to  carry  out  its 
provisions  for  establishing  permanent  landmarks.  He 
was  to  learn  whether  any  settlements  had  been  effected 
or  were  being  planned  which  would  prejudice  the 
rights  of  the  empire  under  that  treaty.1 

Spain's  refusal  to  ratify  the  treaty  for  almost  two 
years  in  the  vain  effort  to  induce  the  United  States 
to  agree  not  to  recognize  her  rebellious  colonies  had 
delayed  its  execution  until  Mexico  had  become  de 
facto  independent.  The  recognition  of  that  inde 
pendence  by  the  United  States  in  the  early  part  of 

1  Instrucciones  Reservadas  para  Zozaya,  31  de  octubre  de 
1822,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  85.  This  treaty,  later 
known  as  the  Florida  Treaty,  is  always  spoken  of  in  the  cor 
respondence  of  the  time  as  the  Treaty  of  Washington. 

277 


278  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

1822  made  it  necessary  to  reckon  henceforth  with 
Mexico  in  any  matter  concerning  the  southwestern 
boundary.  In  the  meantime  much  had  been  said  con 
cerning  the  treaty  and  the  claim  to  Texas  which  many 
asserted  the  United  States  had  acquired  in  purchasing 
Louisiana  from  France.  There  was  a  strong  disposi 
tion  on  the  part  of  many  people,  some  having  consid 
erable  influence  with  the  government,  to  take  advan 
tage  of  the  change  of  sovereignty  to  regain  the  terri 
tory  which  they  insisted  had  thus  been  bartered  away.2 
This  sentiment  in  the  United  States  was  strengthened 
by  a  statement  of  Onis,  the  Spanish  negotiator  of  the 
treaty,  to  the  effect  that  "it  is  improperly  called  a 
treaty  of  cession,  as  it  is  in  reality  one  of  exchange 
or  permutation  of  one  small  province  for  another  of 
double  the  extent,  richer  and  more  fertile."3 

The  language  of  Onis  also  strengthened  the  sus 
picious  fears  of  the  Mexican  government  concerning 
the  intentions  of  the  United  States.  Elsewhere  he 

2  The  discussion  of  the  basis  for,  the  character  of,  and  the 
justice  of  this  claim  is  not  in  place  here.     See  Rives,  United 
States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  1-26;  Smith,  Annexation  of 
Texas,  5-8;  Babcock,  Rise  of  American  Nationality,  285-289; 
Cox,    "Louisiana-Texas    Frontier,"   Texas   Historical    Quar 
terly,  X,  1-75,  XVII,  140-187;  and  Bancroft,  North  Mexican 
States  and  Texas,  II,  46 ;  and  footnotes  in  each. 

For  the  discussion  by  President  Monroe's  cabinet  of  the 
question  whether  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  for  marking  out 
the  boundary  line  should  be  carried  out  in  conjunction  with 
the  commission  to  be  appointed  by  Spain,  or  whether  Mexico 
should  be  consulted,  see  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  493. 

3  Onis,     Memoir,     146.     Onis,     Memoria,    was    printed    in 
Madrid  in  1820,  and  this  translation  was  printed  in  Baltimore 
in  the  following  year. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  2/Q 

says,  "  The  Americans  at  present  think  themselves  su 
perior  to  all  the  nations  of  Europe;  and  believe  that 
their  dominion  is  destined  to  extend  now  to  the  Isth 
mus  of  Panama  and  hereafter  over  all  the  regions  of 
the  new  world.  Their  government  entertains  the  same 
ideas,  and  the  whole  course  of  its  policy  calculates 
upon  the  illusions  of  these  flattering  expectations."* 
The  ephemeral  republic  proclaimed  by  Long  in  1819 
and  the  colonization  enterprises  of  the  Austins  and 
others  in  the  following  years  confirmed  the  suspicions 
of  the  Mexicans.  Less  than  a  month  after  Minister 
Zozaya  had  landed  at  Baltimore,  less  than  two  weeks 
after  his  formal  reception  at  Washington,  and  only 
two  days  after  the  banquet  which  President  Monroe 
gave  in  his  honor,  he  wrote  his  government  on  De 
cember  26,  1822,  that  he  had  discovered  ambitious 
views  with  reference  to  the  province  of  Texas.  In 
the  national  Congress  and  in  the  state  legislatures,  he 
said,  there  was  talk  of  enlarging  the  army  and  militia, 
which  movement  he  believed  had  no  other  object  than 
that  arising  out  of  their  ambition  for  Texas.  He  de 
clared  :  "  In  time  they  will  be  our  sworn  enemies,  and 
foreseeing  this  we  ought  to  treat  them  as  such  from 
the  present  day."5  In  August,  1823,  Torrens,  the 
Mexican  charge,  wrote  his  government  that  he  fre- 

4Onis,  Memoir,  23. 

5  Nota  del  Ministro  Zozaya,  26  de  diciembre  de  1822,  La 
Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  103.  He  virtually  repeats  the  lan 
guage  of  Onis  when  he  says :  "  La  soberbia  de  estos  repub- 
licanos  no  les  permite  vernos  como  iguales  sino  como  infe- 
riores;  su  evanecimienta  se  extiende  en  mi  juicio  a  creer  que 
su  capital  lo  sera  de  todos  las  Americas." 


28O  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

quently  noticed  the  public  papers  enlarging  on  the 
fine  location  and  fertility  of  the  territory  of  Texas 
and  reminding  the  government  that  it  ought  not  to 
have  lost  the  opportunity  to  obtain  this  rich  province 
from  Spain;  and  one  of  the  objections  which  the  ene 
mies  of  the  secretary  of  state  were  urging  against  his 
candidacy  for  the  presidency  was  that  he  had  ceded  the 
province  to  the  Spaniards.  In  the  same  letter  Torrens 
advised  his  government  not  to  permit  the  American 
population  to  become  preponderant  in  Texas.6  Mex 
ican  authorities  in  Texas  were  at  the  same  time  send 
ing  alarming  reports  of  the  activities  of  United  States 
military  establishments  near  the  border.  As  a  result 
of  these  the  imperial  government  had  sent  a  secret  emis- 

6  Nota  del  .  .  .  Torrens,  21  de  agosto  de  1823,  La  Diplo- 
macia  Mexicana,  II,  22.  Ibid.,  50-53,  under  date  22  de  no- 
viembre  de  1823,  Torrens  writes  at  length  concerning  pro 
posed  Anglo-American  colonies  in  Texas,  saying  among  other 
things,  "mi  opinion  es,  que  intentando  algunos  agentes  de 
Nuevo  Orleans  hacer  establicimientos  de  anglo-americanos  en 
Texas,  con  el  mismo  objeto  que  lo  habian  hecho  en  Baton 
Rouge,  de  adquirir  una  influencia  y  maioria  en  la  poblacion  y 
hacerlos  declarar  que  querian  unirse  a  los  Estados  Unidos, 
promovieron  expediciones  al  principio  como  auxiliares  de  los 
independientes  a  quienes  dieron  las  instrucciones  que  descubrio 
Mercado ;  y  despues  que  vieron  que  Mexico  estaba  casi  pacifico, 
se  propusieron  adular  a  los  realistas  diciendo  que  iban  a 
ayudar  a  exterminar  la  canalla  de  insurgentes,  creyendo  llevar 
al  cabo  de  este  modo  su  primer  projecto.  For  tanto,  me 
parece  peligroso  permitirles  establecerse  en  gran  numero  y 
formando  pueblos  separados,  porque  esto  vendria  a  ser  el 
origen  de  disensiones  con  los  Estados  Unidos."  He  asks  for 
instructions  concerning  the  course  he  should  pursue  regard 
ing  limits.  He  had  not  received  anything  on  that  subject  since 
the  change  in  the  government. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  28 1 

sary  into  Texas  in  the  latter  part  of  1822  to  ascertain 
the  true  intentions  of  the  United  States.7 

On  October  i,  1823,  Alaman,  who  was  secretary 
for  foreign  affairs  of  the  provisional  government 
which  had  taken  control  after  the  fall  of  Iturbide  in 
the  spring,  instructed  Torrens  to  use  all  his  skill  and 
energy  to  have  the  boundary  which  had  been  estab 
lished  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  confirmed 
and  marked  out.8  When  Torrens  received  this  in 
struction  he  asked  an  interview  with  Adams  before 
delivering  any  note  on  the  subject  to  learn  in  advance 
whether  there  would  be  any  difficulty  in  carrying  it 
out.  On  January  26,  1824,  he  wrote  that  he  had  dis 
covered  some  difficulties.  The  time  provided  in  the 
treaty  for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  by  both 
governments  to  mark  the  boundary  had  expired. 
Then  a  proclamation  of  the  king  of  Spain  had  de 
clared  null  and  void  everything  that  had  been  enacted 
by  the  constitutional  government  which  had  ratified 
the  treaty.  He  proposed  to  wait  fifteen  or  twenty 
days  before  he  handed  the  government  a  note  asking 
its  intentions.  According  to  that  explanation  he  would 
word  his  reply;  but  he  would  insist  that  the  attitude 
of  Spain  had  nothing  now  to  do  with  the  matter,  and 

7  Bugbee,  "Texas  Frontier,  1820-1825,"  114   (reprint  from 
Publications    of    the    Southern    History    Association).    As 
evidence  he  cites  letters  in  the  Bexar  Archives. 

8  Alaman  to  Torrens,  i  de  octubre  de  1823,  La  Diplomacia 
Mexicana,  II,  33.    Alaman's  memorial  to  Congress,  November 
i,  1823,  in  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  X,  1072;  and 
Poinsett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  311.     He  says  the  charge  has  been 
instructed  to  secure  the  confirmation  of  this  line. 


282  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

that  Mexico  and  the  United  States  should  proceed  to 
carry  out  the  treaty,  naming  their  commissioners  to 
mark  the  boundary,  if  not  by  virtue  of  the  fourth  ar 
ticle  of  the  Spanish  treaty,  then  by  a  new  convention. 
He  was  sure  the  government  would  attempt  to  gain 
some  advantage  by  this  new  pretext,  and  would  not 
be  surprised  if  the  troops  on  the  frontier  should  be  or 
dered  to  advance  into  Mexican  territory,  so  unlimited 
was  their  ambition  for  Texas.  General  Jackson,  to 
whom  he  had  been  introduced,  had  declared  in  his 
presence  that  the  government  ought  never  to  have  lost 
the  opportunity  to  obtain  it.  In  the  same  conversation 
Jackson  had  said  the  way  to  obtain  a  territory  was  to 
occupy  it  and  after  having  possession  treat  for  it,  as 
had  been  done  in  Florida.  It  would  not  be  strange, 
Torrens  said,  if  the  coming  election  should  result  in 
his  elevation  to  the  presidency,  in  which  case  he  would 
be  sure  to  employ  this  method.9 

The  note  which  Torrens  presented  February  15, 
1824,  declared  that  the  supreme  executive  power  of 
Mexico,  wishing  to  remove  all  matters  that  might  af 
fect  the  good  understanding  which  it  desired  to  main 
tain  with  the  United  States,  had  instructed  him  to 
ask  "that  the  limits  between  the  two  countries  be 
fixed  according  to  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  of 
Washington  of  the  22d  of  February,  1819,  ...  I 
have  therefore  the  honor  to  transmit  the  present  com 
munication  to  your  Excellency  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  is  disposed 

9  Nota  del  ...  Torrens,  26  de  enero  de  1824,  La  Diplo- 
macia  Mexicana,  II,  73. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  283 

to  acknowledge  the  said  article,  and  will  accordingly 
appoint  the  commissioners  aforesaid ;  requesting  at 
the  same  time  that  your  Excellency  may  be  pleased  to 
inform  me  as  early  as  convenient  of  the  intention  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States  on  the  subject."10 
A  little  more  than  a  month  after  presenting  this  note 
Torrens  wrote  his  government  that  he  had  received 
no  reply.11  Five  months  after  its  presentation  he 
wrote  that  he  had  asked  an  interview  with  the  secre 
tary  of  state  to  learn  why  no  reply  had  been  sent.12 
But  still  no  reply  came.  On  April  15,  1824,  the  po 
litical  chief  of  the  Department  of  Texas  had  written 
the  government  at  Mexico  that  he  was  certain  "the 
United  States  was  '  trying  to  annul  or  at  least  has  the 
idea  of  annuling'  the  treaty  of  1819,  and  he  believed 
the  American  government  would  then  assert  its  claim 
to  the  banks  of  the  Rio  Grande."  Similar  alarming 
reports  from  the  same  source  followed.  From  various 
officials  in  Texas  many  letters  were  sent  warning  the 
government  against  the  danger  of  permitting  Anglo- 
American  colonists  to  come  in  such  large  numbers  into 
that  territory.13 

10  Torrens  to  Adams,  February  15,  1824,  House  Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  6;  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  828. 

11  Torrens  to  Secretario,  23  de  marzo  de  1824,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

12  Torrens  to  Secretario,  14  de  julio  de  1824,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

13Bugbee,  "Texas  Frontier,  1820-1825,"  115,  citing  Bexar 
Archives.  A  letter  of  September  19,  1824,  from  the  political 
chief  of  Bexar  said:  "The  Anglo-American  government 
counts  this  province  as  its  own  and  includes  it  on  its  maps, 


284  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

When  in  the  middle  of  1824  Obregon  was  appointed 
minister  to  Washington  his  secret  instructions,  dated 
August  30,  told  him  the  reports  of  Torrens  indicated 
that  the  United  States  had  intentions  on  Mexican  ter 
ritories  in  the  Calif ornias,  New  Mexico,  and  Texas; 
and  with  reference  to  the  last  those  intentions  were 
general  and  public.  Obregon  was  told  to  pay  par 
ticular  attention  to  this  matter.  At  this  time  the  Mex 
ican  government  seems  to  have  been  uncertain  whether 
this  was  or  was  not  an  opportune  time  to  press  the 
negotiation  for  a  treaty  of  limits.  In  the  original 
draft  of  these  secret  instructions  in  the  archives  of 
the  foreign  office  in  Mexico,  there  was  inserted  and 
then  erased  a  paragraph  saying  he  was  not  to  begin 
the  negotiation  for  the  treaty  of  limits  till  circum 
stances  were  more  favorable;  but  if  necessity  should 
arise  to  say  anything  about  the  matter  he  was  to  claim 
the  limits  of  the  treaty  of  1819.  Immediately  fol 
lowing  this  erased  paragraph  is  one  which  completely 
reversed  it.  In  that  he  is  told  that  the  principal  object 
of  his  mission  is  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  limits 
as  early  as  possible  and  in  the  most  advantageous 
terms.  He  was  to  use  his  best  efforts  to  secure  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  treaty  concluded  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain.  If  before  such  negotiation 
should  be  completed  the  United  States  or  its  citizens 
should  attempt  the  occupation  of  any  territory  be 
longing  to  Mexico  under  that  treaty  he  should  formu 
late  claims  on  it  as  a  basis.  He  was  told  that  great 

tracing  its  boundaries  from  the  sources  of  the  Rio  Grande  to 
its  mouth  on  the  coast  of  Tamaulipas." 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  285 

circumspection  was  necessary  in  reference  to  all  who 
came  from  the  United  States  since  there  was  danger 
of  the  introduction  of  spies  or  of  invaders  in  disguise. 
In  carrying  out  his  general  instructions  regarding  the 
admission  of  colonists  he  was  to  bear  in  mind  these 
secret  instructions.  All  reports  on  these  matters  were 
to  be  in  cipher.14 

Obregon's  general  instructions  bearing  the  same 
date  as  his  secret  instructions  told  him  that  coloniza 
tion  was  one  of  the  most  important  matters  then  oc 
cupying  the  attention  of  the  government.  He  was 
asked  to  call  attention  to  the  general  law  of  August 
1 8,  1824,  on  the  subject  and  to  publish  its  regulations 
in  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States.  All  colonists 
from  the  United  States,  he  was  reminded,  must  bear 
passports  and  recommendations  from  Mexican  diplo 
matic  or  consular  agents  in  the  United  States.  It  was 
necessary  to  know  the  place  of  origin,  the  means  of 
support,  and  the  character  of  all  colonists  or  em- 
presarios.  Those  under  suspicion,  vicious  adven- 

14  Instrucciones  mui  Reservadas,  30  de  agosto  de  1824,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection  that  Mexicans 
thought  of  asserting  a  claim  to  the  Oregon  country.  Torrens 
wrote  that  the  settlement  of  that  country  was  being  consid 
ered  in  the  United  States  Congress,  where  it  was  being  urged 
that  to  leave  this  territory  occupied  by  Indians  with  England 
on  one  side  and  Mexico  on  the  other  to  intrigue  with  the  In 
dians  was  dangerous  to  the  United  States  and  could  do  more 
harm  than  all  Europe.  Torrens  added  that  he  thought  it 
would  be  dangerous  to  Mexico  to  permit  the  United  States 
to  occupy  it.  Torrens  to  Secretario,  5  de  mayo  de  1824,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 


286  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

turers,  or  vagabonds  were  to  be  excluded.  But  in 
dustrious  persons,  especially  artisans,  shipbuilders,  and 
fishermen,  were  to  be  encouraged  and  given  lands.15 

Before  the  time  of  Poinsett's  appointment  as  min 
ister  from  the  United  States  to  Mexico  in  March, 
1825,  no  reply  had  been  made  to  Torrens's  note  of  more 
than  a  year  earlier  and  no  negotiation  had  been  under 
taken  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary.  With  the 
new  minister,  Obregon,  no  communication  had  passed 
on  the  subject.  In  the  instructions  which  were  given 
to  Poinsett  on  March  26,  1825,  by  Clay,  the  secretary 
of  state  under  the  new  Adams  administration,  the 
third  article  of  the  treaty  of  1819  with  Spain  was 
quoted  describing  the  boundary  line,  and  the  fourth 
article  providing  for  its  demarcation  was  mentioned. 
He  was  told  that  the  treaty  had  not  yet  been  carried 
into  execution,  but  that  "  having  been  concluded  when 
Mexico  composed  a  part  of  the  dominions  of  Spain 

15  Instrucciones,  30  de  agosto  de  1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exte- 
riores.  For  the  text  of  the  colonization  law  see  Mexico, 
Leyes,  Decretos  y  Ordenes  que  forman  el  Derecho  Interna 
tional,  125.  For  a  discussion  of  the  law,  see  any  Texas  his 
tory. 

On  March  23,  1824,  Torrens  had  reported  to  his  government 
that  the  Swiss  consul  at  Washington  had  asked  him  if  there 
would  be  any  objection  to  receiving  colonists  from  Switzer 
land;  and  he  had  replied  that  he  thought  they  would  be  re 
ceived  since  they  were  an  industrious  people  and  could  not 
be  enemies  to  liberal  institutions.  Torrens  to  Secretario,  23 
de  marzo  de  1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.  On  July  10  the 
government  at  Mexico  approved  this  act  of  Torrens  and 
authorized  him  to  assure  the  Swiss  consul  that  Catholics  from 
his  country  would  find  a  favorable  reception.  Secretario  to 
Torrens,  10  de  julio  de  1824,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  287 

[it]  is  obligatory  upon  both  the  United  States  and 
Mexico."  Torrens's  note  of  February  15  of  the  pre 
ceding  year  is  cited  as  indicating  the  willingness  of 
Mexico  to  accede  to  that  treaty.  But  Clay  continued : 
"  Some  difficulties  may  possibly  hereafter  arise  be 
tween  the  two  countries  from  the  line  thus  agreed 
upon,  against  which  it  would  be  desirable  now  to 
guard,  if  practicable;  and  as  the  government  of  Mex 
ico  may  be  supposed  not  to  have  any  disinclination  to 
the  fixation  of  a  new  line  which  would  prevent  those 
difficulties,  the  President  wishes  you  to  sound  it  on 
that  subject ;  and  to  avail  yourself  of  a  favorable  dis 
position,  if  you  should  find  it,  to  effect  that  object. 
The  line  of  the  Sabine  approaches  our  great  western 
mart  nearer  than  could  be  wished.  Perhaps  the  Mex 
ican  government  may  not  be  unwilling  to  establish 
that  of  the  Rio  Brasses  de  Dios,  or  the  Rio  Colorado, 
or  the  Snow  Mountains,  or  the  Rio  del  Norte  in  lieu 
of  it/"- By  the  agreed  line,  portions  of  both  the  Red 
River  and  branches  of  the  Arkansas  are  thrown  on  the 
Mexican  side,  and  the  navigation  of  both  of  these 
rivers,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Sabine,  is  made  common 
to  the  respective  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries. 
When  the  countries  adjacent  to  those  waters  shall  be 
come  thickly  inhabited,  collisions  and  misunderstand 
ings  may  arise  from  the  community  thus  established, 
in  the  use  of  their  navigation,  which  it  would  be  well 
now  to  prevent."  As  an  additional  motive  to  induce 
Mexico  to  consent  to  such  an  alteration  Clay  suggested 
that  it  would  place  the  capital  of  Mexico  nearer  the 


288  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

center  of  the  Mexican  territories,  and,  further,  that 
the  troublesome  Comanche  Indians  would  be  left  to 
the  United  States.  These  arguments,  if  ever  pre 
sented,  were  probably  about  as  convincing  as  it  would 
be  for  a  large  land  owner  to  say  to  a  neighboring  small 
farmer,  "Your  house  is  not  in  the  middle  of  your 
fields.  Give  me  forty  acres  next  to  my  line  and  you 
will  not  have  to  go  so  far  to  work.  Besides,  this  field 
contains  an  ugly  patch  of  thistles  which  my  superior 
industry  and  intelligence  will  enable  me  to  cope  with 
more  successfully  than  you  can."  Clay  showed  that 
he  was  not  prepared  to  insist  on  a  change  of  the  line 
or  to  urge  the  matter  unduly  by  saying,  in  conclud 
ing  his  instructions  with  reference  to  the  boundary : 
"  But  if  you  should  find  that  the  Mexican  government 
is  unwilling  to  alter  the  agreed  line  in  the  manner 
proposed  and  that  it  insists  upon  the  execution  of  the 
third  and  fourth  articles  of  the  treaty  before  men 
tioned,  you  are  authorized  to  agree  to  the  recognition 
and  establishment  of  the  line  as  described  in  the  third 
article,  and  to  the  demarcation  of  it  forthwith,  as  is 
stipulated  in  the  fourth."16 

16  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  26,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  225.  Extracts  are  printed  in  House 
Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42, 
page  5;  and  in  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  829. 
For  brief  discussions  of  Poinsett's  instructions  concerning 
Texas,  see  Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  166 ; 
Reeves,  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk,  61 ;  Garrison,  Texas, 
170;  Bancroft,  North  Mexican  States  and  Texas,  II,  88;  Mc- 
Master,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  V,  460 ;  Von 
Hoist,  Constitutional  and  Political  History  of  the  United 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  289 

(  Before  Poinsett  had  opportunity  to  open  negotia 
tions  respecting  the  boundary,  in  fact  only  two  days 
after  his  formal  reception  by  the  President  of  Mex 
ico,  that  official  received  an  interesting  sidelight  on 
Poinsett's  personal  views  with  reference  to  the  most 
desirable  location  of  the  boundary  line.  On  June  3, 
1825,  a  man  named  Azcarate  who  had  been  an  official 
close  to  Iturbide  wrote  a  letter  to  President  Victoria 
saying  that  when  Poinsett  arrived  at  the  coast  of  Mex 
ico  in  1822  he  was  received  by  General  Santa  Anna  as 
an  official  envoy,  and  when  he  reached  the  capital  he 
was  supposed  by  all  to  have  this  character  and  was 
so  presented  to  the  emperor.  After  the  presentation 
Poinsett  had  told  the  writer  that  he  desired  an  inter 
view  to  speak  of  an  interesting  matter.  At  the  time 
appointed  the  writer  met  him,  expecting  the  communi 
cation  to  be  official.  With  a  map  before  him  Poinsett 
pointed  out  the  line  of  1819  but  said  he  thought  it 
was  not  a  desirable  one,  and  then  traced  a  line  which 
showed  that  he  desired  to  absorb  all  Texas,  New  Mex 
ico,  and  Upper  California,  and  parts  of  Lower  Cali 
fornia,  Sonora,  Coahuila,  and  Nueva  Leon.  Repress 
ing  his  anger  Azcarate  replied  that  by  virtue  of  the 
treaty  of  Iguala  [Cordoba?]  the  Mexican  government 
would  always  respect  the  Onis  treaty  and  would  never 
cede  a  handbreadth  of  territory.  An  appointment 
was  made  to  continue  the  interview  the  next  day. 

States,  1828-1846,  553 ;  Falconer,  Discovery  of  the  Mississippi, 
48;  Kennedy,  Texas,  I,  370;  Adams,  "Texas  Speech"  in 
House  of  Representatives,  1838,  106. 

20 


290  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

In  the  meantime  Azcarate  saw  Iturbide,  explained 
the  matter,  and  received  authority  to  use  his  judgment 
in  finding  definitely  the  character  of  the  proposals 
that  Poinsett  had  to  make.  Before  entering  on  the 
discussion  at  the  second  meeting  Azcarate  presented 
his  credentials  and  asked  for  Poinsett's.  The  latter 
thereupon  declared  that  he  came  in  no  public  character 
but  merely  as  a  traveler,  and  was  only  expressing  his 
own  personal  opinion.  Although  it  was  evident  that 
the  discussion  could  be  only  an  academic  one,  never 
theless  the  interview  was  continued  and  Azcarate  was 
able,  he  said,  to  perceive  five  purposes  which  Poinsett 
had  in  mind:  namely,  to  get  possession  of  rich  min 
eral  lands;  to  gain  ports  on  both  seas  for  controlling 
the  commerce  between  them;  to  get  control  of  the 
fur  trade  with  the  Indians ;  to  get  control  of  the  fish 
eries  in  the  Calif ornias ;  and  to  monopolize  the  coast 
ing  trade  on  both  seas.  Azcarate  concluded  his  obser 
vations  by  saying  that  in  his  conception  the  establish 
ment  of  limits  was  to  be  the  apple  of  discord  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico.  His  desire  for  the 
happiness  of  the  fatherland  was  his  motive,  he  told 
Victoria,  for  making  this  communication.  He  said  it 
was  possible  that  slight  errors  might  have  crept  into 
this  account  of  the  interview,  but  it  was  substantially 
true  and  could  be  verified  from  a  report  in  the  office 
of  foreign  relations  which  he  delivered  to  Iturbide  at 
the  time  without  preserving  a  copy.17 

17  Azcarate  to  Victoria,  3  de  junio  de  1825,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores.  Azcarate  was  appointed  minister  to  England  in 
1822  by  the  imperial  government,  but  did  not  go.  See  Boca-  \ 

i 


TEXAS   AND   THE    BOUNDARY   ISSUE  29 1 

On  July  12,  1825,  about  six  weeks  after  Poinsett's 
reception,  occurred  his  first  conference  with  Alaman, 
the  Mexican  minister  for  foreign  relations,  concerning  V 
the  boundary.  In  it  he  had  "  suggested  that,  although 
the  government  of  the  United  States  held  itself  bound 
to  carry  into  effect  the  treaty  of  limits  concluded  with 
the  king  of  Spain  the  22d  of  February,  1819,  still  it 
would  appear  more  becoming  the  independent  char 
acter  of  this  government  to  lay  aside  that  treaty  alto 
gether,  and  to  endeavor  to  establish  a  boundary  which 
would  be  more  easily  defined,  and  which  might  be 
mutually  more  advantageous.  The  secretary  expressed 
himself  much  gratified  by  such  a  suggestion,  and  pro 
posed  that  the  two  governments  should  forthwith  ap 
point  commissioners  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  the 
country  bordering  on  the  line  formerly  settled  with 
Spain,  so  as  to  obtain  such  information  in  regard  to 
that  portion  of  our  respective  territories  as  would  en 
able  us  to  act  understandingly  on  the  subject."  Poin- 
sett  objected  that  such  a  commission  would  delay  the 
negotiation  at  least  two  years  since  it  would  take  nearly 
a  year  to  arrange  for  the  commission  and  another 
year  to  do  its  work  and  make  a  report.  Alaman  re 
plied  that  his  government  would  be  very  unwilling 

negra,  Memorias,  I,  76.  Poinsett  tells  of  his  presentation  to 
Iturbide  on  November  3,  1822,  but  of  course  says  nothing  of 
this  conversation  with  Azcarate.  In  his  description  of  the 
emperor  Poinsett  shows  his  antipathy  to  monarchy  in  general 
and  to  the  imperial  system  of  Iturbide  in  particular.  Poin 
sett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  67-69. 


2Q2  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

to  fix  the  limits  on  the  very  slender  information  which 
it  then  possessed.18 

On  the  matter  of  the  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
proposed  commission  to  examine  the  country  near  the 
border  an  exchange  of  formal  notes  occurred  a  few 
days  later  in  which  each  gave  at  length  his  reasons  for 
the  position  he  had  taken.  Poinsett  referred  the  mat 
ter  to  his  government.19  As  Poinsett  anticipated,  the 
government  at  Washington  refused  to  accede  to  the 
proposal  for  a  joint  commission  since  such  was  con 
sidered  unnecessary  and  would  be  reversing  the  usual 
procedure,  which  was  to  decide  on  the  principle  and 
then  send  the  joint  commission  to  mark  the  line  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  agreement.  If  examination  were 
needful  before  deciding  on  the  line  it  would  be  better 
for  each  government  to  send  a  separate  commission. 
The  United  States  had  no  objection  to  Mexico's  do 
ing  so  if  that  government  desired ;  but  hoped  no  un 
necessary  time  would  be  lost  in  resuming  the  nego 
tiation.20 

18  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  18,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches    from   Mexico,   I;    extracts   in   House   Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  19;  arid 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  831. 

19  Alaman  to  Poinsett,  July  20, 1825,  and  Poinsett  to  Alaman, 
July  27,   1825,   MS.,  Department  of   State,   Despatches   from 
Mexico,  I;  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  ses 
sion,  number  42,  page  20;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XXVI,  831. 

20  Clay  to  Poinsett,  September  24,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  X,  835 ;  extracts  in  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  VI,  581 ;  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress, 
i  session,  number  42,  page  7;  and  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XXVI,  836. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  293 

In  reporting  to  Clay  on  July  27  what  had  passed 
between  himself  and  Alaman  on  the  subject,  Poinsett 
said :  •'  I  find  that  there  exists  great  apprehension  in 
the  minds  of  the  people  of  this  country  that  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  contemplate  renewing 
their  claim  to  the  territory  north  of  the  Rio  Bravo  del 
Norte ;  and  it  may  be  of  some  importance  to  consider 
their  great  sensibility  on  this  subject.^  He  added  in 
cipher :  "  It  appears  to  me  that  it  will  be  important  to 
gain  time  if  we  wish  to  extend  our  territory  beyond 
the  boundary  agreed  upon  by  the  treaty  of  1819. 
Most  of  the  good  land  from  the  Colorado  to  the  Sabine 
has  been  granted  by  the  State  of  Texas  and  is  rapidly 
peopling  with  either  grantees  or  squatters  from  the 
United  States,  a  population  they  will  find  difficult  to 
govern,  and  perhaps  after  a  short  period  they  may 
not  be  so  averse  to  part  with  that  portion  of  their  ter 
ritory  as  they  are  at  present."21  A  little  more  than  a 
week  after  sending  this  first  report  on  limits  Poinsett 
again  wrote  in  cipher :  ("  I  feel  very  anxious  about  the 
boundary  line  between  the  two  nations.  While  it  will 
be  politic  not  to  justify  their  jealous  fears  on  that  sub 
ject  by  extravagant  pretensions,  I  think  it  of  the 
[greatest]  importance  that  we  should  extend  our  ter 
ritory  toward  the  Rio  del  Norte  either  to  the  Colorado 

21  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  27,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  I;  extract  not  including  the  cipher 
portion  in  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session, 
number  42,  page  20;  and  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XXVI,  833.  The  cipher  portion  is  quoted  in  Reeves,  Diplo 
macy  under  Tyler  and  Polk,  62;  and  in  Rives,  United  States 
and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  168. 


294  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

or  at  least  to  the  Brazos.  We  ought  to  have  on  the 
frontier  a  hardy  race  of  white  settlers,  which  the 
climate  of  that  region  of  country  situated  between 
the  Mississippi  and  the  Sabine  will  not  admit  of."22 
Five  days  later  another  despatch  to  Clay,  mostly  in 
cipher,  told  of  Alaman's  declaring,  in  what  was  sup 
posed  to  be  a  secret  session  of  the  Congress,  that  the 
United  States  ought  to  be  regarded  as  enemies  rather 
than  as  friends,  because :  \"  Mexico  had  everything  to 
fear  from  our  ambitions  and  nothing  to  hope  from 
our  friendship.  He  cited  the  treaty  of  limits  with 
Spain  as  an  instance  of  our  disposition  to  encroach 
upon  her  territory.  There  are  a  few  members  of 
both  houses  disposed  to  view  the  treaty  of  1819  in  the 
same  light,  and  it  is  possible  if  the  question  be  left 
open  and  the  discussion  renewed  this  government  may 
revive  the  absurd  pretensions  of  Cevallos  with  regard 
to  the  western  boundary  of  Louisiana.  I  am  thus 
particular  because  I  think  it  advisable  that  the  Pres 
ident  should  be  possessed  of  every  circumstance  that 
can  aid  him  to  come  to  a  correct  decision  upon  this 
subject."23 

Poinsett's  suspicions  that  the  Mexican  officials  were 
going  to  try  to  push  the  line  further  east  instead  of 
permitting  the  United  States  to  push  it  west  proved 
to  be  well  founded.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that 

22  Poinsett  to  Clay,   August  5,   1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,   Despatches  from  Mexico,  I.     See  Reeves,  Diplomacy 
under  Tyler  and  Polk,  63. 

23  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  10,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


TEXAS   AND   THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE  295 

this  determination  on  the  part  of  Mexican  officials  to 
recover  territory  which  Spain  had  ceded  to  the  United 
States  manifested  itself  almost  immediately  after  re 
ceiving  from  the  governor  of  Chihuahua  the  long,  in 
teresting,  and  enthusiastic  report  on  the  extent,  the 
fertility,  and  the  importance  of  the  country  drained  by 
the  Missouri  and  Arkansas  rivers,  reviewed  above  in 
the  chapter  on  Diplomacy  Concerning  the  Santa  Fe 
Trail. 

In  an  interview  respecting  the  boundary  on  Sep 
tember  20,  1825,  Alaman  asked  Poinsett  to  trace  on  a 
map  the  boundary  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  as  defined  by  the  treaty  of  1795.  Poinsett  did 
so  and  then  asked  why  the  Mexican  negotiator  had 
wished  it  done.  The  latter  replied  that  he  thought  it 
advisable  to  specify  the  ancient  boundary  in  the  com 
mercial  treaty  they  were  about  concluding  and  leave  it 
so  until  the  new  line  should  be  agreed  on  in  the  new 
treaty  of  limits  to  be  concluded.  Poinsett  then  de 
clared  to  Alaman  that  before  1819  the  United  States 
had  claimed  to  the  Rio  Bravo  del  Norte  and  Spain 
had  claimed  to  the  Mississippi.  He  also  asserted  that 
the  treaty  of  that  year  with  Spain  was  binding  on  the 
Mexican  States,  having  been  concluded  before  their 
emancipation  from  Spain  and  since  acknowledged  by 
their  accredited  agent  in  the  United  States.  It  was 
only  motives  of  delicacy  toward  Mexico  that  had  pre 
vented  the  United  States  from  carrying  that  treaty 
into  full  effect.  It  was  the  same  motive  that  had 
caused  him  to  propose  the  conclusion  of  an  entirely 


296  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

new  treaty.  But  he  would  not  yield  one  square  inch 
of  land  which  had  been  included  within  the  limits  of 
the  United  States  according  to  that  treaty.  In  his 
opinion  a  more  advantageous  line  might  be  drawn; 
but  such  was  not  to  be  sought  for  east  of  the  Sabine 
or  north  of  the  Red  river  or  the  Arkansas.  Finally 
Poinsett  asserted  that  he  would  not  consent  to  the  in 
sertion  of  any  such  article  in  the  commercial  treaty 
without  at  the  same  time  renewing  in  it  the  claim  of 
the  United  States  to  all  of  the  country  north  and  east 
of  the  Rio  Bravo  del  Norte.24 

In  October,  1825,  the  radical  change  occurred  in  the 
Mexican  ministry  which  displaced  partisans  of  the 
centralist  faction  and  replaced  them  with  federalists 
favorable  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States.  It  was 
thought  that  Poinsett  had  been  largely  instrumental 
in  bringing  about  the  change  and  it  was  suspected  that 
he  was  using  his  influence  to  secure  a  treaty  of  limits 
through  his  friends  which  would  extend  the  borders 
of  his  country  at  the  expense  of  Mexico.  But  if  he 
was  trying  to  do  so,  as  he  probably  was  not,  he  was 
unsuccessful.  One  of  the  new  ministry  writing  to 
another  on  November  7,  1825,  reminded  him  of  the 
"memorable  words  of  the  laws  of  the  Indies,  which 
say,  '  We  promise  and  give  our  honor  and  royal  word 

24  Poinsett  to  Clay,  September  20,  1825,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I;  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  23 ;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  835. 

It  was  on  August  5  that  the  government  received  the  report 
from  the  governor  of  Chihuahua.  See  footnote  16  of  the 
chapter  on  Diplomacy  Concerning  the  Santa  Fe  Trail. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

for  us  and  our  successors,  that  never  shall  be  alienated 
or  separated  in  whole  or  in  part,  either  its  cities  (of 
America)  or  inhabitants,  for  any  cause  or  reason,  or 
in  favor  of  any  person  whatever.  And  if  we  or  our 
successors  should  make  any  donation  or  alienation  con 
trary  to  the  aforesaid,  it  is  null  and  such  we  declare 
it.' "  According  to  this  the  whole  Florida  treaty  was 
null.  But  in  this  minister's  conception  there  was  an 
other  reason  why  Mexico  was  at  liberty  to  ignore  the 
Florida  treaty  if  desirous  of  doing  so.  He  declared 
that  the  treaty,  though  approved  by  the  Spanish  cortes, 
did  not  have  the  "  consent  of  the  Mexican  delegation, 
which  refused  to  sign  it."25 

/  Thus  within  a  few  months  after  the  negotiations 
had  begun  each  government  discovered  that  the  other, 
while  claiming  to  be  willing  to  ratify  and  abide  by  the 
treaty  of  1819,  was  really  wishing  to  secure  the  ex 
treme  limits  claimed  by  the  United  States  on  the  one 
side  and  by  Spain  on  the  other  before  that  treaty  was 
concluded.  Each  had  also  discovered  that  the  other 
was  determined  not  to  give  up  anything  which  that 
treaty  secured  to  it.  But  each  hoped  something  would 
happen  to  break  down  the  determination  of  the  other. 
Having  thus  found  it  impossible  to  come  to  any  under 
standing  for  the  time  regarding  the  matter  of  limits, 
little  of  importance  passed  between  the  negotiators  on 
the  subject  for  more  than  a  year. 

In  the  meantime  the  influence  was  working  which 

25  Esteva  to  Llave,  November  7,  1825,  enclosure  with  Poin- 
sett  to  Clay,  January  4,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


298  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

Poinsett  had  said  would  probably  in  time  make  Mex 
ico  less  unwilling  to  part  with  Texas.  The  settle 
ment  of  the  territory  was  progressing  rapidly.  Obre- 
gon  in  Washington  reported  to  his  government  that 
these  settlements  were  Mexican  only  in  name,  belong 
ing  in  customs  and  inclinations  almost  wholly  to  the 
United  States.26  Indians  in  Texas  were  becoming 
more  and  more  troublesome  as  they  saw  their  lands 
being  so  rapidly  taken  away  from  them.  The  minis 
ter  for  war  notified  the  minister  for  foreign  relations 
that  officials  near  the  border  complained  of  the  sale 
of  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  Indians  by  citizens  of 
the  United  States.27  On  June  16,  1826,  Camacho,  the 
secretary  for  foreign  relations,  called  the  matter  to 
Poinsett's  attention,28  and  on  June  20,  Poinsett  re 
ported  the  complaint  to  Clay.29  Steps  were  taken  to 
locate  a  Mexican  consul  at  Natchitoches  in  Louisiana 
to  prevent  the  importation  of  arms  by  that  route  and 

26  Obregon  to  Secretario,  12  de  noviembre  de  1825,  MS.,  Re- 
laciones  Exteriores. 

27  Pedraza  to  Secretario,  10  de  febrero,  24  de  febrero,  and 
9  de  junio  de  1826;  and  Blanco  to  Secretario,  7  de  agosto  de 
1826;  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

28  Camacho  to  Poinsett,  20  de  junio  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores;  and  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  II. 

29  Poinsett  to  Camacho,  June  20,  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Ex 
teriores  ;  Poinsett  to  Clay,  June  20,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II.    The  last  declares  that 
hostile  tribes  in  Mexico  were  in  the  habit  of  capturing  defence 
less   Mexicans  and  carrying  them  across  the  border  where 
United  States  citizens  ransomed  them  and  held  them  till  their 
friends  in  Mexico  redeemed  them.    This  it  was  said  encour 
aged  Indian  warfare. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  2QQ 

to  enforce  the  regulations  restricting  the  admission  of 
colonists.30  In  March  Poinsett  protested  against  cer 
tain  grants  of  land  which  he  heard  had  been  made 
near  the  border  in  Texas,  saying  he  would  not  con 
sider  any  grant  as  valid  which  was  made  while  nego 
tiations  were  pending  in  case  such  grants  should  lie 
in  territory  ultimately  included  in  the  United  States.31 
When  in  June,  1826,  the  negotiations  for  the  commer 
cial  treaty  were  nearing  conclusion  the  Mexican  pleni 
potentiaries  proposed  an  additional  article  declaring 
that  the  contracting  parties  would  take  into  considera- 

so  Erasmo  Seguin  of  Bexar  was  appointed  to  the  post  in 
January,  1826;  but  in  May  he  asked  to  be  relieved  from 
serving  because  of  his  ill  health,  because  of  the  unhealthful- 
ness  of  the  climate  of  Natchitoches,  and  because  he  could  not 
take  his  numerous  family  with  him.  Credentials  and  detailed 
instructions  for  him  accompanied  his  letter  of  appointment. 
Secretario  to  Seguin,  21  de  enero  de  1826,  and  Seguin  to  Sec- 
retario,  28  de  marzo  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

Bernardo  Gutierrez,  the  commandant  of  Tamaulipas,  wrote 
in  March  urging  the  appointment  of  a  consul  for  Natchitoches 
and  recommending  a  resident  of  the  place  named  Juan  Cortes 
whom  he  had  seen  there  in  1812.  Pedraza  to  Secretario,  7 
de  marzo  de  1826,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

31  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  18,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I ;  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  24. 

Poinsett  told  of  the  effort  of  John  D.  Hunter  to  obtain  a 
grant  of  land  for  Indians  who  were  anxious  to  move  over  the 
frontier  from  the  United  States  into  Texas.  The  "govern 
ment  refused  to  give  them  a  large  tract  of  land  where  they 
might  remain  in  a  body ;  but  offered  to  settle  them  in  different 
parts  of  the  country."  Poinsett  thought  it  would  not  be  politic 
for  the  United  States  to  permit  Indians  thus  to  move  in  bodies 
across  the  border.  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  30,  1826,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  I. 


3<DO  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

tion  as  soon  as  possible  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty 
of  limits,  and  in  the  meantime  would  facilitate  in  any 
way  needed  the  work  of  the  commissions  sent  by  either 
power  to  examine  the  country  near  the  proposed  boun 
dary;  and  declaring  also  that  unauthorized  acts  or 
settlements  by  the  citizens  of  one  country  in  territory 
that  should  fall  to  the  other  should  not  constitute 
valid  claims.32  In  accepting  the  article  Poinsett  de 
clared  it  was  totally  unnecessary  because  the  United 
States  considered  the  treaty  of  1819  with  Spain  bind 
ing  and  was  ready  to  execute  it.  "The  undersigned 
was  instructed,  however,  by  his  government  to  accede 
to  the  wishes  of  Mexico,  if  it  desired  to  fix  a  new 
line,  which  might  obviate  some  difficulties  which  are 
supposed  to  attend  the  existence  of  the  present  limits 
as  agreed  upon  by  the  treaty  aforesaid.  But  he  was 
especially  instructed  not  to  insist  upon  changing  this 
line  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  but  to  agree  to  carry  all  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  of  Washington  concluded  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  Spain  into  full  effect,  so  far 
forth  as  relates  to  the  boundaries  of  the  two  coun 
tries,  if  required  to  do  so  by  the  Mexican  govern 
ment."33 

At  the  end  of  the  year  1826  an  event  occurred  in 

32  Camacho  and  Esteva  to  Poinsett,  June  19,  1826,  American 
State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  599;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Conven- 
ciones,  II,  125. 

33  Poinsett  to    Plenipotentiaries,   June  26,    1826,   American 
State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  599;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Conven- 
ciones,  II,  126.     For  the  additional  article  see  the  last,  144. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  30! 

Texas  which  partially  fulfilled  Poinsett's  prophecy 
made  a  year  and  a  half  earlier.  This  was  the  well 
known  Fredonian  revolt.  It  was  led  by  Hayden  Ed 
wards  who  had  received  from  the  Mexican  authorities 
a  large  empresario  grant  in  the  neighborhood  of  Na- 
cogdoches,  which  grant  had  subsequently  been  revoked 
because  he  had  been  unsuccessful  in  his  indiscreet 
though  well  meant  efforts  to  overcome  difficulties  that 
were  all  but  insuperable.  Blinded  with  anger  and  a 
desire  for  revenge  and  fatuously  hoping  the  people 
of  the  other  Anglo-American  colonies  would  come  to 
his  assistance,  he  and  a  few  associates  formed  a  treaty 
with  the  Cherokee  Indians,  issued  a  declaration  of  in 
dependence,  raised  a  red-and-white  flag  symbolizing 
a  union  between  the  red  and  the  white  men,  and  drew 
a  line  dividing  Texas  between  the  two  races.  Austin 
issued  a  violent  denunciation  of  the  revolt;  and  mem 
bers  of  his  and  other  colonies  joined  the  Mexican 
authorities  to  put  it  down.  The  Fredonians  unsup 
ported  and  discouraged  disbanded  with  scarcely  an 
attempt  at  resistance.34 

34  Most  writers  on  Texas  history  have  discussed  the  ques 
tions  whether  Edwards  was  justified  in  starting  the  revolt  and 
whether  Austin  was  justified  in  opposing  it.  G.  M.  Bryan,  in 
Comprehensive  History  of  Texas,  I,  506-534,  gives  a  full  and 
careful  account,  quoting  a  large  number  of  documents  from 
the  Austin  papers.  He  explains  without  unduly  condemning 
Edwards's  actions,  and  fully  justifies  Austin's.  Yoakum,  in 
the  same  volume,  114-121,  justifies  Edwards  and  mildly  accuses 
Austin.  Brown,  Texas,  I,  131-140,  is  more  sympathetic  with 
the  Fredonians  than  Bryan  but  not  so  enthusiastic  as  Yoakum. 
He  says :  "  Austin  was  justified  in  his  course  but  not  in  his 
denunciations."  Foote,  Texas  and  the  Texans,  I,  213-292, 


3O2  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

This  independence  movement,  athough  in  itself  the 
merest  fiasco,  is  of  very  great  importance  as  marking 
a  turning  point  in  the  relations  between  the  two  coun 
tries.  It  created  a  great  sensation  in  both  and  fur-  • 
nished  the  occasion  for  numerous  diplomatic  com 
munications.  Obregon  in  reporting  the  revolt  to  his 
government  said  the  Americans  established  in  Texas 
never  ceased  disturbing  the  tranquility  of  Mexico. 
They  considered  themselves  a  colony  of  their  father 
land,  and  expected  to  reunite  themselves  to  it  as  soon 
as  they  could.  They  took  their  slaves  where  the 
laws  did  not  permit  slavery,  and  in  order  to  save  their 
property  they  broke  away  from  Mexico.  In  view 
of  the  character  of  the  people  on  the  frontier  he  be 
lieved  that  the  only  way  to  maintain  peace  there  was 

gives  a  long  sympathetic  account  of  the  revolt,  quoting  many 
letters  and  enthusiastically  praising  B.  W.  Edwards,  who  was 
his  personal  friend.  He  explains  without  condemning  Austin's 
attitude.  Bancroft,  North  Mexican  States  and  Texas,  II,  98- 
no,  gives  an  impartial  account,  explaining  without  severely 
condemning  either.  Garrison,  Texas,  165,  says  that  Edwards 
would  have  found  it  difficult  to  avoid  trouble  "  even  if  he  had 
shown  the  utmost  prudence;  but  his  want  of  caution,  not  to 
say  his  improprieties,  lay  on  him  heavy  responsibility  for  the 
result.  .  .  .  The  whole  affair  was  so  confused  that  one  grows 
weary  of  seeking  to  locate  the  blame."  Barker,  in  the  Texas 
Historical  Quarterly,  XIII,  259,  says:  "Austin's  part  was  an 
important  one.  He  gave  Edwards  sage  advice  which,  if  he 
had  followed  it,  would  have  enabled  him  to  avoid  most  of  his 
trouble ;  and  in  the  end  took  the  only  possible  course  to  pre 
serve  the  confidence  of  the  government  and  the  interests  of 
the  colonists."  Miss  Rather,  in  the  same  magazine,  VIII,  112, 
explains  the  De  Witt  Colony's  opposition  to  the  Fredonians. 
A  recent  brief  account  of  the  Fredonian  revolt  is  given  by 
Miss  Howren,  in  the  same  magazine,  XVI,  382. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  303 

to  allow  no  more  American  colonizers  within  the  limits 
of  Mexico,  to  fill  the  territory  with  vigorous  and  re 
spectable  Mexican  people,  and  to  establish  a  sufficient 
military  force  there  to  protect  them.  He  was  satis 
fied  that  the  United  States  government  had  nothing  to 
do  with  the  affair ;  but  compared  this  with  similar  re 
volts  that  had  occurred  earlier  at  Baton  Rouge  and  in 
West  Florida  and  had  been  preludes  to  the  seizure  of 
territories  there.35 

On  February  16,  1827,  Obregon  had  an  interview 
with  the  secretary  of  state  on  the  matter.  Clay  had  said 
that  the  President  was  infinitely  sorry  and  wished  him 
to  convey  to  the  Mexican  government  the  friendly  sen 
timents  of  the  United  States.  Three  days  later  Clay 
addressed  to  Obregon  a  formal  note  declaring:  "In 
formation  having  reached  this  city  of  disturbances  in 
the  province  of  Texas,  adjoining  the  territory  of  the 
United  States,  which  appear  to  threaten  the  peace  of 
the  United  Mexican  States,  I  hasten  by  the  direction 
of  the  President  to  express  to  you  the  very  great  regret 
which  he  feels  on  account  of  the  existence  of  those 
disturbances.  The  frankness  which  has  ever  charac 
terized  the  government  of  the  United  States  in  all  its 
intercourse  with  foreign  powers  and  the  friendly  feel 
ings  which  it  cherishes  for  the  welfare  of  the  Republic 
of  the  United  Mexican  States  supersede  altogether 
any  necessity  for  the  assurances  which,  nevertheless,  I 

35  Obregon  to  Secretario,  8  de  febrero,  and  10  de  febrero  de 
1827,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.  With  these  letters  and 
others  of  earlier  and  later  dates  Obregon  enclosed  newspaper 
clippings  giving  reports  of  the  revolt. 


304  TEXAS    AND   THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE 

1 

take  pleasure  in  giving  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  has  not  given  the  smallest  countenance 
or  encouragement  to  those  disturbances.  The  Presi 
dent  has  directed  orders  to  be  conveyed  to  that  por-  , 
tion  of  the  military  force  of  the  United  States  which  , 
is  stationed  on  the  Mexican  frontier  to  give  no  aid  or 
succor  of  any  kind  to  those  who  have  taken  arms 
against  or  may  oppose  the  authority  of  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  Mexican  States;  and  he  will  see 
the  restoration  of  tranquility  with  much  satisfac 
tion."36  ' 

On  February  21,  1827,  Poinsett  wrote  telling  the 
effect  produced  in  Mexico  when  news  reached  there 
of  the  Nacogdoches  revolt.  In  the  debate  in  the  Mex 
ican  Congress  members  had  not  hesitated  to  express 
their  opinion  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
"  was  privy  to  this  movement,  if  indeed  it  had  not  en 
couraged  it.  The  latter  opinion  is  boldly  avowed  by 
the  Sol,  a  paper  extremely  inimical  to  the  interests  of 
the  United  States."  The  Congress  had  appropriated 
five  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  put  down  the  insur 
rection.37  About  two  weeks  later  Poinsett  wrote  that 

36  Obregon  to  Secretario,  17  de  febrero,  and  21  de  febrero 
de  1827,  the  latter  enclosing  a  copy  of  Clay  to  Obregon,  Feb 
ruary  19,  1827,  quoted  above,  and  also  Obregon  to  Clay,  20  de 
febrero  de  1827,  politely  acknowledging  Clay's  of  the  preced 
ing  day,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

37  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  21,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of     - 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,   II.     Early  in  February  the 
Mexican  foreign  office  had  told  Poinsett  of  a  raid  by  Anglo- 
Americans  on  Nacogdoches,  which  had  occurred  on  Novem 
ber  22,  1826.    After  committing  some  depredations  they  had 


TEXAS   AND   THE    BOUNDARY   ISSUE  305 

the  expedition  against  the  insurgents  in  Texas  had 
started  for  Vera  Cruz  whence  it  would  sail  for  Mata- 
gorda,  the  rendezvous.  It  would  consist  of  one  thou 
sand  troops  and  would  be  joined  by  ten  thousand 
others  from  the  interior  provinces.  "A  desire  was 
manifested  to  evince  on  this  occasion  great  promptness 
and  energy,  so  as  to  prevent  similar  attempts  being 
made  elsewhere."  In  a  conference  which  Poinsett  had 
with  President  Victoria  the  latter  had  said  he  was 
satisfied  that  the  government  of  the  United  States 
had  not  encouraged  the  revolt ;  but  expressed  a  desire 
that  the  President  of  the  United  States  should  give 
some  public  manifestation  of  his  disapprobation.38 
The  troops  intended  for  Texas  were  assembled  in 
Vera  Cruz,  and  although  word  came  of  the  collapse  of 
the  revolt  still  they  prepared  to  go  to  the  Texas  coast 
to  guard  against  similar  outbreaks.  The  large  force 
of  provincial  troops  were  not  to  join  them,  however, 
as  originally  planned.  But  the  expedition  got  no  fur 
ther  than  Vera  Cruz.  The  state  government  endeav- 

left,  declaring  that  they  would  return  on  December  15.  Poin 
sett  replied  that  he  had  transmitted  this  complaint  to  his  gov 
ernment  and  felt  sure  that  the  aggressors  would  be  punished. 
On  receiving  the  complaint  Clay  returned  to  Poinsett  a  copy 
of  orders  which  he  had  sent  to  the  military  authorities  on  the 
border,  and  which  he  said  he  believed  would  put  a  stop  to 
the  offense  and  secure  the  punishment  of  the  guilty.  Espinosa 
to  Poinsett,  February  2,  1827 ;  Poinsett  to  Espinosa,  February 
4,  1827 ;  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  7,  1827 ;  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II ;  and  Clay  to  Poinsett, 
March  24, 1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instructions,  XI,  283. 
38  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  8,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 
21 


306  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

ored  to  make  use  of  them  to  resist  the  national  author 
ity;  and  in  June  the  central  authorities  recalled  them 
to  Mexico  city.39 

Although  Adams  and  Clay  in  the  note  of  February 
19,  quoted  above,  distinctly  disavowed  for  the  govern 
ment  any  connection  or  sympathy  with  the  revolt  in 
Texas,  yet  they  appeared  ready  to  take  advantage  of 
the  event  to  see  if  it  had  produced  the  change  in  senti 
ment  at  Mexico  which  Poinsett  had  predicted.  Clay 
wrote  on  March  15,  1827,  that  the  numerous  and  ex 
tensive  grants  of  land  by  the  Mexican  authorities  "  to 
citizens  of  the  United  States  in  the  province  of  Texas 
authorize  the  belief  that  but  little  value  is  placed  upon 
the  possession  of  that  province  by  that  government. 
These  grants  seem  to  have  been  made  without  any 
sort  of  equivalent,  judging  according  to  our  opinions 
of  the  value  of  land.  They  have  been  made  to,  and 
apparently  in  contemplation  of  being  settled  by,  citi 
zens  from  the  United  States.  These  emigrants  will 
carry  with  them  our  principles  of  law,  liberty,  and 
religion;  and  however  much  it  might  be  hoped  that 
they  might  be  disposed  to  amalgamate  with  the  ancient 
inhabitants  of  Mexico,  so  far  as  political  freedom  is 
concerned,  it  would  be  almost  too  much  to  expect  that 
all  collisions  would  be  avoided  on  other  subjects. 
Already  some  of  these  collisions  have  manifested 
themselves,  and  others,  in  the  progress  of  time,  may 
be  anticipated  with  confidence.  These  collisions  may 

39  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  24,  June  5,  June  16,  and  June  20, 
1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  II. 


TEXAS    AND    THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE  307 

insensibly  enlist  the  sympathies  and  feelings  of  the  two 
republics  and  lead  to  misunderstandings. 
I  "The  fixation  of  a  line  of  boundary  of  the  United 
States  on  the  side  of  Mexico,  should  be  such  as  to  se 
cure,  not  merely  certainty  and  apparent  safety  in  the 
respective  limits  of  the  two  countries,  but  the  con 
sciousness  of  freedom  from  all  danger  of  attack  on 
either  side,  and  the  removal  of  all  motives  for  such 
attack.  That  of  the  Sabine  brings  Mexico  nearer  our 
great  commercial  capital  than  is  desirable;  and  al 
though  we  now  are,  and  for  a  long  time  may  remain, 
perfectly  satisfied  with  the  justice  and  moderation  of 
our  neighbor,  still  it  would  be  better  for  both  parties 
that  neither  should  feel  that  he  is  in  any  condition  of 
exposure  on  the  remote  contingency  of  an  alteration  in 
existing  friendly  sentiments. 

£  "  Impressed  with  these  views,  the  President  has 
thought  the  present  might  be  an  auspicious  period 
for  urging  a  negotiation,  at  Mexico,  to  settle  the  boun 
dary  between  the  territories  of  the  two  republics. 
The  success  of  the  negotiation  will  probably  be  pro 
moted  by  throwing  into  it  other  motives  than  those 
which  strictly  belong  to  the  subject  itself.  If  we  could 
obtain  such  a  boundary  as  we  desire,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  might  be  disposed  to  pay  a  rea 
sonable  pecuniary  consideration.  The  boundary  which 
we  prefer  is  that  which,  beginning  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Rio  del  Norte  in  the  sea,  shall  ascend  that  river  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Puerco,  thence  ascending  this 
river  t&  its  source,  and  from  its  source,  by  a  line  due 


308  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

north,  to  strike  the  Arkansas,  thence  following  the 
course  of  the  southern  bank  of  the  Arkansas  to  its 
source,  in  latitude  42°  north,40  and  thence  by  that 
parallel  of  latitude  to  the  South  sea.  The  boundary 
thus  described  would,  according  to  the  United  States 
Tanner's  map,  published  in  the  United  States,  leave 
Santa  Fe  within  the  limits  of  Mexico  and  the  whole 
of  Red  River  or  Rio  Roxo  and  the  Arkansas,  as  far 
up  as  it  is  probably  navigable,  within  the  limits  as 
signed  to  the  United  States.  If  that  boundary  be  un 
attainable,  we  would,  as  the  next  most  desirable,  agree 
to  that  of  the  Colorado,  beginning  at  its  mouth,  in 
the  bay  of  Bernardo,  and  ascending  the  river  to  its 
source,  and  thence  by  a  line  due  north  to  the  Ar 
kansas,  and  thence,  as  above  traced,  to  the  South  sea. 
This  latter  boundary  would  probably  also  give  us  the 
whole  of  the  Red  River,  would  throw  us  somewhat 
farther  from  Santa  Fe,  but  it  would  strike  the  Ar 
kansas  possibly  at  a  navigable  point.  To  obtain  the 
first-described  boundary,  the  President  authorizes  you 
to  offer  to  the  Government  of  Mexico  a  sum  not  ex 
ceeding  one  million  of  dollars.  If  you  find  it  im 
practicable  to  procure  that  line,  you  are  then  author 
ized  to  offer,  for  the  above  line  of  the  Colorado,  the 
sum  of  five  hundred  thousand  dollars.  If  either  of 

40  This  error,  which  was  commonly  made,  was  due  to  loose 
ness  of  statement  rather  than  to  ignorance.  The  treaty  of 
1819  used  this  language,  but  added  "  if  the  source  of  the  Ar 
kansas  River  shall  be  found  to  fall  north  or  south  of  latitude 
forty-two,  then  the  line  shall  be  run  from  the  said  source  due 
south  or  north  as  the  case  may  be,  till  it  meets  the  said  par 
allel,  etc." 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  309 

the  above  offers  should  be  accepted,  you  may  stipu 
late  for  the  payment  of  the  sum  of  money,  as  you  may 
happen  to  agree,  within  any  period  not  less  than  three 
months  after  the  exchange  at  the  city  of  Washing 
ton  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty."  Then  follow 
instructions  for  stipulating,  in  case  of  success,  that 
there  should  be  common  navigation  of  and  common 
jurisdiction  over  the  boundary  river;  that  bona  fide 
land  grants  should  be  confirmed;  that  the  inhabitants 
should  be  given  full  rights  as  United  States  citizens; 
and  that  the  delivery  of  the  territory  should  be  simul 
taneous  with  the  payment  of  the  consideration.  A 
copy  was  enclosed  of  Clay's  note  to  Obregon  of  Feb 
ruary  19,  "  in  order  to  put  you  in  possession  of  what 
has  occurred  here,  and  to  enable  you  to  efface  any  im 
pression,  should  such  exist  at  Mexico,  that  the  United 
States  have  given  countenance  to  the  insurrection."41 
/That  Adams  and  Clay  were  in  hearty  accord  in  this 
attempt  to  purchase  Texas  cannot  be  doubted. v  On  the 
day  preceding  that  on  which  the  instruction  was  sent 
the  former  entered  in  his  diary  that  the  latter  "  spoke 
of  a  draft  he  had  some  time  since  submitted  of  an  in 
struction  to  Poinsett  to  propose  to  the  Mexican  Gov 
ernment  the  purchase  of  the  province  of  Texas  to  the 
Rio  del  Norte  or  the  Colorado.  I  asked  him  to  let  me 

41  Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  15,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XI,  270 ;  Extract  in  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  8;  and  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  837.  See  Rives,  United 
States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  169,  for  a  brief  allusion  to 
this  attempt  to  purchase. 


3IO  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

see  the  draft  again."  The  next  day  he  entered  the 
statement  that  Clay  "read  his  instruction  to  Poinsett 
to  propose  the  purchase  of  Texas.  I  advised  him 
to  leave  out  the  offer  of  ships  of  war,  and  offer  only 
money."42  In  his  long  speech,  or  rather  series  of 
speeches,  several  years  later  on  the  Texas  question 
and  the  right  of  petition  Adams  cited  this  instruction 
but  did  not  dwell  on  the  motive.43  He  declared  that 
previous  to  this  time  he  had  uniformly  favored  ac 
quiring  Texas,  saying :  "  I  had  myself,  in  the  negotia 
tion  of  our  treaty  with  Spain,  labored  to  get  the  Rio 
del  Norte  as  our  boundary,  and  I  adhered  to  the  de 
mand  till  Mr.  Monroe  and  all  his  cabinet  directed  me 
to  forego  it."44 

42  Adams,  Memoirs,  March  14  and  15,  1827,  VII,  239,  240. 

43  Adams,   "  Texas   Speech "  in  House  of  Representatives, 
1838,  107.     He  said  this  offer  was  found  to  be  highly  disa 
greeable  to  Mexico,  so  was  not  pressed. 

44  Adams's  speech  of  April  15,  1842,  Niles,  Register,  LXII, 
138.     In  this  speech  he  argued  that  because  he  wanted  Texas 
in  1825  and  1827  when  slavery  had  been  abolished  there  and 
could  not  have  been  restored  had  it  been  acquired  then,  was  no 
reason  why  he  should  be  criticised  for  opposing  the  acquisi 
tion  of  Texas  later. 

For  brief  studies  of  the  attempt  to  purchase  Texas  in  1827, 
see  Barker,  "Jackson  and  the  Texas  Revolution,"  American 
Historical  Review,  XII,  788 ;  Reeves,  Diplomacy  under  Tyler 
and  Polk,  63;  Garrison,  Westward  Extension,  87;  Bancroft, 
History  of  Mexico,  V,  155 ;  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional  and 
Political  History  of  the  United  States,  1828-1846,  554;  Mc- 
Master,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  V,  460; 
Yoakum,  in  Comprehensive  History  of  Texas,  I,  135;  Ken 
nedy,  Texas,  I,  370;  Jay,  Review  of  the  Mexican  War,  13; 
Robinson,  Mexico  and  her  Military  Chieftains,  144.  Most  of 
these  say  that  Poinsett  did  not  present  the  proposal  to  the 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  3!  I 

(When  Poinsett  received  Clay's  proposal  to  buy 
Texas  he  wrote :  "  I  fear  the  sum  offered  for  the  ter 
ritory  is  too  small.  The  expenses  of  the  Government 
are  so  great  that  they  don't  regard  so  insignificant  a 
sum  as  a  million  as  of  much  use  to  them."4?  However, 
he  cautiously  approached  the  Mexican  government  on 
the  subject  a  few  days  later.  On  May  19,  1827,  he 
wrote  the  secretary  for  foreign  relations  suggesting 
that  the  fortunate  settlement  of  the  difficulties  in  Tex 
as  suggested  the  importance  of  settling  as  early  as 
possible  and  in  a  permanent  manner  the  boundaries 
between  the  two  countries.  He  added  that  he  had 
been  instructed  by  his  government  to  call  attention  to 
this  fact  and  say^that  he  was  fully  empowered  to  treat 
on  the  subject.46  Some  time  later  he  again  cautiously 
approached  the  Mexican  authorities  on  the  subject, 
this  time  definitely  suggesting  the  idea  of  purchase, 
though  not  in  an  official  manner.  Early  in  the  next 
year  he  wrote  Clay :  "  I  have  taken  great  pains  to 
ascertain  what  prospect  of  success  there  would  be  of 
the  Congress  ratifying  the  treaty  if  I  could  have  pre 
vailed  upon  the  plenipotentiaries  to  alter  the  limits 

Mexican  government,  citing  Clay's  "  Raleigh  Letter  "  of  1844, 
Niles,  Register,  LXVI,  152,  which  says  that  Poinsett  "  fore- 
bore  even  to  make  an  overture  for  that  purpose."  No  serious 
regular  negotiation  was  undertaken ;  but  Poinsett  did  sound 
the  authorities  on  the  subject  Adams,  Memoirs,  XI,  365,  says 
the  offer  was  rejected. 

45  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  10,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.     See  Reeves,  Diplomacy  under 
Tyler  and  Polk,  64. 

46  Poinsett  to  Secretary  of  State  of  Mexico,  May  19,  1827, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


312  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

in  the  manner  suggested  by  you,  and  am  convinced 
that  the  attempt  would  fail  and_jDnly_  excite  an  un 
friendly  feeling.  I  Jiave  theref oj:e_abandoned  it  alto 
gether.  ;  In  a  private  conversation  with  one  of  the 
plenipotentiaries,  I  hinted  at  a  remuneration  in  money 
to  the  Mexican  government  as  an  inducement  to  ex 
tend  our  boundary  to  the  Rio  del  Norte;  but  he  as 
sured  me  it  would  be  impossible  to  obtain  either  the 
consent  of  the  government  or  of  the  Congress  to  such 
a  measure,  because  it  would  be  considered  a  dismem 
berment  of  the  Mexican  territory,  which  is  prohibited 
by  the  constitution.  If  both  governments  should  fix 
upon  the  Rio  del  Norte  or  any  other  point  as  the 
limits  of  the  republics,  the  state  of  Texas  would  have 
no  right  to  complain;  but  the  general  government 
could  not  sell  any  part  of  that  state  to  us  without 
violating  the  constitution  and  legitimate  rights  of 
Texas."47 

Apart  from  these  two  very  cautious  attempts  of 
Poinsett  to  open  negotiations  for  carrying  out  Clay's 
instructions  of  March  15,  1827,  for  the  purchase  of 
Texas,  nothing  of  importance  on  the  subject  of  limits 

47  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  8,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.  The  above  portion  of 
this  letter  is  omitted  from  the  extract  printed  in  House  Execu 
tive  Documents,  25  congress,  i  session,  number  42,  page  26; 
and  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  841. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  Mexican  negotiator  based 
his  argument  for  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  sale  of  Texas 
on  the  doctrine  of  state  rights.  If  the  matter  could  have 
been  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  people  of  the  state  the  diffi 
culty  would  probably  have  disappeared  very  quickly.  In 
1829  Van  Buren  suggested  that  this  be  done.  See  below. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  313 

passed  between  the  two  governments  from  that  time 
until  the  beginning  of  the  following  year.  In  the 
meantime  the  Mexican  commission  to  examine  the 
country  near  the  proposed  boundary  had  completed  its 
slow  preparations  and  started  to  the  scene  of  its  labors. 
The  two  years  which  Poinsett  had  said  would  be  neces 
sary  to  complete  the  work,  if  a  joint  commission  were 
sent  as  Alaman  proposed,  had  more  than  passed  before 
the  Mexican  commission  started  from  the  city  of  Mex 
ico.  In  July,  1826,  Poinsett  wrote  that  a  commission 
had  been  appointed  and  that  General  Mier  y  Teran 
had  been  placed  at  its  head.  That  gentleman  had  told 
Poinsett  that  he  expected  to  start  in  September  of 
the  same  year;  but  the  latter  supposed  his  departure 
would  not  take  place  before  October.48  It  did  not. 
Neither  did  it  occur  for  more  than  a  year  later  than 
that.  On  September  6,  1827,  the  Mexican  Congress 
appropriated  fifteen  thousand  dollars  to  defray  the 
expenses  of  the  commission.49  A  month  later  Poin 
sett  wrote  Clay  that  the  commission  had  still  not  de 
parted  because  the  money  was  not  in  the  treasury, 
and  he  was  still  trying  to  convince  the  government 
of  the  uselessness  of  the  mission  till  the  treaty  had 
settled  the  boundary.50  But  still  they  persisted;  and 

48  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  12,  1826,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches   from  Mexico,  II ;  House  Executive  Documents, 
25  congress,  i  session,  number  42,  page  24;  British  and  For 
eign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  837. 

49  Mexico,    Leyes,    Decretos,    y    Ordenes    que    forman    el 
Derecho  Internacional,  139. 

50  Poinsett  to  Clay,  October  6,   1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III;  House  Executive  Docu- 


314  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

the  money  was  soon  forthcoming.  On  November  10, 
1827,  the  commission  started  from  the  city  of  Mexico. 
Almost  four  months  later  it  arrived  at  Bexar,  March 
i,  1828,  and  was  ready  to  begin  its  work.51 

At  about  this  time  there  came  into  the  Mexican 
foreign  office  two  extensive  reports  tracing  the  history 
of  the  Louisiana-Texas  boundary  from  a  very  early 
period,  in  an  effort  to  get  at  a  historical  basis  for 
fixing  the  boundary.52  These  seem  to  have  strength- 

ments,  25  congress,  i  session,  number  42,  page  25 ;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  840. 

51  Berlandier  y  Chovel,  Diario  de  Viage  de  la  Comision  de 
Limites,  .  .  .  bajo  .  .  .  Mier  y  Teran,  7  and  115.    This  seems 
to  be  a  very  much  condensed  and  slightly  changed  translation 
of  a  manuscript  in  French  by  Berlandier  filling  seven  octavo 
volumes  on  travels  in  Mexico  and  Texas  between  1826  and 
1834.     This  and  a  few  other  Berlandier  manuscripts  of  in 
terest  in  the  history  of  Texas,  continuing  down  as  late  as  the 
Mexican  War  of  1846  to  1848,  have  recently  been  purchased 
by  the  Library  of  Congress  at  Washington.    Berlandier  was 
the  naturalist  of  the  expedition,  and  his  notes  are  of  value 
chiefly  from  the  scientific,  especially  the  geographical  stand 
point 

The  passport  for  General  Teran,  which  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  had  requested,  was  delivered  by  Clay  to  Obregon  on 
March  24,  1828,  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  i 
session,  number  42,  page  42 ;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XXVI,  844- 

52  One  of  these  is  the  "  Informe  de  Padre  P.  M.  J.  Puellas 
acerca  de  los  limites  de  Texas,"  dated  Zacatecas,  28  de  no- 
viembre  de  1827,  a  report  concerning  documents  in  archives 
in  that  city  on  the  subject.    The  other  is  "  Extractos  de  la 
memoria  del  Padre  Pichardo,  y  de  los  informes  del  ministro 
y  consul  de  Espafia  en  los  Estados  Unidos  acerca  de  limites 
de  Texas  e  invasiones  en  su  territorio."    The  transcript  of 
these  extracts  covers  fifty  typewritten  pages  and  reviews  sev- 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  315 

ened  the  already  existing  determination  of  the  govern 
ment  not  to  yield  Texas  or  any  portion  of  its  territory. 
Although  the  Mexican  negotiators  had  repeatedly 
insisted  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  the  infor 
mation  which  the  Teran  commission  was  to  gather 
before  the  treaty  of  limits  could  be  concluded,  yet  it 
had  hardly  departed  before  preparations  were  made  to 
renew  the  negotiations  immediately,53  and  had  hardly 
gotten  half  way  to  the  scene  of  its  labors  when  a 
treaty  was  signed.  When  the  commercial  treaty 
which  had  been  concluded  July  10,  1826,  was  consid 
ered  by  the  Mexican  Chamber  of  Deputies  early  in 
the  next  year,  that  chamber  passed  a  resolution  de 
claring  it  would  not  consider  that  treaty  further  until 
an  article  should  be  inserted  recognizing  the  validity 
of  the  treaty  of  1819  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  so  far  as  it  had  to  do  with  the  boundary.54  On 
January  8,  1828,  after  Poinsett  had  been  trying  in 
vain  to  induce  the  Mexican  government  to  renew  the 
negotiation  for  a  commercial  treaty  (to  take  the  place 
of  that  mentioned  above,  which  the  legislative  bodies 
of  both  governments  had  refused  to  ratify),  he  wrote 

eral  hundred  pages  of  manuscripts,   MS.,   Relaciones   Exte- 
riores. 

53  Translation  of  Speech  of  Victoria  to  Congress,  December 
24,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mex 
ico,  III. 

54  Resolution  of  April  2,  1827,  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Conven- 
ciones,  I,  113;  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  8,  1828,  MS.,  Depart 
ment   of    State,    Despatches    from    Mexico,    III;    extracts   in 
House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number 
42,  page  26;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  841. 


316  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

Clay  that  the  Mexican  negotiators  had  insisted  that 
Mexico  was  "invested  with  all  the  rights  of  Spain 
and  bound  by  all  the  obligations  of  the  mother  country 
.  .  .  and  in  short  declared  that  if  I  did  not  consent  to 
comply  with  the  resolution  of  the  Chamber  of  Depu 
ties  it  would  be  useless  to  discuss  the  other  articles  of 
the  treaty,  as  it  was  certain  that  Congress  would  not 
ratify  any  treaty  which  did  not  contain  such  a  provi 
sion.  I  withdrew  my  opposition ;  but  observed  that,  as 
the  treaty  of  navigation  and  commerce  was  for  a  lim 
ited  period  and  that  of  limits  perpetual,  it  would  be 
better  to  make  them  distinct  conventions,  to  which 
proposition  the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  consented." 
It  was  in  this  connection  that  Poinsett  explained  in 
cipher,  as  quoted  above,  his  cautious  hint  to  one  of 
the  negotiators  that  the  United  States  was  willing  to 
purchase  Texas.  He  concluded  that  cipher :  "  Believ 
ing,  therefore,  that  any  attempt  to  alter  the  former 
treaty  of  limits  would  prove  ineffective  and  only  ex 
cite  unfriendly  feelings,  I  shall  accept  the  proposal  of 
the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  and  renew  the  treaty 
of  Washington  of  iSiQ."55  N; 

The  first  conference  in  the  negotiation  of  the  bound 
ary  treaty  had  occurred  on  the  day  on  which  Poinsett 
wrote  the  above  explanation  of  his  reasons  for  aban- 

55  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  8,  1828,  cited  in  note  54. 

The  Mexican  negotiators,  in  explaining  to  the  foreign  office, 
said  that  they  believed  the  United  States  would  not  have  at 
tempted  to  change  the  boundary  unless  they  had  expected  to 
gain  an  advantage  at  the  expense  of  Mexico.  Camacho  and 
Esteva  to  Espinosa,  12  de  enero  de  1828,  Mexico,  Tratados  y 
Convenciones,  I,  114. 


TEXAS    AND    THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE  317 

doning  Texas.  After  the  Mexican  negotiators  had 
explained  their  position  Poinsett  "  replied  that,  al 
though  the  limits  as  settled  by  the  treaty  of  Washing 
ton  were  liable  to  some  objections  and  might  be  al 
tered  advantageously  for  both  parties  as  he  had  before 
frequently  explained,  still  if  the  Government  of  Mex 
ico  insisted  upon  the  execution  of  articles  three  and 
four  of  that  treaty  he  could  not  object  to  it.  ...  Any 
alteration  of  the  treaty  of  Washington  must  depend 
upon  the  mutual  consent  of  the  present  contracting 
parties."56  In  the  second  conference,  which  occurred 
on  January  10,  the  negotiators  agreed  upon  the  pre 
amble  declaring  the  purpose  of  the  treaty  and  the  first 
article,  saying,  "  The  two  high  contracting  parties  will 
proceed  forthwith  to  carry  into  full  effect  the  third 
and  fourth  articles  of  said  treaty."57  The  second  ar 
ticle  of  this  treaty  is  in  the  exact  words  of  the  third 
article  of  the  treaty  of  1819;  and  the  third  article  of 
this  is  the  same  as  the  fourth  of  that.  The  fourth  and 
last  article  of  this  treaty  says  "the  ratifications  shall 
be  exchanged  at  Washington  within  the  term  of  four 

56  Protocol  of  first  conference,  January  8,  1828,  House  Ex 
ecutive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  27; 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  841 ;  Mexico,  Tra- 
tados  y  Convenciones,  I,  109.     It  was  also  enclosed  with  Poin 
sett  to  Clay,  February  7,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  III. 

57  Protocol  of  second  conference,  January  10,  1828,  House 
Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page 
28;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  843;  Mexico, 
Tratados  y  Convenciones,  I,  no,  112. 


318  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

months,  or  sooner,  if  possible."     On  January  12,  it 
was  signed.58 

Thus  after  a  deadlock  of  more  than  two  years  over 
the  question  of  limits  the  treaty  was  negotiated  and 
signed  all  within  four  days.  But  they  who  marry  in 
haste  repent  at  leisure.  The  four  months  designated 
within  which  ratifications  should  be  exchanged  af 
forded  ample  time  in  case  action  should  be  prompt; 
but  it  did  not  allow  for  much  unnecessary  delay,  since 
it  required  approximately  two  months  for  a  messenger 
to  pass  from  Mexico  to  Washington.  The  conclusion 
of.  the  boundary  treaty  had  removed  the  obstacle  to 
the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  of  amity,  commerce,  and 
navigation,  which  was  signed  almost  exactly  a  month 
later.  Since  the  two  were  complementary  the  former 
was  held  till  the  latter  was  ready.  That  the  govern 
ment  at  Washington  might  have  time  to  consider  the 
treaty  of  limits  and  be  ready  to  ratify  it  within  the 
time  allowed,  Poinsett  forwarded  a  copy  of  it  on  Feb 
ruary  7,  when  he  foresaw  that  the  commercial  treaty 
would  soon  be  concluded.59  On  February  22  his  mes 
senger  set  out  from  the  city  of  Mexico  bearing  the 
official,  signed  copies  of  both  treaties,  that  of  limits  of 

58  For  the  treaty,  see  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI, 
946;  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  I,   115,   117.    For  a 
brief  account  of  the  negotiation,  see  Rives,  United  States  and 
Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  170-171. 

59  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  7,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III;  extracts  in  House  Ex 
ecutive  Documents,  25  congress,  i  session,  number  42,  page 
26;    and   same   congress,   2   session,   number   351,   page   189; 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  843. 


TEXAS   AND   THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE  319 

January  12,  and  that  of  amity  and  commerce  of  Feb 
ruary  14,  i828.60 

In  Poinsett's  letter  of  February  7,  cited  above,  he 
gave  some  reasons  for  his  abandoning  Texas  in  addi 
tion  to  those  explained  in  his  letter  of  a  month  earlier. 
He  said :  "  This  government  and  people  have  been  kept 
purposely  in  a  continual  state  of  excitement  upon  this 
very  delicate  question.  We  have  been  represented  by 
the  agents  of  certain  European  powers  as  the  natural 
enemies  of  Mexico ;  and  our  desire  to  make  alterations 
in  the  treaty  of  limits  concluded  with  Spain  and  to 
deprive  them  of  a  portion  of  their  territory  was  con 
stantly  urged  in  proof  of  our  bad  faith  and  insatiable 
ambition.  It  became  necessary,  therefore,  for  me  to 
use  very  cautious  language  upon  this  subject,  and  in 
all  my  conversations  and  notes  in  relation  to  the  ques 
tion  of  limits  to  endeavor,  if  any  change  were  made, 
that  it  should  be  at  the  suggestion  of  this  government, 
so  that  the  honorable  dealing  of  the  United  States  in 
this  respect  might  at  all  times  be  manifest."61 

The  Adams  administration  were  apparently  fully 
convinced  by  these  two  letters  of  Poinsett  that  it  was 
useless  to  attempt  longer  to  obtain  Texas.  Neither 
was  there  any  considerable  opposition  in  the  Senate. 
Action  was  as  prompt  as  could  be  desired.  On  April 

60  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  22,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III ;  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign,  VI,  948;  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress, 
2  session,  number  351,  page  190. 

61  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  7,  1828,  as  cited  in  note  59. 
This  very  interesting  portion  of  this  letter  is  not  printed  in 
any  of  the  three  extracts  cited  in  that  note. 


32O  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

21  Clay  wrote  Poinsett  that  the  latter 's  messenger  had 
arrived  with  the  treaties  and  that  they  would  be  im 
mediately  laid  before  the  Senate  for  their  advice  and 
consent.62  On  the  same  day  the  treaty  of  limits  was 
transmitted  to  the  Senate  by  President  Adams,63  and 
referred  by  that  body  to  its  committee  on  foreign  rela 
tions.64  One  week  later  that  committee  reported  it 
back  without  amendment ;  the  committee  of  the  whole 
considered  it  at  once  also  without  amending  and  re 
ported  it  to  the  Senate ;  and  that  body  immediately  pro 
ceeded  by  unanimous  consent  to  consider  the  resolu 
tion  to  advise  and  consent  to  its  ratification,  and  ap 
proved  the  resolution,  thirty-eight  yeas  to  three  nays.65 
Two  days  later,  April  30,  1828,  Clay  wrote  Obregon, 
the  Mexican  minister  in  Washington,  "  I  am  ready  to 
proceed  in  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty 
at  any  time  that  may  suit  your  convenience  within  the 
period  prescribed,"  reminding  him  that  only  a  few  days 
remained.66  On  May  I  Obregon  acknowledged  Clay's 
note  of  the  day  before,  expressing  his  regret  that  he  did 
not  have  it  in  his  power  to  effect  the  exchange  imme 
diately,  and  explaining  that  he  had  not  yet  received 

62  Clay  to  Poinsett,  April  21,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XII,  98;  House  Executive  Documents,  25  con 
gress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  17. 

63  American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  946. 

64  Senate  Executive  Journal,  III,  604. 

65  Senate    Executive    Journal,    605.    Those    opposing   were 
Benton,   Ellis,   and   Smith  of   South  Carolina. 

66  Clay  to  Obregon,  April  30,  1828,  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  46;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  846. 


TEXAS   AND   THE    BOUNDARY   ISSUE  32! 

the  ratification  by  his  own  government.67  There  re 
mained  eleven  days  before  the  time  set  for  exchang 
ing  the  ratifications  would  expire. 

In  Mexico,  on  the  other  hand,  action  on  the  treaty 
was  very  different.  Poinsett  reported  on  April  24 
that  its  progress  had  been  delayed  by  the  extreme 
indolence  of  the  man  who  had  been  secretary  of  state. 
He  had  kept  the  treaty  for  more  than  two  months 
without  presenting  it  to  the  Congress  although  Poinsett 
had  warned  him  repeatedly  of  the  prejudice  to  Mexi 
can  interests  caused  by  the  delay.68  It  had  to  be  acted 
on  by  the  both  houses  of  the  Mexican  Congress.  The 
lower  house  had  ratified  it  before  Poinsett  wrote  this 
letter  of  April  24,69  and  two  days  later  he  wrote  that  the 
Senate  had  ratified  it.  The  action  of  the  Congress,  he 
said,  was  prompt  enough  but  it  was  impossible  to  get  it 
to  Washington  in  time  to  exchange  the  ratifications 
before  the  four  months'  time  limit  should  expire.70 

6T  Obregon  to  Clay,  May  i,  1828,  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  46;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  846. 

68  Espinosa,  who  had  been  secretary  of  state  for  foreign 
relations  for  nearly  two  years,  was  succeeded  by  Canedo  on 
March  8,  1828.     See  Bocanegra,  Memorias,  I,  557.     This  was 
not  quite  two  months  after  the  treaty  had  been  signed.    Had 
the  new   secretary  and  both  houses   of   Congress    acted   as 
promptly  as  did  the  authorities  at  Washington  there  still  would 
have  been  time. 

69  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  24, 1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV;  House  Executive  Documents, 
25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  28;  British  and  For 
eign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  845. 

70  Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  26, 1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV;  House  Executive  Documents, 


322  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

In  spite  of  this  the  Mexican  ratifications  were  trans 
mitted  to  Obregon  with  instructions  to  effect  the 
exchange,  and  that  minister  notified  Clay  on  August 
2,  1828,  that  he  had  just  received  them  and  was  ready 
to  effect  the  exchange  when  convenient  to  the  United 
States  government;  but  he  was  informed  that  since 
the  time  limit  had  expired  the  treaty  would  have  to 
be  laid  before  the  Senate  again  at  the  next  session 
to  get  its  approval  before  the  exchange  could  be 
effected.71 

Although  Poinsett's  advances  had  been  very  guarded 
and  he  had  not  really  made  any  offer  to  purchase 
Texas,  yet  the  fact  that  the  United  States  wished 
and  was  endeavoring  to  do  so  became  known,  since, 
as  Poinsett  said,  there  were  no  secrets  in  Mexico. 
Greatly  exaggerated  reports  concerning  the  matter 
reached  European  courts.  In  the  middle  of  the  year 
1828,  Rocafuerte,  the  Mexican  representative  in  Lon 
don,  wrote  his  government  that  a  rumor  was  current 
in  diplomatic  circles  there  to  the  effect  that  Mexico 
had  already  ceded  Texas  to  the  United  States  for  the 
sum  of  thirty-five  million  pesos;  and  that  this  was 
the  result  of  the  scandalous  intrigues  of  the  minister 

25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  29;  British  and  For 
eign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  845. 

71  Obregon  to  Clay,  August  2,  1828,  and  Brent  to  Obregon, 
same  date,  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  ses 
sion,  number  42,  pages  47,  48;  British  and  Foreign  State  Pa 
pers,  XXVI,  846,  847.  On  May  10  Cafiedo  had  informed  Poin 
sett  of  the  ratification  by  his  government,  House  Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  202.  For 
a  brief  discussion  of  this  treaty  and  its  failure,  see  Rives,, 
United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  170, 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  323 

of  the  United  States  at  the  Mexican  capital.  He  said 
he  could  not  believe  it,  but  neither  could  he  deny  it.72 
As  soon  as  Rocafuerte's  letter  reached  Mexico  his 
government  instructed  him  to  deny  the  rumor  at  once 
since  it  was  utterly  without  foundation.73 
,  In  the  latter  part  of  this  year  1828,  a  curious  re 
quest  for  the  cession  of  Texas  reached  the  Mexican 
government  from  a  very  different  source  and  for  a 
very  different  purpose.  It  came  from  London  but  not 
from  the  British  government.  It  is  of  small  impor 
tance  but  of  considerable  interest.  Robert  Owen,  the 
well  known  socialistic  philanthropist,  presented  through 
Rocafuerte  a  request  that  the  government  of  Mexico 
should  cede  to  him  the  state  of  Coahuila  and  Texas 
as  a  place  where  he  might  work  out  his  philanthropic 
plans  for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind.  He  proposed 
that  it  should  be  an  entirely  independent  state,  and 
that  its  independence  should  be  guaranteed  by  Mex 
ico,  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  As  the 
chief  consideration  other  than  the  philanthropic  ones 
which  should  induce  Mexico  to  grant  his  request,  he 
argued,  "That  it  is  a  frontier  province  between  the 
Mexican  and  North  American  republics  which  is  now 
settling  under  such  circumstances  as  are  likely  to 
create  jealousies  and  irritations  between  citizens  of 
these  states  and  which  most  probably  at  some  future 
period  will  terminate  in  a  war  between  the  two  re- 

72  Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  Londres,  16  de  julio  de  1828, 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 

73  [Secretario  to  Rocafuerte],  22  de  septiembre  de  1828,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 


324  TEXAS    AND    THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE 

publics.  This  consideration  alone,  in  the  opinion  of 
many  experienced  statesmen,  would  render  it  a  wise 
measure  in  the  Mexican  republic  to  place  this  province 
under  the  new  arrangements  about  to  be  proposed." 
In  Rocafuerte's  letter  transmitting  the  memorial  he 
said  he  had  told  Owen  that  there  was  not  the  slightest 
prospect  of  the  government's  granting  the  request,  for, 
"  although  it  is  very  beautiful,  very  plausible,  and  very 
philanthropic  on  paper  it  is  unrealizable  in  practice."7* 
Numerous  notes  passed  between  Poinsett  and  the 
Mexican  government  concerning  difficulties  arising  out 
of  the  operation  of  a  law  which  had  been  passed  in 
September,  1823,  allowing  goods  intended  for  con 
sumption  in  Texas  to  come  in  duty  free  for  seven 
years.  Poinsett  presented  complaints  that  officials 
were  not  allowing  this  privilege.  Canedo  declared  that 
an  erroneous  interpretation  had  been  placed  on  the 
law,  that  there  were  many  frauds  practiced,  and  that  to 
prevent  these  it  had  been  ordered  that  all  goods  should 
pay  the  duty,  but  that  afterwards  reimbursements 
should  be  made  for  goods  proved  to  have  been  used  in 
Texas.  The  privilege  was  still  abused  and  merchants 
of  Monclova  complained  because  they  no  longer  had 
the  benefit  of  it.  Poinsett  argued  with  the  Mexican 
officials  that  the  lax  enforcement  of  the  law  by  the 
Mexican  authorities  on  the  coast  had  encouraged  mer 
chants  of  the  United  States  to  engage  in  this  trade  and 
that  they  should  not  be  made  to  suffer  by  the  sudden 

74Rocafuerte  to  Secretario,  Londres,  15  de  Julio  de  1828, 
and  Owens's  memorial  accompanying,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exte- 
riores. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY    ISSUE  325 

withdrawal  of  the  privilege.  He  attempted  to  have 
time  allowed  to  notify  shippers.  But  an  order  was 
issued  in  April,  1828,  to  treat  as  contrabandists  all 
who  attempted  to  land  goods  under  the  law.  Poin- 
sett  informed  Clay,  April  23,  1828,  that  the  Mex 
ican  government  had  decided  to  put  a  stop  immediately 
to  the  free  entry  of  goods  for  consumption  by  the  in 
habitants  of  Texas.75 

In  the  absence  of  treaty  stipulations  for  the  purpose 
there  was  no  regular  means  for  the  recovery  by  the 
United  States  of  absconding  debtors,  runaway  slaves, 
and  escaped  criminals  who  had  taken  refuge  in  Mex 
ican  territory.  Clay  wrote  Poinsett  in  January,  1828, 
that  information  had  come  to  Washington  to  the  effect 
that  impediments  were  placed  in  the  way  of  recover 
ing  such,  especially  in  Texas.  A  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  had  assumed  the  existence 
of  such  impediments  and  called  on  the  President  for 

_75  Poinsett  to  Secretario,  September  10,  1827,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores.  Canedo  to  Poinsett,  April  8,  1828;  Poin 
sett  to  Canedo,  April  n,  1828;  Canedo  to  Poinsett,  April  21, 
1828;  enclosures  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  15,  1828,  MS., 
Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV.  Poinsett 
to  Clay,  April  23,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  III.  The  last  is  printed  in  House  Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  201. 

Bancroft,  North  Mexican  States  and  Texas,  II,  114,  says  the 
exemption  expired  in  1830.  This  is  the  time  it  should  legally 
have  expired  had  it  not  been  withdrawn.  He  probably  follows 
Filisola,  Memorias,  I,  163,  which  says,  "  al  acabar  aquel  mismo 
aiio  de  1830  debian  terminar  las  escenciones  y  privilegios  con- 
cedidos  a  los  distritos  de  Tejas,  Monclova,  y  Rio  Grande,  para 
la  introduccion  libre  de  derechos  de  todo  lo  que  necesitasen 
para  el  uso  de  aquellos  habitantes." 


326  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

information  regarding  the  matter.  Obregon  had  de 
clared  that  he  knew  of  no  such  obstacles.  Poinsett  was 
instructed  to  make  inquiries  and  in  case  he  found  that 
^such  existed  he  was  to  protest  against  them.76  In 
(  April,  1828,  Clay  instructed  Poinsett  to  ask  the  sur 
render  of  several  persons  named  Hardin  who  were 
charged  with  having  committed  an  atrocious  murder 
in  Tennessee  and  had  fled  to  Texas.  The  treaties  con 
cluded  and  just  received,  he  said,  provided  for  such 
extradition,  but  since  ratifications  had  not  been  ex 
changed  it  could  not  be  demanded.  On  June  3  Poin 
sett  presented  the  request.  Expecting  that  there 
would  be  a  long  delay  before  the  government  decided 
what  to  do,  he  applied  through  a  friend  directly  to  the 
governor  of  the  state  of  Coahuila  and  Texas  asking 
that  the  men  be  secured  until  the  government  should 
decide.  But  only  three  days  after  the  request  was 
presented  Canedo  replied  to  Poinsett  that  the  President 
had  directed  the  governor  of  Coahuila  and  Texas  to 
arrest  and  surrender  the  murderers.  Later  that  gov 
ernor  wrote  Poinsett  directly  that  he  would  do  so.77 

76  Clay  to  Poinsett,  January  12,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Instructions,  XII,  53 ;  Clay  to  Adams,  January  14,  1828, 
and  Adams  to  House  of  Representatives,  January  15,   1828, 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign,  VI,  822. 

77  Clay  to  Poinsett,  April  21,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Instructions,  XII,  98;  House  Executive  Documents,  25  con 
gress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  17.     On  pages  18-32  are  the 
documents  containing  the  charges  against  the  Hardins ;  Poin 
sett  to  Caiiedo,  June  3,  1828,  Canedo  to  Poinsett,  June  7,  1828, 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  12,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  De 
spatches  from  Mexico,  IV ;  the  last  is  printed  in  House  Execu 
tive  Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  214. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  327 

The  Fredonian  revolt  that  had  collapsed  so  speedily 
early  in  1827  was  only  the  beginning  of  a  series  of 
disturbances  in  Texas  during  the  following  two  years 
which  called  for  the  exchange  of  numerous  diplomatic 
notes.  In  August,  1827,  Obregon  wrote  his  govern 
ment  of  another  attack  which  it  was  reported  would 
soon  be  made  on  Nacogdoches  by  a  band  who  had  set 
out  from  New  Orleans  under  the  guise  of  a  surveying 
party  going  to  mark  out  a  grant  of  land  that  had 
been  made  in  Texas,  but  upon  reaching  the  border  had 
assumed  a  warlike  aspect  and  were  planning  the  de 
scent  on  Nacogdoches  with  the  assistance  of  the  Chero 
kee  Indians.78  In  October  of  the  same  year  he  wrote 
that  there  was  talk  of  the  United  States  taking  con 
trol  of  the  disorderly  Mexican  territory  south  of  the 
Red  river,  to  prevent  the  Indians  residing  there 
from  making  attacks  on  citizens  of  the  United  States 
north  of  that  river.  Obregon  advised  his  govern 
ment  to  take  steps  to  prevent  this.79  In  April,  1828, 
Canedo  complained  to  Poinsett  that  a  party  of  fifteen 
men  from  the  United  States  had  made  an  irruption 
into  Texas  and  at  Nacogdoches  had  declared  them 
selves  the  advance  guard  of  a  republican  army  con 
sisting  of  several  hundred  which  was  going  to  march 
on  Bexar  or  Guadalupe.  Poinsett  replied  promptly 

Poinsett  to  Clay,  June  9,  1828,  MS.,  United  States  Embassy 
Archives,  Mexico.  This  last  is  missing  in  the  files  of  the  De 
partment  of  State. 

78  Obregon  to  Secretario,  10  de  agosto  de  1827,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

79  Obregon  to  Secretario,  13  de  octubre  de  1827,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 


328  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

that  he  would  submit  the  matter  to  his  government 
and  ask  that  measures  be  taken  to  prevent  such  move 
ments.80  Indians  were  causing  trouble  by  attacking 
each  other  across  the  border.  In  July,  1828,  Cafiedo 
called  Poinsett's  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Co- 
manche  Indians  living  in  Mexican  territory  had  asked 
permission  to  pursue  and  recover  property  that  had 
been  taken  from  them  by  Indians  from  the  United 
States  who  had  returned  thither.  The  request  was 
denied  through  respect  for  the  territory  of  a  friendly 
state.81 

About  the  middle  of  the  year  1828  reports  reached 
the  government  in  Mexico  that  Spanish  refugees  in 
New  Orleans  were  planning  to  cooperate  with  the 
Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba  in  an  expedition  to  the 
Texas  coast.  Orders  were  at  once  despatched  to  the 
governor  of  Coahuila  and  Texas  to  remove  all  Span 
iards  from  the  coast  as  soon  as  the  expedition  should 
approach ;  and  a  secret  agent  was  sent  to  New  Orleans 

80  Canedo  to  Poinsett,  April  12,  1828,  Poinsett  to  Canedo, 
April  19,  1828,  enclosures  with  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  14,  1828, 
MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV.     In 
Poinsett  to  Clay,  April  23,   1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  III,  and  House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  201,  mention 
is  made  of  this  raid;  and  also  of  the  violation  of  Mexican 
sovereignty  by  a  party  of  one  hundred  hunters  near  the  north 
ern  limit  of  California.     Poinsett  explained  that  this  was  prob 
ably  due  to  ignorance  of  the  exact  location  of  the  line. 

81  Canedo  to  Poinsett,  July  15,  1828,  enclosed  with  Poinsett 
to  Clay,  July  16,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  IV;  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress, 
2  session,  number  351,  page  242. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  329 

to  keep  the  government  informed.  That  agent  re 
ported  in  September  that  there  certainly  had  been 
talk  of  such  a  movement  early  in  the  year;  but  the 
schemers  had  neither  sufficient  men  nor  money.  Their 
chief,  Jose  Lara,  had  gone  to  Cuba,  expecting  a  re 
ward  for  his  zeal.  In  November  the  same  secret 
agent  reported  a  still  more  visionary  movement.  This 
was  led  by  a  Spanish  officer  who  had  been  expelled 
from  Mexico.  He  was  trying  to  incite  the  poorest  of 
his  countrymen  and  some  Mexicans  of  the  same  class 
to  join  him  in  a  disorderly  plundering  raid.  He  as 
sured  them  that  they  could  collect  a  hundred  and  fifty 
or  two  hundred  men,  go  to  Texas  and  proclaim  the 
Devil,  if  they  wanted  to,  surprise  some  settlements, 
and  get  away  with  what  they  could  carry.82  These 
movements  amounted  to  nothing  and  would  not  de 
serve  serious  notice  in  themselves;  but  the  Mexican 
authorities  were  unduly  alarmed  at  them  and  they  had 
no  little  influence  on  the  rising  tide  of  hostility  in  Mex 
ico  for  the  United  States  which  so  deeply  affected 
the  diplomatic  relations.  Similar  reports  continued 
through  1828  and  1829,  from  agents  both  in  New  Or 
leans  and  in  Texas,  especially  from  General  Teran 
who  was  near  the  border  as  head  of  the  boundary 
commission.  On  July  29,  1829,  Bocanegra,  who  was 

82  Pedraza  to  Secretario,  22  de  julio  de  1828,  Secretario  to 
Pedraza,  26  de  julio  de  1828,  Secretario  to  Gobernador  de 
Coahuila  y  Texas,  26  de  julio  de  1828,  Gobernador  de  Coahuila 
y  Texas  to  Secretario,  n  de  agosto  de  1828,  Secretario  de 
Relaciones  to  Secretario  de  Guerra,  27  de  agosto  de  1828, 
Martinez  to  Secretario,  Nuevo  Orleans,  23  de  septiembre,  and 
17  de  noviembre  de  1828;  all  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


330  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

then  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  wrote 
Poinsett  that  he  was  instructed  by  President  Guer 
rero  to  communicate  intelligence  just  received  from 
New  Orleans.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  Jose  Lara 
was  enlisting  men  in  New  Orleans  under  a  commis 
sion  from  the  government  of  Havana,  and  that  he 
had  already  sent  to  that  government  more  than  four 
hundred  recruits.  It  was  also  reported  that  at  sev 
eral  places  along  the  border  United  States  troops  were 
being  collected  and  drilled  and  supplies  collected.  He 
asked  that  these  acts  in  violation  of  neutrality  and  in 
aid  of  the  Spanish  expedition  against  Mexico  be  pre 
vented.83  Two  days  after  receiving  this  Poinsett 
made  a  spirited  reply,  declaring  that  the  vigilant  exe 
cution  of  the  laws  in  the  United  States  against  foreign 
enlistment  made  incredible  such  things  as  Bocanegra 
said  were  going  on  in  New  Orleans.  He  ventured  to 
suggest  that  Lara  was  doing  no  more  than  transport 
to  Cuba  Spaniards  expelled  from  Mexico  who  were 
unable  to  support  themselves  and  were  willing  to  take 
advantage  of  the  offer  made  by  the  captain  general 
of  Cuba  of  refuge  and  support  in  that  island.  He 
declared  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  such  military 
preparations  on  the  border  as  Bocanegra  had  men 
tioned  except  from  statements  published  in  libellous 
papers  in  Mexico  by  enemies  of  the  liberties  of  Amer 
ica  who  were  striving  to  disturb  the  friendly  relations 
between  the  two  republics.  They  had  no  foundation  in 
fact.  He  said  that  if  Spain  attacked  Mexico  the  United 

83  Bocanegra  to  Poinsett,  July  29,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  33! 

States  would  remain  neutral;  but  would  be  friendly 
and  sympathetic  with  Mexico.84  In  reporting  to  Van 
Buren,  the  secretary  of  state  in  the  new  Jackson  ad 
ministration,  this  correspondence  with  Bocanegra, 
Poinsett  said  that  the  conduct  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  with  reference  to  all  foreign  nations  was  ridicu 
lous  and  ought  only  to  excite  our  compassion.  They 
regarded  Mexico  as  the  most  favored  nation  on  earth 
and  thought  all  others  were  jealous  of  her,  especially  the 
United  States.  He  said  that  General  Teran  had  never 
ceased  to  arouse  the  fears  of  the  government  regard 
ing  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  Texas  ; 
and  frequent  insinuations  by  Europeans  of  American 
designs  on  Texas  confirmed  these  fears.  He  had  seen 
a  letter  of  June  3  from  Teran,  "  who  has  always  been 
attached  to  the  English  interests.  This  person  as 
sures  the  government  in  his  last  despatches  that  we 
are  making  vast  preparations  to  attack  that  country 
and  have  already  fifteen  thousand  men  on  the  fron 
tier."  Teran  enlarged  on  the  great  size,  fertility  and 
natural  resources  of  Texas,  and  the  consequent  reasons 
why  Mexico  should  never  yield  possession.85  Another 
note  from  Bocanegra  on  August  20  telling  of  more 
positive  announcements  of  military  preparations  in 
the  United  States  against  Mexico  elicited  the  next  day 
pointed  denials  from  Poinsett  and  renewed  declara 
tions  of  the  friendly  disposition  of  the  United  States 

84  Poinsett  to  Bocanegra,  July  31,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

85  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  August  2,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


332  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

for  Mexico.  He  said  he  thought  that  the  agents  of 
the  government  gave  too  easy  credence  to  false  state 
ments.  In  reporting  this  correspondence  to  Van  Buren 
Poinsett  said  he  had  declared  in  a  conference  with 
Bocanegra  on  the  subject  that  until  the  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  should  be  ratified  military  move 
ments  on  the  frontiers  must  be  expected.  The  treaty 
contained  a  provision  for  restraining  the  Indians  on 
the  border.  He  had  said  that,  if  Mexico  did  not  re 
strain  her  Indians  from  attacks  on  the  United  States 
side,  the  United  States  would  pursue  such  tribes  for 
punishment  even  to  the  gates  of  Mexico.  In  the  be 
ginning  of  this  letter  to  Van  Buren  Poinsett  explained 
that  the  Mexican  Senate  had  addressed  to  Bocanegra 
an  insolent  demand  for  information  regarding  the  re 
ported  activities  of  the  United  States,  and  Poinsett 
believed  that  body  wanted  to  plunge  the  country  into 
war  with  the  United  States  hoping  that  such  a  war 
would  overthrow  the  existing  state  of  things  in 
Mexico.  He  declared :  "  I  will  not  therefore  suffer 
myself  to  be  provoked;  nor  will  I  personally  yield  to 
their  attacks,  altho'  my  residence  in  this  country  has 
become  almost  insupportable."86 

It  will  be  recalled  that  it  was  the  second  of  August, 

1828,  when  Obregon  was  told  that  the  ratifications  of 

86  Bocanegra  to  Poinsett,  August  20,  1829,  Poinsett  to  Boca 
negra,  August  21,  1829,   Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  August  22, 

1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV; 
all  of  these  except  the  important  beginning  of  the  last  are  in 
House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number 
351,  pages  291-294. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  333 

the  boundary  treaty  of  January  12,  1828,  could  not  be 
exchanged  till  that  treaty  should  again  be  acted  upon 
by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  at  the  next  session, 
because  the  four  months'  time  limit  had  expired.87 
This  necessarily  delayed  the  matter  till  the  following 
winter.  But  action  was  not  taken  even  then.  In  the 
middle  of  April  of  the  following  year  Montoya,  the 
Mexican  charge  at  Washington,  brought  the  matter 
to  the  attention  of  the  new  Jackson  administration 
by  saying  in  a  letter  to  Van  Buren  that  he  presumed 
the  treaty  had  been  presented  to  the  Senate  as  had 
been  said  would  be  necessary,  and  by  asking  whether 
the  secretary  of  state  was  now  ready  to  proceed  with 
the  exchange  of  the  ratifications,  explaining  that  the 
Mexican  government,  desirous  of  effecting  the  ex 
change,  had  invested  him  with  full  powers  for  the 
purpose.  Van  Buren  replied  that  he  was  not  fully 
informed  as  to  the  reasons  why  the  preceding  admin 
istration  had  not  again  submitted  the  treaty  of  limits 
to  the  Senate;  but  supposed  it  was  because  Mexican 
action  on  the  commercial  treaty  was  expected  and  it 
was  desired  to  have  the  Senate  act  on  the  two  together, 
and  this  expectation  had  been  disappointed.  It  would 
be  necessary  still  to  submit  the  treaty  to  the  Senate  to 
be  acted  upon  again,  and  he  promised  that  it  should 
be  submitted  at  the  next  session.  In  the  meantime  he 
hoped  the  Mexican  ratifications  of  the  commercial 
treaty  would  arrive  so  the  two  could  be  submitted  to 
the  Senate  together.88  Thus  the  exchange  had  again 

87  See  above,  this  chapter. 

88  Montoya  to  Van  Buren,  April  16,  1829,  and  Van  Buren 


334  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

been  delayed,  this  time  for  nearly  a  year.  But  before 
this  year  had  expired  the  new  administration  had  de 
termined  to  try  its  hand  at  negotiating  a  new  treaty  of 
limits  which  should  supersede  the  other  and  give 
Texas  to  the  United  States. 

Early  in  March,  1829,  in  reviewing  at  length,  for 
the  information  of  the  new  administration,  the  whole 
of  his  diplomatic  activities  and  difficulties  in  Mexico, 
Poinsett  discussed  very  briefly  the  boundary  negotia 
tions.89  Again  in  July  he  reviewed  his  negotiations 
for  the  treaties,  tracing  those  for  the  treaty  of  limits 
to  the  conclusion  of  the  pending  treaty  a  year  and  a 
half  earlier,  and  concluded  by  declaring :  "  I  am  still 
convinced  that  we  never  can  expect  to  extend  our 
boundary  south  of  the  river  Sabine,  without  quarrel 
ing  with  these  people,  and  driving  them  to  court  a 
more  strict  alliance  with  some  European  power."90 

This  renewed  assertion  of  Poinsett's  belief  that  it 
would  never  be  possible  to  secure  Texas  peaceably  did 
not  reach  the  Department  of  State  until  nearly  a  month 
after  the  new  administration  had  matured  its  project 
for  the  acquisition  of  Texas  and  despatched  instruc- 

to  Montoya,  April  22,  1829,  House  Executive  Documents,  25 
congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  49;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XXVI,  848. 

89  Poinsett  to  Secretary  of  State,  March  10,  1829,  MS.,  De 
partment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

90  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  July  22,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV ;  'House  Executive  Docu 
ments,  25  congress,   I  session,  number  42,  page  29,  prints  a 
brief  extract ;  and  the  rest  is  in  the  same,  2  congress,  number 
351,  page  285.    This  was  received  at  the  Department  of  State 
on  September  22. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  335 

tions  for  the  purpose.  It  is  doubtful  whether  it  would 
have  affected  the  situation  even  had  it  arrived  before 
the  instructions  were  sent.  The  plan  seems  to  have 
developed  slowly.  Nearly  six  months  of  Jackson's 
term  was  gone  before  it  took  shape.  The  earliest 
documentary  evidence  of  the  growth  of  the  plan  which 
is  preserved  in  the  correspondence  of  Van  Buren  is  a 
report  of  Anthony  Butler.  It  is  not  dated  but  seems 
to  have  been  presented  about  August  n,  1829,  since  a 
letter  from  Jackson  of  the  following  day  says,  "  I  am 
pleased  with  the  document  you  sent  me  respecting 
Texas,  and  will  be  happy  to  see  you  and  Col.  Butler 
whenever  it  may  suit  your  convenience."  That  this 
was  not  the  origin  of  the  project  is  evident  from  But 
ler's  opening  his  report  with  the  statement,  "  In  nego 
tiating  for  Texas  a  variety  of  considerations  present 
themselves,"  and  his  reference  later  to  the  "  anticipated 
negotiation."  He  discusses  at  considerable  length  the 
soil,  climate,  resources,  and  water  ways  of  Texas  and 
the  value  of  the  province  to  the  United  States.  "  The 
considerations  which  present  themselves  "  he  discusses 
under  seven  heads.  In  Van  Buren's  instructions  he 
embodied  nearly  every  suggestion  which  Butler  here 
makes.  In  addition  to  his  arguments  Butler  adds  a 
gentle  appeal  to  personal  ambition  by  suggesting  that 
the  people  of  the  south  and  west  are  so  vitally  inter 
ested  in  the  matter  "as  to  secure  for  that  man  who 
may  accomplish  the  recovery  of  Texas  their  thanks, 
their  confidence,  and  their  gratitude,"  which,  he  adds, 


336  TEXAS   AND    THE    BOUNDARY    ISSUE 

is  likely  hereafter  to  amount  to  something  more  than 
complimentary  toasts  or  newspaper  eulogisms.  Jack 
son's  letter  referred  to  above  shows  that  they  had 
been  studying  with  some  care  Poinsett's  explanations 
of  the  reasons  why  the  offer  to  purchase  Texas  in  1827 
had  failed,  for  he  says  that  the  constitutional  question 
can  be  solved ;  -and  that  two  million  added  to  the  one 
million  offered  will  amend  the  Mexican  constitution. 
Another  document  which  seems  to  have  had  a  marked 
influence  in  shaping  the  final  instructions  is  an  un 
signed  and  undated  "Project  for  the  acquisition  of 
[the]  province  of  Texas  "  which  sets  forth  the  motive 
for  the  negotiation  by  saying,  "  To  counteract  the  evils 
growing  out  of  the  surrender  of  that  part  of  Louisiana 
west  of  the  Sabine  and  east  of  the  Rio  del  Norte 
or  Grand  river,  it  is  proposed  to  open  a  negotiation 
for  the  retrocession  of  the  same  to  the  United  States." 
It  gives  several  suggestions  as  to  how  Poinsett  might 
approach  the  Mexican  government  and  says  that  the 
present  threatened  invasion  of  Mexico  by  Spain  and 
the  deranged  condition  of  the  finances  "makes  the 
time  a  very  propitious  one  for  the  ascertainment  of 
her  views  in  regard  to  this  territory  as  Mr.  P.  can 
give  his  enquiries  the  character  of  individual  solici 
tude  for  her  welfare  and  a  desire  to  relieve  her  em 
barrassments  rather  than  turn  them  to  the  advantage 
of  his  own  country."  \  On  August  13  Jackson  made 
a  rough  outline  draft  of  the  instructions  to  be  given 
to  Poinsett.  With  these  various  documents  as  a  basis 
Van  Buren  prepared  first  a  rough  outline  draft  and 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  337 

then    the    complete    instructions    which    were    dated 
August  25,  i829.91 

91  Butler  to  Secretary  of  State  [August  u,  1829];  Jackson 
to  Van  Buren,  August  12,  1829;  "  Project  for  [the]  acquisition 
of  the  province  of  Texas  "  [August  13,  1829]  ;  Jackson's  draft 
of  instructions  to  Poinsett,  August  13,  1829;  Van  Buren's 
outline  draft  of  instruction  to  Poinsett,  which  covers  16 
manuscript  pages ;  First  Draft  in  several  different  hands  with 
numerous  corrections  and  containing  practically  everything  in 
the  final  instructions,  and  covering  32  pages;  Second  Draft 
dated  August  25,  1829,  covering  37  pages ;  all  in  Van  Buren 
MSS.,  Library  of  Congress,  IX  and  X.  The  conjectural  dates 
have  been  adopted  from  the  Library  of  Congress  Calendar  of 
the  Van  Buren  Papers,  prepared  by  W.  C.  Ford  and  Elizabeth 
West,  and  printed  in  1910.  Jackson's  draft  of  August  13  is 
printed  in  Reeves,  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk,  65,  note. 
This  writer  cites  the  Jackson  Papers  as  the  place  where  the 
manuscript  is  found.  This  must  be  an  error. 

Most  writers  on  Texas  history  discuss  these  instructions  of 
August  25,  1829,  and  in  connection  with  them  mention  the 
offer  to  purchase  made  by  Clay  on  March  15,  1827,  and  his 
original  instructions  to  Poinsett  on  March  26,  1825,  to  nego 
tiate  for  a  westward  extension  of  the  boundary.  See  Miss 
Howren,  "  Causes  and  Origin  of  the  Decree  of  April  6,  1830," 
Southwestern  Historical  Quarterly,  XVI,  383-387;  Barker, 
"  Jackson  and  the  Texas  Revolution,"  American  Historical  Re 
view,  XII,  789;  McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the 
United  States,  V,  461  and  542-555,  which  dwells  at  great 
length  on  the  efforts  of  the  Jacksonian  newspapers  to  facili 
tate  the  purchase;  Kennedy,  Texas,  I,  372.  The  following 
five  give  very  brief  discussions:  Bancroft,  North  Mexican 
States  and  Texas,  II,  89;  MacDonald,  Jacksonian  Democracy, 
2II-;  Yoakum,  in  Comprehensive  History  of  Texas,  I,  129;  the 
remainder  are  strongly  prejudiced.:  Von  Hoist,  Constitutional 
and  Political  History  of  the  United  States,  1828-1846,  555 ;  Jay, 
Review  of  the  Mexican  War,  15 ;  Adams,  "  Texas  Speech  "  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  1838,  114-121;  Tornel,  Tejas 
y  los  Estados  Unidos,  3,  10;  Filisola,  Memorias,  I,  158-162. 

23 


338  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

These  instructions  begin  by  saying :  "  It  is  the  wish 
of  the  President  that  you  should,  without  delay,  open 
a  negotiation  with  the  Mexican  government  for  the 
purchase  of  so  much  of  the  province  of  Texas  as  is 
hereinafter  described,  or  for  such  a  part  thereof  as 
they  can  be  induced  to  cede  to  us."  The  President 
was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  the  proposed  acquisi 
tion  in  order  to  guard  the  western  frontier,  protect 
New  Orleans,  and  secure  the  undisturbed  possession 
of  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  river  with  all  its  tribu 
taries.  "The  boundary  at  present  assumed  by  Mex 
ico  is  deemed  objectionable"  for  various  reasons 
which  he  sets  forth.  There  was  some  uncertainty  as 
to  which  of  two  streams  emptying  into  Sabine  Bay 
was  the  true  Sabine  river.  Whichever  it  should  be 
that  river  was  navigable  only  by  small  vessels  and 
never  would  sustain  sufficient  commerce  to  warrant 
the  maintenance  there  of  custom  houses,  without 
which  it  would  be  "  impossible  to  prevent  that  frontier 
from  becoming  the  seat  of  an  extensive  system  of 
smuggling."  The  lands  east  of  the  Sabine  were  poor 
and  occupied  by  persons  of  an  objectionable  character 
who  would  continue  to  create  incessant  difficulties  and 
broils  which  would  foster  and  influence  the  "spirit 
of  jealousy  to  which  our  neighbors  are  already  too 
much  inclined."  In  enumerating  the  reasons  which 
ought  to  induce  Mexico  to  be  willing  to  make 
the  cession  he  begins  by  saying :  "  Nothing  would  be 
more  adverse  to  the  feelings  of  the  President  than 
to  give  that  government  reason  to  believe  that  he  is 


TEXAS   AND   THE    BOUNDARY   ISSUE  339 

capable  of  taking  advantage  of  their  necessities  to  ob 
tain  from  them  any  portion  of  the  Mexican  territory, 
the  cession  of  which  would  impair  the  true  interests 
or  commit  the  honor  of  that  country."  He  then  ar 
gues  :  "  The  comparatively  small  value  of  the  terri 
tory  irf  question  to  Mexico ;  its  remote  and  discon 
nected  situation ;  the  unsettled  condition  of  her  affairs ; 
the  depressed  and  languishing  state  of  her  finances; 
and  the  still,  and  at  this  moment  particularly,  threat 
ening  attitude  of  Spain  all  combine  to  point  out  and 
recommend  to  Mexico  the  policy  of  parting  with  a 
portion  of  her  territory  of  very  limited  and  contingent 
benefit  to  supply  herself  with  the  means  of  defend 
ing  the  residue  with  the  better  prospect  of  success 
and  with  less  onerous  burdens  to  her  citizens.  It  is 
for  the  federal  government  of  Mexico,  if  they  approve 
of  the  policy  of  doing  so,  to  judge  of  their  constitu 
tional  power  to  make  the  cession.  It  is  believed  that 
no  doubt  could  exist  on  that  account  if  the  consent  of 
the  state  of  Coahuila  were  obtained;  and  if  the  view 
we  take  of  the  true  interests  of  the  republic  of  Mexico 
are  not  founded  in  error,  it  is  supposed  that  such  con 
sent  would  not  be  withheld."  An  argument,  as  to 
suggesting  which  Poinsett  was  to  use  his  judgment, 
was  that  the  internal  disturbances  and  revolutions 
of  Mexico  rendered  a  dissolution  of  the  republic  pos 
sible  ;  and  it  was  generally  conceded  that  in  such  event 
Texas  would  be  the  first  to  strike  a  blow  for  inde 
pendence,  the  example  of  which  would  endanger  the 
unity  of  the  rest.  The  aggressive  character  of  the 


34O  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

settlers  on  the  United  States  side  of  the  border;  the 
settlement  of  adventurous  persons  in  the  prohibited 
zone  on  the  Mexican  side;  and  the  lack  of  harmony 
between  the  non-Spanish  settlers  in  Texas  and  the 
government  were  all  causes  of  discord  and  heartburn 
ings  between  the  two  governments  that  should  be 
removed  if  possible.  The  Comanche  Indians  in  Texas 
were  very  troublesome  to  the  settlements  and  occa 
sioned  great  expense  to  the  Mexican  government  to 
maintain  garrisons  there.  Other  tribes  were  mov 
ing  into  the  region  and  increasing  the  trouble. 

The  territory  of  which  the  cession  was  desired  by 
the  United  States  was  described  as  all  lying  east  of 
a  line  drawn  through  the  center  of  the  desert  or  Grand 
Prairie  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande 
"north  to  the  mountains  dividing  the  waters  of  the 
Rio  Grande  del  Norte  from  those  that  run  eastward  to 
the  Gulf,  and  until  it  strikes  our  present  boundary  at  the 
forty-second  degree  of  north  latitude."  If  Poinsett 
found  that  the  Mexican  government  objected  to  this 
line  because  it  contained  the  large  Mexican  settlements 
of  San  Antonio  de  Bexar  and  La  Bahia,  but  still  found 
that  government  disposed  to  part  with  any  portion  of 
the  territory  in  question,  then  he  was  authorized  to 
accept  any  of  three  other  lines,  regarding  those  farthest 
west  as  most  desirable.  The  second  should  begin  at 
the  mouth  of  the  La  Vaca,  ascend  the  left  bank  of  that 
stream  to  its  head,  then  due  north  to  the  Colorado,  up 
the  west  bank  of  that  river  to  its  head,  and  "thence 
by  the  most  direct  course  that  will  intersect  our  line 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY    ISSUE  34! 

at  the  forty-second  degree  of  north  latitude  and  in 
clude  the  head  waters  of  the  Arkansas  and  Red 
rivers."  The  third  line  was  to  commence  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Colorado  and  follow  its  west  bank  all  the  way 
and  thence  as  described  in  the  second.  The  fourth 
was  to  follow  the  west  bank  of  the  Brazos  from  its 
mouth  to  its  source  and  thence  to  the  forty-second 
degree  as  the  two  previous.  Poinsett  was  authorized 
to  make  such  alterations  in  these  lines  as  should  appear 
to  him  clearly  beneficial.  "  The  line  proposed  as  the 
one  most  desirable  to  us  would  constitute  a  natural 
separation  of  the  resources  of  the  two  nations.  It  is 
the  center  of  a  country  uninhabitable  on  the  Gulf; 
and  on  the  mountains  so  difficult  of  access  and  so 
poor  as  to  furnish  no  inducement  for  a  land  inter 
course;  and  of  course  no  theatre  for  those  differ 
ences  that  are  almost  inseparable  from  a  neighbor 
hood  of  commercial  interests.  It  corresponds  with 
the  habitual  feelings  of  the  people  of  Mexico  and 
with  the  avowed  policy  of  the  Mexican  government 
by  causing  a  wide  separation  and  difficulties  of  inter 
course  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries, 
and  by  preventing  those  excitements  and  bickerings 
invariably  produced  by  the  contiguous  operation  of 
conflicting  laws,  habits,  and  interests." 

The  price  to  be  offered  for  Texas,  Van  Buren 
introduces  by  saying,  "  The  President  does  not  desire 
the  proposed  cession  without  rendering  a  just  and  fair 
equivalent  for  it.  He  therefore  authorizes  you  to  of 
fer  to  the  Mexican  government  for  a  cession  accord- 


342  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

ing  to  the  first-mentioned  boundary  a  sum  not  ex 
ceeding  four  millions  of  dollars;  and  so  strong  are 
his  convictions  of  its  great  value  to  the  United  States 
that  he  will  not  object  if  you  should  find  it  indispens 
ably  necessary  to  go  as  high  as  five  millions."  For 
each  of  the  other  lines  Poinsett  was  authorized  to  de 
cide  upon  and  offer  what  he  considered  a  proportion 
ate  amount  of  the  purchase  price.  It  would  be  prefer 
able  to  make  the  payments  in  three  or  four  equal  an 
nual  installments ;  but  if  necessary  the  whole  sum  could 
be  paid  within  four  months  after  the  exchange  of 
ratifications  and  delivery  of  the  possession  of  the 
ceded  territory.  In  case  of  success  other  details  are 
provided  for  such  as  rights  of  navigation  and  juris 
diction,  validity  of  land  grants,  and  the  extension  of 
personal  and  political  rights  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
ceded  territory.92 

Anthony  Butler,  the  author  of  the  report  mentioned 
above  as  one  of  the  principal  bases  of  the  instructions 
to  purchase  Texas,  was  selected  by  the  administra 
tion  to  bear  the  letter  to  Poinsett.  When  in  the  middle 
of  October  of  this  year  1829  Poinsett  was  recalled  at 
the  request  of  the  Mexican  government,  Butler,  al- 

92  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  August  25,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Secret  Record,  I,  39;  House  Executive  Documents, 
25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  10;  British  and  For 
eign  State  Papers,  XXVI,  850,'  This  was  not  entered  in  the 
regular  volume  of  Instructions ;  nor  in  the  regular  volume  of 
the  Archives  of  the  United  States  Embassy  in  Mexico. 
Jackson's  "  full  power "  to  Poinsett  to  negotiate  concerning 
the  matter  bears  the  same  date  as  the  instruction.  See  also 
Van  Buren  MSS.,  Library  of  Congress,  X. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY    ISSUE  343 

ready  on  the  ground,  was  appointed  to  represent  the 
United  States  at  Mexico,  with  the  rank  of  charge. 
On  October  17  Jackson  signed  the  letter  investing  But 
ler  with  full  power  to  conduct  the  negotiation  for 
Texas.  The  instructions  of  August  25,  which  he  had 
borne  to  Poinsett,  were  to  be  his  guide.93 
/  Poinsett,  convinced  of  the  uselessness  of  attempting 
to  acquire  Texas,  and  feeling  that  his  influence  with 
the  government  was  gone,  appears  to  have  refrained 

93  Butler's  commission  as  bearer  of  the  despatch  is  Van 
Buren  to  Butler,  August  24,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Secret  Record,  I,  52 ;  his  "  full  power  "  to  negotiate  is  Jack 
son  to  Butler,  October  17,  1829,  on  page  53  of  the  Secret 
Record.  His  instructions  to  negotiate  are  Van  Buren  to 
Butler,  October  16,  and  the  postscript  to  that  letter  dated 
October  17,  1829,  House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  2 
session,  number  351,  pages  40-53. 

"  Butler,  an  old  comrade  in  arms  of  Jackson,  .  .  .  lacked 
moral  character  and  fitness  for  any  position  of  trust.  No 
worse  selection  for  a  diplomatic  position  could  have  been 
made.  .  .  .  [He]  was  charged  with  being  a  speculator  in 
Texas  lands,  a  gambler,  a  drunkard,  and  a  liar.  But  this 
last  epithet  came  from  Jackson  himself  some  years  after 
wards,  when  his  shortness  of  memory  afforded  him  an  easy 
escape  from  the  entanglements  of  fact.  It  is  safe  to  say  that 
Butler's  mission,  discreditable  and  even  disgraceful,  had  much 
to  do  with  the  unsatisfactory  course  of  our  diplomatic  rela 
tions  with  Mexico  which  ended  in  war.  When  Butler  appears 
for  the  first  time  upon  the  stage  of  diplomacy,  he  had  recently 
been  in  Texas  and  professed  to  be  familiar  with  the  proposed 
river  boundaries.  Sent  to  Mexico  as  bearer  of  despatches  to 
Poinsett,  he  went  overland,  again  through  Texas,  and  secretly. 
.  .  .  From  1829  to  1836,  during  practically  all  of  Jackson's 
term,  Anthony  Butler  represented,  or  rather  misrepresented, 
the  United  States  in  Mexico."  Reeves,  Diplomacy  under 
Tyler  and  Polk,  68. 


344  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

from  even  suggesting  the  new  project.  But  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  was  ready  to  make  a  proposi 
tion  for  the  purchase  of  Texas  became  public  shortly 
after  Poinsett's  departure.  On  January  9,  1830,  a 
paragraph  appeared  in  the  newspaper  called  El  Sol 
declaring  that,  "A  few  days  before  the  departure  of 
Mr.  Poinsett  from  this  capital,  the  American  Colonel 
Butler  arrived  here,  commissioned,  as  it  is  said,  by 
the  government  of  Washington,  to  negotiate  with 
ours  for  the  cession  of  the  province  of  Texas  for  the 
sum  of  five  millions  of  dollars.  As  we  are  not  in 
formed  that,  so  far,  the  colonel  has  made  any  over 
tures  on  the  subject,  we  presume  that  he  does  the  new 
administration  the  justice  to  suppose  it  incapable  of 
lending  itself  to  a  transaction  as  prejudicial  and  de 
grading  to  the  republic  as  it  would  be  disgraceful  to 
the  minister  who  would  subscribe  to  it."  Butler  was 
mystified  at  being  so  quickly  found  out.  He  wrote 
Van  Buren  the  next  day  that  the  paragraph  was  "a 
very  remarkable  one.  You  perceive  that  they  under 
take  not  only  to  assert  that  the  object  of  my  mission 
is  the  purchase  of  Texas,  but  they  also  state  a  price  to 
be  paid  for  the  cession !  I  have  not  time  to  say  much 
on  this  matter  at  present,  but  I  will  endeavor  to  un 
ravel  the  mystery  hereafter."94  In  the  weeks  preced 
ing  and  following  this  a  multitude  of  violently  anti- 
American  newspaper  articles  and  pamphlets  issued 
from  the  Mexican  press,  voicing  the  suspicion  gen- 

94  Butler  to  Van  Buren,  January  10,  1830,  and  enclosure, 
House  Executive  Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number 
351,  page  310. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  345 

erally  felt  that  the  United  States  was  attempting  to 
dismember  the  Mexican  republic.  As  evidence  of  the 
desire  of  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States  for  Mexican  territory  they  unfortunately  had 
the  numerous  articles  which  had  been  appearing  in  the 
administration  newspapers  in  the  United  States  dwell 
ing  on  the  value  of  Texas  and  the  desirability  of  its  ac 
quisition.95 

Finally  the  administration  at  Washington  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  it  was  unwise,  for  the  time  being 
at  least,  to  endeavor  to  make  the  purchase;  and  Van 
Buren  wrote  Butler  April  i,  1830:  "The  unsettled 
state  of  affairs  in  Mexico,  and  the  excitement  growing 
out  of  it,  to  which  reference  has  already  been  several 
times  made  in  the  course  of  this  communication,  have 
induced  an  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  President 
that  the  present  is  not  an  auspicious  moment  for  the 
successful  opening  of  the  negotiations  which  form  the 
object  of  the  instructions  from  this  department  of 
the  25th  of  August,  1829.  To  watch  the  state  of  the 
public  mind,  the  opinions  of  the  principal  members 
of  the  government,  and  hear  what  is  said  on  all  sides, 
is  all  that  is,  for  the  present,  expected  from  your 
agency  in  the  matter.  In  doing  this  the  greatest  cau 
tion  and  circumspection  is  enjoined  upon  you ;  and  the 
exercise  of  the  most  guarded  discretion  will  be  neces 
sary  on  your  part  not  to  commit  yourself  or  your  gov 
ernment  upon  any  point  connected  with  the  subject. 
You  will,  also,  in  informing  this  department  of  the 

95  See   McMaster,    History  of   the   People  of   the  United 
States,  V,  543-547- 


346  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

result  of  your  observations  and  reflections,  adopt  every 
measure  which  prudence  will  suggest  to  insure  the 
safety  of  your  communications.  If,  however,  an  op 
portunity  should  present  itself  to  carry  into  effect  the 
wishes  of  your  government,  in  this  respect,  you  will 
not  fail  to  embrace  it  upon  the  principles  and  accord 
ing  to  the  instructions  already  given  to  you."96 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  trace  the  rela 
tions  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  respect 
ing  Texas  and  the  boundary  only  through  the  year 
1829.  The  instruction  of  April  i  of  the  following  year 
is  introduced  to  show  that  the  Jackson  administration 
virtually  withdrew  the  offer  of  the  preceding  August. 
In  the  hands  of  most  diplomatic  agents  this  instruc 
tion,  taken  together  with  the  state  of  public  opinion 
in  Mexico,  would  have  ended  completely  all  effort  to 
obtain  the  cession  of  Texas.  But  it  was  not  so  with 
Butler.  He  interpreted  the  last  sentence  quoted  as 
leaving  the  matter  entirely  to  his  discretion.  On  re 
ceiving  the  letter  he  replied:  "I  am  glad  that  you 
adopt  the  opinion  that  the  present  time  is  inauspicious 
for  the  commencement  of  the  negotiation  for  Texas, 
and  have  placed  under  my  discretion  the  period  and 
the  manner  of  opening  that  subject.  That  discretion 
shall  be  exercised  with  all  proper  caution,  and  my 
judgment  taxed  to  the  extent  of  its  powers  for  secur 
ing  success."97  During  the  six  years  of  his  residence 

96  Van   Buren  to  Butler,   April   i,    1830,   House  Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  62. 

97  Butler  to  Van  Buren,   May  21,    1830,   House  Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  326. 


TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE  347 

he  never  abandoned  the  project,  showing  in  his  corre 
spondence  with  the  officials  of  the  government  in 
Washington  an  unblushing  readiness  to  resort  to  brib 
ery  and  trickery  when  he  found  that  legitimate  diplo 
matic  effort  would  not  accomplish  his  purpose.98)  To 
show  the  ultimate  failure  of  all  negotiations  respect 
ing  the  boundary  up  to  this  date,  the  subsequent  fate 
of  the  treaty  of  limits  pending  at  this  time  should  be 
briefly  traced.  It  will  be  recalled  that  it  was  con 
cluded  January  12,  1828,  and  that,  owing  to  delay  on 
the  part  of  Mexico  the  exchange  of  ratifications  was 
not  effected  within  the  stipulated  time  limit  of  four 
months.  On  April  5,  1831,  an  additional  article  was 
concluded  renewing  the  treaty  and  extending  the  time 
for  exchanging  the  ratifications  one  year  from  that 
date."  On  April  5,  1832,  the  last  day  allowed,  the 
ratifications  were  exchanged.  This  time  the  Mex 
ican  government  acted  nearly  three  months  before  the 
expiration  of  the  time ;  but  the  United  States  delayed 
until  the  last  day,  the  Mexican  representative  having 
declared  two  days  earlier  that  his  government  had  in 
structed  him  not  to  exchange  the  ratifications  of  the 
commercial  treaty  unless  those  of  the  treaty  of  limits 
could  be  exchanged  at  the  same  time,  and  the  United 
States  Senate  having  advised  and  consented  to  its  rati 
fication  on  the  day  preceding  the  exchange.100  The 

98  See  Barker,  "  Jackson  and  the  Texas  Revolution,"  Ameri 
can  Historical  Review,  XII,  791-797. 

"United  States,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  1776-1909,  I, 
1084. 

100  United  States,  Treaties  and  Conventions,   1776-1909,  I, 


34^  TEXAS   AND   THE   BOUNDARY   ISSUE 

one  year  provided  in  article  three  within  which  com 
missioners  should  meet  to  begin  marking  the  line  ex 
pired  without  Mexico's  acting,  though  the  United 
States  had  been  prompt  enough  this  time;101  and  on 
April  3,  1835,  a  second  additional  article  was  agreed 
to  which  provided  that  the  commissioners  should  be 
appointed  within  one  year  from  the  exchange  of  the 
ratifications  of  this  second  additional  article.  But  the 
ratifications  of  this  article  were  not  exchanged  till 
April  20,  i836,102  when  Texas  had  wrested  her  inde 
pendence  from  Mexico  by  force  of  arms.  The  com 
missioners  never  met. 

With  the  attempts  of  the  Mexican  government  in 
September,  1829,  and  April,  1830,  to  stop  immigra 
tion  into  Texas  from  the  United  States,  the  relations 
between  Texas  and  Mexico  and  the  relations  between 
Mexico  and  the  United  States  respecting  Texas  enter 
a  new  phase.  This  has  been,  and  is  being,  treated  with 
sufficient  fullness  by  students  of  the  Texas  Revolution, 
the  Texas  national  period,  and  the  annexation  of 
Texas  to  the  United  States. 

1084 ;  and  Montoya  to  Livingston,  March  26,  1832,  House  Ex 
ecutive  Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page 
51 ;  and  same  to  same,  March  31,  1832,  in  the  same  document, 
page  53 ;  also  same  to  same,  April  3,  1832,  in  the  same  docu 
ment,  page  57. 

101  Castillo  to  McLane,  December  2,  1833,  House  Executive 
Documents,  25  congress,  I  session,  number  42,  page  60;  same 
to  same,  same  document,  page  62;  McLane  to  Butler,  Jan 
uary  13,  1834,  same  document,  page  16;  and  Butler  to  Lom- 
bardo,  December  21,  1834,  same  document,  page  38. 

102  Mexico,  Tratados  y  Convenciones,  I,  180. 


CHAPTER  X 

PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT  AND  His  RECALL 

Poinsett's  part  in  the  organization  of  the  York 
Masons,  the  beginning  of  the  political  activity  of  those 
lodges,  and  the  early  attacks  on  him  because  of  his  re 
lations  with  them  have  been  considered  in  a  previous 
chapter.1  The  Yorkino  party,  which  had  come  into 
existence  in  the  early  part  of  1826  and  before  the  end 
of  the  year  had  grown  so  strong  as  to  carry  most 
of  thef  state  elections,  continued  to  grow  and  retained 
its  influence.  The  Escoceses,  the  Scottish  Masons, 
unable  to  retain  or  regain  influence  and  still  attribut 
ing  the  growth  and  power  of  their  opponents  to  the 
magic  influence  of  Poinsett  over  the  government  and 
the  Yorkinos,  resorted  first  to  innuendo  and  then  to 
violence,  in  order  to  drive  him  from  the  country. 

Zavala,  who  was  a  Yorkino,  says  that  the  newspapers 
which  the  opposing  factions  established  declared  with 
as  much  ignorance  as  impudence  that  so  long  as  the 
Escoceses  had  control  the  government  was  tranquil 
and  prosperous ;  but  that  as  soon  as  the  Yorkinos  at 
tempted  to  take  part  in  the  government  disorder  and 
anarchy  prevailed.  He  says  that  this  is  the  argument 
of  the  tyrant  who  has  monopolized  power  and  wishes 
to  keep  it  from  the  people.  Just  so,  he  continues,  the 

1  That  on  Poinsett's  Relations  with  the  York  Masons. 
349 


3  SO  PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON   POINSETT 

king  of  Spain  argued  that,  so  long  as  the  Spaniards 
were  allowed  to  rule  America  and  the  natives  did 
nothing  but  obey,  all  was  quiet;  but  as  soon  as  the 
natives  began  to  assert  their  rights  the  struggle  began 
and  peace  vanished.2  The  Yorkinos  also  published 
papers  to  advocate  their  cause.  These  became  the 
objects  of  suspicion  and  attack  from  their  opponents 
who  declared  that  they  were  subsidized  by  Poinsett 
and  were  working  for  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
as  opposed  to  those  of  Mexico.3 

2  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  I,  354.    In  the  preceding  seven 
pages  Zavala  reviews   the  party  strife.    The  tone  of   these 
newspaper  criticisms  of  Poinsett  and  of  the  government  sup 
posed  to  be  dominated  by  him  is  shown  in  the  following  ex 
tracts  from  Voz  de  la  Patria,  II,  numero  8,  15  de  febrero  de 
1830:   "No  afligan  menos  la  Patria  los  males  politicos  que 
ya  comenzaban  a  manifestarse,  y  cujo  origen  fontal  se  debe 
casi  esclusivamente  a  la  instalacion  de  los  logias  de  los  Yorki 
nos  en  Mexico.  .  .  .  Poinsett,  el  regulador  y  arbitro  de  este 
establecimiento,  de  que  se  ha  llamado  Sumo  Pontifice,  mui 
luego  procure  sacar  todo  el  partido  posible  para  llenar  sus 
objetos  principales;  a  saber  destruir  nuestra  Republica,  y  en- 
grandecer  la  del  Norte  America,  por  ser  on  [en]  su  concepto 
incompatible  la  existencia  de  ambas.  ...  La  mano  artera  de 
Poinsett  movia  a  su  placer  los  hilos  de  esta  trama :  este  hombre 
insidioso   de  la  humanidad,  y  cujo  nombre  hace  temblar  a 
las  republicos  de  Chiloe  ,y  Buenos-Aires,  de  donde  fue  lan- 
zado  como  una  mala  y  dam'na  bestia." 

3  Aviraneta,  a  European  Spaniard  traveling  in  Mexico,  was 
told  in  Vera  Cruz  "  que  el  Mercurio  es  un  periodico  suben- 
cionado  por  Poinssete  [sic]   enviado  de  los  Estados  Unidos: 
es  un  periodico  yorkino,  para  promover  la  espulsion  de  los 
comerciantes  y  propietarios  Espanoles  del  teritorio  del  repub- 
lica,  y  substituir  la  influencia  del  pueblo  Yanki."     See  Avi 
raneta  e  Ibargoyen,  Memorias  Intimas,  1825-1829,  in  D.  Luis 
Garcia  Pimentel,  Documentos  Historicos  de  Mejico,  III,  45. 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  251 

On  November  10,  1827,  Poinsett  reported  to  Clay 
an  act  which  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  he  could  have 
defended  from  the  charge  of  interfering  in  Mexican 
politics.  As  has  been  shown  in  preceding  chapters 
Guerrero  had  been  closely  associated  with  what  Poin 
sett  frequently  alluded  to  as  the  American  or  demo 
cratic  party.  He  was  also  a  member  of  the  Yorkino 
lodges,  an  active  spirit  in  their  organization,  and 
practically  the  head  of  the  order.  In  October,  1826, 
Poinsett  had  predicted  that  Guerrero  would  be  the 
Yorkino  candidate  for  the  next  presidential  election. 
He  now  proceeded  to  assist  in  making  his  prophecy 
come  true. 

Against  the  wish  of  his  friends  in  the  government 
Guerrero  had  declared  that  he  was  going  to  join  the 
movement,  at  the  time  becoming  popular,  for  ex 
pelling  from  Mexico  all  remaining  European  Span 
iards.  These  friends  appealed  to  Poinsett  to  per 
suade  Guerrero  to  abandon  his  designs,  and  to  awrait 
patiently  the  effect  of  his  friends'  efforts  to  have  him 
elected  next  year  as  successor  to  Victoria.  He  had 
written  the  desired  letter,  Poinsett  told  Clay,  and  Pres 
ident  Victoria  had  thanked  him  for  writing  it.  Guer 
rero  had  replied  in  a  tone  of  great  intimacy,  modestly 
declaring  his  unfitness  for  the  high  office  which  Poin 
sett  had  thus  informed  him  his  friends  wished  him  to 

On  page  58  he  says :  "  Los  escritores  del  Mercuric  son  hom- 
bres  vendidos  al  oro  que  desparama  Poinsset  [sic]  a  manos 
llenas,  entre  los  incautios  mejicanos."  A  brief  outline  ac 
count  of  the  party  strife  is  printed  in  Martinez,  Sinopsis  His- 
torica  de  las  Revoluciones,  I,  58. 


352         PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT 

become  a  candidate  for.  Poinsett  virtually  admitted 
that  this  was  interference  by  telling  Clay  he  wished 
President  Adams  to  understand  that  he  had  never 
taken  any  step  toward  interfering  in  the  affairs  of 
Mexico  \"  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  and  gen 
erally  at  the  solicitation  of  the  government."*  •,  If  the 
government  had  been  as  subservient  to  Poinsett  as  his 
critics  supposed  it  to  be,  he  would  have  had  no  diffi 
culty  in  obtaining  their  consent.  It  was  the  suspicion 
that  he  and  the  government  were  in  accord  that  occa 
sioned  their  most  serious  criticism.  But  from  the 
tone  of  Poinsett's  letter  to  Clay  it  is  evident  here  also, 
as  in  other  cases  where  his  acts  might  be  considered  of 
doubtful  propriety,  that  he  was  doing  what  he  believed 
to  be  for  the  good  of  Mexico,  and  deemed  necessary  in 
order  to  prevent  that  country  from  suffering  serious 
evils  which  he  thought  he  foresaw. 

The  danger  which  he  and  Guerrero's  friends  fore 
saw  this  time  was  real.  Within  less,  than  a  month  he 
reported  that  there  had  been  an  insurrectionary  move 
ment  in  Puebla  and  in  Vera  Cruz  the  purpose  of  which 
was  to  force  those  states  to  expel  the  European  Span 
iards.  In  the  latter  state  it  had  accomplished  its  pur 
pose  immediately,  the  legislature  yielding  without  re 
sistance;  but  in  the  former  it  had  resulted  in  blood 
shed.  These  and  similar  movements  elsewhere  were 
being  promoted  by  a  secret  society  that  had  been  or 
ganized  for  the  purpose  by  leading  members  of  the 
Yorkino  party  and  modeled  on  the  Italian  Carbonari. 

*  Poinsett  to  Clay,  November  10,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III. 


PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT        353 

The  new  organizations  had  spread  rapidly  and  vir 
tually  controlled  the  whole  country.  They  were  pre 
paring  to  manage  the  election  of  Guerrero  in  the  com 
ing  campaign.5 

Disturbances  rapidly  developed.  Party  controversy 
became  more  bitter.  Poinsett  reported  on  January  9, 
1828,  that  the  Escoceses,  despairing  of  regaining  their 
influence  by  peaceable  means,  had  appealed  to  arms. 
He  confessed  that  he  had  not  foreseen  this  conflict 
because  he  did  not  think  the  leaders  of  that  party 
would  be  so  rash. 

On  December  23,  preceding,  the  Plan  of  Montano 
had  been  proclaimed  and  a  revolution  started  to  force 
its  adoption.  The  plan  contained  four  demands :  The 
first  was  the  extermination  of  all  secret  societies. 
The  second  was  the  dismissal  of  certain  ministers. 
The  fourth  was  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  con 
stitution  and  laws.  But  the  principal  demand  was  the 
third,  \vhich  was  aimed  directly  at  Poinsett  and  de 
clared  :  "  The  Supreme  Government  shall,  without  an 
instant's  delay,  furnish  the  envoy  of  the  United  States 
to  this  republic  with  his  passports  to  leave  the  country." 
The  fourth  demand  is  the  stock  argument  of  the  revo 
lutionist  that  he  is  not  trying  to  destroy  the  govern 
ment  or  the  laws  but  to  maintain  them.  The  second 
grew  out  of  the  belief  that  the  ministers  were  the 
tools  of  Poinsett  and  working  for  the  interests  of  the 

5  Poinsett  to  Clay,  December  8,  1827,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.  He  said  an  act  for  the 
expulsion  of  the  Spaniards  was  before  the  lower  house  of 
the  national  Congress  and  would  probably  pass. 

24 


354  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 

United  States.  The  purpose  of  the  first  was  the  de 
struction  of  what  was  considered  a  gigantic  organiza 
tion  which  enabled  Poinsett  and  his  friends  to  dom 
inate  the  country.  Thus  the  other  three  demands 
grew  out  of  and  were  but  corollaries  to  the  third,  the 
ostensible  purpose  of  which  was  to  rid  the  country  of 
what  was  felt  to  be  the  baneful  influence  of  the  United 
States  minister.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  the  des 
perate  effort  of  a  disappointed  and  despairing  political 
faction  to  regain  control  by  voicing  what  was  thought 
to  be  a  popular  demand.  But  they  were  mistaken  in 
the  strength  of  their  cause,  although  at  first  it  seemed 
formidable  and  had  high  official  sanction.  Nicholas 
Bravo,  the  vice-president  and  titular  head  of  the  Scot 
tish  Masons,  took  the  field  at  the  head  of  the  revolu 
tionary  forces.  But  General  Guerrero,  titular  head  of 
the  York  Masons,  led  the  government  troops  and 
overthrew  Bravo  and  his  associates  in  less  than  a 
month  and  with  scarcely  an  effort.  Movements  simi 
lar  to  this  and  in  sympathy  with  it  were  expected  to 
follow  shortly  in  many  places.  In  Vera  Cruz  the  stan 
dard  of  revolt  was  raised  and  the  governor  headed  the 
movement.  Active  measures  prevented  such  risings 
elsewhere.  Other  states  hastened  to  express  their  in 
dignation  and  Vera  Cruz  retracted  its  position. 

The  diplomatic  corps  in  the  city  had  openly  advo 
cated  the  cause  of  the  insurgents;  but  Poinsett  was 
sure  that  they  had  acted  without  instructions.  They 
had  been  deceived  into  thinking  the  movement  would 
easily  succeed  because  the  social  aristocracy  belonged 


PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT         355 

to  Bravo's  party.  Poinsett  added :  "  It  is  needless  to 
say  that  I  have  pursued  a  different  course.  The  cause 
of  free  institutions  is  the  cause  of  America,  and  al 
though  I  have  taken  no  part  in  the  contest  and  ob 
truded  no  advice,  I  have  not  withheld  my  opinion 
and  counsel  whenever  it  has  been  asked  by  this  gov 
ernment  or  by  those  connected  with  it."  Speaking  of 
the  demand  that  he  be  sent  out  of  the  country  he  de 
clared  :  "  These  people  [the  Scottish  party]  persist  in 
regarding  me  as  the  principal  obstacle  to  their  success 
and  as  directing  not  only  the  operations  of  the  oppo 
site  party  but  of  the  government."  In  closing  this 
long  report  of  the  revolt  and  its  collapse  he  said  he 
considered  the  event  fortunate  since  it  had  overthrown 
the  faction  concerning  whose  plots  there  had  been 
great  uneasiness.6  After  telling,  on  February  9,  of 
the  collapse  of  the  revolt  Poinsett  showred  that  he  was 
thinking  of  making  his  escape  from  the  continual  in 
sinuations  and  attacks  made  by  the  party  opposed  to 
the  government.  He  said:  "Although  very  desirous 
to  avail  myself  of  the  permission  of  the  President 
to  terminate  my  mission,  I  shall  wait  until  the  treaties 
are  ratified,  and  until  I  can  leave  this  country  without 

6  Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  9.  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  III.  The  most  radical  York- 
inos  wished  to  execute  the  rebels ;  the  Escoceses  wished  to 
proclaim  an  amnesty  for  all.  Wisely  a  middle  course  was 
pursued.  They  were  allowed  to  go  into  exile,  and  ultimately 
to  return.  See  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  V,  37-40;  Ri 
vera,  Historia  de  Jalapa,  II,  450;  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico, 
V,  836-839;  and  Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848, 
I,  172. 


356        PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT 

prejudice  to  the  interests  which  have  been  entrusted 
to  me."7 

The  failure  of  the  Montafio  revolt  left  the  Yorkinos 
in  control  of  the  government.  The  fact  that  it  had 
ostensibly  been  directed  at  Poinsett  and  had  failed  to 
drive  him  out  of  the  country  confirmed  the  popular 
notion  of  his  magic  influence  over  the  government  and 
country.8  In  July,  two  months  before  it  occurred, 
Poinsett  wrote  that  excitement  over  the  coming  presi 
dential  election  was  high,  and  there  was  talk  of  revis 
ing  the  election  laws.  He  believed  the  popular  party 
would  prevail;  but  feared  a  revolution  over  this  and 
the  disordered  finances.  After  the  election  and  before 
the  result  was  known  he  wrote  that  the  candidate  of 
the  aristocratic  party  seemed  to  lead,  and  added  that  if 
Guerrero,  the  popular  candidate,  should  not  be  elected 
he  believed  the  people  would  rise  against  the  choice 

7  Poinsett  to  Clay,  February  9,  1828,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,   Despatches   from   Mexico,   III.    The  President's  per 
mission  to  terminate  his  mission  here  referred  to  was  con 
tained  in   Clay  to   Poinsett,   November   19,    1827,   mentioned 
above  at  the  close  of  the  chapter  on  Poinsett's  Relations  with 
the  York  Masons. 

8  Looking  back  after  Poinsett's  departure  on  the  period  of 
strife  during  his  stay  in  Mexico,  Voz  de  la  Patria,  II,  numero 
14,  ii  de  marzo  de  1830,  says:  "  Poinsett  mandaba  a  Victoria, 
como  a  un  piljuanejo,  y  este  no  queria  oir  mas  voz  que  la  de 
Poinsett,  .  .  .  Poinsett  llevaba  adelante  su  influjo,  y  sacaba  de 
el  todo  el  partido  posible.  Figurabase  ser  algun  dia  el  arbitro 
de  la  nacion." 

Ibar's  Muerte  Politica  de  la  Republica,  numero  n,  20  de 
mayo  de  1829,  speaks  of  "  las  miras  ambiciosas  de  ese  ministro 
estrangero,  agente  pagado  por  el  gabinete  de  Norte-America 
para  remacharnos  las  cadenas  de  la  esclavitud." 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  357 

which  should  be  made.  On  September  25,  1828,  he 
wrote  that  the  election  had  resulted  in  the  choice  by  a 
very  narrow  majority  of  Pedraza,  the  aristocratic  can 
didate,  over  Guerrero,  the  popular  nominee.  In  antici 
pation  of  this  the  radical  Yorkinos  had  already  ap 
pealed  to  arms  in  the  state  of  Vera  Cruz  under  the 
leadership  of  Santa  Anna,  who  had  raised  a  cry  for  the 
preservation  of  the  federal  system  of  government,  for 
the  sovereign  rights  of  the  people,  for  the  immortal 
Guerrero,  and  for  the  expulsion  of  the  European  Span 
iards.  During  the  first  four  days  of  December  there 
was  fighting  in  the  streets  of  Mexico  City,  Poinsett 
wrote  on  the  tenth  of  that  month,  which  resulted  in 
the  complete  success  of  the  revolutionists.  Pedraza, 
the  President-elect  and  according  to  Poinsett  the  cause 
of  all  the  trouble,  had  fled ;  and  Guerrero,  the  defeated 
candidate,  was  made  secretary  for  war  instead  of 
Pedraza  in  the  cabinet  of  President  Victoria.  Notice 
had  been  sent  to  both  factions  struggling  throughout 
the  country  to  cease  hostilities.  The  principal  agent 
in  effecting  the  revolution,  Poinsett  said,  was  Zavala, 
who  had  been  forced  into  the  ranks  by  unwise  attacks 
on  him  in  the  Senate,  charging  him  unjustly  with  hav 
ing  been  in  communication  with  the  insurrection.  The 
secretary  of  state  had  come  to  Poinsett  and  revealed 
his  fears  that  England  or  some  other  foreign  power 
would  interfere.  Poinsett  calmed  his  fears  by  declar 
ing  that  no  power  had  any  right  to  interfere.  During 
December  the  country  was  in  a  state  of  anarchy.  But 
toward  the  end  of  the  month  most  of  the  states  had 


358        PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT 

given  in  their  adherence;  and  early  in  the  new  year 
the  last  resistance  had  ceased.  Poinsett  declared  it 
to  be  his  belief  that  it  had  been  the  federal  institu 
tions  only  that  had  saved  Mexico  from  a  military  des 
potism.  He  deplored  the  violence  that  had  resulted 
but  declared  that  if  ever  a  revolution  could  be  justified 
this  was,  for  the  oligarchy  had  again  gotten  control 
and  the  weak  Victoria  had  yielded  to  them  a  second 
time.  Many  of  the  popular  party  had  been  impris 
oned  without  cause.  The  election  had  been  by  states, 
each  having  one  vote  cast  by  its  legislature.  When 
the  votes  were  counted  by  the  national  Congress  it 
was  declared  that  Pedraza  had  received  a  majority  of 
the  votes,  but  that  public  opinion  had  pronounced  so 
positively  against  him  that  even  he  had  felt  the  neces 
sity  of  resigning  all  claims  to  the  office.  In  conse 
quence  of  this  the  choice  was  reduced  to  the  next 
highest.  Therefore  Guerrero  was  declared  elected. 
During  the  remainder  of  the  unexpired  presidential 
term  civil  commotions  continued  in  some  of  the  states 
in  resistance  to  the  government  and  the  declared  re 
sult  of  the  election ;  and  the  national  Senate,  still  dom 
inated  by  the  aristocratic  party,  was  also  resisting  the 
will  of  the  people  especially  in  the  matter  of  the  ex 
pulsion  of  Spaniards  and  in  declaring  amnesty  for  the 
participants  in  the  late  revolution.  But  early  in  March 
Poinsett  reported  that  quiet  had  been  restored  through 
out  the  country  and  the  choice  of  Guerrero  seemed  to 
be  giving  general  satisfaction.  And  on  April  3,  1829, 
he  reported  that  Guerrero  had  been  inaugurated  as 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  359 

President  on  the  first  of  the  month,  and  that  the  re 
public  was  tranquil.  On  April  15  he  said  the  Pres 
ident  seemed  about  to  confine  his  cabinet  to  members 
of  the  popular  party,  which  Poinsett  considered  a  wise 
move.  Poinsett's  friend,  Zavala,  had  been  made  sec 
retary  of  the  treasury,  and  would,  he  thought,  give 
general  satisfaction.9 

In  his  long  recapitulation  on  March  10,  1829,  for 
the  benefit  of  the  new  Jackson  administration  at  Wash 
ington  of  all  that  had  passed  since  he  had  been  in 
Mexico,  after  telling  how  the  members  of  the  defeated 
Scottish  party  and  the  representatives  of  the  foreign 
powers  had  all  abused  him  both  publicly  and  privately, 
and  after  reviewing  the  attacks  upon  him  by  the  legis 
lature  of  Vera  Cruz  and  Puebla,  and  recounting  the 
suspicions  and  charges  against  him  in  connection  with 
the  Montano  revolt  and  the  revolution  following  the 
elections  of  1828,  Poinsett  declared  his  belief  that 
"there  is  no  instance  on  record  of  a  foreign  minister 
having  been  so  persecuted  in  any  country."  He  real 
ized  that  it  was  hard  to  believe  this  hatred  was  not  due 

9  This  account  of  the  campaign,  the  election,  and  the  results 
is  taken  entirely  from  Poinsett's  letters  to  Clay  running 
throughout  the  nine  months,  as  follows:  July  16,  1828;  Sep 
tember  17,  1828;  September  25,  1828;  October  22,  1828;  De 
cember  10,  1828;  December  17,  1828;  December  24,  1828;  De 
cember  27,  1828;  January  8,  1829;  January  10,  1829;  January 
23,  1829;  January  31,  1829;  March  3,  1829;  April  3,  1829;  and 
April  15,  1829;  all  in  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  IV. 

Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  I,  173-177, 
gives  a  good  account  of  the  election  and  the  revolution  fol 
lowing  it. 


360        PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT 

to  improper  interference.  But  it  had  resulted  purely 
from  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  encroachments  of  Euro 
pean  powers.  If  he  had  chosen  to  witness  such  with 
indifference,  he  said  he  could  have  passed  on  smoothly 
and  insignificantly.  But  he  did  not  think  this  the 
proper  course;  and  had  cheerfully  borne  the  obloquy 
which  his  conduct  had  brought  upon  him,  caring  only 
that  his  actions  should  be  fully  understood  in  the 
United  States  and  especially  by  the  government.10  It 

10  Poinsett  to  Clay,  March  10,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV.  In  this  long  letter  cov 
ering  42  pages,  commenting  further  on  the  persons  and  prin 
ciples  involved  in  the  revolutionary  events  of  recent  months, 
Poinsett  said  that  Pedraza  was  a  political  turncoat;  he  had 
fought  during  the  war  for  independence  in  the  Spanish  service 
against  the  insurgents;  he  went  as  a  deputy  to  the  Cortes  in 
Spain;  on  his  return  he  became  a  minister  of  Iturbide;  later 
he  was  a  leader  in  the  overthrow  of  Iturbide  and  an  adherent 
of  the  Scottish  party;  on  the  discovery  of  the  plot  of  Friar 
Arenas  and  the  connection  of  the  Scottish  party  with  it,  he 
deserted  that  party  and  won  popularity  in  the  punishment  of 
those  conspirators  and  in  assisting  to  overthrow  General 
Bravo ;  he  became  secretary  for  war ;  and  when  it  was  desired 
to  divide  the  York  party  he  was  chosen  as  the  instrument, 
having  friends  in  all  of  the  opposing  factions.  His  success  in 
the  election  for  president  was  due  to  the  fact  that  some  of 
the  state  legislatures  had  been  chosen  while  the  Scottish 
party  was  in  the  lead.  The  Senate  and  Supreme  Court  of  the 
federal  government  were  both  still  of  that  faction.  He  be 
lieved  if  the  reactionary  factions  had  used  their  advantage 
with  moderation  they  could  have  retained  power ;  but  their 
persecution  drove  Santa  Anna,  Zavala,  and  others  to  take 
refuge  in  revolution. 

Poinsett  defended  the  army  that  took  Mexico  by  assault, 
and  said  the  cruelties  that  had  been  attributed  to  it  had  been 
greatly  exaggerated.  He  blamed  the  government  for  not 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  361 

should  be  noticed  here  again  that  Poinsett  does  not 
claim  not  to  have  interfered  in  Mexican  political  af 
fairs,  but  endeavors  to  defend  his  actions  from  the 
charge  of  improper  interference  by  explaining  his 
motive. 

The  opposition  to  the  election  of  Guerrero  thus- 
acquiesced  in  his  inauguration  in  April,  1829,  and  it 
seemed  for  a  time  that  his  administration  would  suc 
ceed  in  maintaining  quiet  in  the  country.  But  the 
opposition  to  Poinsett,  because  he  was  popularly  sup 
posed  to  have  been  largely  instrumental  in  bringing 
about  the  victory  of  the  new  government,  never  ceased.  / 
Attacks  by  the  public  press  became  more  frequent,  / 
more  virulent,  and  more  unreasonable.  A  periodical 
of  June  6,  1829,  asked  in  inflammatory  language  why 
all  Mexicans  did  not  unite  in  one  terrific  cry  that 

having  prevented  the  attack  on  the  city  by  a  vigorous  defence 
at  first;  and  when  they  had  failed  to  do  that  he  thought  they 
should  have  accepted  the  proffered  opportunity  to  capitulate 
before  the  attack  began.  The  opposition  of  the  recent  revolu 
tionists  to  the  Spaniards,  he  said,  could  be  explained  by  re 
viewing  the  political  interference  of  the  Spaniards,  who  had 
been  uniformly  trying  to  restore  Spanish  control.  The  Senate 
still  refused  to  pass  a  law  expelling  the  Spaniards  as  the  revo 
lutionists  demanded  because  the  Spaniards  had  uniformly  sup 
ported  the  Scottish  party  which  still  prevailed  in  that  body. 
He  feared  that  this  might  cause  some  further  disturbance. 

For  reviews  of  the  election  of  1828  and  the  disturbances  fol 
lowing,  in  addition  to  Rives,  cited  in  note  9,  see  Bancroft, 
History  of  Mexico,  V,  40-45;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  II, 
101-148;  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mejico,  V,  839-843;  Zamacois, 
Historia  de  Mejico,  XI,  671-715.  Zavala's  account  is  of  course 
prejudiced  in  favor  of  the  revolution,  since  he  was  one  of  the 
chief  leaders  in  it. 


362        PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT 

would  penetrate  the  sordid  deafness  of  those  con 
trolling  the  government  demanding  that  the  country 
should  rid  itself  of  that  bold  and  intriguing  minister, 
the  sole  source  of  all  of  the  country's  evils  and  mis 
eries.  On  June  24  the  same  periodical  declared  that 
if  the  republic  of  North  America  really  wished  to 
show  that  she  desired  the  friendship  and  good  faith 
of  Mexico  she  ought  to  order  this  astute  and  intrigu 
ing  minister  to  withdraw  from  Mexican  soil.  Let 
those  States  know  that  the  Mexican  nation  detested 
him  and  justly  desired  his  expulsion.11 

On  July  15  Poinsett  wrote  that  Mexico  was  in  a 
critical  condition.  The  dissolution  of  the  confederacy 
seemed  inevitable  unless  some  popular  military  chief 
seized  control  to  save  it;  and  that  would  be  a  death 
blow  to  free  institutions.  Added  to  the  danger  of  in 
vasion  from  Spain  was  the  opposition  in  the  states  to 
the  federal  government  and  the  dissensions  between 
states.  Many  Mexicans  were  so  desirous  of  chang 
ing  the  form  of  the  government  that  they  would 
rather  deliver  the  country  to  a  foreign  prince  than  see 
it  continue  in  its  present  form.  He  believed  European 
governments  were  intriguing  to  bring  about  such  a 
change;  and  said  he  would  like  to  know  the  attitude 
of  the  administration.  For  himself,  he  thought  it 

11  Ibar,  Muerte  Politica  de  la  Republica  Mexicana,  numero 
15,  6  de  junio  de  1829;  numero  19,  24  de  junio  de  1829; 
numero  i,  n  de  marzo  de  1829;  numero  6,  23  de  abril  de 
1829;  and  numero  26,  18  de  julio  de  1829.  The  last  declares 
that  it  is  also  said  with  some  reserve  that  Poinsett  was  a  paid 
agent  of  the  Madrid  government  to  assist  in  the  Spanish 
reconquest. 


PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT         363 

could  not  accord  with  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  to  permit  any  European  power  to  obtain  undue 
influence  in  these  states.12 

At  the  end  of  July,  1829,  the  legislature  of  the 
state  of  Mexico  addressed  a  memorial  to  President 
Guerrero  requesting  the  dismissal  of  Poinsett.  It  was 
a  long  diatribe  based  confessedly  not  on  facts  proved 
but  on  a  general  belief  that  he  was  secretly  opposed  to 
the  interests  of  Mexico,  that  he  was  the  cause  of  dis 
cord  in  Mexico,  and  that  his  presence  was  undesirable. 
It  called  to  witness  the  cry  of  alarm  which  was  re 
sounding  throughout  the  republic  against  him.  It 
declared  that  his  character  of  a  diplomat  ought  to  have 
caused  him  to  refrain  from  all  interference  in  internal 
affairs.  The  legislature  would  not  say,  as  some 
thought,  that  he  was  the  controlling  spirit  of  the  ad 
ministration  ;  but  it  was  well  known  that  he  had  been 
instrumental  in  organizing  one  of  the  secret  societies 
whose  struggle  was  the  cause  of  the  country's  disasters.  N> 
It  had  been  suggested  that  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  being  opposed  to  those  of  Mexico  made  it  de 
sirable  to  prolong  the  discord  in  the  latter  and  the 
agent  of  those  states  was  maintained  in  Mexico  for 
that  purpose.  Whether  this  suspicion  was  true  or  not 
the  character  of  their  envoy  was  such  as  to  adapt  him 
for  carrying  out  such  a  policy.  His  natural  talents, 
his  smooth  and  elegant  manner,  his  erudition,  his 
cheerful  disposition,  and  his  professed  devotion  to  re 
publicanism  all  adapted  him  for  political  manipula- 

12  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  July  15,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


364  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 

tions.  [  If  this  was  not  the  policy  of  that  government 
why  did  not  the  President  or  cabinet  at  Washington 
voluntarily  recall  him,  knowing  the  discord  he  was 
causing,  to  prevent  new  catastrophes  and  avoid  com 
promising  the  friendly  relations  of  the  countries?  In 
closing,  the  legislature  requested  the  President  of  the 
republic  to  give  orders  that  Poinsett  be  given  his  pass 
ports  to  leave  the  country.13 

In  the  following  weeks  the  legislatures  of  several 
other  states  made  the  same  request.  A  few  days  after 
the  first  attack  Poinsett  published  a  lengthy  reply  to 
the  suspicions  and  charges  declaring  that  they  were 
without  foundation.  In  this  he  said  that  he  felt  com 
passion  rather  than  anger,  and  closed  with  a  paternal 
exhortation  breathing  good  will  for  the  Mexican 
people  as  a  whole  in  spite  of  the  attacks  which  a 
faction  were  making  upon  him.  He  declared  that 
there  was  no  jealousy  in  the  United  States  for  Mex 
ico  but  a  desire  for  the  latter's  prosperity;  and  ap 
pealed  to  Mexicans  to  imitate  the  institutions  and  the 
characteristics  which  made  the  United  States  great.14 

In  Poinsett's  letter  to  Van  Buren  of  August  7,  tell- 

13  Manifesto   of  the  Legislature  of  the   State  of   Mexico, 
Tlalpam,  31  de  julio  de  1829,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores.    A 
translation  of  this  is  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren, 
August  7,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,    IV.     A   pamphlet   containing   the    same   printed    in 
Spanish  accompanies. 

14  Poinsett's  reply,  August  2,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State, 
Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV,  enclosed  with  Poinsett  to  Van 
Buren,   August  7,    1829.     The  English  translation  covers  26 
pages.     The  same  printed  in  Spanish  accompanies. 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON   POINSETT  365 

ing  of  the  manifesto  and  his  reply  he  said  he  would  be 
sensibly  mortified  in  reporting  the  attacks  that  had 
been  made  on  him  if  he  could  attribute  them  to  any 
misconduct  or  want  of  prudence  on  his  part.  He  de 
clared  that  the  suspicions  and  conjectures  were  utterly 
unfounded ;  and  said  that  he  had  not  interfered  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  country  nor  deviated  from  the 
frank,  open,  manly  policy  which  distinguishes  the  in 
tercourse  of  the  United  States.  He  was  not  conscious, 
he  said,  of  any  offense  unless  his  uncompromising  re 
publican  principles  and  friendly  intercourse  with 
leaders  of  the  popular  party  could  be  considered  such. 
He  said  that  the  aristocratic,  monarchical,  and  Euro 
pean  factions  which  were  in  control  when  he  arrived 
in  the  country  had  attributed  their  fall  to  him;  but 
it  was  really  due  to  the  institutions  of  the  country. 
They  still  believed  him  the  soul  of  the  existing  gov 
ernment  and  wished  to  overthrow  him.  He  said  this 
faction  were  telling  the  people  of  Mexico  that  the 
United  States  was  jealous  of  Mexico  and  had  in 
structed  him  to  throw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  progress. 
They  even  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  cabinet  in 
Washington  had  caused  the  death  of  their  minister 
Obregon  (who  had  committed  suicide)  and  therefore 
they  argued  publicly  that  the  people  of  Mexico  would 
be  justified  in  assassinating  Poinsett.  He  said  that 
he  had  had  frequent  interviews  with  President  Guer 
rero,  who  had  expressed  his  regret  at  the  attack  and 
his  own  satisfaction  with  Poinsett's  conduct,  and  had 
spoken  in  strong  terms  of  the  infamy  of  those  who 


366  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 

thus  sought  to  interrupt  the  friendly  relations  of  the 
two  republics.  The  President  had  said  that  he  re 
garded  it  really  as  an  attack  on  those  in  control  of 
the  government.15 

Although  Poinsett  asserts  that  he  had  not  interfered 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country,  and  asserts  that 
he  was  not  conscious  of  any  offense,  yet  in  this  very 
defense  of  his  conduct  he  admits  his  friendly  inter 
course  with  members  of  the  popular  party,  and  by  im 
plication  his  unfriendliness  for  the  members  of  the  op 
posing  factions.  This  was  exactly  their  complaint 
against  him. 

Poinsett's  frequent  and  lengthy  defenses  of  his  con 
duct  in  his  correspondence  with  the  government  at 
Washington  were  apparently  occasioned  by  a  feeling 
that  his  conduct  was  not  fully  approved  there.  Com 
munications  from  Clay  had  been  very  infrequent  for 
some  time  before  the  close  of  the  Adams  administra 
tion;  and  it  was  several  months  before  Van  Buren, 
the  new  secretary  of  state,  wrote  to  him,  except  on 

15  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  August  7,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

Zavala,  who  was  in  the  ministry  of  Guerrero  at  the  time 
of  the  legislative  attacks,  but  who  resigned  soon  after,  says 
that  back  of  all  these  attacks  could  be  seen  the  hand  of  two 
of  the  other  ministers,  Herrera  and  Bocanegra.  The  timid 
and  uncertain  policy  of  Guerrero,  who  was  aware  of  their 
plans,  he  says,  enabled  them  to  do  this.  Zavala,  Ensayo  His- 
torico,  II,  197.  Ibar,  Muerte  Politica  de  la  Republica,  numero 
32,  8  de  agosto  de  1829,  says :  "  ^  Quien  fue  el  que  mando 
asesinar  a  nuestro  enviado  a  los  Estados  Unidos  del  Norte, 
al  virtuoso  Obregon?  Poinsett.  Conocidas  son  las  intrigas 
de  este  ministro  infame,  y  hoy  se  han  presentado  a  todo  luz." 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  367 

matters  of  mere  routine.  This  neglect  was  the  occa 
sion  of  some  complaint  by  Poinsett.  Finally  on  Oc 
tober  1 6,  1829,  the  Jackson  government  passed  its 
opinion  on  his  conduct.  Van  Buren  said  he  regretted 
to  learn  that  there  was  a  prejudice  against  Poinsett 
of  the  strongest  and,  there  was  every  reason  to  fear, 
of  the  most  incurable  type ;  and  continued :  "  The  only 
ground  upon  which  this  state  of  feeling  appears  to 
be  justified,  is  the  allegation  on  the  part  of  those  who 
entertain  it,  that  you  have  availed  yourself  of  your 
situation  to  intermeddle  in  the  domestic  affairs  of 
that  Republic.  The  suspicions  entertained  on  this  sub 
ject — the  existence  of  which  he  sincerely  deprecates — 
the  President  feels  himself  justified,  by  all  the  infor 
mation  of  which  he  is  possessed,  in  considering  with 
out  just  cause.  The  fact  that  no  complaint  has  at 
any  time  been  made  by  the  authority  to  which  you  are 
accredited,  which  would  be  the  most  likely  to  be  in 
formed  of  such  interference,  if  it  did  exist,  and  the 
first  to  feel  aggrieved  thereby ;  your  knowledge  of  the 
established  policy  of  this  government  in  that  respect, 
and  its  decided  repugnance  to  all  intermeddling  in  the 
internal  concerns  of  other  states ;  your  own  assurance 
to  the  contrary ;  and  the  confidence  which  the  Presi 
dent  reposes  in  your  discretion  and  patriotism — secure 
him  from  the  apprehension  that  the  present  embar 
rassed  state  of  our  affairs  with  that  country  is  attribut 
able  to  the  indiscretion  of  the  representative  of  the 
United  States."  But  he  said  whatever  the  cause  of 
those  suspicions  might  be  they  existed  and  were  be- 


368         PUBLIC  ATTACKS  ON  POINSETT 

lieved  by  the  President  to  interfere  in  the  relations  of 
the  two  countries.  Since  Poinsett,  availing  himself  of 
the  permission  granted  by  the  preceding  administra 
tion,  had  already  expressed  a  wish  to  return,  the 
President,  Van  Buren  said,  "  gives  his  assent  to  your 
resignation.  It  is,  however,  his  anxious  wish  that 
your  return  should  not  be  attended  by  any  circum 
stance  which  might  wear  the  appearance  of  censure, 
or  afford  countenance  to  the  imputations  of  your  ene 
mies."  The  way  to  prevent  this  "  assent  to  your  resig 
nation"  from  having  the  appearance  of  censure  was 
outlined  in  the  following  paragraph.  If  by  the  time 
he  should  receive  this  letter  there  should  have  been 
such  an  effectual  change  in  sentiment  toward  him  in 
Mexico  as  to  render  his  continuance  agreeable  and  to 
lead  him  to  think  he  could  carry  into  effect  the  views 
of  his  government,  it  would  accord  with  the  Pres 
ident's  wishes  that  he  should  remain  where  he  was. 
He  was  to  be  at  liberty  to  speak  freely  in  his  inter 
views  with  public  men  of  his  freedom  of  election  to 
return  or  remain.16 

Jackson  and  Van  Buren  apparently  had  no  expec 
tation  that  there  would  be  such  a  change  in  sentiment 
toward  Poinsett  that  he  would  think  of  remaining. 
The  belief  that  the  prejudices  were  of  an  incurable 
character  had  been  expressed  in  the  beginning;  and 
the  whole  tone  of  the  letter,  especially  the  instructions 
concerning  taking  leave,  seems  to  assume  that  he  would 
return.  A  charge  was  appointed  and  sent  to  take  his 

16  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  October  16,  1829,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Instructions,  American  States,  XIV,  141. 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  369 

place.  The  apparently  optional  character  of  the  recall 
seems  to  have  been  simply  a  device  to  "  save  the  face  " 
of  Poinsett.  Unless  there  should  be  an  "effectual 
change  in  sentiment "  there  was  really  no  option. 

^But  if  the  apparent  option  in  Poinsett's  recall  had 
been  a  real  option  on  October  16,  a  chain  of  circum 
stances  which  had  been  in  operation  for  more  than 
three  months  culminated  the  next  day  to  make  his  re 
call  positive.  On  October  17  Montoya,  the  Mexican 
charge  in  Washington,  handed  to  Van  Buren  a  letter 
from  the  President  of  Mexico  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  demanding  the  recall  of  Poinsett.  This 
had  been  written  on  July  i,  1829,  a  full  month  before 
the  manifesto  of  the  legislature  of  the  state  of  Mex 
ico  had  been  presented  to  Guerrero  requesting  him  to 
order  that  passports  be  given  to  Poinsett.  President 
Guerrero  said  to  President  Jackson :  "  Of  late,  public 
opinion  has  pronounced  itself  against  him  in  the  most 
conclusive,  general  and  decided  manner,  as  appears 
from  the  writings  published  almost  every  day  in 
nearly  all  the  states  of  the  confederation.  The  public 
clamor  against  Mr.  Poinsett  has  become  general,  not 
only  among  the  authorities,  and  men  of  education,  but 
also  among  the  vulgar  classes ;  not  only  among  the  in 
dividuals  who  suspected  him,  but  also  among  many  of 
those  who  have  been  his  friends.  To  Mr.  Poinsett 
are  attributed  the  misfortunes  which  have  befallen 
the  Republic,  and  it  has  even  been  unhesitatingly  sup 
posed  that  he  had  a  direct  influence  over  the  proceed 
ings  of  the  government,  in  consequence  of  which  they 
25 


37O  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON   POINSETT 

have  not  been  received  by  the  public  with  the  respect 
which  is  due  to  them.  Owing  to  the  general  distrust 
of  Mr.  Poinsett  the  relations  between  the  two  republics 
have  not  been  attended  with  that  success  which  had 
been  anticipated."^  The  fact  that  Poinsett's  recall  had 
not  previously  been  demanded  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
his  presence  had  caused  these  embarrassments  is  sug 
gested  as  evidence  that  the  Mexican  government  was 
unwilling  to  do  anything  to  disturb  friendly  relations. 
"  But,"  the  Mexican  President  continued,  "  things  have 
now  arrived  at  such  a  point  that  the  government  of 
Mexico  would  fail  in  its  performance  of  its  most  es 
sential  duties  if  it  forebore  from  asking  of  that  of  the 
United  States  the  recall  of  its  minister.  .  .  .  The 
course  of  events  may  be  such  as  to  require  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  Mexico,  as  a  duty,  the  exercise  of  its 
rights  to  grant  the  necessary  passports  to  Mr.  Poinsett 
before  the  receipt  at  Mexico  of  the  answer  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States  of  America.  In 
such  case  (which  God  forbid)  the  government  of  Mex 
ico  trusts  that  that  of  the  United  States  of  America 
which  is  characterized  by  the  impartiality  and  liber 
ality  of  its  principles  and  institutions,  will  appreciate 
the  propriety  of  a  step  of  this  nature,  which  it  would 
itself  adopt  if  placed  in  the  same  situation  and  under 
similar  circumstances."17  In  the  note  to  Montoya  en 
closing  this  demand  for  Poinsett's  recall  the  Mexican 

17  Guerrero  to  Jackson  [July  I,  1829],  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Notes  from  Mexican  Legation,  I,  enclosed  with  Mon 
toya  to  Van  Buren,  October  17,  1829.  The  Spanish  original 
of  Guerrero's  letter  accompanies  this  translation. 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 


government  told  its  charge  that  it  wished  to  do  noth 
ing  to  disturb  peaceable  relations  with  the  United 
States  ;  but  instructed  him  to  ask  an  audience,  express 
a  sincere  desire  to  preserve  harmony,  explain  the  situ 
ation  in  Mexico  with  respect  to  the  United  States  min 
ister,  and  say  that  the  Mexican  government  found  it 
self  unhappily  but  necessarily  compelled  to  ask  that 
minister's  recall.18 

On  October  17,  Van  Buren  added  a  postscript  to 
his  letter  of  the  preceding  day  to  Poinsett  revoking 
the  option  of  remaining  or  returning,  thus  making  it  a 
positive  recall.  He  added  :  "  In  the  absence  of  a  con 
trary  allegation  on  the  part  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  and  confiding  in  your  assurances,  he  [President 
Jackson]  still  allows  himself  to  believe  that  the  preju 
dices  against  you  are  without  just  cause."19  Although 
the  Jackson  administration  thus  officially  exonerated 
Poinsett  again,  yet  the  wording  is  such  as  to  indicate 
that  the  approval  was  not  very  enthusiastic  and  was 

18  Secretario  to  Montoya,   I   de  julio  de  1821,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

19  Postscript,  October  17,  to  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  Octo 
ber  16,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Instructions,  American 
States,  XIV,  141.    Jackson  to  Guerrero,  October  17,  1829,  MS., 
Relaciones  Exteriores. 

A  postscript  of  October  17,  1829,  attached  to  Van  Buren  to 
Butler  of  October  16,  indicates  that  Jackson  and  Van  Buren 
thought  the  attacks  on  Poinsett  due  to  the  failure  of  the 
Mexican  government  to  protect  him  rather  than  to  his  actions. 
House  Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  351,  page  52. 

Jackson's  reasons  for  recalling  Poinsett,  quoted  from  the 
Jackson  Manuscripts,  are  printed  in  Reeves,  Diplomacy  under 
Tyler  and  Polk,  68. 


372  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 

given  only  because  there  was  no  positive  assertion  by 
the  Mexican  government  that  the  prejudice  against 
him  was  with  just  cause.  There  is  a  slight  indication 
that  the  administration  was  not  fully  convinced  of 
Poinsett's  innocence,  or  was  somewhat  provoked  at 
his  conduct,  in  the  fact  that  on  this  same  day,  Oc 
tober  17,  a  draft  which  Poinsett  had  drawn  on  the 
department  was  protested  because  of  what  was  re 
garded  as  a  small  irregularity  in  the  way  he  had  re 
tained  for  himself  the  sum  of  money  due  to  the  dif 
ference  in  the  rate  of  exchange  between  the  two  coun 
tries.20  The  matter  could  have  been  arranged  in  a 
manner  less  humiliating  to  Poinsett  had  it  been  so 
desired.  This  seems  to  have  been  "the  last  straw 
that  broke  the  earners  back."  In  Montoya's  letter 
to  his  government  telling  of  his  presenting  the  de 
mand  for  the  recall  he  too  assumed  the  innocence  of 
Poinsett  because  of  the  absence  of  allegations  of  his 
guilt.  He  said  he  was  persuaded  that  there  were  no 

20  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  October  17,  1829,  MS.,  Depart 
ment  of  State,  Instructions,  American  States,  XIV,  148. 
When  Poinsett  was  embarrassed  by  learning  that  his  draft 
had  been  protested  he  said  he  regretted  that  this  had  been 
thought  necessary,  since  he  would  have  made  good  the  differ 
ence  with  pleasure  if  he  had  known  that  the  department 
wished  him  to  do  so.  He  explained  how  he  had  been  drawing 
his  salary  and  why  he  had  drawn  in  that  way,  and  closed  by 
saying,  "[I  will]  be  perfectly  content  with  the  decision  of  the 
Department  with  respect  to  the  draft  for  £100  on  London 
provided  the  government  will  refund  the  amounts  for  which 
I  have  given  them  credit,  on  account  of  the  favorable  state 
of  exchange  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States."  Poin 
sett  to  Van  Buren,  December  9,  1829,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  3/3 

grounds  for  the  charges  made  in  Mexico  that  the 
United  States  was  jealous  of  the  prosperity  of  Mex 
ico.21 

In  the  instructions  which  were  written  on  October 
1 6  for  Butler,  who  was  to  take  Poinsett's  place  if  the 
latter  should  return,  there  is  a  positive  statement  of 
the  government's  desire  that  such  actions  as  Poinsett's 
should  not  be  repeated.  Van  Buren  said :  "  With  re 
spect  to  your  future  official  correspondence  with  the 
government  of  Mexico,  and  your  intercourse,  public 
and  private,  with  the  people  and  their  functionaries, 
the  past  strongly  admonishes  you  to  avoid  giving  any 
pretext  for  a  repetition  against  yourself  of  the  im 
putations  which  have  been  cast  upon  Mr.  Poinsett,  of 
having  interfered  in  the  domestic  concerns  or  politics 
of  the  country;  or  even  showing  any  partiality  to 
wards  either  of  the  parties  which  now  appear  to  divide 
the  Mexican  people.  The  manifestation  of  such  a 
preference,  or  of  any  connexion,  remote  as  it  might 
be,  with  their  political  associations,  might  again  be 
construed  into  a  wish  to  influence  or  foment  their 
party  divisions.  The  President,  therefore,  expects 
you  to  exercise  the  most  sedulous  care  in  guarding 
against  similar  imputations,  and  wishes  you  to  use 

21  Montoya  to  Secretario,  19  de  octubre  de  1829,  MS.,  Rela- 
ciones  Exteriores. 

For  brief  discussions  of  Poinsett's  recall,  see  McMaster, 
History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  V,  549;  Bancroft, 
History  of  Mexico,  V,  81 ;  Bocanegra,  Memorias  para  la  His- 
toria  de  Mexico,  I,  382,  II,  23;  Zamacois,  Historia  de  Mejico, 
XI,  810;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Historico,  II,  197;  Mayo,  Political 
Sketches,  95. 


374  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 

your  utmost  endeavors  in  allaying  the  irritation  which 
seems  to  pervade  a  large  portion  of  the  people,  and  to 
do  away  the  groundless  and  unjust  prejudices  which 
have  been  excited  against  the  government  of  the 
United  States.  A  social,  open,  and  frank  deportment 
towards  men  of  all  classes  and  all  parties;  a  proper 
degree  of  respect  for  their  opinions  whatever  they 
may  be ;  a  ready  frankness  in  explaining  the  true  pol 
icy  of  your  government,  without  attempting  to  obtrude 
your  views  where  they  are  not  desired ;  and  the  most 
guarded  care  in  condemning  or  censuring  theirs,  are 
among  the  means  which  the  President  would  suggest 
as  most  likely  to  command  the  confidence  of  the  people, 
and  to  secure  for  yourself  a  proper  standing  in  the 
opinion  of  their  public  functionaries."2 

It  was  on  December  9,  1829,  that  Poinsett's  recall 
reached  him.23  The  Mexican  government  had  not 
found  it  necessary  to  give  him  his  passports  as  Guer 
rero's  letter  demanding  his  recall  said  might  have  to 
be  done.  But  Poinsett  had  himself  asked  permission 
in  a  letter  of  November  4  to  return  home.24  On  De- 

22  Van  Buren  to  Butler,  October  16,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of   State,   Instructions,   American   States,   XIV,   149;   House 
Documents,  25  congress,  2  session,  number  53,  page  51.     It 
should  be  mentioned  here  that  Butler's  conduct  in  Mexico  was 
far  worse  than  Poinsett's,  that  his  motives  were  less  unselfish, 
and  that  his  recall  also  was  demanded.     See  above,  the  latter 
part  of  the  chapter  on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue. 

23  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  December  9,  1829,  acknowledging 
receipt  of  his  recall,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches 
from  Mexico,  IV. 

24  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  November  4,  1829,  MS.,  Depart- 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  3/5 

cember  25  he  had  a  conference  with  the  provisional 
executive  and  took  formal  leave.23  On  the  last  day  of 
the  year  the  provisional  President  of  Mexico  in  a  letter 
to  the  President  of  the  United  States  acknowledged  the 
latter's  note  of  October  17  announcing  Poinsett's  re 
call  and  said  that  act  was  looked  upon  as  a  testimony 
to  the  sincere  friendship  of  the  United  States  for 
Mexico.26 

ment  of  State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV.  This  says  that 
he  had  asked  the  commander  of  the  United  States  squadron 
in  the  West  Indies  to  send  a  warship  to  the  Mexican  coast  to 
take  him  from  the  country. 

25  Poinsett  to  Van  Buren,  December  26,  1829,  saying  that  he 
had  taken  leave  on  the  preceding  day  and  expected  to  depart 
January  2,  1830,  MS.,  Department  of  State,  Despatches  from 
Mexico,  IV. 

A  new  revolution  had  overthrown  Guerrero.  He  had  fled, 
and  Vice-President  Bustamante  had  taken  control.  Poinsett 
to  Viesca,  15  de  diciembre  de  1829,  asked  an  audience  to  pre 
sent  his  letter  of  recall ;  Secretario  to  Poinsett,  24  de  diciembre 
de  1829,  in  reply,  appointed  December  25,  MS.,  Relaciones 
Exteriores.  Poinsett  left  Mexico  on  January  3,  1830,  and 
arrived  at  New  Orleans  on  February  2.  Poinsett  to  Van 
Buren,  New  Orleans,  February  3,  1830,  MS.,  Department  of 
State,  Despatches  from  Mexico,  IV. 

26  Provisional    President   of    Mexico   to    President   of   the 
United  States,  31  de  diciembre  de  1829,  MS.,  Relaciones  Exte 
riores.    Accompanying  this  is   Secretario  to  Poinsett,  31   de 
diciembre  de  1829,  granting  privilege  to  leave  and  assigning 
an  escort. 

About  the  middle  of  December  a  circular  letter  was  sent  by 
the  central  government  to  the  governors  of  the  states  telling 
of  Poinsett's  recall.  This  and  congratulatory  replies  to  it 
from  fifteen  of  the  state  governments  are  in  an  expediente  in 
MS.,  Relaciones  Exteriores. 


376  PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT 

The  government  at  Washington  realized  that  a  crisis 
had  been  reached  in  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries,  and  that  there  was  little  prospect  for  a  sat 
isfactory  conclusion  of  the  pending  negotiations.  This 
was  made  clear  in  the  instructions  which  had  been 
given  to  Butler,  who  now  became  the  United  States 
charge  in  Mexico.  In  those  instructions  Van  Buren 
declared :  "  From  a  full  and  deliberate  review  of  the 
course  which  Mexico  has  allowed  herself  to  pursue  to 
wards  us,  the  President  is  well  satisfied  that  but  little 
of  real  advantage  to  the  country  can  be  expected  from 
your  labors  until  an  entire  change  be  effected  in  the 
disposition  of  that  republic  towards  the  United  States. 
.  .  .  He  is  deeply  and  painfully  impressed  with  the 
unfriendly  and  undeserved  conduct  of  Mexico  towards 
us,  her  neighbor  and  sister  republic,  .  .  .  her  earliest 
and  best  friend."  The  letter  then  reviews  at  length 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States  during  the  struggle 
of  Mexico  and  other  colonies  for  independence  and 
the  early  recognition  by  the  United  States  of  that  in 
dependence.  Butler  was  instructed  to  protest  pacific 
ally  but  firmly  against  Mexico's  long  continued  un 
friendliness,  and  to  say  that  the  feelings  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States  had  been  deeply  wounded  by  the 
repeated  attacks  on  their  representative.  It  was  de 
clared  in  conclusion  that  the  Mexican  government 
could  do  much  to  redress  the  wrongs  of  the  past  by  a 
speedy  ratification  of  the  pending  treaty  of  commerce. 
If  it  should  be  ratified  substantially  as  agreed  upon 
and  not  with  its  most  valuable  stipulations  expunged, 


PUBLIC   ATTACKS   ON    POINSETT  377 

then  the  pending  treaty  of  limits  would  be  submitted 
to  the  United  States  Congress  along  with  that  of  com 
merce,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  remissness  of  Mex 
ico  had  caused  the  treaty  of  limits  to  lose  all  of  its 
obligatory  character.27 

27  Van  Buren  to  Butler,  October  16,  1829,  MS.,  Department 
of  State,  Instructions,  American  States,  XIV,  149. 


CHAPTER  XI 
COMMENTS  ON  AUTHORITIES 

MANUSCRIPTS 

Manuscripts  in  the  Archives  of  the  Department 
of  State,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Despatches  from  Mexico,  volumes  I,  II,  III,  and 
IV,  and  one  volume  of  Duplicate  Despatches  from 
Poinsett,  which  contains  some  letters  and  many  en 
closures  not  in  the  regular  volumes.  Except  a  few 
letters  at  the  beginning  of  the  first,  all  five  of  these 
volumes  are  filled  with  letters  and  enclosures  to  the 
department  from  Poinsett  in  Mexico  between  the  years 
1825  and  1829. 

Instructions  to  United  States  Ministers  in  foreign 
countries,  volumes  IX,  X,  XI,  XII,  XIII,  and  XIV. 
Of  course  the  instructions  to  the  legation  in  Mexico 
occupy  only  a  small  part  of  these  six  volumes,  since 
they  include  also  instructions  to  all  other  countries 
where  the  United  States  had  representatives.  The 
last  one,  or  possibly  two,  of  these  volumes  is  marked 
Instructions  to  American  States,  which  became  a  sep 
arate  series  at  that  time. 

Secret  Record,  volume  I,  contains  the  instruction 
of  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett  for  the  purchase  of  Texas 
in  1829. 

Notes  from  the  Mexican  Legation  in  Washington 
to  the  Department  of  State,  volume  I.  These  are  not 

378 


COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES  379 

of  very  great  importance  or  interest,  since  no  impor- 
ant  negotiation  was  conducted  in  Washington. 

Notes  to  the  Mexican  Legation  in  Washington  were 
of  still  less  value. 

Manuscripts  in  the  Archive  de  Relaciones  Ex- 
teriores,  Mexico: 

These  are  not  bound,  nor  are  they  filed  in  any 
permanent  form.  Most  of  them  are  sewed  together 
or  merely  folded  in  tiny  bundles,  called  expedientes, 
each  containing  letters  which  deal  with  the  same  or 
closely  related  subjects.  They  can  be,  and  frequently 
are,  moved  about  and  mixed  up,  so  cannot  be  des 
ignated  except  by  the  name  of  the  archive,  "  Rela 
ciones  Exteriores."  Fifteen  hundred  or  sixteen  hun 
dred  pages  of  typewritten  transcripts  were  made  and 
used  for  this  study.  They  are  now  the  property  of 
the  School  of  History  of  the  University  of  Texas  and 
are  filed  in  its  archives.  Photostat  copies  have  been 
made  by  the  Manuscripts  Division  of  the  Library  of 
Congress  at  Washington. 

Manuscripts  in  the  Archives  of  the  United  States 
Embassy  in  Mexico: 

Despatches  from  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States,  one  volume;  Despatches  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  two  volumes ;  Notes 
to  the  Mexican  Government,  one  volume ;  Notes  from 
the  Mexican  Government,  one  volume;  Miscellaneous 
Papers,  Duplicate  Despatches,  etc.,  one  volume. 
Nearly  all  of  these  series  extend  several  years  beyond 


380  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

the  period  covered  by  this  study.  Comparatively  few 
manucripts  relating  to  this  period  are  to  be  found  in 
the  Embassy  archives  of  which  duplicates  or  the 
originals  do  not  exist  in  the  archives  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  State  at  Washington.  Only  in  such  cases 
have  they  been  cited. 

Poinsett  Manuscripts  in  the  Archives  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  Historical  Society,  Philadelphia: 

Only  a  few  volumes  of  this  large  collection  relate  to 
the  period  of  Poinsett's  residence  in  Mexico.  And 
of  these  most  are  personal  letters,  nearly  all  being 
written  to  Poinsett.  Only  a  very  few  are  cited. 

Van  Buren  Manuscripts  in  the  Library  of  Con 
gress,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Volumes  IX  and  X  contain  the  lengthy,  interesting, 
and  important  documents  showing  the  origin  and 
growth  of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren's  plan  for  purchas 
ing  Texas  in  1829. 

PUBLISHED  DOCUMENTS 

American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  volume 
V  (1858),  and  volume  VI  (1859).  Edited  under 
authority  of  Congress  and  published  by  Gales  and 
Seaton,  Washington.  The  first  of  these  contains  a 
few  and  the  second  a  large  number  of  communica 
tions  between  the  Department  of  State  and  Poinsett. 
But  many  of  them  are  only  extracts,  the  most  interest-- 
ing  portions,  nearly  always  including  the  valuable 
cipher  paragraphs,  being  omitted.  In  most  cases  the 


COMMENTS   ON    AUTHORITIES  381 

documents  here  have  been  cited  as  well  as  the  manu 
scripts  in  the  archives. 

House  of  Representatives,  Executive  Documents,  25 
Congress,  I  Session,  number  42.  This  is  a  collection 
of  documents,  rilling  ninety-four  pages,  transmitted 
by  the  President  at  the  request  of  Congress,  contain 
ing  negotiations  relating  to  the  boundary,  and  printed 
in  1837. 

House  of  Representatives,  Executive  Documents, 
25  Congress,  2  Session,  number  351.  This  collection 
contains  more  than  eight  hundred  pages  of  documents, 
most  of  them  concerning  the  boundary,  submitted  by 
the  President  in  1838. 

House  of  Representatives,  Executive  Documents,  32 
Congress,  i  Session,  number  121.  This  collection  of 
fifty-nine  pages  relating  to  Cuba  was  submitted  by 
the  President  and  printed  in  1852. 

Many  important  documents  were  withheld  in  all 
three  of  these  house  executive  document  collections, 
and  of  those  printed  many  were  only  extracts.  They 
have  been  cited  in  the  same  way  as  the  American  State 
Papers  mentioned  just  above. 

British  ^nd  Foreign  State  Papers,  compiled  by  the* 
Foreign  Office,  and  published  by  the  government,  Lon 
don.  Volumes  IX,  XIII,  XVI,  and  XXVI  contain 
documents  important  for  this  study.  Many  of  these 
documents  are  also  found  in  one  or  more  of  the  pre 
ceding  collections  of  American  official  documents. 
Frequently  two  of  these  documentary  sources  have 
been  cited  in  addition  to  the  manuscript  sources  since 


382  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

few  have  access  to  the  archives  and  not  many  libraries 
are  likely  to  contain  all  three  documentary  collections. 

La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  published  by  the  Secre- 
taria  de  Relaciones,  Mexico,  Volume  I,  1910;  II,  1912; 
III,  1913.  These  three  volumes  are  the  beginning  of 
what  promises  to  be  a  monumental  collection  of  Mex 
ican  diplomatic  correspondence.  They  do  not  extend 
beyond  the  early  part  of  1825.  They  are  of  value 
not  only  for  the  history  of  Mexico  but  for  the  his 
tory  of  all  countries  that  have  had  relations  with  Mex 
ico. 

Tratados  y  Convenciones  concluidos  y  ratificados 
por  la  Republica  Mexicana.  Edicion  oficial,  Mexico, 
1878,  two  volumes. 

Leyes,  Decretos,  y  Ordenes  que  forman  el  Derecho 
Internacional  Mexicano.  Mexico,  1879.  This  and 
the  two  volumes  mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraph 
are  bound  uniformly  and  the  three  are  known  col 
lectively  as  "  Derecho  Internacional"  parts  i,  2,  and  3. 

Treaties  and  Conventions  between  the  United  States 
and  Other  Powers,  1776-1909.  Compiled  by  W.  M. 
Malloy  under  authority  of  the  government  and  pub 
lished  by  the  Government  Printing  Office,  1910.  Two 
volumes,  but  paged  continuously  as  one. 

Senate  Executive  Journal,  volume  III,  published  by 
the  government. 

Correspondence  of  the  Russian  Ministers  in  Wash 
ington,  1818-1825,  American  Historical  Review, 
XVIII,  309-345,  and  537-562.  This  casts  several  in 
teresting  side  lights  on  matters  in  this  study. 


COMMENTS   ON    AUTHORITIES  383 

Coleccion  de  Ordenes  y  Decretos  de  la  Soberana 
Junta  provisional  gubernativa  y  los  Soberanos  Con- 
gresos  Generales  de  la  Nacion  Mexicana.  Segunda 
edicion,  coregida  y  aumentada  por  una  comision  de  la 
Camara  de  Diputados.  Mexico,  1829. 

Many  of  the  books  listed  below  contain  important 
official  documents  also,  a  few  of  them  being  largely 
composed  of  such. 

SECONDARY  SOURCES 

The  following  books  have  been  useful  for  all  or 
several  of  the  subjects  studied: 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs.  Edited  by  C.  F.  Adams. 
12  volumes.  Philadelphia,  1874-1877.  This  author 
ity,  which  is  indispensable  for  the  study  of  any  sub 
ject  in  American  history  during  the  long  public  career 
of  Adams,  reveals  a  great  many  interesting  facts  con- 
concerning  the  inner  working  of  the  United  States 
government  while  he  was  secretary  of  state  and  pres 
ident,  which  was  during  almost  the  entire  period  cov 
ered  by  this  study. 

Alaman,  Lucas,  Historia  de  Mejico  desde  los  Prim- 
eros  Movimientos  que  prepararon  su  Independencia  en 
el  afio  de  1808  hasta  la  Epoca  presente.  5  volumes. 
Mexico,  1849-1852.  This  is  devoted  principally  to 
the  revolution.  The  last  volume  covers  the  period 
from  1821  onward,  and  most  of  that  is  devoted  to  the 
period  before  the  end  of  1824. 

Bancroft,  H.  H.,  History  of  Mexico.  6  volumes. 
San  Francisco,  .  The  last  hundred  pages  of 


384  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

volume  IV,  1886,  and  the  first  hundred  of  volume  V, 
1887,  cover  the  period  of  this  study.  They  are  vol 
umes  XII  and  XIII  of  his  collected  Works. 

Bocanegra,  J.  M.,  Memorias  para  la  Historia  de 
Mexico  Independiente.  Edicion  oficial.  Mexico,  Im- 
prenta  del  Gobierno,  1892.  2  volumes.  He  was  in 
the  cabinet  during  the  last  year  of  Poinsett's  residence 
in  Mexico,  was  hostile  to  Poinsett  and  largely  instru 
mental  in  demanding  his  recall. 

Clay,  Henry,  Works.  Edited  by  Calvin  Colton.  6 
volumes.  New  York,  1863.  The  fourth  volume  con 
tains  a  few  documents  of  minor  importance  for  this 
study. 

Gales  and  Seaton's  Congressional  Debates. 

Latane,  J.  H.,  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spanish  America.  [Shaw  Lectures  for 
1899].  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  1900.  This  excellent 
book  covers  too  long  a  period  to  deal  in  great  detail 
with  subjects  considered  in  this  study. 

McMaster,  J.  B.,  History  of  the  People  of  the 
United  States  from  the  Revolution  to  the  Civil  War. 
New  York,  Appleton.  Volume  V,  1900,  covers  the 
period  of  this  study,  but  deals  very  briefly  with  most 
matters. 

Martinez,  Victor  Jose,  Sinopsis  Historica,  Filisofica, 
y  Politica  de  las  Revoluciones  Mexicanas.  2a  Edicion, 
Mexico,  1884.  This  is  not  well  organized,  but  con 
tains  many  interesting  observations  and  some  valuable 
facts. 

Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law,  8  vol 
umes.  Washington,  Government  Printing  Office,  1916. 


COMMENTS   ON    AUTHORITIES  385 

Not  a  great  deal  of  matter  bearing  on  this  study  is 
given  by  Moore,  but  what  he  gives  is  valuable. 

Niles,  Register,  too  well  known  to  need  comment,  is 
valuable  for  contemporary  opinion,  and  some  docu 
ments. 

Paxson,  F.  L.,  Independence  of  the  South  American 
Republics:  A  Study  in  Recognition  and  Foreign  Pol 
icy.  Philadelphia,  1903.  For  matters  relating  to  the 
recognition  of  Mexican  independence  this  is  valuable. 
Other  matters  it  does  not  claim  to  treat. 

[Poinsett,  J.  R.],  Notes  on  Mexico,  made  in  the 
Autumn  of  1822,  ...  by  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.  Philadelphia,  1824.  This  gives  his  observa 
tions  during  his  unofficial  travels  two  and  a  half  years 
before  he  went  as  minister  to  Mexico. 

Poinsett,  J.  R.,  Exposicion  de  la  Conducta  Politica 
de  los  Estados  Unidos  para  con  las  Nuevas  Republicas 
de  America.  This  is  the  pamphlet  issued  by  Poinsett 
in  Mexico  in  1827  in  answer  to  the  attacks  made  upon 
him  in  the  Vera  Cruz  manifesto. 

Reeves,  J.  S.,  American  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and 
Polk.  [Shaw  Lectures  for  1906].  Johns  Hopkins 
Press,  1907.  Chapter  III  reviews  in  a  brief  but  valu 
able  manner  the  relations  between  Mexico  and  the 
United  States  concerning  Texas  from  1825  to  1840. 

Rivera,  Manuel,  Historia  Antigua  y  Moderna  de 
Jalapa  y  de  los  Revoluciones  del  Estado  de  Vera  Cruz. 
5  volumes.  Mexico,  1869.  The  second  volume  covers 
the  period  from  1816  to  1830,  and  gives  some  im 
portant  facts. 
26 


386  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

Rives,  G.  L.,  The  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821- 
1848.  2  volumes.  Scribners,  1913.  This  is  a  valu 
able  work  but  gives  comparatively  little  that  is  new 
concerning  diplomatic  relations  during  the  period  cov 
ered  by  this  study. 

Zamacois,  N.,  Historia  de  Mejico  desde  sus  tiem- 
pos  mas  remotas  hasta  nuestras  dias.  Barcelona  and 
Mexico,  1879.  Volume  XI  covers  the  period  from 
1821  to  1829.  It  is  popular  in  style,  is  arranged  chron 
ologically  by  years  and  sometimes  by  months,  and  is 
not  accurate.  It  gives  brief  allusions  to  foreign  rela 
tions. 

Zavala,  D.  Lorenzo,  Ensayo  Historico  de  las  Revo- 
luciones  de  Mejico  desde  1808  hasta  1830.  Volume 
I,  Paris,  1831 ;  volume  II,  New  York,  1832.  The 
writer  figured  prominently  at  times  in  opposition  to 
the  government,  at  other  times  in  the  government. 
He  was  a  close  friend  of  Poinsett's  and  favored  the 
latter 's  American  policies,  consequently  he  is  preju 
diced. 

For  the  chapter  on  British  Influence  in  Mexico, 
and  Poinsett's  Struggle  Against  It,  the  following 
are  valuable: 

Alaman,  Lucas,  Memoria  que  el  Secretario  de  Rela- 
ciones  presenta  al  Soberano  Congreso,  8  de  Noviembre 
de  1823.  Mexico,  [1823].  A  translation  of  this 
under  date,  November  i,  is  in  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  X,  1070. 

Bagot,  Joceline,  George  Canning  and  his  Friends. 
2  volumes.  London,  Murray,  1909.  This  gives  a. 


COMMENTS   ON    AUTHORITIES  387 

great  many  valuable  letters  to  and  from  Canning  and 
other  officials. 

Paxson,  F.  L.,  "  England  and  Mexico,  1824-1825," 
in  Texas  Historical  Quarterly,  IX,  138-141.  This 
very  brief  article  casts  light  on  the  struggle  between 
Poinsett  and  the  British  charge,  Ward. 

Stapleton,  A.  G.,  Political  Life  of  George  Canning, 
from  1822  to  1827.  3  volumes.  London,  1831. 
Chapter  VIII  in  volume  II  on  Spanish  America  is  es 
pecially  valuable. 

Stapleton,  A.  G.,  George  Canning  and  His  Times. 
London,  1859.  This  contains  valuable  additions  to 
the  preceding  work. 

Stapleton,  E.  J.,  Some  Official  Correspondence  of 
George  Canning.  2  volumes.  London,  Longmans, 
1887.  This  contains  a  great  many  letters  valuable  for 
both  this  chapter  and  that  on  Cuba  Saved  to  Spain. 

Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  Life  of  Canning.  London, 
Finch,  1905.  The  mechanical  features  of  this  are  not 
careful,  but  it  contains  many  valuable  things,  especially 
in  the  chapter  on  Canning  and  the  New  World. 

Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  "  Later  American  Policy  of 
George  Canning,"  in  American  Historical  Review,  XI, 
779-797.  This  article  is  based  largely  on  Public  Rec 
ord  Office  manuscripts,  and  is  very  interesting  and 
valuable. 

Tornel  y  Mendivil,  Jose  Maria,  Breve  Resena  His- 
torica  de  los  Acontecimientos  mas  notables  de  la 
nacion  Mexicana  desde  el  ano  1821  hasta  nuestros 
dias.  Mexico,  1852.  This  reflects  clearly  the  writer's 
hatred  for  Poinsett. 


388  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

In  addition  to  the  manuscripts  and  documents, 
and  the  books  in  the  first  group,  the  following  are 
valuable  for  the  chapter  on  Cuba  Saved  to  Spain : 

Callahan,  J.  M.,  Cuba  and  International  Relations, 
A  Study  in  American  Diplomacy.  Johns  Hopkins 
Press,  1899.  The  absence  of  any  citation  of  authori 
ties  in  this  is  a  bar  to  confidence  in  what  appears  from 
the  text  to  be  a  very  careful  study  based  largely  on 
documentary  sources. 

Chadwick,  F.  E.,  The  Relations  of  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  Diplomacy.  Scribner's,  1909. 

For  the  chapter  on  the  Santa  Fe  Trail  the  follow 
ing  contain  some  valuable  material: 

Bancroft,  H.  H.,  History  of  Arizona  and  New  Mex 
ico,  [Works,  volume  XVII].  San  Francisco,  1889. 

Broadhead,  G.  C,  "  The  Santa  Fe  Trail,"  in  the  Mis 
souri  Historical  Review,  IV,  309-319. 

Gregg,  Josiah,  Commerce  of  the  Prairies,  or  the 
Journal  of  a  Santa  Fe  Trader.  2  volumes,  second 
edition.  New  York,  1845.  The  same  is  reprinted  in 
volumes  XIX  and  XX  of  Thwaites,  Early  Western 
Travels.  A.  H.  Clark,  1905. 

Inman,  Henry,  The  Old  Santa  Fe  Trail.  Macmil- 
lans,  1898.  This  is  a  popular  account  of  adventures. 

"The  Santa  Fe  Trail.  A  Brief  Summary  of  the 
Trail  through  Kansas,  with  the  report  of  the  Commit 
tee  appointed  to  prepare  a  correct  Map."  In  the 
Eighteenth  Biennial  Report  of  the  Kansas  State  His 
torical  Society,  1911-1912,  107-125.  This  contains 


COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES  389 

a  large  folded  map,  and  the  Field  Notes  of  Joseph  C. 
Brown,  surveyor  of  the  United  States  Surveying  Ex 
pedition  of  1825-1827. 

The  following  contain  contemporary  comment  in 
Mexico  hostile  to  Poinsett: 

Aviraneta  e  Ibargoyen,  D.  Eugenio,  Mis  Memorias 
Intimas,  1825-1829.  In  D.  Luis  Garcia  Pimental, 
Documentos  Historicos  de  Mejico,  tomo  III.  Mejico, 
Paris,  Madrid,  1906.  The  author  was  a  Spanish  mer 
chant  traveling  ostensibly  on  private  business,  but 
loyal  to  the  Spanish  government. 

[Bustamante],  Voz  de  la  Patria,  II,  numbers  4,  8, 
15,  and  others,  passim,  to  35,  January  to  May,  1830. 

Ibar,  Francisco,  Muerte  Politica  de  la  Republica 
Mexicana.  This  is  a  violent  periodical  running 
through  thirty-four  numbers  from  March  n  to  August 
29,  1829. 

The  following  are  of  especial  value  for  the  chapter 
on  Texas  and  the  Boundary  Issue: 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  Speech  upon  the  Right  of  Petition 
and  the  Annexation  of  Texas,  delivered  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  from  June  16  to  July  7,  1838. 
Washington,  1838. 

Bancroft,  H.  H.,  North  Mexican  States  and  Texas, 
volume  II,  [Works,  volume  XI].  San  Francisco, 
1889. 

Barker,  E.  C.,  "  Stephen  F.  Austin  and  the  Inde 
pendence  of  Texas,"  in  the  Texas  Historical  Quar 
terly,  XIII,  257-284. 


39O  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

Barker,  E.  C,  "  Jackson  and  the  Texas  Revolution," 
in  the  American  Historical  Review,  XII,  788-809. 

Berlandier,  Luis,  y  Chovel,  Rafael,  Diario  de  Viage 
de  la  Comision  de  Limites  .  .  .  bajo  .  .  .  Don  Manuel 
Mier  y  Teran.  Mexico,  1850.  This  was  the  commis 
sion  sent  in  1827  to  examine  the  country  near  the  pro 
posed  boundary.  This  book  is  frequently  catalogued 
under  the  name  of  Teran.  It  seems  to  be  a  much  con 
densed  and  somewhat  disorganized  translation  of  Ber- 
landier's  extended  manuscript  journal  in  French,  which 
fills  seven  volumes  and  which  was  recently  acquired  by 
the  Library  of  Congress,  Manuscripts  Division.  The 
original  journal  pays  attention  to  scientific  rather  than 
to  political  matters. 

Brown,  J.  EL,  History  of  Texas,  from  1685  to  1892. 
2  volumes.  St.  Louis,  copyright  1892.  This  is  of 
small  value  for  this  study,  and  is  not  always  to  be 
depended  upon. 

Bugbee,  Lester  G.,  "The  Texas  Frontier,  1820- 
1825,"  in  the  Publications  of  the  Southern  History 
Association,  March,  1900. 

Comprehensive  History  of  Texas,  1685  to  1897, 
edited  by  D.  G.  Wooten.  2  volumes.  Dallas,  1898. 
This  is  a  cooperative  work  of  which  some  parts  are 
very  valuable. 

Cox,  I.  J.,  "The  Louisiana-Texas  Frontier,"  in  the 
Texas  Historical  Quarterly,  X,  1-75  and  XVII,  140- 
187. 

Falconer,  Thomas,  On  the  Discovery  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  and  on  the  Southwestern,  Oregon,  and  North- 


COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES  39! 

western    Boundary   of   the  United    States.     London, 

1844. 

Filisola,  Vicente,  Memorias  para  la  Historia  de  la 
Guerra  de  Texas.  2  volumes.  Mexico,  1848,  1849. 

Garrison,  G.  P.,  Texas,  A  Contest  of  Civilizations 
[American  Commonwealths  Series].  Houghton, 
1903. 

Jay,  Wm.,  A  Review  of  the  Causes  and  Conse 
quences  of  the  Mexican  War.  Boston,  1849. 

Kennedy,  William,  Texas :  The  Rise,  Progress  and 
Prospects  of  the  Republic  of  Texas.  2  volumes. 
London,  1841. 

-  Mayo,  Robert,  Political  Sketches  of  Eight  Years  in 
Washington.  Baltimore,  1839.  This  is  an  attack  on 
the  Jacksonian  policy  with  reference  to  Texas  and 
Mexico. 

Onis,  D.  Luis  de,  Memoir  upon  the  Negotiations 
between  Spain  and  the  United  States,  which  led  to 
the  treaty  of  1819.  Baltimore,  1821. 

Rather,  Miss  Ethel,  "  De  Witt's  Colony,"  in  Texas 
Historical  Quarterly,  VIII,  95-191. 

Smith,  J.  H.,  The  Annexation  of  Texas.  Baker  and 
Taylor  Company,  1911.  Except  for  a  few  introduc 
tory  discussions  Smith's  important  work  is  upon  a 
period  later  than  this  study. 

Tornel  y  Mendivil,  Jose  Maria,  Tejas  y  los  Estados 
Unidos  de  America,  en  sus  relaciones  con  la  Republica 
Mexicana.  Mexico,  1837.  This  is  occupied  largely 
with  a  study  of  the  French  basis  for  the  claim  of  the 
United  States  to  Texas.  It  gives  very  little  of  im 
portance  from  a  diplomatic  standpoint. 


392  COMMENTS   ON   AUTHORITIES 

Van  Buren  Papers,  Calendar  of,  Prepared  from  the 
original  manuscripts  in  the  Library  of  Congress,  by 
Elizabeth  Howard  West.  Washington,  1910. 

Von  Hoist,  H.,  Constitutional  and  Political  History 
of  the  United  States,  1828-1846.  Translated  by  J.  J. 
Lalor.  Chicago,  1888.  The  author  studies  the  Texas 
question  as  an  episode  in  slavery  expansion,  and  is 
strongly  prejudiced. 


INDEX 


Adams,  J.  Q. :  candidate  for  the 
presidency  in  1824,  31;  atti 
tude  toward  Cuba  in  1822, 
92;  expectation  that  the  United 
States  would  ultimately  pos 
sess  Cuba,  94. 

Alaman:  foreign  minister  in  Mex 
ico,  67,  74;  high  appreciation 
of  British  friendship,  68;  fa 
vored  British  interests,  74;  in 
fluence  over  President  Vic 
toria,  77 ;  opposition  to,  and 
resignation  of,  77,  121;  his 
hostility  to,  and  published 
criticism  of  Poinsett,  81;  con 
ferences  with  Ward  and  Poin 
sett  concerning  the  French 
fleet,  119;  declarations  con 
cerning  the  Santa  Fe  road, 
171-173.  1755  opens  the  nego 
tiations  for  a  commercial 
treaty,  206;  negotiations  con 
cerning  Texas  and  the  boun 
dary,  291-296. 

Aldama:  Hidalgo's  agent  to  the 
United  States  in  1811,  5,  note. 

Alexander  I,  emperor  of  Russia: 
asked  by  Clay  to  mediate  be 
tween  Spain  and  the  former 
Spanish  colonies,  108-114. 

Alpuche:  a  York  Mason,   192. 

American  party  in  Mexico:  78,  80, 
83;  relations  with  York  Ma 
sons,  190. 

Anderson,  minister  to  Colombia: 
notified  of  Clay's  attitude  to 
ward  Cuba,  142;  concludes  a 
treaty  with  Colombia,  206. 

Arispe:  influence  in  effecting  the 
ministerial  change,  78;  friend 
ship  for  the  United  States, 
78;  a  York  Mason,  192;  at 


tempt    to    facilitate    the    com 
mercial  negotiation,   215. 
Azcarate:  report  of  a  conversation 
with  Poinsett  in  1822  concern' 
ing  the  boundary,  289-290. 

Baca,  political  chief  of  New  Mex 
ico:  his  commission  to  Escu- 
dero,  177. 

Bandits,  Mexican:  attacks  on 
United  States  traders  and 
merchants,  275. 

Benton,  Thomas  H. :  mentioned  for 
the  post  of  minister  to  Mex 
ico,  43  and  note;  presents 
bill  in  Congress  for  marking 
out  the  Santa  Fe  road,  168. 

Birthday  of  the  king  of  England: 
discussion  as  to  whether  it 
should  be  celebrated  in  Mex 
ico,  63. 

Blockaded  port:  obligation  of 
United  States  vessels  enter 
ing,  262  and  note. 

Bocanegra:  secretary  of  state  for 
foreign  affairs,  330. 

Boston,  the:  carrying  on  illicit 
trade  in  California  waters, 
270. 

Boundary:  see  Texas  and  the 
boundary  issue. 

Brassos:   see   Brazos. 

Bravo,  vice-president  of  Mexico: 
a  member  of  the  Cuban  Junta, 
130;  headed  the  Montano  re 
volt,  354. 

Brazos,  the  river:  a  possible  bound 
ary,  287,  294,  341. 

British  Commission  to  open  diplo 
matic  relations  with  Mexico: 
58-59,  62;  its  hasty  report,  62. 


394 


INDEX 


British  mediation  between  Spain 
and  Mexico,  65,  66. 

British  minister  at  Washington: 
absents  himself  from  a  ban 
quet  in  honor  of  the  Mexican 
minister,  14;  on  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  towarq 
Cuba,  95. 

British  recognition  of  Mexican  in 
dependence:  52,  55,  58,  64, 
65  and  note,  76,  85;  motive 
for,  71-72;  invited  by  the 
United  States,  198. 

British  treaty:  negotiated,  49;  in 
structions  for,  65,  69;  favor 
able  to  Mexico,  69;  concluded, 
70;  rejected  by  Canning,  70, 
83;  reasons  for  rejection,  83- 
84;  Morier  sent  to  negotiate 
a  new  one,  84,  85;  his  failure, 
87;  a  Mexican  agent  sent  to 
London  to  negotiate,  87;  con 
cluded  and  ratified,  88;  urged 
by  the  Mexican  plenipoten 
tiaries  as  a  model  for  a  treaty 
with  the  United  States,  210; 
exception  to  "most  favored 
nation  "  rule,  211. 

Brown,  James:  minister  to  France, 
Clay's  instructions  to  con 
cerning  Cuba,  115. 

Brown:  senator  from  Mississippi, 
offered  the  post  of  minister  to 
Mexico,  34. 

Bustamante:  insurgent  agent  to 
the  United  States  in  1814,  5> 
note. 

Bustamante:  Mexican  minister  to 
Colombia  to  arrange  for  a 
joint  seizure  of  Cuba,  101. 

Butler,  Anthony:  instructions  to, 
as  charge  concerning  the 
pending  commercial  treaty, 
249;  conclusion  of  the  com 
mercial  treaty,  251;  proposes 
to  the  Jackson  administration 
a  plan  for  purchasing  Texas, 
335 ;  bearer  of  a  despatch  in 
structing  Poinsett  to  try  to 


purchase  Texas,  342;  his  char 
acter,  343,  note;  warned 
against  interfering  in  Mexi 
can  affairs,  373,  376. 

Calhoun:  his  desire  to  have  Cuba 
for  the  United  States,  91. 

Camacho,  secretary  for  foreign  re 
lations:  to  go  to  England  to 
negotiate  a  treaty,  87-88;  suc 
cessful,  88;  a  negotiator  for 
a  commercial  treaty  with  the 
United  States,  213  and  fol 
lowing. 

Cambreleng,  C.  C. :  advice  to 
Poinsett,  48,  74. 

Canedo,  secretary  for  foreign  af 
fairs:  a  negotiator  for  a  com 
mercial  treaty  with  the  United 
States,  244  and  following. 

Canning,  George:  British  foreign 
minister,  55;  early  attitude 
toward  Mexican  independence, 
55;  opposes  a  European  con 
ference  on  Spanish-American 
affairs,  57;  proposals  to  Rush 
concerning  the  Spanish-Ameri 
can  states,  60,  97;  Adams's 
answer,  61;  rebukes  his  com 
mission  to  Mexico  for  its 
hasty  report,  62-63;  opposi 
tion  to  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  in  Mexico,  70- 
73',  opposition  to  the  United 
States  at  the  Panama  con 
gress,  73 ;  personal  letter  to 
Victoria,  76;  reasons  for  re 
jecting  the  treaty  with  Mex 
ico,  83-84;  suspects  French 
movements  in  the  West  In 
dies,  122;  declares  England's 
policy  toward  Cuba,  125;  cyn 
ical  attitude  toward  Clay's 
overture,  126;  his  counter 
proposal,  127;  instructions  to 
the  British  representative  to 
the  Panama  congress,  156; 
considers  seizing  Cuba,  161. 


INDEX 


395 


Canning,  Stratford:  British  min 
ister  in  Washington,  15,  note; 
comment  concerning  the  atti 
tude  of  the  United  States  to 
ward  Cuba,  95. 

Casas:  head  of  an  insurgent  gov 
ernment  in  Texas,  5,  note. 

Centralista:  a  political  party  in 
Mexico,  82;  relations  with  the 
Scottish  Masons,  190  and  fol 
lowing. 

Chihuahua:  a  United  States  con 
sul  for,  appointed,  169,  170; 
governor  of,  sends  a  report 
concerning  the  frontier,  173, 
295;  Escudero,  a  citizen  of, 
in  the  United  States,  177. 

Claims:  of  United  States  citizens 
against  Mexico,  252-276. 

Clark,  William,  superintendent  of 
Indian  affairs  at  St.  Louis: 
relations  with  Escudero,  177. 

Clay,  Henry:  exchanges  portraits 
with  Iturbide,  6,  note;  Mexi 
can  regard  for,  20-22,  note; 
Adams's  plan  to  get  rid  of 
him  by  making  him  minister 
to  Colombia,  35;  his  advocacy 
of  the  cause  of  the  Spanish- 
American  states,  36;  secretary 
of  state,  44;  instructions  to 
Poinsett,  46;  cautious  advice 
concerning  British  influence, 
75;  far  reaching  negotiations 
concerning  Cuba  and  Spain's 
relations  with  her  former  col 
onies,  105-163;  his  instruc 
tions  to  Poinsett  concerning 
Texas  and  the  boundary,  286- 
288;  attempt  to  purchase 
Texas,  306-310. 

Cockpit:  Poinsett  meets  two  mem 
bers  of  the  Mexican  cabinet 
in,  51. 

Colombia:  intention  to  send  an 
expedition  to  Cuba,  94,  note, 
99,  100,  101,  105,  in,  132- 
i34»  I43-I47.  iS4,  159;  Clay's 


effort  to  restrain,  from  attack 
ing  Cuba,  142. 

Colombian  treaty:  a  copy  of,  given 
to  Poinsett  to  use  as  a  model 
for  a  treaty  with  Mexico,  205. 

Colonization:  Mexican  law  regu 
lating,  285;  Mexican  restric 
tions  on,  285. 

Colorado,  the  river:  a  possible 
boundary,  287,  293,  308,  340, 
34i. 

Comanche  Indians:  attacks  by, 
along  the  Santa  Fe  Trail,  186. 

Commercial  controversies:  252- 
276;  over  consular  certificates, 
252-259;  over  unfair  tariff 
charges,  259-261;  seizure  of 
cargoes  for  various  causes, 
262-266;  disorderly  conduct 
of  United  States  shipmasters, 
267-270;  Mexican  complaints 
of  the  seizure  of  their  vessels 
in  United  States  ports,  273- 
274;  United  States  seamen 
forced  into  the  Mexican  serv 
ice,  274. 

Commercial  treaty:  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  concluding,  205-251; 
opening  of  negotiations,  205- 
207;  "reciprocity"  treatment, 
208-210,  212,  221;  proposed 
exception  to  the  "  most  fa 
vored  nation  "  clause  in  favor 
of  the  Spanish- American  states, 
211,  214-221;  "free  ships, 
free  goods  "  principle  with 
an  exception  against  Great 
Britain,  221-222,  227;  ac 
cepted,  235-239;  attempt  to 
exclude  from  Mexico  Span 
iards  naturalized  in  the  United 
States,  222,  226,  234;  con 
cluded  and  signed  on  July  10, 
1826,  224;  Mexican  delay  in 
ratifying,  nullifies,  224,  225, 
228;  United  States  Senate  ac 
cepts,  with  certain  modifica 
tions,  226-228;  adverse  report 


396 


INDEX 


of  the  committee  of  the  Mex 
ican  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
228-232;  fugitive  slave  pro 
visions  opposed  in  Mexico, 
229-231,  240-242,  243,  245; 
negotiations  resumed,  232; 
treaty  of  limits  concluded  and 
signed  as  an  indispensable 
preliminary  to  resuming  com 
mercial  negotiations,  233 ; 
"  reciprocity "  treatment  se 
cured,  235;  second  treaty  con 
cluded  on  February  14,  1828, 
239;  prompt  ratification  of, 
at  Washington,  242;  delays 
in  ratification  at  Mexico,  243- 
249;  fourteen  articles  of,  re 
jected,  245;  negotiations  re 
sumed  by  Butler  and  con 
cluded  and  ratifications  ex 
changed,  250-251. 

Consular  certificates:  required  by 
Obregon's  regulations,  252; 
penalty  for  neglect  to  procure 
them,  253;  cost  of  procuring, 
254;  controversies  occasioned 
by,  254-259. 

Consuls  of  Mexico  in  the  United 
States:  Obregon  to  appoint 
and  supervise,  25,  252-254. 

Correo,  the:  detained  on  a 
charge  of  smuggling,  270. 

Cortes:  Iturbide's  agent  in  the 
United  States,  6;  to  serve  as 
minister  in  case  of  Zozaya's 
capture  by  pirates,  9. 

Crawford:  candidate  in  the  elec 
tion  of  1824,  40;  controversy 
with  Ninian  Edwards,  40-42. 

Cuba:  saved  to  Spain,  89-165; 
hope  of  United  States  officials 
for  obtaining,  60,  91,  103, 
105,  114;  probability  that 
Spain  would  lose,  89,  102, 
107;  probable  fate  of,  89;  the 
Turkey  of  trans-Atlantic  poli 
tics,  89;  plans  to  ask  admis 
sion  of,  to  the  United  States, 


91;  attitude  of  the  United 
States  government  toward,  in 
1822,  92;  Poinsett  visits,  93; 
his  advice  concerning,  93; 
possibility  of  attacks  upon, 
from  Mexico  and  Colombia, 
94,  note,  99,  100,  101,  105, 
in,  131-134.  143-147,  154, 
159;  expectation  of  Adams 
that  the  United  States  would 
possess,  94;  belief  in  the 
United  States  that  Spain 
planned  to  cede  Cuba  to  Eng 
land,  95;  memorial  to  Canning 
concerning  the  advisability  of 
seizing,  95-96;  attitude  of  the 
United  States  government  to 
ward,  in  1823,  96-99;  Mexican 
interest  in,  99-104;  Obregon 
instructed  to  watch  move 
ments  in  and  cultivate  friend 
ship  with,  99;  Torrens  to 
learn  the  attitude  of  Colom 
bia  toward,  100;  Bolivar  ex 
pected  to  seize,  101;  Mexican 
ambition  for,  revealed  to 
Canning  by  Michelena,  102; 
Clay's  instruction  to  Poinsett 
concerning,  105;  Clay's  rep 
resentations  to  Spain  concern 
ing,  106-108;  Clay's  represen 
tations  to  Russia  concerning, 
108-114;  Clay's  representa 
tions  to  England  concerning, 
114-115;  Clay's  representa 
tions  to  France  concerning, 
115;  Spanish  government  of, 
desires  Spain  to  recognize  the 
new  Spanish  states,  116; 
French  war  vessel  accom 
panies  Spanish  transports  to, 
117-119,  122;  French  fleet  in 
the  neighborhood  of,  causes 
uneasiness,  119-123;  Clay's 
protest  to  France  against 
French  movements,  124-125; 
Canning's  declaration  of  Eng 
land's  policy  toward,  in  1823, 


INDEX 


397 


125;  Canning  distrusts  Clay's 
policy  toward,  and  submits  a 
counter  proposal,  126-128; 
Clay  reveals  to  Mexico  his 
negotiations  concerning,  128; 
effort  in  the  United  States  to 
promote  the  independence  of, 
128;  Cuban  junta  in  Mexico 
seeks  for  aid,  129-130;  Mexi 
can  plans  for  freeing,  130-134; 
cordial  reception  of  a  Mexi 
can  vessel  at  Havana,  135; 
Clay's  fear  of  a  Mexican  at 
tack  upon,  136;  Clay  instructs 
a  confidential  agent  to,  137, 
162;  Nesselrode's  reply  to 
Clay's  overture,  138-140;  Clay 
reiterates  to  Russia  his  policy, 
141;  Clay's  effort  to  prevent 
Mexico  and  Colombia  from 
attacking,  142;  Poinsett's  ne 
gotiations  with  Mexico  con 
cerning,  143-147;  resolutions 
of  the  Mexican  Congress  con 
cerning,  144;  Clay's  negotia 
tion  with  Spain  concerning, 
I47-IS3;  Mexico  and  Colom 
bia  suspend  plans  for  attack 
ing,  154;  fate  to  be  consid 
ered  by  the  Panama  congress, 
155-158;  danger  of  seizure  by 
England,  161;  Jackson  ad 
ministration  continues  the  pol 
icy  of  its  predecessor,  163- 
165. 

Cuban  Junta  in  Mexico:  organ 
ized  to  promote  Cuban  inde* 
pendence,  129;  urges  Mexico 
to  aid  Cuba,  133. 

Cubans:  seek  aid  in  the  United 
States,  128;  disappointed  in 
Mexico,  turn  to  Colombia, 
146;  new  project  for  collect 
ing  funds  in  Mexico,  158. 

Dallas,  G.  M. :  candidate  for  the 
post  of  minister  to  Mexico, 
38,  43- 


David:  insurgent  agent  to  the 
United  States,  5,  note. 

Dawkins:  British  agent  to  go  to 
the  congress  at  Panama,  73, 
156-158,  and  note. 

Delight,  the  brig:  cargo  seized 
for  lack  of  consular  certifi 
cates,  257. 

Democratic  party  in  Mexico: 
friendly  to  Poinsett  and  the 
United  States,  80. 

Eagle,  the:   outrage  of,   268. 

Edwards,  Hayden:  leader  of  the 
Fredonian  revolt,  301. 

Edwards,  Ninian:  selected  as  min 
ister  to  Mexico,  38,  39; 
charges  of,  against  Crawford, 
40;  charges  investigated,  40- 
41;  resignation  of,  41. 

Election  of  1824:  relation  of,  to 
the  appointment  of  a  minister 
to  Mexico,  31,  39,  40,  42  and 
note,  43. 

Elizalda:  appointed  Mexican  min 
ister  to  the  United  States,  i ; 
unable  to  go,  5. 

Ellisen:  Russian  minister  in  Wash 
ington,  14. 

Envoys,  early  Mexican:  4-5  and 
note. 

Escoceses:  See  Scottish  Rite  Ma 
sons. 

Escudero:  travels  in  the  United 
States,  177;  relations  with 
Indian  agent  Clark  at  St. 
Louis,  177;  at  Washington, 
178;  return  of,  to  Mexico, 
178;  claim  of,  for  Indian  at 
tacks,  187. 

Esteva:  secretary  of  the  treasury 
in  Mexico,  74;  an  English  par 
tisan,  75;  deserts  British 
party  and  joins  American,  77, 
78;  among  the  York  Masons, 
192. 

European    congress    on    Spanish- 


393 


INDEX 


American  affairs:  opposed  by 
Canning,  57,  97. 

European  party  in  Mexico:  formed 
by  Ward,  79;  connection  with 
Scottish  Masons,  190. 

Everett:  considered  for  post  of 
minister  to  Mexico,  43,  note; 
minister  to  Spain,  106;  in 
structions  concerning  Cuba, 
106-108;  negotiations  with  the 
Spanish  government,  concern 
ing  Cuba,  161. 

Fair  American,  the:  seized  for 
want  of  consular  certificates, 
255-256. 

Federalista  party:  82;  relations 
with  the  York  Masons,  190 
and  following. 

Financial  difficulties  of  the  Mexi 
can  legation:  10,  note,  17-19; 
a  cause  of  Obregon's  suicide, 
30. 

Florida  Treaty:  boundary  line  of, 
to  be  observed  until  a  new 
treaty  should  be  concluded, 
277-285,  289,  291,  295,  297, 
300,  315,  317. 

Foreign  relations:  early  interest 
of  the  Mexican  government 
in,  3,  note;  importance  of, 
appreciated,  20. 

Franklin,  the:  carrying  on  il 
licit  trade  in  California  waters, 
270. 

Fredonian  revolt:  301  and  note; 
its  influence  on  diplomatic  re 
lations,  302-312;  effect  of  the 
news  of,  in  Mexico,  304;  prep 
arations  to  suppress,  305. 

"  Free  ships,  free  goods "  prin 
ciple:  urged  by  Poinsett,  but 
with  an  exception  against 
Great  Britain,  221-222,  227; 
the  exception  accepted,  235- 
239- 

French  convoy  for  Spanish  trans 
ports:  117-119,  122. 


French  fleet  in  the  West  Indies: 
suspicious  movements  of,  119- 
123;  Clay's  protest  against, 
124-125. 

Guerrero:  a  leader  of  the  York 
Masons,  192;  Yorkino  candi 
date  for  the  presidency,  196; 
attitude  toward  the  pending 
commercial  treaty,  248,  249; 
informed  by  Poinsett  that  the 
Yorkinos  desire  him  for  their 
candidate,  351;  suppresses  the 
Montano  revolt,  354;  narrow 
defeat  in  the  election  of  1828, 
357;  declared  elected  after  the 
successful  candidate  had  fled, 
358;  recognized  as  president, 
359,  361;  demands  Poinsett's 
recall,  369-371;  overthrown  by 
a  revolution,  375,  note. 

Hardins:  fugitives  in  Texas 
charged  with  murder  in  Ten 
nessee,  326. 

Harrison,  W.  H. :  candidate  for 
the  post  of  minister  to  Mex 
ico,  43. 

Herrera:  minister  for  foreign  af 
fairs  in  Mexico,  2;  letter  of, 
to  Adams,  2;  mission  of,  to 
the  United  States  in  1815,  4 
and  note. 

Hervey:  one  of  Canning's  com 
mission  to  open  diplomatic  re 
lations  with  Mexico,  58,  62; 
guarantees  a  Mexican  loan, 
62;  recalled  because  of  it,  63. 

Holy  alliance:  Mexican  desire  for 
assistance  from  the  United 
States  against,  25. 

Indians:  provisions  of  commercial 
treaty  concerning,  245;  in 
Texas  troublesome,  298;  sale 
of  arms  to,  a  cause  of  com 
plaint,  298;  attacks  of,  near 
the  border,  327. 


INDEX 


399 


Iturbide:  triumph  of  the  revolu 
tion  under,  i ;  letter  of,  to 
President  Monroe,  6;  conflict 
with  his  Congress,  6;  ex 
changes  portraits  with  Henry 
Clay,  6,  note;  made  emperor, 
7;  overthrown  and  exiled, 
15-16;  threatened  return  of, 
42;  leaves  England  on  his  re 
turn,  64. 

Jackson,  Andrew:  a  candidate  for 
the  presidency  in  the  election 
of  1824,  35;  appointment  of, 
as  minister  to  Mexico,  36; 
does  not  accept,  36;  attitude 
toward  Texas,  282;  attempt  to 
purchase  Texas,  334~342. 

Jefferson:  his  advice  asked  by 
Adams  concerning  Canning's 
proposals  to  Rush,  60;  his  de 
sire  for  Cuba,  91,  98;  advo 
cates  joining  England  in  guar 
anteeing  the  independence  of 
Cuba,  96;  retracts  this  advice, 
97,  note;  advice  that  the 
United  States  join  England 
in  the  proposals  which  Can 
ning  made  to  Rush,  98. 

Key  West:  improper  use  of  as  a 
naval  base  by  Mexican  com 
manders,  271. 

King,  Rufus:  Poinsett's  letter  to, 
concerning  Ward's  political 
activity,  and  the  Mexican 
ministerial  change,  79;  Clay's 
instructions  to,  concerning 
Cuba,  114-115;  Canning's  con 
ferences  with,  126;  Poinsett's 
letter  to,  concerning  the  York 
Masons,  191. 

Lara,  Jose:  a  Spaniard  in  New 
Orleans  plotting  against  Texas, 
329,  330. 

La  Vaca,  the  river:  considered  as 
a  possible  boundary,  340. 


Letona:  Hidalgo's  agent  to  the 
United  States  in  1810,  5,  note. 

Liberty,  the:  seized  for  carry 
ing  contraband,  263-264. 

Limits:  See  Texas  and  the  boun 
dary  issue. 

Limits:  treaty  of  with  the  United 
States  to  be  negotiated,  9. 

Loan:  a  Mexican,  to  be  negotiated 
in  the  United  States,  9. 

Louisiana:    limits  of,    277,   314. 

Mackie:  Canning's  special  agent 
to  Mexico,  55;  his  conferences 
with  Victoria,  56,  76. 

Madison:  his  advice  asked  by 
Adams  concerning  Canning's 
proposals,  60;  advice  given, 
98. 

Maltitz,  Russian  minister  in  Wash 
ington:  on  Russia's  attitude 
toward  Spain,  153. 

Martinique:  French  commander  at, 
responsible  for  French  convoy 
of  Spanish  transports,  122. 

Mason:  sent  from  Mexico  to 
Washington  with  official  copy 
of  the  commercial  treaty,  224. 

Masons,  Scottish:  See  Scottish 
Rite  Masons. 

Masons,  York:  S«e  York  Rite  Ma 
sons. 

Mazatlan:  conduct  of  the  com 
mander  of  the  brig  Nile 
at,  267. 

Meade,  Richard:  advances  money 
to  the  Mexican  charge,  18,  19. 

Merchants,  United  States:  at 
tacked  by  robbers  in  Mexico, 
275- 

Michelena:  appointed  Mexican 
minister  to  London,  63;  re 
ceived  by  Canning,  64;  re 
called  from  London  to  repre 
sent  Mexico  at  Panama,  67, 
note;  reveals  too  much  con 
cerning  Mexico's  ambition  for 
Cuba,  102. 


4OO 


INDEX 


Middleton,  Henry,  minister  to 
Russia:  Clay's  instructions  to, 
concerning  Cuba,  Spain,  and 
the  new  Spanish  states,  108- 
114;  negotiations  with  Russia 
concerning  Clay's  overture, 
138-140,  153. 

Mier  y  Teran:  chief  of  the  Mex 
ican  boundary  commission, 
313;  reports  concerning  Texas, 
329,  331- 

Migoni:  Mexican  agent  in  Lon 
don,  56. 

Monroe  Doctrine:  note  of  Mex 
ican  charge  concerning,  in 
December,  1823,  22;  reference 
to,  in  Poinsett's  instructions, 
47:  in  his  speech  at  his  for 
mal  reception,  53;  compared 
with  England's  assurance  to 
Mexico,  59;  selfish  motive  of 
the  United  States,  61;  Can 
ning's  opposition  to,  72;  Poin- 
sett  corrects  Alaman  concern 
ing,  121. 

Montano:  plan  of,  starting  a  revo 
lution  and  demanding  Poin 
sett's  removal,  353-356. 

Montoya:  Mexican  charge  at 
Washington,  29,  note;  presents 
a  demand  for  Poinsett's  re 
call,  369. 

Morier:  supersedes  Hervey  as 
English  commissioner  to  Mex 
ico,  63;  welcomed  in  Mexico, 
67;  concludes  a  treaty  which 
is  rejected  by  Canning,  69; 
sent  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty, 
84;  his  failure,  87. 

"  Most  favored  nation  "  provision 
in  the  commercial  negotiation: 
207;  proposed  exception  to  it 
in  favor  of  the  Spanish- 
American  states,  211-212,  214- 
217;  causes  the  negotiation  to 
be  suspended,  216,  220;  Clay's 
arguments  against  the  excep 
tion,  217-220;  the  exception 


yielded    by    Mexican    negotia 
tors,   221. 

Muzquiz:  appointed  Mexican  min 
ister  to  the  United  States,  23; 
unable  to  go,  24  and  note. 

Nacogdoches:  Fredonian  revolt  at, 
301;  new  attack  expected,  327. 

Narbona,  governor  of  New  Mex 
ico:  letter  of  Storrs  to,  con 
cerning  trade,  176;  Sibley's 
letter  to,  concerning  the  Santa 
Fe  road,  182;  receives  per 
mission  for  Sibley  to  make  a 
restricted  survey,  185. 

Natchitoches:  plans  for  placing  a 
Mexican  consul  at,  298. 

Navy,  the  Mexican:  an  agent  for, 
in  the  United  States,  6;  bril 
liant  hopes  for,  133;  Porter, 
an  American  citizen,  made 
commander  of,  270-272;  ir 
regular  conduct  of,  at  Key 
West,  272-274. 

Nesselrode,  Russian  foreign  min 
ister:  reply  to  Clay's  overture 
for  joint  intervention  in 
Spain,  138-140;  declarations 
to  Middleton  concerning  Rus 
sian  mediation  in  Spain,  153. 

New  Orleans:  attacks  on  Texas 
expected  from,  328. 

Newspapers:  Mexican  minister  to 
the  United  States  instructed 
to  make  use  of  them,  8. 

Nile,    the    brig:    outrage    of,    267. 

Norte,   Rio   del:    See   Rio   Grande. 


Obregon,    Pablo : 
as     minister 
States,     24; 
25;    arrival 
Washington, 
services,   28; 
ties   of,    29 
of,    29    and 
concerning 
trade,    169; 


:  appointment  of, 
to  the  United 
his  instructions, 

and  reception  at 
26;  value  of  his 
financial  difficul- 

and  note;  suicide 
note;  despatches 
the  Santa  Fe 
concerning  Escu- 


INDEX 


401 


dero's  mission,  178;  consular 
regulations  issued  by,  252, 
255;  his  instructions  concern 
ing  Texas  and  the  boundary, 
284-286. 

O'Donoju:  last  Spanish  viceroy  of 
Mexico,  2,  note. 

O'Gormon:  one  of  Canning's  com 
mission  to  open  diplomatic  re 
lations  with  Mexico,  58,  62. 

Onis:  Spanish  negotiator  of  the 
Florida  treaty,  278;  language 
of,  concerning  that  treaty, 
278;  language  concerning  the 
future  ambition  of  the  United 
States  government,  279. 

Osage,  Fort:  starting  point  from 
which  the  Santa  Fe  road  was 
surveyed,  180. 

d'Oubril,  Russian  minister  at  Ma 
drid:  his  communications  with 
Everett  concerning  Russia's 
attitude  toward  Cuba  and  the 
proposed  mediation,  151-153. 

Owen,  Robert:  asks  the  cession 
of  Coahuila  and  Texas  for  a 
philanthropic  socialistic  ex 
periment,  323. 

"Palace  revolution":  British  in 
fluence  in  the  Mexican  min 
istry  replaced  by  United 
States  influence,  76,  213. 

Panama  -congress:  Canning's  op 
position  to  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  at,  73;  debates 
in  the  United  States  Congress 
concerning,  155;  fate  of  Cuba 
to  be  considered  at,  155-158; 
meager  results  of,  157. 

Pedraza:  Mexican  secretary  for 
war  to  assist  in  the  commer 
cial  negotiations,  213;  success 
ful  candidate  in  the  presiden 
tial  election  of  1828,  357;  his 
flight  when  a  revolt  against 
his  election  started,  357;  Poin- 
sett's  estimate  of  his  charac 
ter,  360,  note. 

27 


Peredo:  insurgent  agent  to  the 
United  States,  in  1813,  5, 
note. 

Piracy  in  the  West  Indies:  bill  in 
the  United  States  Congress  for 
suppressing,  103;  Poinsett's 
proposal  to  promote  the  inde 
pendence  of  Cuba  in  order  to 
overthrow,  104  and  note;  ef 
fect  of,  on  the  United  States, 
112. 

Poinsett,  Joel  R.:  visit  to  Mexico 
in  1822  and  report  to  the  De 
partment  of  State,  34,  45; 
considered  for  the  post  of 
minister  to  Mexico,  43;  offered 
the  place,  44;  a  candidate  for 
the  position  of  secretary  of 
state,  44;  appointed  minister 
to  Mexico,  ^4j_  his  earlier 
career,  45;  his  "Notes  on 
Mexico"  published,  45;  dis 
coverer  of  the  poinsettia, 
46;  Clay's  instructions  to,  46; 
attachment  to  the  federal  form 
of  government,  47;  charged 
with  meddling  in  the  inter 
nal  affairs  of  Mexico,  48; 
reaches  Mexico,  49;  slow 
progress,  50-52;  formal  re 
ception,  52;  opposes  British 
influence,  **"7  4-82 ;  Mexican 
hostility  to,  80-82;  his  bill  in 
Congress  to  promote  Cuban 
independence,  104;  suggests 
motive  for  French  movements 
in  the  West  Indies,  120;  con 
fers  with  Ward  concerning 
the  French  movements,  119- 
121 ;  communications  to  the 
Mexican  government  concern 
ing  Cuba,  143-147;  negotia 
tions  concerning  the  Santa 
Fe  Trail,  170-173,  175,  182- 
185;  denunciations  of,  because 
of  his  relations  with  the  York 
Masons,  190-204;  his  expla 
nations  to  Clay,  199-201; 
criticized  by  Sergeant  and  dis- 


402 


INDEX 


approved  at  Washington,  201; 
qualified  approval,  202;  nego 
tiations  for  a  commercial 
treaty,  205-251;  negotiations 
to  settle  commercial  contro 
versies,  252-276;  negotiations} 
concerning  Texas  and  the 
boundary  issue,  286-344;  hrs 
personal  views  concerning  a 
desirable  boundary,  289-290; 
public  attacks  on  him  and  his 
recall,  349-377;  samples  of 
violent  newspaper  attacks 
against  him,  350,  note;  in 
forms  Guerrero  that  the  York- 
inos  wish  the  latter  to  be  a 
candidate  for  the  presidency, 
351;  Montano  revolt  to  force 
Poinsett's  dismissal,  353-356; 
his  reports  concerning  the 
election  of  1828,  and  the 
Yorkino  revolt  following,  356- 
359;  felt  that  he  was  unjustly 
persecuted,  359;  justifies  his 
conduct,  360;  hopeless  polit 
ical  confusion  in  Mexico,  362; 
state  legislatures  ask  his  dis 
missal,  363,  364;  again  de 
fends  his  conduct,  364-366; 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren's 
qualified  approval,  366-368; 
a  hint  that  he  should  resign, 
368;  his  recall  demanded  by 
the  President  of  Mexico,  369- 
371;  recalled,  371. 

Poinsettia:  the  flower  discovered 
by  Poinsett  and  named  for 
him,  46. 

Polignac:  Canning's  declaration  to, 
58. 

Porter,  Commodore:  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  in  the  Mex 
ican  naval  service,  270-272; 
authorized  to  issue  commis 
sions  to  privateers,  271; 
makes  improper  use  of  hos 
pitality  at  Key  West,  271. 

Porto  Rico:  probability  that  Spain 


would  lose,  89;  probable  fate 
of,  89;  effect  of  Canning's 
proposals  to  Rush  upon,  98. 

Privateers:  Commodore  Porter 
authorized  to  grant  letters  to, 
270-272. 

Provisional  Junta,  the  Mexican: 
organized,  i. 

Puebla,  Bishop  of:  attempt  to  get 
him  into  the  Mexican  cabi 
net,  77. 

"  Reciprocity "  treatment:  en 
deavor  to  introduce,  into  the 
commercial  treaty,  208-210, 
212;  yielded  by  Poinsett, 
221;  voluntarily  offered  by 
Mexican  negotiators,  235;  in 
cluded  in  the  final  treaty, 
251- 

Recognition  of  Mexican  inde 
pendence  by  the  United 
States,  12;  President  Mon 
roe's  message  recommending, 
32,  33.  47,  49>  S3J  attempt 
of  Spain  to  prevent,  277. 

Ridgeley,  United  States  com 
mander  at  Key  West:  con 
cerning  the  conduct  of  Mex 
ican  privateers  at  Key  West, 
272-274. 

Rio    del   Norte:    See   Rio    Grande. 

Rio  Grande:  considered  as  a  pos 
sible  boundary,  283,  287,  293, 
296,  307,  340. 

Rocafuerte:  secretary  of  the 
Mexican  legation  in  London, 
63;  charge,  67,  note;  con 
ference  with  Canning  con 
cerning  the  rejected  treaty, 
83-84 ;  writes  from  London 
concerning  a  rumor  that 
Mexico  had  ceded  Texas  to 
the  United  States,  322. 

Rush,  Richard:  Canning's  pro 
posals  to,  57,  60,  87. 

Russia:  Clay's  overture  to,  on  be 
half  of  Spain,  108-114;  ef- 


INDEX 


403 


forts  of,  to  influence  the 
United  States  attitude  toward 
Spain,  113,  note;  reply  to 
Clay's  overture,  138-140; 
Clay  restates  the  attitude  of 
the  United  States  toward 
Spain  and  Cuba,  141 ;  repre 
sentations  to  Spain  concern 
ing  Cuba,  147,  149,  151-153- 
Russian  minister  at  Washington: 
absents  himself  from  a  ban 
quet  in  honor  of  the  Mexican 
minister,  14. 

Sabine:  not  a  desirable  bound 
ary,  287,  294,  307,  338. 

St.  Louis:  Mexican  consul  estab 
lished  at,  169;  Escudero 
treats  with  the  superintend 
ent  of  Indian  affairs  at,  177. 

St.  Petersburg,  court  of:  Clay's 
overture  to,  on  behalf  of 
Spain,  108-114. 

Saltillo:  a  United  States  consul 
for,  appointed,  169,  170. 

Salvador:  commissioners  from, 
asking  admission  to  the 
United  States,  17,  note. 

Santa  Anna:  his  rebellion  against 
Iturbide,  38,  note;  his  pro 
posed  expedition  to  Cuba, 
120,  130  and  note;  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Cuban  Junta  in 
Mexico,  130;  heads  the 
Yorkino  revolt  against  the 
success  of  the  Escoceses  in 
the  election  of  1828,  357. 

Santa  Fe:  effort  of  Clay  to  get, 
for  the  United  States,  308. 

Santa  Fe  trade:  166-170,  174; 
New  Mexican  interest  in, 
176;  not  desired  by  Mexico, 
187;  continued  growth  of, 
187;  provision  for  the  regu 
lation  of,  in  the  commercial 
treaty  of  1831,  251. 

Santa  Fe  Trail:  166-189;  early 
trade  by  way  of,  166-170, 
174;  Poinsett  opens  negotia« 


tions  concerning,  170-173;  re 
port  of  the  governor  of  Chi 
huahua  concerning  the  fron 
tier,  173;  negotiation  sus 
pended,  175;  Storrs's  letter  to 
the  governor  of  New  Mexico 
concerning  trade  along,  176; 
Escudero's  expedition  along, 
177-179;  United  States  com 
mission  to  survey,  179-182; 
ease  with  which  the  road 
could  be  opened,  181;  Poin- 
sett's  continued  negotiations 
concerning,  182-185;  quali 
fied  consent  of  the  Mexican 
government,  185;  claims  for 
Indian  attacks  along,  186; 
growth  of  trade  by  way  of, 
187-189;  treaty  provision  reg 
ulating  this  trade,  189,  251. 

Scottish  Rite  Masons:  political 
activity  of,  190  and  follow 
ing;  Montano  revolt  sup 
ported  by,  353-356;  success 
in  the  election  of  1828,  357; 
Yorkino  revolt  against,  357. 

Seguin,  Erasmo:  appointed  Mex 
ican  consul  for  Natchitoches, 
but  declined,  299,  note. 

Sergeant:  return  from  Mexico  and 
report  concerning  Poinsett's 
conduct,  201. 

Sibley,  George  C. :  chief  of  the 
commission  to  survey  the 
Santa  Fe  road,  179-182,  185. 

Sisal:  capture  of  a  United  States 
ship  at,  because  it  carried 
Spanish  goods,  268. 

Slaves,  fugitive:  Mexican  objec 
tions  to  having  a  provision 
in  the  commercial  treaty  for 
the  return  of,  229-231,  240- 
242,  243,  245;  omitted  from 
final  treaty,  251. 

Smuggling:  from  the  United 
States  into  Mexico,  267. 

Snow  Mountains:  a  possible  bound 
ary,  287. 


404 


INDEX 


"  El  Sol,"  a  Mexican  newspaper: 
Poinsett  objects  to  an  edi 
torial  in,  121 ;  expressed  be 
lief  that  the  United  States 
government  had  encouraged 
the  Fredonian  revolt,  304. 

Southwestern  boundary:  See  Texas 
and  the  boundary  issue. 

Spain:  Mexican  expectation  of 
assistance  from  the  United 
States  against,  8;  Clay's  rep 
resentations  to,  concerning 
Cuba,  and  the  recognition  of 
her  former  colonies,  106-108; 
determination  to  retain  Cuba, 
J34»  J375  produce  of,  ex 
cluded  from  Mexican  ports, 
263,  268;  delay  in  ratifying 
the  treaty  of  1819,  277. 

Spanish  minister:  protests  against 
the  reception  of  the  Mexican 
minister  at  Washington,  13. 

Storrs:  representation  to  the  gov 
ernor  of  New  Mexico  con 
cerning  the  Santa  Fe  trade, 
176. 

Sugar:  importation  of,  prohibited, 
264;  a  cargo  of,  unjustly 
seized  at  San  Bias,  264. 

Superior,  the:  seized  on  a 
charge  of  smuggling,  270. 

Tabares:  an  insurgent  agent  to 
the  United  States,  5,  note. 

Tacubaya:  attempted  continua 
tion  of  the  Panama  congress 
at,  201. 

Tamaulipas:  law  of  the  state  of, 
fixing  a  certain  route  for 
goods  in  transit,  265. 

Tampico:  Spanish  occupation  of, 
266;  provisions  from  the 
United  States  intended  for 
the  Spanish  army  seized  at, 
266. 

Tariff  charges:   unfair,   259-261. 

Teran:   See  Mier  y  Teran. 

Texas    and    the    boundary    issue: 


277-348;  Zozaya  instructed  to 
negotiate  a  boundary  treaty, 
9;  negotiations  for  the  bound 
ary  treaty  separated  from 
those  for  commerce,  206; 
Mexican  demand  for  the 
speedy  conclusion  of  a  treaty 
of  limits,  231,  233;  a  treaty 
signed  hastily  on  January  12, 
1828,  233;  Mexican  apprehen 
sions  of  United  States  inten 
tions,  277-283;  instructions  to 
Mexican  agents  concerning, 
277,  281,  284-286;  Mexican 
indecfsion  concerning  the  time 
to  begin  negotiations,  284; 
Clay's  instructions  to  Poinsett 
in  1825  concerning,  286-288; 
Poinsett's  personal  views  in 
1822  concerning  a  desirabTe 
line,  289;  beginning  of  nego 
tiations  concerning,  291;  a 
joint  boundary  commission 
proposed  but  rejected,  291; 
the  claims  of  the  two  coun 
tries  irreconcilable,  293-297; 
disturbances  on  the  Texas 
border,  298-301;  influence  of 
the  Fredonian  revolt  on  diplo 
matic  relations,  301-310;  at 
tempt  of  Adams  and  Clay  to 
purchase  Texas  in  1827,  306- 
310;  the  offer  rejected  by 
Mexico,  311;  Mexican  com 
mission  to  examine  the  coun 
try  near  the  boundary,  313; 
Mexican  demand  for  a  treaty 
of  limits  before  a  commercial 
treaty,  315;  a  treaty  hastily 
concluded  confirming  the  line 
of  1819,  316-319;  Poinsett's 
reasons  for  abandoning  Texas, 
319;  prompt  ratification  at 
Washington,  320;  delay  at 
Mexico  until  too  late  to  ef 
fect  the  exchange,  321;  ru 
mor  in  London  that  Mexico 
had  ceded  Texas  to  the 


INDEX 


405 


United  States,  322;  Robert 
Owen's  request  for  Texas, 
323;  goods  for  consumption 
in  Texas  admitted  free  of 
duty,  324;  criminals  from  the 
United  States  refugees  in 
Texas,  325;  new  disorders  in 
Texas,  327-332;  the  treaty 
still  unratified  in  1829,  333; 
Poinsett  believes  that  Mexico 
will  never  cede  Texas  will 
ingly,  334;  Jackson  and  Van 
Buren's  plan  for  purchasing 
Texas,  334-342;  opposition  in 
Mexico,  344;  attempt  aban 
doned  by  the  Washington 
government,  345;  Butler's 
persistence,  346;  Poinsett's 
boundary  treaty  of  1828 
finally  ratified  by  both  coun 
tries  and  ratifications  ex 
changed,  347;  revolt  of  Texas 
before  the  commission  to 
mark  the  boundary  ever  met, 
348. 

Tornel:  President  Victoria's  pri 
vate  secretary,  76;  Poinsett's 
estimate  of  him,  76;  opposi 
tion  to  Poinsett,  80;  pub 
lished  criticism  of  Poinsett, 
81 ;  misinforms  Ward  con 
cerning  Poinsett's  relations 
to  the  York  Masons,  191. 

Torrens:  secretary  of  the  Mexi 
can  legation  at  Washington, 
8,  note,  10;  charge,  17;  fi 
nancial  embarrassment  of, 
18;  credentials  and  instruc 
tions  delayed,  19,  20;  trans 
ferred  to  Colombia,  27,  100; 
advice  concerning  Cuba,  99; 
instructed  to  learn  the  atti 
tude  of  Colombia  toward 
Cuba,  100;  notices  concern 
ing  expeditions  from  the 
United  States  to  Santa  Fe, 
167;  reports  designs  of 
United  States  toward  Texas, 


279;  note  to  the  United 
States  government  concern 
ing  Texas  and  the  boundary, 
282;  delay  of  the  United 
States  in  answering,  283,  286; 
this  note  later  cited  by  Clay, 
287. 

Trade:  Obregon  to  issue  regula 
tions  governing,  25;  trade  to 
Santa  Fe,  166-170,  174. 

Treaty  of  commerce,  etc.:  ob 
stacles  in  the  way  of,  205- 
251. 

Tuyll,  Russian  minister  in  Wash 
ington:  conversations  with 
Clay  and  Adams  concerning 
Cuba  and  Spain,  113,  114. 

Van  Buren,  secretary  of  state: 
instructions  concerning  Cuba 
and  Spain,  163-165;  instruc 
tions  to  Butler  concerning  the 
Santa  Fe  trade,  188;  reports 
to,  from  Poinsett  concerning 
Texas,  331-334;  instructions 
to  Poinsett  to  purchase  Texas, 
338-342;  qualified  approval  of 
Poinsett,  366;  warns  Butler 
against  interfering  in  Mex 
ico,  373. 

Vaughn:  British  minister  in  Wash 
ington,  reproved  by  Canning 
for  his  communications  with 
the  United  States  concerning 
Cuba,  156,  note. 

\  era  Cruz:  attack  by  the  legisla 
ture  of,  on  Poinsett,  197- 
204. 

Verona:    congress   of,    94. 

Victoria,  Guadalupe:  letter  to  the 
President  of  the  United 
States,  27;  orderly  govern 
ment  under,  28;  his  confer 
ences  with  Mackie,  56,  76; 
Poinsett's  estimate  of  him, 
74;  friendly  to  British  in 
fluence,  76,  78,  85;  change 
from  British  to  American 


406 


INDEX 


party,     77,    88;     his    dynastic 
ambition,    78. 

Ward,  British  charge  in  Mexico: 
formally  received,  52;  one  of 
Canning's  commission  to  open 
diplomatic  relations  with  Mex 
ico,  58,  62;  opposes  Alaman, 
77;  differences  with  Poinsett, 
78;  exaggerated  report  to 
Canning  concerning  Poinsett's 
influence,  79;  friendly  confer 
ence  with  Poinsett,  119-121; 
misinformed  concerning  Poin 
sett's  relations  with  the  York 
Masons,  191. 

Washington,  treaty  of:  same  as 
Florida  treaty.  See  277,  note. 

Wellington:  his  instructions  as 
representative  to  the  congress 
at  Verona,  55. 

Wheaton,  Henry:  considered  for 
post  of  minister  to  Mexico,  43. 

Wilcocks:  Adams's  adviser  in 
Mexico,  i,  32;  in  Washing 
ton  as  bearer  of  a  despatch, 
32;  consul  of  the  United 
States  in  Mexico,  51. 

Yorkinos:   See  York  Rite  Masons. 

York  Rite  Masons:  denunciations 
of  Poinsett  because  of  his  re 
lations  with,  190-204;  polit 
ical  success  of,  193  and  fol 
lowing,  349-353;  Montano  re 
volt  against,  353-356;  York- 
ino  triumph,  356;  narrowly 


lost  the  election  of  1828,  357; 
revolt  of,  against  the  success 
ful  Escoceses,  357. 

Zavala:  a  York  Mason,  192,  196; 
exonerates  Poinsett,  193;  In 
fluence  over  Guerrero,  196; 
offered  the  position  of  min 
ister  to  the  United  States, 
196;  exonerates  the  York 
Masons,  349;  principal  agent 
in  starting  the  Yorkino  re 
volt  against  the  result  of  the 
election  of  1828,  357. 

Zea,  Spanish  foreign  minister: 
his  protest  against  British 
recognition  of  Mexico,  66, 
note;  communications  with 
Everett  concerning  Cuba,  149. 

Zozaya:  chosen  as  minister  to  the 
United  States,  6;  his  cre 
dential  letter,  7  and  note; 
his  instructions,  8;  reported 
captured  by  pirates,  9;  reaches 
the  United  States,  10;"  re 
ceived  by  President  Adams, 
12;  cordial  treatment  of,  14; 
Stratford  Canning's  descrip 
tion  of,  15,  note;  departure 
from  Washington,  15-17;  not 
returned,  23;  comments  on 
Jackson's  appointment  as  min 
ister  to  Mexico,  37,  note;  his 
instructions  concerning  Texas 
and  the  boundary,  277;  report 
concerning  United  States  in 
tentions  on  Texas,  279. 


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